Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

The Commission was established on November 29, 1963, to uphold the public's right to full, truthful knowledge of the assassination, which it describes as a cruel, shocking act of violence targeting the President, his family, the United States, and all people. The report is compiled with a commitment to reason, fairness, and objective fact presentation, acknowledging its responsibility to deliver an unvarnished account of the tragedy that cut short the life of a young, energetic leader in a nation founded on peaceful political change.

This section provides a complete chronological narrative of the day of the assassination, covering the President's arrival in Dallas, pre-scheduled trip activities, motorcade routing and security planning, the shooting in Dealey Plaza, immediate transport to Parkland Memorial Hospital, the President's death and Lyndon B. Johnson's swearing-in as successor, autopsy findings, the investigation identifying the Texas School Book Depository as the shooting origin, Lee Harvey Oswald's interactions with law enforcement after the attack, his escape from Dallas, and the fatal shooting of Patrolman J.D. Tippit.

At 11:40 a.m. CST on November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy, First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy, and their official party arrived at Love Field in Dallas, Texas, to begin the second day of a 5-month pre-planned Texas trip. The itinerary was organized by the President, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, and Texas Governor John B. Connally Jr., with prior stops that day in San Antonio (where the President dedicated U.S. Air Force aerospace medicine research facilities) and Fort Worth (where he addressed a large morning breakfast gathering). Remaining scheduled events included a downtown Dallas motorcade, a luncheon speech at the Trade Mart, and a flight to Austin for a Democratic fundraising dinner, with a final stop at the Vice President's Texas ranch planned after the Austin event.

The Dallas motorcade was added to the trip to let the President connect with voters in a city he had lost in the 1960 presidential election, with planning led primarily by Governor Connally and presidential special assistant Kenneth O'Donnell. The Secret Service was notified on November 8 that 45 minutes had been allocated for the motorcade from Love Field to the Trade Mart, the selected luncheon site chosen for its suitable security features and event capacity. The route was designed to maximize public access to the President, approved by local host committees and White House representatives on November 18, and publicized in local newspapers starting November 19, with advance notices confirming the motorcade would turn from Main Street onto Elm Street via Houston Street to reach the Stemmons Freeway and Trade Mart.

At approximately 12:30 p.m., as the President's open limousine turned from Houston Street onto Elm Street and slowed to roughly 11 miles per hour while descending toward the railroad overpass, shots were fired in rapid succession. The first bullet struck the President in the back of the neck, exiting the front of his neck and nicking the left lower knot of his necktie; the second struck Governor Connally in the back, traveling through his chest, right wrist, and left thigh; the third and fatal bullet struck the President in the back of the head, causing a massive, lethal wound. Secret Service agents responded immediately: Agent Clinton J. Hill jumped from the followup car to shield the President and First Lady in the limousine, while Agent Roy H. Kellerman ordered driver William R. Greer to speed directly to Parkland Memorial Hospital 4 miles away.

Immediately after the shooting, Secret Service agents moved to protect the presidential party and expedite transport to medical care. Agent Hill climbed onto the rear of the limousine to shield the stricken President and Mrs. Kennedy as Greer accelerated the vehicle at high speed toward Parkland Memorial Hospital. The Dallas Police Department had already alerted the hospital's medical team to the President's impending arrival via radio message from the motorcade, ensuring staff were ready to provide immediate care upon the vehicle's arrival.

At Parkland Hospital, physicians attempted to save the President's life, performing a tracheotomy to address his neck wound and breathing issues, but were unable to detect a pulse after all heart activity ceased at 1 p.m. President Kennedy was pronounced dead shortly thereafter, with last rites administered by a priest. Governor Connally underwent surgery and survived his serious wounds. Upon confirmation of the President's death, Vice President Johnson departed Parkland under close guard for Love Field, where he was sworn in as the 36th President of the United States by Federal District Court Judge Sarah T. Hughes at 2:38 p.m. in the central compartment of the presidential plane, which departed immediately for Washington, D.C.

The President's body was transported to the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, for a full pathological examination after the presidential plane arrived at Andrews Air Force Base at 5:58 p.m. EST. The autopsy confirmed the large fatal head wound observed at Parkland, the neck wound enlarged by the Parkland medical team during the tracheotomy (both classified as presumed exit wounds), a small entry wound in the rear of the skull, and another entry wound near the base of the back of the neck. The cause of death was ruled a gunshot wound to the head, with bullets determined to have been fired from a position behind and slightly above the President's level.

Within minutes of the shooting, law enforcement focused on the 7-story Texas School Book Depository building on the northwest corner of Elm and Houston Streets as the likely origin of the shots. The building housed a private textbook distribution company and leased space to publisher representatives. Multiple eyewitnesses in front of the building reported seeing a rifle fired from the sixth-floor southeast corner window, including Howard L. Brennan, who had been standing across Elm Street facing the building. Brennan provided a description of the shooter to police, which was broadcast over Dallas police radio at 12:45 p.m., identifying the suspect as a slender white male in his early 30s, approximately 5'10" tall. Dallas motorcycle patrolman Marrion L. Baker entered the building within 2 minutes of the shooting, and with building superintendent Roy Truly, encountered Lee Harvey Oswald, a quiet, solitary employee who had started working at the Depository on October 16, 1963, on the second-floor landing; after confirming Oswald was an employee, Baker proceeded up the stairs to continue the search.

Shortly after his encounter with Patrolman Baker and building superintendent Truly on the Depository's second floor, Oswald was seen passing through the second-floor offices holding a full Coke bottle purchased from the lunchroom vending machine, heading toward the building's front entrance. He exited the building and boarded a westbound bus on Elm Street 7 blocks east of the Depository around 12:40 p.m., where he was recognized by his former landlady Mary Bledsoe. After staying on the bus for only 3-4 minutes during which it traveled just 2 blocks due to traffic from the motorcade and shooting, Oswald exited the bus and entered a vacant taxi 4 blocks away, asking to be dropped off several blocks past his roominghouse at 1026 North Beckley Avenue in the Oak Cliff section of Dallas.

Oswald arrived at his roominghouse shortly before 1 p.m., surprising housekeeper Earlene Roberts with his unexpected midday visit and hurried demeanor. He made no comment when she remarked he seemed to be in a rush, then retrieved his jacket from his room and fled the property, placing him in the area near the site of the next violent incident in the immediate aftermath of the assassination.

At approximately 1:15 p.m., roughly 45 minutes after the presidential assassination, Dallas patrolman J.D. Tippit was driving slowly east on East 10th Street in Oak Cliff, having been directed to the area via radio at 12:45 p.m. as part of a citywide patrol concentration following the assassination, and having confirmed his availability for emergencies at 12:54 p.m. Tippit pulled alongside a man walking east on 10th Street near Patton Avenue who matched the general description of the suspect broadcast over police radio; after exchanging words through the car window, Tippit opened his door and began walking around the front of his vehicle, at which point the man drew a revolver and fired four shots in rapid succession, killing Tippit instantly. Witness Domingo Benavides stopped nearby, observed the gunman removing spent cartridge cases from his weapon as he fled toward Patton Avenue, and promptly reported the shooting to police headquarters via Tippit's patrol car radio shortly after 1:16 p.m.

After shooting Officer Tippit, the gunman fled the scene on foot, heading south on Patton Avenue from the 10th Street and Patton intersection. Multiple civilian witnesses—including Helen Markham, Barbara Jeanette Davis, Virginia Davis, taxicab driver William W. Scoggins, and used car salesman Ted Callaway—observed his flight. He discarded his jacket in a gas station parking lot before continuing west on Jefferson Boulevard toward the Texas Theatre.

The suspect entered the Texas Theatre on West Jefferson without purchasing a ticket, an act observed by shoe store manager Johnny Calvin Brewer, who alerted theater cashier Julia Postal. Postal called police, and shortly after 1:45 p.m., officers surrounded the theater, identified the suspect, and after a brief struggle in which the suspect drew a concealed weapon, disarmed and arrested him. He was transported to police headquarters by approximately 2 p.m.

Following reports that the presidential shots were fired from the Texas School Book Depository, Dallas Police officers responded to the building. Inspector J. Herbert Sawyer arrived shortly after 12:34 p.m., conducted an initial search of the lower floors, and ordered no one be permitted to leave the building between 12:37 and 12:40 p.m. Capt. J. Will Fritz arrived shortly before 1 p.m. to take charge of the investigation.

During the search of the sixth floor, Deputy Sheriff Luke Mooney discovered a stack of cartons in the southeast corner arranged to conceal a person at the half-open window, positioned so a person sitting on the carton could look down Elm Street toward the motorcade route with minimal visibility from outside. Three empty cartridge cases were found on the floor near the window, confirming the site as the firing position.

Approximately 10 minutes after the cartridge cases were found, Deputy Sheriff Eugene Boone located a bolt-action rifle with a telescopic sight stuffed between two rows of boxes in the northwest corner of the sixth floor. The rifle was stamped with serial number C2766 and markings "1940", "MADE ITALY", and "CAL. 6.5", and was photographed before being collected. A handmade paper sack large enough to hold the disassembled rifle was later found in the southeast corner of the sixth floor near the cartridge cases.

While evidence was being collected from the sixth floor, building superintendent Roy Truly notified police that Lee Harvey Oswald, one of the Depository's 15 warehouse employees, was missing. After providing Oswald's personal details, Capt. Fritz left for police headquarters, only to discover that the man arrested at the Texas Theatre was the missing Depository employee, making Oswald the primary suspect in both the presidential assassination and Tippit's murder.

Lee Harvey Oswald was born in New Orleans on October 18, 1939, two months after his father's death, to mother Marguerite Claverie Oswald. He had two older brothers: half-brother John Pic and full brother Robert, 5 years his senior. At age 3, he was placed in an orphanage where his brothers already resided due to his mother's need to work. In 1944, he was removed from the orphanage and moved with his mother to Dallas, where his older brothers joined them later that year. His mother married Edwin A. Ekdahl in 1945, and Oswald lived with the couple until their 1949 divorce, attending school in multiple Texas and Louisiana locations with generally declining average grades through age 9.

In 1952, 12-year-old Oswald moved with his mother to New York City, where he became a chronic truant and exhibited serious emotional and psychological issues. He was placed at Youth House, a New York juvenile psychiatric observation facility, where a social worker described him as "seriously detached", withdrawn, and emotionally starved, noting he felt his mother saw him as a burden and had violent fantasies. The chief psychiatrist diagnosed him with a "personality pattern disturbance with schizoid features and passive-aggressive tendencies" and recommended psychiatric treatment. He returned to school in May 1953 with temporary improvement, but behavioral issues resurfaced by fall, and his mother refused further psychiatric care. In January 1954, he and his mother moved back to New Orleans.

After dropping out of 10th grade in New Orleans in 1955 at age 16, Oswald attempted to enlist in the Marine Corps but was rejected due to his age. He worked office messenger and clerk jobs in New Orleans for 10 months, during which he began reading communist literature, praised communism to coworkers, and wrote to the Socialist Party of America professing his belief in Marxism. He and his mother moved back to Fort Worth in July 1956, and he enlisted in the Marine Corps on October 24, 1956, 6 days after his 17th birthday. He scored 212 on his initial M-1 rifle qualification, earning a sharpshooter rating, and later received training in aviation fundamentals and radar scanning. Described as a loner who resented authority, he was court-martialed twice: once for possessing an unregistered weapon and once for provocative language toward a noncommissioned officer. He served 15 months overseas, mostly in Japan, before being stationed in Santa Ana, California for his final year of service. During this time he expressed admiration for Fidel Castro and interest in joining the Cuban army, and scored 191 on a follow-up M-1 rifle qualification, earning a marksman rating. He requested early discharge from the Marine Corps on September 11, 1959, citing his mother's ill health and financial struggles, and left for New Orleans shortly after.

After his Marine Corps discharge, Oswald spent only 3 days with his mother in Fort Worth before traveling to New Orleans, where he booked passage on the freighter SS *Marion Lykes*, sailing for Le Havre, France on September 20, 1959. He had planned his trip to the Soviet Union for months, applying to a Swiss college with false credentials in March 1959, obtaining a passport listing the USSR as a destination, and saving nearly $1,500 during his Marine service. He arrived in Moscow via train from Finland on October 16, 1959, and immediately applied for Soviet citizenship. After being ordered to leave the USSR by October 21, 1959, he slashed his wrists in an apparent suicide attempt, was hospitalized, and on October 31 formally announced his intention to renounce U.S. citizenship at the American Embassy, citing his Marxist beliefs. The Soviet Union did not grant him citizenship but allowed him to remain in Minsk on a year-to-year basis starting in January 1960, where he worked as an unskilled laborer at a radio factory. His permission to stay was extended in January 1961, and that February he wrote to the U.S. Embassy expressing a desire to return to the United States. In March 1961, he met 19-year-old Russian pharmacist Marina Nikolaevna Prusakova, and the two married on April 30, 1961. Over the following year, the Oswalds corresponded with U.S. and Soviet authorities to secure permission to leave the USSR, and visited the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in July 1961, where officials confirmed he had not lost his U.S. citizenship. Marina was granted permission to depart the Soviet Union on December 25, 1961.

Oswald's Return to the United States In February 1962, Oswald and his Russian wife Marina welcomed a daughter. After the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service granted a waiver (at the Department of State’s request) to allow Marina to obtain a U.S. visa without first leaving the Soviet Union, the family departed Moscow on June 1, 1962, with $435.71 in travel assistance from the State Department. They arrived in Fort Worth, Texas, two weeks later.

Oswald's Life and FBI Interviews in Fort Worth The Oswalds first stayed with Oswald’s brother Robert, then his mother, before moving into their own apartment in early August 1962. Oswald began working as a sheet metal worker on July 16. During their time in Fort Worth, he was interviewed twice by the FBI: on June 26, he was described as arrogant, denied involvement in Soviet intelligence activities, and agreed to notify the FBI of any Soviet contact; on August 16, he had a less belligerent attitude and repeated his promise to report intelligence recruitment attempts.

Oswald's Move to Dallas and Political Views In early October 1962, Oswald quit his sheet metal job and moved the family to Dallas. The Oswalds had been connected to a group of Russian-speaking local residents who provided material support to the family out of sympathy for Marina and the child, but almost all of the group disliked Oswald. Despite being disillusioned with the Soviet government, Oswald was deeply committed to Marxist ideology, expressed disdain for U.S. democracy, capitalism, and American society, and criticized the Russian-speaking group for embracing American values and pursuing economic advancement.

Oswald's Friendship with Ruth Paine In February 1963, the Oswalds met Ruth Paine, a separated woman living in Irving, Texas (a Dallas suburb) with her two children. Paine, who was interested in the Russian language and sympathetic to Marina (who spoke no English and had limited funds), befriended Marina and visited her several times over the following two months.

Oswald's Attempted Assassination of Edwin Walker After losing his job at a photography firm on April 6, 1963, Oswald attempted to assassinate retired U.S. Army Major General Edwin A. Walker on April 10, using a rifle he had ordered by mail a month earlier under an assumed name. Marina learned of the attack when she found a note Oswald left with instructions for her if he did not return. The incident, combined with the family’s financial struggles, led Marina to urge Oswald to move to New Orleans to find work.

Oswald's Relocation to New Orleans Oswald departed for New Orleans on April 24, 1963. Unaware of the Walker shooting, Ruth Paine invited Marina and the baby to stay with her in Irving while Oswald looked for work. In early May, after Oswald notified Paine he had found a job, she drove Marina and the child to New Orleans to rejoin him.

Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba Activities in New Orleans While in New Orleans, Oswald created a fictitious New Orleans chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, serving as its self-appointed secretary and inventing a fictional president, A.J. Hidell (the group’s only member). He was arrested on August 9, 1963, for a scuffle that occurred while he was distributing pro-Castro leaflets. The next day, he requested an FBI interview at the police station, provided false background information, and was evasive about his Fair Play for Cuba activities. Over the following two weeks, he appeared on local radio programs twice, claiming to be the committee’s New Orleans spokesperson.

Oswald's Mexico City Trip and Failed Visa Applications Oswald lost his job as a coffee processing machine greaser on July 19, 1963. In September, Ruth Paine traveled to New Orleans, and on September 23 drove Marina, the baby, and the family’s belongings back to Irving, where Marina (who was due to give birth in October) would stay until after the birth. Oswald remained behind ostensibly to find work, but instead took a bus to Mexico City, arriving September 27. He visited the Cuban and Soviet embassies seeking visas to travel to Cuba en route to the Soviet Union, but his efforts failed because Cuba would not grant a visa without a corresponding Soviet visa. He returned to Dallas, arriving October 3, 1963.

Oswald's Return to Dallas and Employment at the Texas School Book Depository After reuniting with his wife on October 4, Oswald decided to rent a room in Dallas and visit his family on weekends. He first stayed with Mrs. Bledsoe for a week, then rented a room on Beckley Avenue under the alias O.H. Lee on October 14. That same day, at a neighbor’s suggestion, Ruth Paine called the Texas School Book Depository to inquire about job openings, informed Oswald of the vacancy, and he was interviewed and hired the next day, starting work on October 16. His second daughter was born October 20. Through October and November, he followed a routine of weekend visits to Irving, riding with coworker Buell Wesley Frazier, who lived near the Paines. On November 15, he stayed in Dallas at his wife’s request (the Paine home was crowded for a birthday party). On November 18, the couple argued bitterly on the phone when Marina learned he was living under an assumed name. On November 21, Oswald told Frazier he was traveling to Irving to pick up curtain rods, surprising his wife and Paine, who thought he was returning to reconcile after their fight. That night, Paine noticed an unexpected light on in the garage (where the family’s belongings, including Oswald’s rifle, were stored). The next morning, Oswald left before his wife woke, leaving his wedding ring (a first) and $170 in his wallet behind. He carried a long, bulky package (which he claimed held curtain rods) to Frazier’s car, and entered the Depository building with the package after arriving at the parking lot.

The Assassination of President Kennedy and Oswald's Arrest On the morning of November 22, Marina watched President Kennedy’s motorcade on television, and cried when she learned he had been shot. When news reported the shots likely came from the Depository where Oswald worked, she recalled the Walker incident and checked the garage for the rifle, finding the blanket that had held it was empty (the rifle was missing). At 3 p.m., police arrived at the Paine home, and Marina directed them to the blanket, confirming the rifle was gone. Meanwhile, Oswald was interrogated at Dallas police headquarters by Captain Fritz, with FBI and Secret Service agents present. He denied any role in the Kennedy assassination or the murder of Patrolman J.D. Tippit, claimed he was eating lunch and speaking to his foreman at the time of the assassination, denied owning a rifle, and claimed his face had been superimposed on a photo of another man holding a rifle and pistol. He refused to answer questions about a selective service card in his wallet bearing the name "Alek J. Hidell". Over three days, Oswald was brought before a crowd of more than 100 press representatives in the police hallway at least 16 times for questioning; he attempted to hire his own attorney but had not secured representation by Sunday morning. At 7:10 p.m. on November 22, Oswald was formally charged with Tippit’s murder, as multiple witnesses had identified him in lineups, and the revolver he carried at arrest was compatible with the weapon used in Tippit’s killing. The formal assassination charge was filed after 1:30 a.m. on November 23. By 10 p.m. on November 22, the FBI had traced the rifle found on the Depository’s sixth floor to a Chicago mail-order house, which confirmed it had been ordered in March 1963 by "A. Hidel" for shipment to Oswald’s Dallas post office box, paid for with a money order signed "A. Hidell"; handwriting analysis confirmed Oswald placed the order. Dallas police released many case details to the public, often erroneously, during impromptu press conferences, and brought Oswald to a midnight press conference where Jack Ruby, a 52-year-old Dallas nightclub operator, was present in the press pool.

Jack Ruby's Murder of Lee Harvey Oswald On the morning of November 24, 1963, arrangements were made to transfer Oswald from the Dallas city jail to the Dallas County jail, with press told the transfer would not occur before 10 a.m. Between 2:30 and 3 a.m. that day, anonymous death threats against Oswald had been received by the FBI and county sheriff’s office, but press crowded the jail basement to film the transfer, which was moved up to use an unmarked police car for speed. At approximately 11:20 a.m., Oswald emerged from the jail office flanked by detectives and walked toward the car in the glare of television camera lights. Jack Ruby stepped out from the press area to the right of the cameras, walked to within a few feet of Oswald, and fired a single shot from a Colt .38 revolver into Oswald’s abdomen. Oswald was pronounced dead at Parkland Hospital at 1:07 p.m. without regaining consciousness. Ruby was arrested immediately, denied any conspiracy connection to the Kennedy assassination, and claimed he killed Oswald in a spontaneous fit of rage and grief over the President’s death. He was indicted for Oswald’s murder on November 26, 1963, found guilty on March 14, 1964, sentenced to death, and his appeal was pending as of September 1964.

Commission Conclusions on the Kennedy Assassination The Warren Commission, created to investigate the facts surrounding the Kennedy assassination and related events, conducted a full independent investigation with complete cooperation from all government agencies, and presented its reasoned, unanimous conclusions after a thorough search for the truth. Its first conclusion was that the shots that killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor John Connally were fired from the sixth floor southeast corner window of the Texas School Book Depository, based on four supporting findings: (a) multiple witnesses saw a rifle being fired from the window, and some saw a rifle there immediately after the shots; (b) the nearly intact bullet found on Governor Connally’s stretcher at Parkland Memorial Hospital and two bullet fragments found in the presidential limousine were fired from the 6.5-millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found on the Depository’s sixth floor, to the exclusion of all other weapons; (c) the three spent cartridge cases found near the sixth floor window were fired from the same rifle, to the exclusion of all other weapons; and (d) the presidential limousine’s windshield was struck by a bullet fragment on its interior surface but was not penetrated.

Kennedy and Connally Wound Analysis and Shot Origin Analysis of the gunshot wounds to President Kennedy and Governor John Connally confirms the bullets were fired from above and behind the Presidential limousine. Kennedy sustained two wounds: a non-lethal shot entering the back of his neck and exiting the lower front of his neck, followed by a fatal shot entering the right-rear of his head. Connally was struck by a bullet that entered the right side of his back, traveled downward through his right chest, exited below his right nipple, passed through his right wrist, and caused a superficial wound to his left thigh. No credible evidence supports claims that shots were fired from the Triple Underpass, ahead of the motorcade, or any other location outside the Texas School Book Depository.

Number of Shots Fired The preponderance of evidence indicates three shots were fired during the assassination.

Single Bullet Theory for Kennedy and Connally Wounds While confirming which specific shot struck Connally is not required for the Commission's core findings, persuasive expert evidence indicates the same bullet that pierced the President's throat caused all of Connally's wounds. Disagreement over this conclusion stems from Connally's testimony and other factors, but all Commission members agree all shots that injured Kennedy and Connally were fired from the sixth-floor window of the Texas School Book Depository.

Oswald as Assassination Shooter The Commission concludes the shots that killed Kennedy and wounded Connally were fired by Lee Harvey Oswald, supported by the following evidence: the Mannlicher-Carcano 6.5mm rifle used was owned and possessed by Oswald; he carried the rifle into the Depository on the morning of November 22, 1963; he was present at the sixth-floor firing window at the time of the assassination; the rifle was found partially hidden between cartons on the sixth floor shortly after the attack, alongside the improvised paper bag Oswald used to transport it to the building; expert analysis of assassination footage confirms a rifleman of Oswald's skill level could have fired all shots within the elapsed time of the shooting; Oswald lied about key substantive matters to police following his arrest; and he had previously attempted to kill Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker in April 1963, demonstrating his willingness to commit murder.

Oswald's Killing of Officer J.D. Tippit Oswald killed Dallas Police Patrolman J.D. Tippit roughly 45 minutes after the JFK assassination, a finding that supports the conclusion that Oswald fired the shots at Kennedy and Connally. Supporting evidence includes: nine eyewitnesses (two who observed the shooting, seven who heard gunshots and saw the gunman flee with a revolver) positively identified Oswald as the shooter; cartridge casings at the Tippit scene were matched to the revolver found in Oswald's possession at arrest, excluding all other weapons; the revolver was owned by Oswald; and Oswald's jacket was found along the flight path of the gunman who fled the Tippit killing scene.

Oswald's Arrest Resistance Within 80 minutes of the JFK assassination and 35 minutes of the Tippit killing, Oswald resisted arrest at a local theatre by attempting to shoot another Dallas police officer.

Commission Findings on Oswald's Interrogation and Detention The Commission's findings on Oswald's interrogation and detention by Dallas police are: (a) aside from the force required to effect his arrest, Oswald was not subjected to physical coercion; he was informed he could not be compelled to provide information, that his statements could be used against him in court, was advised of his right to counsel, given the opportunity to obtain counsel of his choice, and rejected legal assistance offered by the Dallas Bar Association at the time; (b) unrestricted access for newspaper, radio, and television reporters to the areas Oswald was moved through in the police station subjected him to harassment and created chaotic conditions that hindered orderly interrogation and protection of his prisoner rights; (c) numerous erroneous public statements from local law enforcement officials during this period of confusion created obstacles to a fair trial for Oswald, and the misleading information contributed to public doubt, speculation, and fear that may not have otherwise arisen.

Commission Findings on Oswald's Killing by Jack Ruby The Commission's findings on Jack Ruby's November 24, 1963 killing of Oswald are: (a) Ruby entered the Dallas Police Department basement shortly after 11:17 a.m. and killed Oswald at 11:21 a.m.; (b) while evidence of Ruby's entry method is not conclusive, the weight of evidence indicates he walked down the ramp leading from Main Street to the basement; (c) there is no evidence supporting rumors that Ruby was assisted by any Dallas Police Department personnel in the killing; (d) the Dallas Police Department's decision to transfer Oswald to county jail in full public view was unsound, the transfer arrangements made only hours before the attempted move were inadequate, and news media and other individuals were not excluded from the basement even after police were notified of threats to Oswald's life, all of which contributed to his death.

No Conspiracy Involving Oswald or Ruby The Commission found no evidence that either Lee Harvey Oswald or Jack Ruby was part of any domestic or foreign conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy, based on extensive investigation: no evidence exists that anyone assisted Oswald in planning or carrying out the assassination, after review of the motorcade route planning, Oswald's October 1963 hiring by the Texas School Book Depository, how the rifle was brought into the building, carton placement at the firing window, Oswald's escape from the building, and eyewitness testimony to the shooting; no evidence links Oswald to any person or group in a conspiracy to kill the President, after investigation of his associations, finances, personal habits, and activities after his June 1962 return from the Soviet Union; no evidence shows Oswald was employed, persuaded, or encouraged by any foreign government to carry out the assassination, or that he was a foreign government agent, after review of his 1959-1962 defection to and life in the Soviet Union, his Fair Play for Cuba Committee contacts, his September-October 1963 visits to Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City, and his contacts with the Soviet Embassy in the U.S.; no evidence connects his attempts to affiliate with political groups including the Communist Party USA, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and Socialist Workers Party to the assassination; no evidence supports speculation that Oswald was an FBI, CIA, or other U.S. government agent, employee, or informant, after thorough investigation of his pre-assassination relationships with all U.S. government agencies, with all contacts found to be part of the agencies' regular duties; no direct or indirect relationship between Oswald and Ruby has been found, nor credible evidence that either knew the other, after investigation of all rumors and speculation of such a link; no evidence shows Ruby acted with any other person in killing Oswald; and no credible evidence shows Ruby knew Officer Tippit, or that Oswald knew Tippit. The Commission notes that while proving a negative to absolute certainty is difficult, any evidence of others being involved with Oswald or Ruby has not been uncovered by all U.S. investigative agencies and has not come to the Commission's attention.

No Government Official Conspiracy Across its full investigation, the Commission found no evidence of conspiracy, subversion, or disloyalty to the U.S. government by any federal, state, or local official.

Oswald Acted Alone: Motive Analysis Based on the evidence, the Commission concludes Oswald acted alone in the assassination, so his motives must be derived from examination of his own life. The Commission could not reach a definitive determination of his motives, but identified contributing factors: deep-rooted resentment of all authority and hostility toward every society he lived in; inability to form meaningful relationships and a continuous pattern of rejecting his environment in favor of new surroundings; a desire to leave a mark on history and despair over repeated failures in his undertakings; demonstrated capacity for violence via his attempted killing of General Walker; and his avowed commitment to his own interpretation of Marxism and communism, expressed via antagonism toward the U.S., defection to the Soviet Union, failure to reconcile with U.S. life after becoming disenchanted with the Soviet Union, and frustrated efforts to travel to Cuba. Each of these factors contributed to his willingness to commit cruel, irresponsible violent acts.

Secret Service Performance Findings The Commission acknowledges the Secret Service faces inherent limitations in protecting the President due to the demands of the office and the President's willingness to adhere to safety plans, but finds that improvements to presidential protection are required by the investigation's facts. Its performance findings include: (a) the rapidly increasing complexities of the presidency have outpaced the Secret Service's ability to secure adequate personnel and facility resources, a situation that requires prompt remediation; (b) pre-assassination Secret Service criteria and procedures for identifying and protecting against presidential threats were inadequate: the Protective Research Section lacked sufficient trained personnel and technical/mechanical support to fulfill its preventive duties, and the Service's criteria only focused on direct threats to the President, failing to identify other potential danger sources, and relied heavily on other federal or state agencies for relevant information rather than developing its own specific threat criteria; (c) there was insufficient liaison and information coordination between the Secret Service and other federal agencies involved in presidential protection: the FBI had extensive information on Oswald but had no official responsibility under existing Secret Service criteria to share that information with the Service prior to the Dallas trip, and the FBI took an unduly restrictive view of its preventive intelligence role, with more coordinated handling of the Oswald case likely bringing his activities to the Secret Service's attention; (d) some advance Dallas security preparations were thorough (e.g., Love Field and Trade Mart measures), but others were deficient: pre-trip procedures did not define clear responsibilities for local police and other protection personnel, and procedures for detecting assassins in buildings along the motorcade route were inadequate, as the Service did not check buildings along the route and relied on divided street police and motorcade agent responsibilities for window monitoring, arrangements the Commission found clearly insufficient; (e) the Presidential car's configuration and Secret Service agent seating arrangements did not allow agents the opportunity to immediately assist the President at the first sign of danger; (f) within these limitations, the agents most directly responsible for the President's safety reacted promptly when shots were fired from the Texas School Book Depository.

Presidential Protection Recommendations The Commission offers the following recommendations for improving presidential protection, prompted by the assassination and aligned with a Secret Service planning document dated August 27, 1964: 1. A committee of Cabinet members (including the Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General) or the National Security Council should be assigned to review and oversee Secret Service protective activities and the work of other federal agencies supporting presidential safety, to ensure maximum federal resources are engaged in protection efforts and to guide definition of domestic and foreign threats to presidential security. 2. Any determination to transfer all or part of the Secret Service's presidential protective responsibilities to another department or agency should be made by the Executive branch and Congress, potentially based on recommendations from the proposed oversight committee.

The Commission recommends that the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a special assistant dedicated to supervising the Secret Service on a daily basis within the Department of the Treasury. This special assistant should possess significant stature and experience in law enforcement, intelligence, and related fields, so as to provide effective ongoing supervision and to keep the Secretary fully informed of the Secret Service's performance. An initial responsibility of this special assistant should be overseeing the Secret Service's current effort to revise and modernize its basic operating procedures.

The Commission recommends that the Secret Service undertake a complete overhaul of its facilities for the advance detection of potential threats against the President. Three specific measures are proposed: first, the Secret Service should develop more precise criteria defining which potential threats other agencies should report, and these criteria should include prompt notice of all returned defectors; second, the Secret Service should accelerate its current plans to employ the most efficient data-processing techniques; and third, once new criteria are established, the Secret Service should enter into formal agreements with each federal agency to ensure it receives the required information.

The Commission recommends that the Secret Service improve the protective measures employed in the planning and execution of Presidential motorcades. In particular, the Secret Service should continue its current efforts to heighten the precautionary attention given to buildings situated along the motorcade route.

The Commission recommends that the Secret Service continue its recent efforts to improve and formalize its working relationships with local police departments in the areas the President is scheduled to visit.

The Commission believes that once the new criteria and procedures are in place, the Secret Service will lack sufficient personnel and adequate facilities to fulfill its mission. The Commission accordingly recommends that the Secret Service be provided with the personnel and resources that the Service and the Department of the Treasury can demonstrate are necessary to carry out its important responsibilities.

Even with an increase in Secret Service personnel, presidential protection will continue to require the resources and cooperation of many federal agencies. The Commission recommends that these agencies, specifically the FBI, continue the practice that has developed—particularly since the assassination—of assisting the Secret Service upon request by providing personnel or other aid, and that there be a closer association and liaison between the Secret Service and all federal agencies.

The Commission recommends that the President's physician always accompany the President during his travels and occupy a position near the President so that he can be immediately available in the event of any medical emergency.

The Commission recommends that Congress adopt legislation making the assassination of the President and Vice President a federal crime. The Commission observes that the absence of clearly defined federal jurisdiction to investigate the assassination of a President represents an anomalous state of affairs.

The Commission has reviewed the Department of State's handling of the Oswald matters and finds that it complied with the law throughout. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that the Department, in accordance with its own regulations, should in all cases exercise great care in returning to this country defectors who have evidenced disloyalty or hostility to the United States or who have expressed a desire to renounce their American citizenship. When such persons are returned, procedures should be adopted to ensure the better dissemination of information concerning them to the relevant intelligence agencies of the Government.

The Commission recommends that representatives of the bar, law enforcement associations, and the news media collaborate to establish ethical standards concerning the collection and presentation of information to the public. The purpose of these standards is to prevent interference with pending criminal investigations, court proceedings, or the right of individuals to a fair trial.

This introductory section frames the chapter's scope: it recounts the advance plans and Secret Service preparations for the Texas trip, the motorcade through downtown Dallas, the assassination, the response at Parkland Memorial Hospital, and the return to Washington. The Commission's account draws primarily on participants' recollections, with documentary or other evidence used where available. Evaluation of security procedures and recommendations for improvement are deferred to chapter VIII.

President Kennedy's November 1963 trip to Texas was under consideration for nearly a year before it occurred. The President wished to resolve factional controversy within the Texas Democratic Party before the 1964 election, and party leaders saw a fundraising opportunity via a political dinner eventually planned for Austin. The President also valued firsthand contact with citizens and public appearances. The basic decision to travel to Texas in late November 1963 was made at a June 5, 1963 meeting in El Paso between President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson, and Governor Connally. The trip was originally planned for one day covering Dallas, Fort Worth, San Antonio, and Houston, but was later extended from November 21 through the evening of November 22. Governor Connally was left to largely plan the Texas events, with White House Special Assistant Kenneth O'Donnell coordinating the trip. All parties agreed that a motorcade through downtown Dallas was desirable once the schedule was extended, and O'Donnell described motorcades in large cities as automatic for maximizing public exposure.

Advance preparations for President Kennedy's Dallas visit were the primary responsibility of two Secret Service agents: Special Agent Winston G. Lawson, the White House detail's advance agent, and Forrest V. Sorrels, special agent in charge of the Dallas office. Both were advised of the trip on November 4. Lawson received a tentative Texas schedule on November 8 from Assistant Special Agent in Charge Roy H. Kellerman, who oversaw the entire Texas journey. Lawson's responsibilities as advance agent included arranging the Dallas timetable and coordinating with White House staff, relevant organizations, and local law enforcement. His most important duties were taking preventive action against potential threats, selecting the luncheon site and motorcade route, and planning security measures for both.

The Secret Service's Protective Research Section (PRS) maintains records on individuals who have threatened the President or behaved as potential dangers. On November 8, 1963, after assuming advance preparation duties, Agent Lawson checked PRS geographic indexes in Washington and found no listings for potential dangers in the Dallas-Fort Worth territory. The Secret Service supplements PRS files with local police and federal agency reports. After arriving in Dallas on November 12, Lawson conferred with local police and the FBI about potential dangers. He inquired about the October 24, 1963 demonstration against Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and obtained photographs of some participants, which were distributed on November 22 at the Trade Mart entrance and luncheon area, with several look-alikes placed under surveillance. The FBI provided the name of one possibly dangerous individual who was investigated, and informed the Secret Service of a November 21 handbill critical of President Kennedy (discussed in chapter VI). Neither the Dallas police nor the FBI had yet identified the handbill's source. No one else was identified as potentially dangerous through local inquiry, and PRS developed no additional information between November 12 and November 22. The adequacy of the Secret Service's intelligence system, including detailed information on Lee Harvey Oswald and reasons his name was not furnished to the Secret Service, is addressed in chapter VIII.

An important purpose of the Dallas visit was a luncheon speech before business and civic leaders. The White House staff specified arrival and departure at Love Field, a motorcade through downtown to the luncheon site, and a direct return route to the airport. On November 4, White House detail agent Gerald A. Behn asked Sorrels to examine three potential sites: Market Hall (unavailable for November 22), the Women's Building at the State Fair Grounds (secure but lacking food facilities and aesthetically unsuitable), and the Trade Mart (well-equipped but with security challenges including numerous entrances, multi-tier balconies, and catwalks). On November 4, Sorrels advised Behn that Trade Mart security difficulties could be overcome with special precautions. Lawson evaluated the site on November 13. O'Donnell made the final decision, and Behn notified Lawson on November 14. Sorrels and Lawson then developed detailed security arrangements, including access control, perimeter policing, roof security, and deployment of more than 200 law enforcement officers (mainly Dallas police, plus 8 Secret Service agents) in and around the building.

On November 8, Lawson was told that 45 minutes had been allotted for the Love Field to luncheon site motorcade. Although not specifically instructed to choose the route, Lawson understood this was his function. Before the Trade Mart was confirmed, Lawson and Sorrels began considering the best route. On November 14, they attended a Love Field meeting and drove the route Sorrels favored, a 10-mile path through suburban Dallas, along Main Street downtown, and to the Trade Mart via Stemmons Freeway, easily completed within 45 minutes. The return route was approximately 4 miles. After the Trade Mart's selection, Lawson and Sorrels met with Dallas Police Chief Jesse E. Curry, Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor, Deputy Chief N. T. Fisher, and other command officers. The route was reviewed again on November 15 with Batchelor and the local host committee, and on November 18 with Batchelor and other officers verifying the 45-minute drive time. The host committee and White House staff were notified of the actual route that afternoon. Sorrels, who had participated in Dallas Presidential protection since President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1936 visit, testified that the traditional route was along Main Street, where tall buildings allowed more public participation. The airport-to-Main route was standard except where Harwood Street was preferred over a short stretch of Central Expressway for safety and spectator accommodation. Lawson described the chosen route as offering wide streets for buses, alternative routes if needed, controlled crowds in suburban areas, and wide downtown streets to keep the public clear. Elm Street, one block north of Main, was not used for the main downtown portion because Main offered better vantage points. To reach the Trade Mart, the agents selected Stemmons Freeway (Route No. 77), the most direct route. Westbound Main Street traffic accesses Stemmons Freeway's northbound lanes via Elm Street, reached by turning right at Houston, going one block north, and turning left onto Elm. This final segment, five minutes from the Trade Mart, passed the Texas School Book Depository Building on the northwest corner of Houston and Elm, which overlooks Dealey Plaza—an attractively landscaped three-acre triangle. From Houston Street (the triangle's base), Commerce, Main, and Elm Streets converge at the apex to form a triple underpass beneath a multiple railroad bridge almost 500 feet from Houston. Elm Street, the northernmost of the three, curves southwesterly through the underpass to an access road leading to Stemmons Freeway and the Dallas-Fort Worth Turnpike. Several Commission Exhibits (Nos. 876, 2113-2116, 2967) illustrate this configuration, including a Main Street traffic sign directing westbound traffic to turn right at Houston to reach the Turnpike. A concrete barrier between Main and Elm prevents right turns from Main to the access road. Security planning along the route included crowd and traffic control, overpass monitoring, and motorcycle escort, reviewed in cooperation with Assistant Chief Batchelor and other Dallas police officials. Foot patrolmen and motorcycle police were deployed along the route, with police assigned to each overpass and instructed to keep them clear. No arrangements were made for police or custodians to inspect buildings along the route, as the Secret Service did not normally request such checks; responsibility for watching building windows was shared by stationed local police and Secret Service agents in the motorcade. The Dallas newspapers publicized aspects of the route in advance. The Dallas Times-Herald reported the Trade Mart as the likely luncheon site on November 15, 1963, and on November 16 described an apparent downtown loop, probably on Main Street, from Love Field. On November 19, the Times-Herald afternoon paper detailed the precise route: from the airport via Mockingbird Lane to Lemmon, then to Turtle Creek, south to Cedar Springs, through downtown on Harwood and west on Main, turning back to Elm at Houston, and out Stemmons Freeway to the Trade Mart.

The President's announced intention to visit Texas in the fall of 1963 generated extensive coverage in the Dallas Morning News and Dallas Times-Herald beginning September 13. Local sentiment was mixed: while some editorials and letters were critical, Dallas officials publicly urged citizens to serve as "congenial hosts." Concern sharpened after Adlai Stevenson was jeered and jostled by demonstrators on October 24, prompting Mayor Earle Cabell to call on Dallas to redeem itself. Police Chief Curry arranged for additional off-duty officers, and on November 18 the City Council adopted an ordinance against interference with lawful assemblies. The Dallas Chamber of Commerce president and a local Republican leader also publicly appealed for a dignified welcome. Against this backdrop, hostile elements surfaced just before the visit, including an anonymous "Wanted for Treason" handbill distributed on November 21 and a black-bordered "Welcome Mr. Kennedy to Dallas" advertisement placed by the American Factfinding Committee in the Morning News on the morning of the President's arrival.

President and Mrs. Kennedy departed the White House by helicopter on the morning of November 21, 1963, and flew by Air Force One to San Antonio, where they were joined by Vice President Johnson and Governor Connally for a motorcade and the dedication of the U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine at Brooks AFB. The party then flew to Houston for a motorcade, a speech at Rice University Stadium before a large enthusiastic crowd, and a dinner honoring Representative Albert Thomas. Staff member David F. Powers remarked that an extra 100,000 people appeared to have come to see Mrs. Kennedy. The party flew on to Fort Worth that evening, staying overnight at the Texas Hotel. On the morning of November 22, the President addressed a crowd from an open parking lot. Before leaving Fort Worth, Kennedy discussed with O'Donnell the risks of public appearances, observing that a determined assassin with a high building and a telescopic rifle could not be defended against.

Following morning rain in Dallas, clearing skies greeted Air Force One when it touched down at Love Field at 11:40 a.m. on November 22. Vice President Johnson's Air Force Two had arrived about five minutes earlier. Governor and Mrs. Connally and Senator Ralph Yarborough had accompanied the President from Fort Worth. After a reception committee welcome, President and Mrs. Kennedy walked along a chain-link fence greeting the large crowd of spectators behind it, with Secret Service agents forming a cordon and Dallas police and plainclothesmen positioned along and within the crowd. About ten minutes after arrival, the Kennedys proceeded to the Presidential automobile to begin the motorcade.

The Dallas motorcade followed standard Secret Service procedures for permitting public viewing while providing protection. Its vehicle order began with Dallas police motorcycles, a pilot car staffed by Dallas police about a quarter mile ahead, and additional motorcycles for crowd control. The lead "rolling command car," an unmarked Dallas police car driven by Chief Curry and carrying Secret Service Agents Sorrels and Lawson and Sheriff Decker, ran four to five car lengths ahead of the President's limousine. The Presidential limousine was a 1961 Lincoln convertible with a clear plastic bubble-top that was neither bulletproof nor bullet resistant; on Kellerman's instructions, following O’Donnell's standing order, the top was removed because of the clear weather. The President rode on the right of the rear seat with Mrs. Kennedy on his left, Governor and Mrs. Connally on the jump seats, Special Agent Greer driving, and Kellerman in the front passenger seat. Flanking motorcycles followed, then the Presidential followup car—a 1955 Cadillac convertible carrying eight armed Secret Service agents plus presidential assistants Powers and O'Donnell—whose agents were charged with scanning crowds, buildings, windows, roofs, and overpasses for trouble and moving to the President's sides if the motorcade slowed or stopped. The Vice-Presidential car and its followup car followed two to three car lengths behind, with Senator Yarborough riding with the Johnsons, and the rear of the motorcade consisted of cars for other dignitaries, telephone and Western Union vehicles, press and staff buses, an ambulance car, and a police car with motorcycles. A base station in Dallas linked the lead car, Presidential car, followup car, communications car, Trade Mart, Love Field, and the Presidential and Vice-Presidential airplanes by radio.

The motorcade departed Love Field shortly after 11:50 a.m., traveling 25 to 30 miles per hour through sparsely populated outskirts. At the President's direction, the limousine stopped twice—once in response to a sign requesting a handshake and once so the President could speak to a Catholic nun and a group of small children—during which Secret Service agents moved forward from the followup car to shield the President. Dense, enthusiastic crowds in downtown Dallas repeatedly forced Special Agent Hill and other agents off the followup car's running boards and onto the rear of the President's limousine to push the crowd back; Special Agent Youngblood similarly stepped out of the Vice-Presidential car when it was slowed by the throng. Following the planned route, the motorcade proceeded west on Main Street to Houston Street, turned right and went north past tall buildings toward the Texas School Book Depository, then onto Elm Street, where the crowd thinned abruptly as the road curved downgrade toward the Triple Underpass and Stemmons Freeway. As the cars approached the Houston-Elm intersection, O'Donnell and Mrs. Connally expressed pleasure at the warm reception, with Mrs. Connally telling the President, "Mr. President, you can't say Dallas doesn't love you," and the President replying, "That is very obvious."

At 12:30 p.m. as the open Presidential limousine traveled approximately 11 miles per hour along Elm Street toward the Triple Underpass, rifle shots mortally wounded President Kennedy and seriously injured Governor Connally. One bullet passed through the President's neck; a subsequent bullet shattered the right side of his skull. Governor Connally sustained bullet wounds to his back, the right side of his chest, his right wrist, and his left thigh.

The exact time of the assassination, 12:30 p.m., was established through four independent witnesses. Special Agent Rufus W. Youngblood observed the electric sign clock atop the Texas School Book Depository Building reading "12:30" as the Vice-Presidential car proceeded north on Houston Street. David F. Powers remarked to Kenneth O'Donnell that it was 12:30 p.m., the scheduled arrival time at the Trade Mart. Seconds after the shooting, Roy Kellerman looked at his watch and said "12:30" to driver William Greer. The Dallas police radio log confirmed that Chief of Police Curry reported the shooting and issued initial orders at 12:30 p.m.

Driver William Greer estimated the Presidential limousine's speed at the time of the first shot as 12 to 15 miles per hour, with other witnesses providing estimates ranging from 7 to 22 miles per hour. A more precise determination was made using Abraham Zapruder's amateur motion picture film. Based on 152 frames covering 136 feet of travel at 18.3 frames per second, it was calculated that the car required 8.3 seconds to cover that distance, yielding an average speed of 11.2 miles per hour immediately preceding the shot that struck the President in the head.

Inside the Presidential limousine, Mrs. Kennedy heard a sound resembling a motorcycle noise, saw a quizzical look on her husband's face as he raised his hand to his throat, then heard a second shot that tore open his skull, prompting her to cradle him and cry out. Governor Connally recognized the first noise as a rifle shot and instinctively turned right, but was struck in the back by the second shot, which he did not hear. Roy Kellerman, in the right front seat, heard a firecracker-like pop, the President say "My God, I am hit," and radioed ahead to get to the hospital. Driver Greer initially mistook the noise for a motorcycle backfire, then accelerated rapidly when ordered to "get out of here fast." Mrs. Connally pulled her wounded husband into her lap, and both observed brain tissue splattered over the car's interior after the fatal head shot, after which the car accelerated toward the hospital.

Special Agent Clinton J. Hill, stationed on the left front running board of the followup car, heard a firecracker-like noise, saw the President lurch forward and to the left, and ran to the Presidential limousine. He heard a second shot approximately five seconds later that removed part of the President's head, then pushed Mrs. Kennedy back into the car when she climbed onto the rear bumper, likely saving her life. Special Agent Emory P. Roberts recalled Agent Ready back to the followup car, and Special Agent George W. Hickey, Jr. cocked an automatic rifle as the cars sped to the hospital. Special Agent Rufus W. Youngblood vaulted into the rear seat of the Vice-Presidential car to shield Vice President Johnson with his body immediately after the first shot. Most agents had drawn their sidearms, and none entered the Texas School Book Depository Building, per Secret Service procedure of remaining with their protectees. Special Agent Forrest V. Sorrels was the first to return to the shooting scene approximately 20 to 25 minutes later.

PARKLAND MEMORIAL HOSPITAL served as the destination for the mortally wounded President Kennedy, where emergency medical staff prepared trauma rooms and assembled a team of physicians for emergency treatment.

The Presidential motorcade raced approximately 4 miles to Parkland Memorial Hospital, led by Chief of Police Curry and police motorcyclists. Curry radioed ahead to have the hospital stand by, and the limousine arrived at the emergency entrance at about 12:35 p.m. at speeds estimated up to 70 or 80 miles per hour down the Stemmons Freeway and Harry Hines Boulevard. Twelve doctors, including surgeons, neurologists, anesthesiologists, and specialists, rushed to the emergency area where trauma rooms 1 and 2 had been prepared. Governor Connally, who had regained consciousness upon arrival, was taken to trauma room 2, while President Kennedy, cradled by Mrs. Kennedy, was lifted onto a stretcher and pushed into trauma room 1.

Dr. Charles J. Carrico, a resident in general surgery, was the first physician to see the President, noting two wounds: a small bullet wound in the front lower neck and an extensive head wound with missing skull, shredded brain tissue, and slow oozing blood. Dr. Malcolm O. Perry arrived and performed a tracheotomy requiring 3 to 5 minutes, while Drs. Carrico and Ronald Jones performed cutdowns on the President's right leg and left arm for fluid infusion, and Dr. Carrico administered hydrocortisone for adrenal insufficiency. Drs. Paul C. Peters and Charles R. Baxter inserted chest tubes to drain blood and air from the chest cavity. Doctors Bashour, Jenkins, and Giesecke joined resuscitation efforts, maintaining peripheral circulation and detecting some electrical cardiac activity. Dr. William Kemp Clark, who most closely observed the head wound, described a large, gaping wound in the right rear of the head with substantial brain tissue damage, noting that a small bullet hole discovered during autopsy could have been hidden in blood and hair.

President Kennedy's Death at Parkland Hospital Doctors at Parkland Hospital determined that efforts to revive the President were hopeless because of his severe head injury. Admiral Burkley, the President's personal physician, did not intervene once he arrived so as not to disrupt the medical team. Father Oscar L. Huber administered last rites. Dr. Clark pronounced the President dead at approximately 1 p.m. because the head injury fell within his area of medical specialization, and the precise time of death could not be determined. The doctors observed that the President was still alive upon arrival at Parkland, with a heartbeat and respiratory efforts, but the head wound was fatal even though the neck injury alone would not have been. The President remained on his back throughout treatment because the medical team focused on controlling bleeding and establishing an airway; Dr. Carrico explained that a full inspection, including of the back, was not practical while treating an acutely injured patient, and no effort was made to examine the back even after death. The Parkland doctors took no further action once the President had expired, deeming it beyond the scope of their duties.

Treatment of Governor Connally While one team attended the President, a second team performed surgery on Governor Connally, who had sustained multiple bullet wounds. After initial examination by Dr. Carrico and Dr. Richard Dulany, Dr. Robert Shaw, chief of thoracic surgery, assumed charge of treatment at approximately 12:45 p.m. Rubber tubes were inserted between the second and third ribs to reexpand the collapsed right lung. At 1:35 p.m., Dr. Shaw began operating, suturing the damaged lung and lacerated muscles and treating an elliptical wound in the back. This first operation concluded at 3:20 p.m. A second operation from 4 p.m. to 4:50 p.m., performed by Dr. Charles F. Gregory with assistance, addressed wounds of the right wrist; the back wound was left partially open for drainage while the palm-side wound was closed, the fracture set, and a cast applied with traction. Concurrently, Dr. George T. Shires and assistants treated a gunshot wound in the left thigh, leaving a small metallic fragment in the Governor's leg.

Vice President Johnson at Parkland A protective circle of Secret Service agents escorted Vice President and Mrs. Johnson into Parkland Hospital, where they took emergency security measures. Several U.S. Representatives, including Henry B. Gonzalez, Jack Brooks, Homer Thornberry, and Albert Thomas, along with Clifton C. Carter, joined the security group. Concerned that the Vice President might also be targeted, Secret Service agents urged him to leave the hospital, but he waited for definitive word on the President's condition. At approximately 1:20 p.m., O’Donnell notified Vice President Johnson that President Kennedy was dead. Agent Youngblood arranged Secret Service protection for Mrs. Johnson's two daughters. After consulting O’Donnell, the Vice President decided to return to Washington on the Presidential plane due to its superior communication equipment. The Vice President and Press Secretary Malcolm Kilduff agreed to delay announcement of the death until the Vice President had left the hospital. When told Mrs. Kennedy would not leave without the President's body, the Vice President stated he would not leave Dallas without her. On Secret Service recommendation, the Vice President boarded Air Force One to wait.

Secret Service Emergency Security Arrangements Secret Service agents immediately took positions at the door of trauma room 1, identified hospital personnel, and cleared the area of nonessential staff. Special Agent Lawson ensured that Dallas police kept the public and press away. Agents Kellerman and Hill telephoned Gerald A. Behn, head of the White House detail, and the line to Washington was kept open. Agents at later stops along the President's itinerary, including the Trade Mart and Austin, were redeployed, with the Austin contingent instructed to return to Washington. At Love Field, security measures were instituted for the Presidential aircraft, the terminal, and surrounding areas, including clearing adjacent warehouses, terminal buildings, and parking lots. The agents chose to leave the aircraft in its original secure location. When hospital security arrangements were complete, the Vice President and Mrs. Johnson were driven to Love Field in unmarked police cars, with Chief Curry driving the Vice President's car. Motorcycle escorts were asked not to use sirens, and the Vice President was instructed to remain below window level during the drive.

Removal of the President's Body Mrs. Kennedy alternated between watching the medical team and waiting outside during the resuscitation efforts. After the President was pronounced dead, O’Donnell tried to persuade her to leave, but she refused, stating she intended to stay with her husband. A casket was obtained and the body prepared. Two Dallas officials told the President's staff that the body could not be removed until an autopsy was performed; despite their protests, the casket was wheeled out and placed in an ambulance. It arrived at the airport shortly after 2 p.m. and was loaded onto Air Force One at approximately 2:15 p.m., with some difficulty because of the narrow airplane door. Concerned that local officials might attempt to prevent takeoff, O’Donnell asked the pilot to depart immediately, but was informed that takeoff would be delayed until Vice President Johnson was sworn in.

End of the Trip This section marks the conclusion of events in Dallas and the transition to the return journey to Washington, D.C., including the swearing in of the new President aboard Air Force One and the subsequent return flight with arrival at Andrews Air Force Base.

Swearing in of the New President From Air Force One, Vice President Johnson telephoned Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who advised that he take the Presidential oath of office before the plane left Dallas. Federal Judge Sarah T. Hughes rushed to the plane to administer the oath, which was witnessed by members of both the Presidential and Vice-Presidential parties in the central compartment. At 2:38 p.m. CST, Lyndon Baines Johnson took the oath of office as the 36th President of the United States, with Mrs. Kennedy and Mrs. Johnson standing at his side. The Presidential airplane departed for Washington, D.C. nine minutes later.

Return to Washington, D.C. During the return flight, Mrs. Kennedy sat with David Powers, Kenneth O’Donnell, and Lawrence O’Brien. At 5:58 p.m. EST, Air Force One landed at Andrews Air Force Base, where President Kennedy had begun his final trip only 31 hours earlier. Detailed security arrangements had been made by radio from the plane, the public was excluded from the base, and only Government officials and the press were permitted near the landing area. President Johnson made a brief television and radio statement. President and Mrs. Johnson were flown by helicopter to the White House; Mrs. Johnson was then driven to her residence under Secret Service escort, while the President walked to the Executive Office Building, where he worked until 9 p.m.

The Autopsy Mrs. Kennedy chose the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, Maryland, for the autopsy because the President had served in the Navy. She and the Attorney General, with three Secret Service agents, accompanied the body on the 45-minute drive from Andrews AFB. On the 17th floor, they joined other Kennedy family members to await completion of the autopsy; Mrs. Kennedy was guarded by agents in assigned quarters, and the Secret Service established a communication system with the White House, screening all calls and visitors. The hospital received the body at approximately 7:35 p.m., with X-rays and photographs taken before the pathological examination began at about 8 p.m. The autopsy report recorded the President as 46 years old, 72½ inches tall, 170 pounds, with blue eyes and reddish-brown hair, and set the cause of death as a gunshot wound to the head. The examination revealed two head wounds: a smaller one to the right of the external occipital protuberance, and a larger one approximately 5 inches in greatest diameter with multiple crisscross fractures. Federal agents brought surgeons three bone fragments recovered from Elm Street and the Presidential automobile, accounting for about three-quarters of the missing skull. X-ray analysis showed 30 to 40 tiny metal fragments running from the rear head wound toward the front, with a sizable metal fragment above the right eye; two small metal fragments were recovered and given to the FBI. The autopsy also disclosed a wound near the base of the back of the neck slightly to the right of the spine, with the bullet traced through the body and, with Parkland Hospital information, concluded to have emerged from the front of the neck at the tracheotomy site. The autopsy concluded at approximately 11 p.m., body preparation for burial finished around 4 a.m., and the President's body was taken to the East Room of the White House, where it was placed under ceremonial military guard.

The Shots From the Texas School Book Depository section introduces the chapter's purpose, explaining that the Commission will analyze evidence and set forth its conclusions concerning the source, effect, number, and timing of the shots that killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally. The Commission evaluated seven distinct categories of evidence, including eyewitness testimony, limousine damage, expert examinations of the rifle and bullet fragments, wound analysis, ballistics tests, clothing examination, and photographic evidence.

The Witnesses section establishes that passengers in the lead motorcade cars generally believed the shots came from the rear and right—toward the Texas School Book Depository—though none saw anyone fire. Several spectators at Houston and Elm Streets, however, did see a rifle being fired from the easternmost sixth-floor window on the building's south side, and others saw a rifle in that window immediately afterward. Three Depository employees on the fifth floor heard the shots fired from the floor directly above them. The Commission found no credible evidence suggesting the shots came from the railroad bridge over the Triple Underpass, the railroad yards, or any other location besides the Depository. A photograph (Commission Exhibit No. 477) shows Howard L. Brennan's position on November 22, 1963.

Near the Depository section presents testimony from eyewitnesses who saw a man fire a weapon from the sixth-floor window. Howard L. Brennan, a steamfitter, watched from a retaining wall approximately 107 feet from the Depository entrance and 120 feet from the sixth-floor southeast corner window, and was corroborated by the Zapruder film. Brennan saw 70-85 percent of the rifle and described the shooter firing his last shot before withdrawing. Amos Lee Euins, a 15-year-old student, saw a "pipe thing" sticking from the window and watched the man fire twice more from behind a fountain bench, reporting his observations to police (though his testimony was initially misheard as "fifth floor" due to Officer Harkness's hasty count). Robert H. Jackson, a Dallas Times Herald photographer in the motorcade, saw a rifle being drawn back into the sixth-floor window after the third shot, an observation confirmed by fellow passengers Thomas Dillard, James Underwood, Malcolm Couch, and James Darnell. Mayor Earle Cabell's wife saw a "projection" from a top-floor window as the car turned at Elm and Houston. James N. Crawford and Mary Ann Mitchell, deputy district clerks, witnessed the shooting from the southeast corner of Elm and Houston, with Crawford describing a quick profile-like movement in the sixth-floor window.

On the Fifth Floor section recounts the experience of three Depository employees on the fifth floor during the assassination. James Jarman Jr., Bonnie Ray Williams, and Harold Norman had gathered at the fifth-floor windows to watch the parade. Norman, positioned in the southeast corner window directly beneath the sniper's location, heard shots and debris falling, concluding the shots came from above. Williams noted that the second and third shots shook the building and dislodged cement onto his head, with Norman stating the shots came "right from over our head" and that he could hear shell casings ejecting and hitting the floor. Jarman initially thought the first sound was a backfire or salute, but after the third shot declared it was gunfire aimed at the President. After fleeing to the west side, Jarman reasoned that the debris on Williams's head confirmed the shots came from above. The Commission conducted experiments on March 20, May 9, June 7, and September 6, 1964, in which a Secret Service agent operated a rifle bolt above the witnesses' fifth-floor positions while cartridge shells were dropped at three-second intervals; Norman confirmed the sounds matched what he heard on November 22, and all seven Commissioners clearly heard the shells drop to the floor.

The Commission found no credible evidence that shots were fired from the Triple Underpass railroad bridge or adjacent railroad yards, despite early witness speculation about shot origins. Patrolmen were stationed on the bridge and Stemmons Freeway overpass per advance Secret Service and Dallas Police plans to keep unauthorized persons away; they allowed 15 identified railroad employees to remain on the bridge to watch the motorcade. Union Terminal Co. employee Lee E. Bowers Jr., in a tower northwest of the Depository, observed only 3 to 4 people in the general area and 3 cars entering the area in the 20 minutes before the motorcade arrived. After the shots, no one on the bridge or in the nearby area saw anyone with a rifle or suspicious activity, and bystanders who searched the area found no evidence of a shooter in the railroad yards or near the Depository. Witnesses on the bridge had varying accounts of the number and origin of the shots, which Bowers attributed to echo effects between the Depository and Triple Underpass.

After the assassination, Secret Service and FBI agents examined the Presidential limousine. They found two bullet fragments (a 44.6-grain nose portion and a 21.0-grain base portion) on the front seat, three small lead particles under the left jump seat previously occupied by Mrs. Connally, lead residue and small cracks on the outer layer of the laminated windshield, and a dent in the chrome strip at the top of the windshield left of the rearview mirror. Spectrographic analysis showed all bullet fragments had similar metallic composition, but it could not be confirmed if they came from the same bullet; the total weight of the fragments was consistent with portions of a single 160 to 161 grain bullet. FBI firearms expert Robert A. Frazier testified the windshield cracks and lead residue proved it was struck from the inside, and the chrome dent was caused by a high-velocity projectile (possibly one of the front seat fragments) striking the inside surface, though it was uncertain if the dent predated the assassination.

The three spent cartridge cases found on the Depository’s sixth floor, the recovered 6.5mm Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, the nearly whole bullet from Governor Connally’s Parkland Hospital stretcher, and all bullet fragments from the Presidential limousine were subjected to firearms identification analysis by qualified experts. The unanimous expert conclusion was that the nearly whole bullet, the two largest bullet fragments, and the three cartridge cases were definitely fired from the C2766 Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found on the sixth floor, to the exclusion of all other weapons.

Shortly after the assassination, Dallas police searched the Depository building. At approximately 1:12 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Luke Mooney found three empty cartridge cases on the sixth floor near the southeast corner window, and guarded the scene until police technicians arrived to photograph and process the evidence. At 1:22 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Eugene Boone and Deputy Constable Seymour Weitzman discovered the bolt-action rifle with telescopic sight between rows of boxes in the sixth floor northwest corner near the staircase. The scene was left undisturbed until Captain J.W. Fritz and Lieutenant J.C. Day arrived to photograph the weapon; after confirming no fingerprints were on the bolt knob and the stock was too rough for prints, Lieutenant Day picked up the rifle by the stock, had Captain Fritz open the bolt to eject a live round, and took the weapon to the police department for examination. Neither Boone nor Weitzman handled the rifle.

A nearly whole bullet was found on the stretcher used to transport Governor Connally at Parkland Hospital after the assassination. After Governor Connally was moved from the stretcher to an operating table on the second floor, hospital senior engineer Darrell C. Tomlinson moved the empty stretcher to the ground floor corridor, where it bumped against a wall and a bullet rolled out. While Tomlinson was unsure if the bullet came from Connally’s stretcher or an adjacent unconnected one, the Commission concluded it came from Connally’s stretcher, as evidence ruled out President Kennedy’s stretcher as a source: Kennedy remained on his stretcher from arrival until his body was placed in a casket in the same emergency room, and the stretcher was later moved to a different trauma room.

The bolt-action, clip-fed rifle found on the Depository’s sixth floor is marked "MADE ITALY," "CAL. 6.5," "1940," and serial number C2766, making it the only known rifle of its type with that serial number. FBI experts identified it as a 6.5-millimeter model 91/38 Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, confirming the caliber by fitting a matching cartridge and measuring a sulfur cast of the barrel interior with a micrometer; it appeared outwardly like a 7.35-millimeter rifle but had been rebarreled to 6.5mm. The rifle is 40.2 inches long, weighs 8 pounds, and has a minimum broken-down length of 34.8 inches (the length of the wooden stock). It is fitted with an inexpensive four-power telescopic sight stamped "Optics Ordnance Inc./Hollywood California" and "Made in Japan," and a non-standard leather sling that appears to be a musical instrument, carrying case, or camera bag strap.

Four firearms identification experts analyzed the nearly whole bullet, two largest bullet fragments, and three cartridge cases to determine if they were fired from the recovered C2766 Mannlicher-Carcano rifle. Two of these experts testified before the Commission: Robert A. Frazier, a 23-year FBI Laboratory firearms identification specialist with an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 comparison examinations and 400 prior court testimonies; and Joseph D. Nicol, superintendent of the Illinois Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation with thousands of bullet and cartridge case examination experience since 1941.

This section outlines the general principles of firearms identification, which rely on matching unique microscopic markings on bullets and cartridge cases to test-fired samples from a specific firearm to confirm a given weapon fired a piece of evidence. Experts Frazier and Nicol, alongside independent FBI examiners, positively identified the nearly whole bullet recovered from President Kennedy's stretcher and two larger bullet fragments found in the Presidential limousine as having been fired from the C2766 Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found in the Texas School Depository to the exclusion of all other weapons. Smaller bullet fragments recovered from the limousine and during the President's medical treatment could only be confirmed to match the larger fragments and rifle ammunition in metallic composition, while three cartridge cases recovered from the Depository's sixth floor were also positively linked to the assassination rifle.

This section details the Commission's evaluation of evidence to identify the source of shots fired at President Kennedy and Governor Connally, including review of expert medical testimony from doctors who treated the pair at Parkland Hospital and conducted the autopsy at Bethesda Naval Hospital, analysis of the men's clothing, and special wound ballistics tests performed with the C2766 Mannlicher-Carcano rifle and matching 6.5-millimeter ammunition.

This section covers the autopsy findings for President Kennedy's head wounds, where the three examining pathologists concluded the smaller hole in the rear of his skull was the entrance wound and the large opening on the right side of his head was the exit wound, based on beveling/cratering effects consistent with a shot fired from behind and above. Wound ballistics tests conducted at Edgewood Arsenal using the assassination rifle and matching ammunition confirmed that a shot from 90 yards could produce wounds identical to the President's, with test bullet fragments closely matching those recovered from the Presidential limousine.

This section details findings related to President Kennedy's neck wounds, including the autopsy identification of a small, clean-edged entrance wound at the base of the back of his neck, with the bullet passing through neck muscles, bruising the upper pleural cavity and top of the right lung, and tearing the trachea before exiting through the front of the neck (the site of the later tracheotomy incision). Parkland Hospital doctors could not determine if the front neck wound was an entrance or exit wound based on appearance alone, but concluded it was an exit wound after reviewing autopsy findings, bullet trajectory, and the lack of any other recovered bullet. The section also addresses early public confusion stemming from Dr. Malcolm Perry's 1963 press conference statements, which were based on incomplete information (he was unaware of the rear neck entry wound and small rear head entry wound at the time) and addressed hypothetical scenarios rather than his final professional assessment.

Dr. Malcolm Perry’s recollection of his press conference comments regarding President Kennedy’s neck wound is corroborated by a November 23, 1963 *New York Herald Tribune* report, which quotes Perry stating it was possible the neck wound was an entrance wound and the back-of-head wound was the exit of a single missile. This account aligns with Perry’s formal Commission testimony, in which he noted the neck wound’s characteristics alone were consistent with either an entry or exit wound. Perry and fellow physician Dr. Clark emphasized at the press conference that they had no definitive way to confirm the wound’s nature at the time.

Army Wound Ballistics experts at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland conducted tests to simulate the path of the bullet that struck President Kennedy’s neck. Using 5.5-inch thick material matching the distance the bullet traveled through the President’s body, with animal skin on both sides, researchers fired 6.5mm Western Cartridge Co. bullets from the C2766 Mannlicher-Carcano rifle at a distance of 180 feet. Entry holes on the simulated neck were regular and round, while exit holes were slightly elongated or round, matching descriptions of the President’s neck wound provided by Drs. Perry and Carrico. Autopsy findings noted the bullet did not strike bone in the President’s neck, traveled at a slight downward angle, and moved right to left laterally through his body; experts confirmed the bullet would lose very little velocity passing through soft neck tissue. Additional tests using break-type screens measured the bullet’s velocity: average entrance velocity was 1,904 feet per second, average exit velocity 1,772 to 1,798 feet per second, with the bullet traveling in a straight, stable line through the simulated neck.

Examination of President Kennedy’s clothing from November 22, 1963 found holes and tears consistent with a missile entering the back of his clothing near his lower neck and exiting the front of his shirt behind his tie, which was nicked on the left side of the knot by the horizontally moving projectile. All defects could have been caused by a 6.5mm bullet. The President’s suit jacket had a roughly circular 1/4-inch entry hole on the upper rear, 5 3/8 inches below the collar top and 1 3/4 inches right of the center back seam, with inward-pressed fibers and copper traces in the hole margins, consistent with a 6.5mm bullet. The back of his shirt had a matching 1/4-inch circular entry hole 5 3/4 inches below the collar top and 1 1/8 inches right of the shirt’s back center, with inward-pressed fibers, confirmed as an entry hole from the same missile that struck the jacket. The front of the shirt had two aligned vertical ragged slits 7/8 inch below the collar button and corresponding buttonhole, with outward-protruding fibers indicating an exit; while the irregular shape precluded a conclusive determination that the slits were bullet holes, they could have been caused by a round bullet. The tie’s horizontal nick indicated it was torn by a horizontally moving object, but fiber analysis could not determine the missile’s direction or nature.

While riding in the right jump seat of the presidential limousine on November 22, 1963, Governor John Connally sustained wounds to his back, chest, right wrist, and left thigh. Dr. Robert Shaw concluded the small, clean-edged wound on Connally’s back was an entry wound; the bullet traveled downward through his chest, shattered his fifth rib, and exited below his right nipple via a 2-inch ragged opening confirmed as the exit point. During Connally’s April 21, 1964 Commission testimony, Dr. Shaw measured a 25° declination angle between the back entry and front chest exit wounds. At the time of the shooting, Connally was unaware of any injuries beyond his chest wounds. Dr. Charles F. Gregory observed a linear perforating wound on the back of Connally’s right wrist, ~2 inches above the wrist joint on the thumb side, ~1/5 inch wide and 1 inch long; thread and cloth were carried into the wound, and X-rays revealed small metal fragments, leading Gregory to conclude it was an entry wound, with a matching ~1/5 inch long exit wound on the palm side of the wrist ~3/4 inch above the wrist crease. Dr. Shaw initially believed the wrist wound was palm entry and back exit, but deferred to Gregory’s more detailed surgical examination of the injury. Connally also had a ~2/5 inch diameter puncture wound on his left thigh, ~5–6 inches above his knee, with minimal soft tissue damage indicating a tangential or low-velocity impact from a larger missile; X-rays found a tiny metallic fragment embedded in the thigh, and surgeons concluded the thigh wound was not caused by this small fragment but by a larger missile.

Examination of Governor Connally’s November 22, 1963 clothing found holes matching his wounds, though many garments had been cleaned and pressed prior to testing, limiting the ability to confirm bullet cause or direction definitively. The back of his coat had a horizontal ~5/8 inch long, 1/4 inch high hole 1 1/8 inches from the right sleeve seam and 7 1/4 inches right of the midline. The front of the coat had a 3/8 inch diameter circular hole 5 inches right of the front right edge, slightly above the top button, and the end of the right sleeve had a rough ~5/8 inch long, 3/8 inch wide hole; all three could have been caused by a bullet, but direction could not be confirmed. The back of his shirt had a ragged horizontal ~5/8 inch long, 1/2 inch high tear near the right sleeve attachment, plus a smaller ~3/16 inch tear adjacent to it, matching the coat’s back hole. The front of the shirt had an irregular H-shaped tear ~1.5 inches high with a 1-inch wide crossbar, located 5 inches from the right seam and 9 inches from the top of the right sleeve; laundering left insufficient characteristics to confirm direction or cause, but the rear hole could be a 6.5mm entry wound and the front hole the corresponding exit. The right sleeve French cuff had a ragged hole 1.5 inches from the sleeve end and 5.5 inches from the outer cuff-link hole; post-laundering characteristics were insufficient for positive conclusions, but the hole could have been caused by a bullet passing through the wrist from back to front. His trousers had a ~1/4 inch diameter roughly circular hole near the left knee, with slight edge tearing giving it a general bullet hole appearance, but the missile’s direction could not be determined.

Ballistics experiments and medical findings established that the missile that passed through Governor Connally’s wrist and thigh first traversed his chest. Army Wound Ballistics experts confirmed the wrist wound was not caused by a pristine (straight-flying, unmarked) bullet: a pristine bullet exits a rifle muzzle in a straight, spinning line with minimal surface striking air, while deflection causes yaw (wobbling, irregular flight) that exposes more surface to impact material. Researchers fired the C2766 Mannlicher-Carcano rifle (the type found in the Depository, using the same ammunition as the bullet recovered from Connally’s stretcher and limousine fragments) from 70 yards at flesh and bone protected by material similar to Connally’s clothing, replicating his wrist wound virtually identically; the test bullet had a substantially flattened nose from striking material, with an average entrance velocity of 1,858 feet per second and average exit velocity of 1,776 feet per second. Six factors confirmed the wrist was not struck by a pristine bullet: (1) test material sustained greater damage than Connally’s wrist; (2) test material had a smaller entry and larger exit wound (a pristine bullet trait) while Connally’s wrist had a larger entry and smaller exit, indicating a tumbling bullet; (3) cloth was carried into the wrist wound, characteristic of an irregular missile; (4) partial cutting of a radial nerve and tendon suggested a tumbling bullet, as a pristine bullet would push aside soft tissue rather than tear it; (5) the stretcher bullet’s nose was not flattened like the test pristine bullet that struck the simulated wrist; (6) the thigh wound bullet had very low velocity, unlike the high exit velocity of pristine test bullets. All evidence indicated the 158.6 grain bullet found on Connally’s stretcher (original pre-firing weight 160–161 grains) caused all his wounds: X-rays showed tiny metallic fragments in his wrist, consistent with the nearly whole bullet depositing small pieces as it tumbled through the tissue. The three Parkland Hospital doctors who treated Connally independently opined a single bullet passed through his chest, tumbled through his wrist with little exit velocity leaving small metallic fragments, punctured his thigh after losing nearly all velocity, and fell out of the thigh wound. Connally testified he believed all his wounds came from a single bullet, reconstructing his seated position (right palm resting on his left thigh) to explain how one missile could strike all three injury sites. Wound ballistics experts and Connally’s Parkland doctors (who recreated his posture with his arm slightly higher but in the same alignment) concurred a single bullet caused all of Connally’s wounds.

The cumulative body of evidence from eyewitnesses, firearms and ballistic experts, and medical authorities confirmed that the shots which struck President Kennedy and Governor Connally were fired from above and behind the two men, specifically from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository Building. To validate this conclusion and map precise details of the event, the Commission requested additional investigation including analysis of motion picture footage of the assassination and onsite reenactment tests. Findings from FBI and Secret Service investigations confirmed the Commission's initial determinations about the source and trajectory of the shots, and also enabled approximations of the Presidential limousine's location at the time each shot was fired and the time intervals between shots.

Motion picture footage captured by spectators Abraham Zapruder, Orville O. Nix, and Mary Muchmore provided critical context for the assassination sequence, with the Zapruder film serving as the most complete record of the event. FBI examination of the Zapruder camera confirmed it captured 18.3 frames per second, allowing researchers to calculate timing of events by assigning 1/18.3 seconds to the action between each consecutive frame. The footage and individual frame slides were reviewed by Governor and Mrs. Connally, the Governor's medical team, autopsy surgeons, and Army wound ballistics scientists to map the precise sequence of events. Testing of the assassin's Mannlicher-Carcano rifle determined a minimum of 2.3 seconds was required between successive shots. On May 24, 1964, the FBI and Secret Service conducted a full reenactment of the assassination: since the Presidential limousine was unavailable for remodeling, the Secret Service follow-up car (a similar vehicle) was used as a substitute, with agents of matching physical build seated in the same relative positions as Kennedy and Connally. The sixth-floor sniper's nest was replicated using the recovered assassination rifle, which was mounted with a camera to record the view from the assassin's position, and the original spectator camera positions were used to capture comparative footage of the reenactment. Agents confirmed the oak tree foliage along the motorcade route matched conditions on the day of the assassination.

Analysis of the Zapruder film and reenactment results established that President Kennedy was most likely struck in the neck between Zapruder frames 210 and 225, when his limousine was between 138.9 and 153.8 feet west of station C (a marked reference point on Houston Street's west curbline). The President was visible to the assassin starting at frame 210, when the car cleared the obstruction of a large oak tree, and his visible reaction to the neck wound became clearly apparent by frame 226. FBI inspection of the Presidential limousine found no interior damage consistent with a bullet exiting the President's neck, ruling out the possibility the bullet struck the vehicle. Given the close seating arrangement of Kennedy and Governor Connally (with Kennedy seated to Connally's right on the extreme right of the limousine), the bullet that passed through Kennedy's neck most likely struck Connally next. Reenactment tests confirmed the entry points of the two men were aligned in the assassin's rifle scope between frames 207 and 210, and trajectory measurements calculated an average angle of declination of 20°52'30" for the shot, adjusted to 17°43'30" when accounting for the 3°9' downward grade of Elm Street, a trajectory consistent with a bullet passing through Kennedy's neck and into Connally's back. Army Wound Ballistics Branch experiments further supported this single-bullet theory: test firings using animal flesh covered in cloth to simulate clothing produced a bullet with matching velocity loss and tumbling behavior to the bullet found on Connally's stretcher, consistent with the projectile passing through both men's bodies. Trajectory alignment was approximate rather than conclusive, as exact recreation of the men's positions was impossible, and variations in their posture or seating position could have altered the calculated angle.

Wound ballistics specialists from Edgewood Arsenal evaluated medical evidence of President Kennedy and Governor Connally's wounds alongside controlled ballistics tests to assess the single-bullet theory. Drs. Arthur J. Dziemian (Army Wound Ballistics Branch chief with 17 years of specialization) and Olivier concluded it was probable a single bullet passed through the President's neck and caused all of the Governor's wounds, citing the Governor's wrist wound severity (indicating the bullet lost velocity after passing through the President's neck and yawing in flight) and the large back wound consistent with a yawing bullet. Dr. Frederick W. Light, Jr. found anatomical evidence insufficient for a firm independent opinion but agreed the single-bullet trajectory was probable based on the two men's positions in the limousine.

After the first shot struck President Kennedy's neck, a second shot penetrated the back of his head and exited through the upper right skull, as captured in the Zapruder, Nix, and Muchmore films. Analysis of these films, combined with plat mapping of cameramen positions, precisely located the President at the time of the head shot: 230.8 feet from the west curbline intersection of Houston and Elm Streets, 265.3 feet from the sixth-floor rifle window, at a 15°21’ angle of declination. The impact was visible as an explosion of brain tissue from the right side of the President's head in the footage.

Witness accounts of the number of shots varied widely: most reported three, some cited two, and others reported four to six. The Commission noted a single shot produces multiple distinct noises (muzzle blast, bullet shock wave, target impact) that can be misperceived as separate shots, and tall Dealey Plaza buildings may have distorted sound. Physical evidence, including three spent cartridges on the sixth floor proven to be fired from the assassination rifle, and bullet fragments from at least two (possibly three) separate bullets, led the Commission to conclude three shots were fired, though it acknowledged the possibility of only two shots with witnesses misperceiving multiple noises from a single shot, and potential subconscious bias from widespread press reporting of a three-shot conclusion.

Given that one shot passed through the President's neck and likely struck the Governor, a second shot hit the President's head, no other shots struck the limousine, and three total shots were fired, the Commission concluded one shot missed the vehicle and its occupants. Evidence was inconclusive as to whether the first, second, or third shot was the one that missed.

The Commission evaluated the possibility that the first shot missed the limousine. Supporting this view, Secret Service Agent Glen A. Bennett reported hearing an initial shot followed by a second that hit the President, and Governor Connally testified he heard a shot, turned, and was struck by a second bullet without seeing the President hit. Mrs. Connally's testimony that she saw the President clutch his throat after the first shot, followed by her husband being hit, also aligned with a missed first shot, as she may have witnessed the President's reaction concurrent with the second shot. However, other evidence supported the first shot hitting the President: Special Agent Hill's testimony indicated the President was struck by the first shot, photographer James W. Altgens' photo (taken at approximately Zapruder frame 255, 2 seconds after the neck shot) captured the President reacting to the first impact, and Phillip L. Willis' photo (taken at approximately frame 210) aligned with the timing of the shot that struck both men. The Commission noted Governor Connally may have had a delayed reaction to being hit, and did not realize his wrist and thigh injuries until the next day, which could explain his recollection of not being struck by the first shot.

The Commission considered whether the second shot missed. The interval between the shot that struck the President's neck (Zapruder frames 210-225) and the head shot (frame 313) was 4.8 to 5.6 seconds, with a minimum 2.3 seconds required between rifle shots, leaving a window for a missed second shot during the interval. Witness testimony that shots were evenly spaced supported this possibility, as a missed second shot would fall near the midpoint of the interval. However, most witnesses recalled the second and third shots were bunched together, not evenly spaced, which argued against a missed second shot. The Commission also noted the assassin would have been firing near the minimum time required to fire three shots in the 4.8-5.6 second window, though it was possible to do so.

The Commission evaluated the possibility that the third shot missed, which aligned with the likelihood the assassin would miss the farthest shot, particularly as the limousine accelerated and turned right after the head shot, moving away from the sixth-floor rifle position. Some witness testimony supported this: AP photographer Altgens was certain the head shot was the last shot, and Dealey Plaza groundskeeper Emmett J. Hudson testified he heard a third shot after the head shot. Mrs. Kennedy's testimony also indicated neither the first nor second shot missed, as she saw her husband raise his hand to his forehead after the first shot, then was struck by the second head shot. Other witnesses reported a third shot hitting near the Triple Underpass: Royce G. Skelton testified a shot hit the left front of the President's car near the underpass, and Dallas Patrolman J.W. Foster reported a shot hitting the turf near a manhole there, though no physical evidence of bullet strikes was found at those locations. Separately, James T. Tague was hit on the cheek by an object during the shooting, and Deputy Sheriff Eddy R. Walthers found a fresh bullet mark on the south curb of Main Street; spectrographic analysis showed the mark contained lead with trace antimony but no copper, meaning it could not have been made by an intact military full metal-jacketed bullet like the one found on Governor Connally's stretcher. Tague believed the mark was caused by the second shot, as he heard a third shot after being hit.

The Final Shot The chapter examines whether the head shot was the final shot fired. While noise from a subsequent shot could have been masked by the Secret Service followup car's siren, or the drama of the head shot could have confused witnesses, eyewitness testimony overall indicates the head shot was the final shot. The mark on the south curb of Main Street cannot be conclusively identified with any specific shot. Tague's testimony about his cheek scratch does not help narrow the possibilities because he did not observe any shots striking the President. Given the wide range of possibilities, conflicting testimony, and impossibility of scientific verification, the Commission cannot conclusively determine which shot missed.

Time Span of Shots Witnesses at the scene generally estimated the shots were fired within 5 to 6 seconds. This approximation was likely based on publicized reports of the sequence: first shot to the neck, second wounding the Governor, and third shattering the President's head. The time span between the neck shot and the skull shot was 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. If the second shot missed, this represents the total time span of the shots. If the first or third shot missed, a minimum of 2.3 seconds (required to operate the rifle) must be added, yielding a minimum of 7.1 to 7.9 seconds for three shots. Longer intervals between a missed shot and a hit would extend this time span further.

Conclusion Based on the chapter's evidence analysis, the Commission concluded that the shots killing President Kennedy and wounding Governor Connally were fired from the sixth-floor window at the southeast corner of the Texas School Book Depository Building. Two bullets probably caused all wounds suffered by both men. Since the preponderance of evidence indicated three shots were fired, the Commission concluded one shot probably missed the Presidential limousine and its occupants, and that the three shots were fired over a time period ranging from approximately 4.8 to in excess of 7 seconds.

The preceding chapter established that the bullets killing President Kennedy and wounding Governor Connally came from the southeast corner window on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository and that the weapon was a Mannlicher-Carcano 6.5-millimeter rifle, serial number C2766. This chapter sets out the evidence supporting the Commission's conclusion about the assassin's identity.

The Commission evaluates eight categories of evidence: (1) ownership and possession of the assassination weapon, (2) how the weapon was brought into the Depository Building, (3) the identity of the person at the firing window, (4) the killing of Dallas Patrolman J.D. Tippit within 45 minutes of the assassination, (5) Oswald's resistance to arrest and attempted shooting of another officer, (6) Oswald's lies to police, (7) evidence linking Oswald to the attempted killing of Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker on April 10, 1963, and (8) Oswald's demonstrated capability with a rifle.

This section addresses ownership and possession of the assassination weapon, beginning with the purchase of the rifle by Oswald, tracing it from the manufacturer to the distributor to the retailer, examining the mail-order transaction, and confirming Oswald's possession through the post office box used for delivery, his use of the "Hidell" alias, counterfeit identification documents, the New Orleans activities conducted under that alias, a palmprint on the rifle barrel, and fiber evidence linking the rifle to Oswald's shirt.

Shortly after the rifle was recovered from the sixth floor of the Depository, FBI agents identified Crescent Firearms, Inc., of New York City, as a distributor of surplus Italian 6.5-millimeter military rifles. On the evening of November 22, 1963, Crescent's records showed it had shipped an Italian carbine bearing serial number C2766 to Klein's Sporting Goods Co. of Chicago. Officers at Klein's, searching records from 10 p.m. to 4 a.m., located the shipment of that serial-numbered rifle to "A. Hidell, Post Office Box 2915, Dallas, Texas," on March 20, 1963.

Klein's received the rifle from Crescent on February 21, 1963, bearing serial number C2766, and assigned it internal control number VC836. Italian Armed Forces Intelligence Service records confirmed this was the only rifle of its type with that serial number. According to Klein's shipping order form, one Italian carbine 6.5 X-4× scope, control number VC836, serial number C2766, was shipped parcel post on March 20, 1963, to "A. Hidell, P.O. Box 2915, Dallas, Texas."

Klein's microfilm records show an order for the rifle received on March 13, 1963, on a coupon clipped from the February 1963 issue of the American Rifleman, signed in handprinting "A. Hidell, P.O. Box 2915, Dallas, Texas," and mailed in a hand-addressed envelope of the same name and return address. Treasury Department and FBI document examiners identified the bold printing on the coupon and the writing on the envelope as Lee Harvey Oswald's, comparing them to his known handwriting on letters, his passport application, and check endorsements. A U.S. postal money order for $21.45 ($19.95 for rifle and scope, $1.50 for postage and handling) accompanied the order and was also identified as Oswald's. Klein's cash register imprinted the $21.45 receipt on the shipping order on March 13, 1963, and a corresponding bank deposit was made that same day.

Post office box 2915 in Dallas was rented to "Lee H. Oswald" from October 9, 1962, to May 14, 1963, with the application and a May 12, 1963 change-of-address card identified as Oswald's handwriting. The box was thus Oswald's when the rifle was shipped from Chicago on March 20, 1963. A change-of-address card requested forwarding of mail to New Orleans, where Oswald had moved on April 24. Postal Inspector Harry D. Holmes of the Dallas Post Office explained that packages are released to box holders on presentation of the notice regardless of whether the named recipient appears on the application, and identification is not ordinarily requested.

The "Hidell" alias was not limited to the rifle purchase. When arrested on the day of the assassination, Oswald possessed a Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver purchased by mail order from Seaport-Traders, Inc., using a coupon listing the purchaser as "A. J. Hidell Age 28" at P.O. Box 2915, Dallas. FBI and Treasury Department handwriting experts identified the writing on that form as Oswald's.

Among the identification cards in Oswald's wallet at his arrest were genuine Oswald Selective Service and Marine Corps certificates, alongside a counterfeit Selective Service notice of classification and a counterfeit Marine certificate of service in the name of "Alek James Hidell." The Hidell Selective Service card bore the signature "Alek J. Hidell" and a photograph of Oswald. Treasury Department and FBI questioned-documents experts testified the Hidell cards were counterfeit photographic reproductions made by photographing the Oswald cards, retouching the negatives, and printing from those retouched negatives, with the Hidell signature in Oswald's handwriting.

In Oswald's personal effects at 1026 North Beckley Avenue was a purported international certificate of vaccination signed by "Dr. A. J. Hideel, Post Office Box 30016, New Orleans," certifying that Oswald had been vaccinated for smallpox on June 8, 1963; the "Hideel" signature was identified as Oswald's, no "Dr. Hideel" is licensed in Louisiana, and no such post office box exists, though Oswald had rented New Orleans box 30061 on June 3, 1963, listing Marina Oswald and A. J. Hidell as additional recipients. "Hidell" was also the fictitious president Oswald assigned to the so-called New Orleans Chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, an organization of which he was the sole member, with Marina Oswald testifying that she was compelled to sign "Hidell" on membership cards and that "Hidell is merely an altered Fidel." Other job applications listed fictitious "Sgt. Robt. Hidell" and "George Hidell" as references, and the first name "Alek" — a nickname Oswald used in Russia — was signed on letters to Marina.

Additional evidence of ownership and possession was provided by a palmprint lifted from the underside of the rifle barrel near the firing end, approximately 3 inches under the woodstock, by Lt. J. C. Day of the Dallas police shortly after the rifle was found. The lift, performed before the rifle was surrendered to the FBI on November 22, was confirmed by FBI Laboratory tests showing the adhesive bore impressions matching the barrel's irregularities. FBI latent fingerprint supervisor Sebastian F. Latona identified the print as Oswald's right palmprint, a finding independently confirmed by New York City Police Department fingerprint expert Arthur Mandella and FBI expert Ronald G. Wittmus. Because the wooden foregrip covers this part of the barrel when the rifle is assembled, the palmprint on the underside of the barrel demonstrates that Oswald handled the rifle when it was disassembled.

A tuft of several cotton fibers in dark blue, gray-black, and orange-yellow shades was found lodged in a crevice between the rifle's butt plate and wooden stock. FBI special agent Paul M. Stombaugh, assigned to the Hair and Fiber Unit of the FBI Laboratory, compared these fibers on November 23, 1963, with fibers from the shirt Oswald was wearing when arrested in the Texas Theatre, finding that the colors, shades, and twist of the tuft fibers matched those in Oswald's shirt. Stombaugh cautioned that fiber analysis cannot yield absolute identification, testifying that while there was "no doubt" the fibers could have come from that shirt, the possibility of another identical shirt could not be eliminated.

The Commission accepted Stombaugh's probabilistic assessment and concluded the fibers most probably came from the shirt Oswald wore at his arrest, the same shirt he wore on the morning of the assassination. Marina Oswald testified she thought her husband wore that shirt to work that day, and former landlady Mary Bledsoe identified the shirt on Oswald approximately 10 minutes after the assassination by a distinctive hole in its right elbow. A bus transfer obtained when Oswald left the bus was still in the shirt pocket at his arrest, undermining his claim to police that he had changed shirts. Stombaugh also testified the fibers "looked as if they had just been picked up" — clean, well-colored, with no grease or fragmentation — indicating they were deposited "in the recent past," which together with evidence that Oswald had not been at Ruth Paine's Irving home (where the rifle was kept) for 10 days prior to November 21 and the absence of evidence he used the rifle between September 23 and November 22, supports a finding that the fibers were deposited on the rifle on the day of the assassination.

FBI expert Stombaugh testified that fibers on the rifle might retain freshness if the weapon had been "put aside" after catching them. The rifle was likely wrapped in a blanket for about 8 weeks before November 22, and continuous storage in the blanket could explain the fibers' relatively fresh appearance. While the Commission could not determine exactly when the fibers were deposited, it concluded that the fibers most probably came from Oswald's shirt, reinforcing the conclusion that Oswald owned and handled the assassination weapon.

Between March 2 and April 24, 1963, the Oswalds lived in a rented house on Neely Street in Dallas with a small back yard. On one Sunday, while his wife Marina was hanging diapers, Oswald asked her to photograph him holding a rifle, a pistol, and copies of two newspapers later identified as the Worker and the Militant. Two pictures were taken, and the Commission concluded the rifle shown in these photographs is the same rifle found on the sixth floor of the Depository Building (Commission Exhibits 133-A and 133-B).

FBI photography expert Lyndal Shaneyfelt photographed the assassination rifle in a position duplicating Exhibit 133-A and testified the rifles shared the same general configuration, including a faintly visible notch in the stock. While he found no differences, he could not make a positive identification to the exclusion of all other similar rifles. Authenticity of the photographs was established through Shaneyfelt's comparison of the Exhibit 133-B negative with a new negative made using Oswald's Imperial Reflex camera, concluding the negative was exposed in Oswald's camera to the exclusion of all others. Exhibit 133-A could not be tested the same way because its negative was never recovered, but identical backgrounds, lighting, and shadows indicate the two pictures were taken at the same time with the same camera, consistent with Marina Oswald's testimony.

The timing of the photograph aligns with the rifle's acquisition timeline. The rifle was shipped from Klein's in Chicago on March 20, 1963, while the Oswalds lived on Neely Street. By examining the newspapers Oswald held, the Commission determined the photograph must have been taken sometime after March 27, 1963. Marina testified it was taken on a Sunday about two weeks before the attempted shooting of Major General Edwin A. Walker on April 10, 1963. By Sunday, March 31, Oswald had likely received the rifle shipped from Chicago, the revolver shipped from Los Angeles, and the two newspapers appearing in the picture.

Marina Oswald testified that the rifle found on the sixth floor was the "fateful rifle of Lee Oswald" and was the only rifle her husband owned after returning from the Soviet Union in June 1962. Purchased in March 1963, the rifle was taken to New Orleans, where Marina saw it in their rented apartment during the summer of 1963; she stated Oswald may have practiced with the telescopic sight and bolt on the screened porch. In September 1963, Oswald loaded his possessions into Ruth Paine's station wagon for the move to Irving, Texas, and Marina stated the rifle was among them, though Ruth Paine testified she was unaware of it. From September 24 until the assassination, the rifle was stored in a green and brown blanket in the Paines' garage. Marina saw the rifle stock when she opened the blanket looking for baby crib parts, and Michael Paine moved the blanket several times, believing it contained tent poles or camping equipment. About three hours after the assassination, a detective and deputy sheriff observed the tied blanket-roll on the garage floor and could detect the outline of a rifle, and FBI examiner Stombaugh found a bulge approximately 10 inches long that could have been caused by the rifle's 11-inch telescopic sight.

The Commission concluded that the assassination rifle was owned and possessed by Lee Harvey Oswald based on five findings: (1) Oswald purchased the rifle, (2) Oswald's palmprint on the rifle showed he had handled it while it was disassembled, (3) fibers on the rifle most probably came from the shirt Oswald wore on November 22, (4) a photograph at Oswald's apartment showed him holding this rifle, and (5) the rifle was kept among Oswald's possessions from purchase until the day of the assassination. The Commission concluded this weapon was used to assassinate President Kennedy and wound Governor Connally.

The Commission evaluated evidence on how Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano rifle (serial number C2766) was brought into the Depository Building. The evaluation considered: (1) circumstances of Oswald's return to Irving on Thursday, November 21, 1963; (2) the rifle's disappearance from its normal storage place; (3) Oswald's arrival at the Depository on November 22 carrying a long and bulky brown paper package; (4) a long handmade brown paper bag found near the shooting point; and (5) palmprint, fiber, and paper analyses linking Oswald and the weapon to the bag.

In October and November 1963, Oswald lived in a Dallas roominghouse while his family stayed with Ruth Paine in Irving, about 15 miles from his workplace. He normally commuted on weekends with Buell Wesley Frazier, a Depository coworker and neighbor of the Paines. On the morning of November 21, Oswald asked Frazier for a ride home that afternoon, explaining he was going home to get curtain rods for an apartment. Frazier's sister, Linnie Mae Randle, also heard this explanation. However, the Commission found this story implausible: Oswald's landlady testified his room already had curtains and rods, two curtain rods belonging to Ruth Paine remained in the garage after Oswald's arrest, Oswald never asked Mrs. Paine about curtain rods, Marina said Oswald never mentioned them, and no curtain rods were found in the Depository. The Commission gave weight to the fact that Oswald gave a false reason for his midweek trip, which conveniently provided a pretext for carrying a bulky package the following morning.

On the evening of November 21, Oswald played with his daughter June on the lawn before dinner, after which Ruth Paine and Marina cleaned house and tended to the children in the east bedrooms. The west end of the house contained the attached garage, where the Oswalds' belongings, including the rifle wrapped in the brown and green blanket, were stored. Around 9 p.m., Ruth Paine went to the garage for half an hour to paint children's blocks and noticed the light was on, which she was certain she had not left on. Both Marina and Ruth Paine testified Oswald was in bed by 9 p.m., and neither saw him in the garage, but the 8 to 9 p.m. window provided ample opportunity for Oswald to retrieve and prepare the rifle. Only if disassembled could the rifle fit into the paper bag found near the shooting window; an FBI firearms expert assembled the rifle in 6 minutes using a coin as a tool and could disassemble it faster. After the assassination, Marina checked the garage and was relieved to see the blanket in its usual position with something inside, not yet knowing the rifle was gone. When police arrived around 3 p.m., Marina indicated the rifle was in the blanket; Mrs. Paine stepped onto the blanket-roll while translating, and an officer picked it up, revealing it to be empty, confirming the rifle had been removed.

On the morning of November 22, Oswald left the Paine house in Irving at approximately 7:15 a.m. while Marina was still in bed, and neither she nor Ruth Paine saw him leave. About half a block away, Linnie Mae Randle observed Oswald from her breakfast-room window walking toward Frazier's car carrying a heavy brown bag, gripping it near the top in his right hand; the bag was more bulky toward the bottom and tapered toward the top, and she estimated it was approximately 28 inches long and 8 inches wide, with color similar to the bag found on the sixth floor. She saw Oswald place the package in the back seat of Frazier's car. Frazier noticed the brown paper package on the back seat and asked about it; Oswald replied, "curtain rods," which Frazier accepted given Oswald's stated reason for the Thursday trip. Frazier estimated the bag was about 2 feet long and 5 to 6 inches wide. Frazier also noted Oswald carried no lunch that day, despite his usual habit of bringing lunch when riding with Frazier.

Buell Wesley Frazier parked about two blocks north of the Depository. Oswald exited first, picked up the brown paper bag, and walked ahead toward the building while Frazier followed, his attention diverted by railroad switching operations. Oswald carried the package with one end under his armpit and the lower portion in his right hand, held straight and parallel to his body. By the time Oswald entered the rear door, he was approximately fifty feet ahead of Frazier—the first time he had not walked alongside Frazier. Once inside, Frazier did not see Oswald. Employee Jack Dougherty believed he saw Oswald arriving but did not recall him carrying anything, and no other employee reported seeing Oswald enter that morning.

The Commission addressed the discrepancy between witness estimates of the bag's length and the actual dimensions of the disassembled rifle. Frazier and Mrs. Randle estimated the bag at roughly twenty-seven to twenty-eight inches, while the wooden rifle stock measured 34.8 inches and the bag recovered from the sixth floor measured thirty-eight inches. When Frazier demonstrated how Oswald carried the package, he showed the disassembled rifle was too long to fit comfortably under the armpit. Mrs. Randle folded the recovered bag down to about twenty-eight and a half inches, saying it "wasn't that long." The Commission concluded the witnesses were mistaken about length, noting Randle saw the bag only fleetingly and Frazier's view was distracted by the railroad operations.

A handmade paper bag was discovered in the southeast corner of the sixth floor beside the window from which shots were fired. The bag was constructed from wrapping paper and tape, was not a commercially available type, and was sized to contain the disassembled Mannlicher-Carcano rifle (serial No. C2766), which was also recovered from the sixth floor. Three cartons had been positioned at the window apparently to serve as a gun rest, with a fourth carton placed behind them. A person seated on the rear carton could assemble the rifle while being shielded from view by the stacked cartons. Lieutenant J. C. Day of the Dallas Police inscribed a note on the bag indicating it was found next to the window from which the gun was fired.

Using silver nitrate processing, the FBI Laboratory developed a latent right palmprint and left index fingerprint on the paper bag. Sebastian F. Latona, supervisor of the FBI's Latent Fingerprint Section, identified both prints as belonging to Lee Harvey Oswald. Ronald G. Wittmus of the FBI and Arthur Mandella of the New York City Police Department independently confirmed the identification. No other identifiable prints were recovered from the bag. The palmprint appeared on the closed end of the bag and was consistent with Oswald having handled a heavy or bulky object—consistent with the manner in which he carried the long package from Frazier's car.

On the day of the assassination, Dallas police collected samples of wrapping paper and tape from the Depository shipping room and forwarded them to the FBI Laboratory. Questioned-documents expert James C. Cadigan compared the samples with the paper and tape from the bag itself and found them identical in all observable characteristics, including thickness, color, width, knurled markings, texture, felting pattern, and fiber composition. A replica bag made on December 1, 1963, from shipping room materials exhibited different characteristics, reflecting the Depository's routine consumption of approximately one roll every three working days. The complete identity of materials enabled the Commission to conclude the bag was fabricated from Depository supplies—materials accessible to Oswald on the first floor in the course of his duties.

FBI Laboratory examiner Paul M. Stombaugh found a single brown delustered viscose fiber and several light green cotton fibers inside the paper bag. The blanket in which the rifle was stored contained brown and green cotton, viscose, and woolen fibers. The fibers recovered from the bag matched corresponding fibers from the blanket in all observable microscopic characteristics, though not every fiber type present in the blanket was found in the bag. Stombaugh therefore could not definitively state the fibers originated from the blanket, but he confirmed the rifle could have transferred such fibers to the bag's interior. The Commission regarded this testimony as probative when considered alongside the other evidence.

The Commission concluded that the preponderance of the evidence establishes that Lee Harvey Oswald told Frazier the curtain rod story to account for both his Thursday return to Irving and the bulky package he intended to bring to work; obtained paper and tape from the Depository's wrapping bench and constructed a bag large enough to hold the disassembled rifle; removed the rifle from the blanket in the Paines' garage on Thursday evening; carried the rifle into the Depository concealed in the bag; and left the bag alongside the southeast corner window from which the shots were fired.

Lee Harvey Oswald was hired on October 15, 1963, as an order filler at the Texas School Book Depository. His duties took him principally to the first and sixth floors, giving him ready access to the sixth floor and the southeast corner window from which the shots were fired. The Commission evaluated both the physical evidence recovered from the window area and the testimony of eyewitnesses to determine whether Oswald was present at the window at the time of the assassination.

Beneath the southeast corner window stood a large carton of books measuring approximately 18 by 12 by 14 inches, relocated from a south wall stack. Atop it rested a small "Rolling Readers" carton measuring approximately 13 by 9 by 8 inches, and in front of that on the windowsill sat another small "Rolling Readers" carton. These two smaller cartons had been moved from a stack about three aisles away. The three cartons together formed an improvised gun rest, while a fourth carton placed on the floor behind them allowed a seated person to look southwesterly down Elm Street over the top of the "Rolling Readers" cartons. The handmade paper bag bearing Oswald's palmprint and fingerprint lay next to these cartons.

The FBI developed twenty identifiable fingerprints and eight palmprints on the cartons forwarded from the sixth floor. Neither the carton on the windowsill nor the large carton beneath the window bore prints attributable to Oswald. However, the other "Rolling Readers" carton contained a left palmprint and right index fingerprint identified by Latona as Oswald's. A palmprint developed by Dallas Police with powder on the top edge of the floor carton—parallel to the long axis—was identified as Oswald's right palmprint. Latona testified the print was less than three days old, and Mandella estimated it was placed within a day or a day and a half of November 22. Wittmus and Mandella independently confirmed the prints as Oswald's. The Commission concluded that the cartons had not been disturbed by floor-laying operations and had been deliberately arranged at the window for a particular purpose.

The Commission assessed the probative value of fingerprint and palmprint identifications found on cartons at the sixth-floor sniper's nest. It ruled out the possibility that other warehouse employees or law enforcement personnel who handled the cartons left the identifiable prints, as no other employees except Oswald left identifiable marks on the cartons. Combined with the freshness of one print and the presence of Oswald’s prints on two of the four cartons and the paper bag, the Commission assigned probative value to the identifications to support the conclusion that Oswald was present at the firing window, though the prints do not confirm the exact time he was there.

The chapter includes testimony and evidence confirming Lee Harvey Oswald was present on the Depository sixth floor approximately 35 minutes before the assassination, tying him to the sniper's nest location prior to the shooting.

Charles Givens, the last known Depository employee to see Oswald inside the building before the assassination, testified that on the morning of November 22, he saw Oswald standing on the fifth floor as his elevator passed while the floor-laying crew descended from the sixth floor around 11:45 a.m. When Givens returned to the sixth floor around 11:55 a.m. to retrieve his cigarettes, he observed Oswald carrying a clipboard walking from the southeast corner of the sixth floor toward the elevator. Oswald instructed Givens to close the west elevator gate when he went downstairs, and the west elevator was no longer present on the first floor when Givens arrived. No Depository employees are documented to have seen Oswald again until after the shooting.

On December 2, 1963, employee Frankie Kaiser recovered a clipboard hidden behind book cartons in the northwest corner of the sixth floor, located a few feet from where the assassination rifle was found. The clipboard was made by and belonged to Kaiser, who confirmed Oswald had taken it when he began working at the Depository. It held three November 22 invoices for Scott-Foresman books located on the first and sixth floors, none of which Oswald had completed, corroborating his presence on the sixth floor near the sniper's nest.

This section compiles eyewitness accounts from individuals who observed a man in the sixth-floor southeast corner window before and during the assassination, including Howard Brennan, Ronald Fischer, Robert Edwards, and Amos Euins.

Howard Brennan, an eyewitness seated on a concrete wall at the southwest corner of Elm and Houston Streets with an unobstructed view of the Depository sixth-floor window roughly 120 feet away, testified he saw a man in the window before and during the shooting. He observed the man leave and return to the window multiple times in the 6 to 8 minutes before the motorcade arrived, and watched him fire the final shot before disappearing from the window. Brennan provided a physical description of the man to police shortly after the assassination that matched Oswald’s profile, though he initially declined to make a positive identification in the November 22 police lineup out of fear for his and his family's safety. He later confirmed to the Commission he could positively identify the man as Oswald, though the Commission did not base its conclusion about the assassin’s identity solely on his later positive identification, as his initial description of a man resembling Oswald was sufficient. Brennan explained his initial belief that the man was standing when firing was likely incorrect, as the low Depository window ledges made a squatting or kneeling person appear standing, a position consistent with the physical evidence of the scene. Brennan also identified two employees he saw leaving the building immediately after the shooting who had been in the fifth-floor window below the sniper's nest, confirming his observations of the post-shooting scene.

Ronald Fischer and Robert Edwards, standing on the curb at the southwest corner of Elm and Houston Streets, observed a man in the southeast corner sixth-floor window roughly 10 to 15 seconds before the motorcade turned onto Houston Street, though neither witness saw the shots being fired. Fischer watched the man for 10 to 15 seconds, noting he appeared uncomfortable, did not watch the approaching motorcade, and stared fixedly toward the Triple Underpass. He described the man as a white, slender person with brown hair, light complexion, 22 to 24 years old, wearing a light-colored open-neck shirt, sitting slightly forward in the lower right portion of the window with boxes stacked behind him. Edwards observed a white, average-sized possibly thin man with light-brown hair in the sixth-floor corner room crowded with boxes. Neither witness could make a positive identification of the man, but their partial descriptions align with Oswald’s physical profile, giving their testimony probative value.

Amos L. Euins, age 15, was one of the first witnesses to alert police that the assassination shots originated from the Texas School Book Depository, and he observed the assassin as the shots were fired.

Euins, positioned at the southwest corner of Elm Street, could not describe the shooter but noted a white bald spot on the man's head as he lowered himself to aim. Euins provided conflicting accounts of the man's race—signing an affidavit describing him as "white," telling a radio reporter he was "colored," and later clarifying before the Commission that he could not ascertain the man's race and that "white" referred only to the bald spot. A Secret Service agent who interviewed Euins 20 to 30 minutes after the assassination confirmed Euins could neither describe the shooter nor identify his race. The Commission deemed Euins' testimony probative as to the source of the shots but inconclusive as to the shooter's identity.

The Commission evaluated the allegation that Oswald was photographed standing in front of the Depository Building when the shots were fired. Associated Press photographer James W. Altgens, standing on the south side of Elm Street between the Triple Underpass and the Depository, captured the image approximately two seconds after the shot that struck the President in the back. The man in the background alleged to resemble Oswald was identified as Billy Nolan Lovelady, who confirmed his own presence in the photograph. Buell Wesley Frazier and William Shelley, standing alongside Lovelady, corroborated this identification. The Commission concluded that Oswald does not appear in the Altgens photograph.

To determine whether Oswald could have been at the southeast corner window of the sixth floor when the shots were fired, the Commission reviewed testimony of witnesses who observed Oswald inside the building within minutes of the assassination. The Commission found that Oswald's documented movements through the building were consistent with his having been positioned at the window at 12:30 p.m.

Patrolman M. L. Baker of the Dallas Police Department was the first to encounter Oswald after the assassination. Baker, riding a motorcycle behind the press car, heard the shots and immediately suspected they came from the Depository Building. He raced to the northwest corner of Elm and Houston, parked, and entered the building with superintendent Roy Truly. After failing to summon an elevator, they climbed the northwest stairway to the second floor. Through a glass window in the vestibule door, Baker glimpsed a man walking into the second-floor lunchroom. Baker drew his revolver and confronted the man, commanding "Come here." The man turned and walked back calmly toward Baker. Truly identified the man as Lee Harvey Oswald. Neither Baker nor Truly observed any change in Oswald's expression, breathlessness, or any items in his hands. Commission counsel conducted reenactment timing tests to establish that Oswald could have fired the shots and reached the lunchroom by the time Baker and Truly arrived.

Timing tests demonstrated that the minimum time required for Baker to park his motorcycle and reach the second-floor lunchroom was within three seconds of the time needed to walk from the southeast corner of the sixth floor down the stairway to the lunchroom. Special Agent John Howlett's test runs required between 1 minute, 14 seconds and 1 minute, 18 seconds to descend from the sixth floor to the lunchroom at walking pace. Analysis of the two slow freight elevators confirmed they could not have been used by Oswald for descent: both were on the fifth floor when Truly checked from the first floor, and neither could have reached the second floor in the brief interval before Baker and Truly arrived. Testimony from fifth-floor employees Jarman, Norman, and Williams—who were watching the parade directly below the sniper's window and then rushed to the west windows—indicated their view of the stairwell was blocked by shelves and boxes during the period Oswald would have descended. The Commission concluded that Oswald's use of the stairway was consistent with all available evidence.

Within a minute after Baker and Truly left Oswald in the lunchroom, Mrs. R. A. Reid, clerical supervisor, saw Oswald walk through the second-floor clerical office toward the front stairway, carrying a full bottle of Coca-Cola. Reid had heard three shots she believed came from the building and had run upstairs to her desk. When she remarked to Oswald that the President had been shot, he mumbled something in response and continued walking. Oswald was wearing only a T-shirt, having left his blue jacket behind—Marina Oswald had suggested he wear a jacket that morning but was still in bed when he left. The jacket, later identified by Marina as her husband's, was subsequently found in the building.

Mrs. Reid testified that she returned to her desk from the street approximately 2 minutes after the shooting. The Commission reconstructed her movements by having her run the distance three times, with a stopwatch timing of 2 minutes representing the minimum possible duration. Based on this reconstruction, Mrs. Reid probably met Oswald at about 12:32 p.m., roughly 30-45 seconds after Oswald's encounter with Patrolman Baker and Roy Truly in the lunchroom. After leaving Mrs. Reid in the front office, Oswald could have descended the stairs and exited the front door by 12:33 p.m.—approximately 3 minutes after the shooting—at which point the building had not yet been sealed off by police.

The exact time the Depository Building was sealed off was difficult to determine, but the earliest estimates still permitted Oswald to exit by 12:33 p.m. Police Officer W.E. Barnett, assigned to the corner of Elm and Houston for the motorcade, testified that immediately after the shots he checked the rear fire escape before returning to the corner, where a sergeant instructed him to identify the building. After learning from a construction worker (likely Howard Brennan) that shots had been fired from a Depository window, Barnett posted himself at the front door while a sergeant covered the rear. Barnett estimated about 3 minutes elapsed between the last shot and his guarding the front door, noting that "people going in and out" during this period. Sergeant D.V. Harkness stated the building was not sealed off at 12:36 p.m. when he radioed about witness Amos Euins. Inspector Herbert V. Sawyer entered the building at 12:34 p.m., rode the elevator to the fourth floor, returned to the street about 3 minutes later, and then directed Sergeant Harkness to station two patrolmen at the front door and seal the back door—this directive coming no earlier than 12:37 p.m. Special Agent Forrest V. Sorrels of the Secret Service testified he returned to the Depository about 20 minutes after the shooting, found no officers at the rear door, and entered without identifying himself.

Although Oswald likely left the building at about 12:33 p.m., his absence went unnoticed for at least half an hour. Truly, returning with Patrolman Baker from the roof, observed the police questioning the approximately 15 warehouse employees and noticed Oswald was not among them. After confirming Oswald was missing, Truly retrieved Oswald's address, phone number, and description from his employment application card, which listed the Paine home in Irving. Truly gave this information to Captain Fritz, who was on the sixth floor at the time. Truly estimated he provided this information 15-20 minutes after the shots, but this was likely no earlier than 1:22 p.m.—the time the rifle was discovered. Fritz believed he learned of Oswald's absence only after the rifle was found, a recollection supported by the fact that Truly found Fritz in the northwest corner of the floor near where the rifle was located.

The Commission concluded that Oswald was present at the window from which the shots were fired at the time of the assassination. This conclusion rested on multiple findings: fingerprint and palmprint evidence established that Oswald handled two of the four cartons next to the window and a paper bag found nearby; Oswald was seen near the southeast corner of the sixth floor approximately 35 minutes before the assassination, and no one could place him elsewhere in the building until after the shooting; an eyewitness immediately provided a description matching Oswald's appearance, identified Oswald in a lineup as the man most nearly resembling the man in the window, and later confirmed this identification; and Oswald's known actions immediately after the assassination were consistent with his having been at the southeast corner window at 12:30 p.m.

After leaving the Depository at approximately 12:33 p.m., Oswald traveled to his roominghouse by bus and taxi, arriving at approximately 1 p.m. and leaving a few minutes later. At about 1:16 p.m., Dallas Police Officer J.D. Tippit was shot less than one mile from Oswald's roominghouse. In determining whether Oswald killed Tippit, the Commission considered four categories of evidence: (1) positive identification of the killer by two eyewitnesses to the shooting and seven eyewitnesses who heard the shots and saw the gunman flee with revolver in hand; (2) firearms identification expert testimony establishing the murder weapon's identity; (3) evidence establishing ownership of the murder weapon; and (4) evidence establishing ownership of a zipper jacket found along the gunman's flight path to the place of arrest.

According to the timeline reconstruction the Commission found most credible, Oswald left the Depository approximately 3 minutes after the assassination. He likely walked east on Elm Street for seven blocks to the corner of Elm and Murphy, where he boarded a bus heading back toward Oak Cliff. A bus transfer found in Oswald's shirt pocket upon his apprehension was dated November 22, 1963, and identified as having been issued by busdriver Cecil J. McWatters of the Dallas Transit Co. McWatters testified that he issued the transfer on a trip passing a checkpoint at St. Paul and Elm Streets at 12:36 p.m., reaching Field Street at about 12:40 p.m. He recalled issuing the transfer to a man who boarded just beyond Field Street after beating on the front door of the bus. Deputy Sheriff Roger D. Craig claimed to have seen a man he later identified as Oswald running toward a light-colored Rambler station wagon about 15 minutes after the assassination, and that Oswald later remarked in the interrogation room, "Everybody will know who I am now." The Commission could not accept key elements of Craig's testimony, noting that Captain Fritz did not recall the dramatic statement and that the overwhelming evidence placed Oswald far from the building by that time. The Commission concluded the man Craig saw enter the Rambler was not Oswald.

McWatters picked Oswald from a police lineup on the evening of the assassination as the man who boarded the bus at the "lower end of town on Elm around Houston," though McWatters later testified he had been in error and a teenager named Milton Jones was the passenger he had in mind about the bus argument. An elderly passenger, Mary Bledsoe, who had rented a room to Oswald about six weeks earlier on October 7 but asked him to leave after a week, boarded the Marsalis bus at St. Paul and Elm Streets to return home after watching the motorcade. She testified that Oswald boarded at Murphy, appearing disheveled with his sleeve torn, his shirt dirty and unbuttoned, his face "so distorted" he "looked like a maniac." When arrested at the Texas Theatre, Oswald wore a brown sport shirt with a hole in the right sleeve at the elbow, which Mrs. Bledsoe identified as the shirt Oswald was wearing on the bus. She stated she was certain Oswald boarded the bus, sat halfway to the rear as traffic moved slowly, heard a passing motorist inform the driver that the President had been shot, and disappeared into the crowd when the bus neared Lamar Street. The Marsalis bus traveled west on Elm, south on Houston, and southwest across the Houston viaduct along Marsalis—whereas the Beckley bus, which stopped across the street from Oswald's roominghouse at 1026 North Beckley, continued west on Elm past the Depository. Rather than waiting for the Beckley bus, Oswald boarded the first Oak Cliff bus that came along. Secret Service and FBI agents reconstructed the trip, walking the seven blocks from the Depository to Murphy and Elm in an average of 6½ minutes, and timing the bus ride from Murphy to Lamar at 4 minutes, placing Oswald on the bus from approximately 12:40 p.m. to 12:44 p.m. if he left the Depository at 12:33 p.m.

Taxicab driver William Whaley informed his employer on the morning of November 23 that he recognized Oswald from a newspaper photograph as a man he had driven to Oak Cliff the previous day. Brought to the police station, Whaley viewed a lineup and picked out Oswald, later testifying that Oswald "showed no respect for the policemen" and was "bawling out the policeman." Whaley's memory of the lineup was inaccurate: he remembered six men including five teenagers, but there were actually four men with Oswald—John T. Horn (age 18, No. 1), David Knapp (age 18, No. 2), Lee Oswald (No. 3), and Daniel Lujan (age 26, No. 4). When Whaley first testified before the Commission, he displayed a trip manifest showing a pickup from the Greyhound bus station at 12:30 p.m. with unloading at 500 North Beckley at 12:45 p.m., though he acknowledged his time records were recorded only by the quarter hour and were not always accurate. While unloading a passenger from the Continental bus station at Greyhound, Whaley saw a man dressed in faded blue khaki work clothes, a brown shirt, and a matching work jacket walking south on Lamar from Commerce. The man asked, "May I have the cab?" and entered the front seat, at which point an elderly woman asked Whaley to call her a cab from the doorway.

Taxi driver Whaley testified that he picked up Oswald at the cabstand near the Greyhound Bus Station, who requested to go to "500 North Beckley." With police sirens blaring through the area, the ride was largely quiet. Approaching the 500 block near Neches and North Beckley, Oswald said "This will do fine," paid a dollar bill for a 95-cent fare, exited without speaking, and walked around the front of the cab to the east side of the street.

Whaley marked what he believed was the intersection of Neches and Beckley on a Dallas map with a large "X," asserting this was the 500 block of North Beckley. However, Neches and Beckley do not actually intersect. Neches is within one-half block of the roominghouse at 1026 North Beckley, and the 500 block of North Beckley is five blocks south of that address.

After reviewing inconsistencies in Whaley's testimony, Commission staff retraced the taxicab route under his direction. Whaley directed the driver to a point 20 feet north of the northwest corner of Beckley and Neely—the 700 block of North Beckley. The reconstructed run from the Greyhound Bus Station took 5 minutes and 30 seconds, and the walk from Beckley and Neely to 1026 North Beckley took 5 minutes and 45 seconds.

Whaley testified that Oswald was wearing either the gray zippered jacket or the heavy blue jacket, but he was in error—the blue jacket was found in the "domino" room of the Depository in late November. Mrs. Bledsoe saw Oswald on the bus without a jacket, wearing a shirt with a hole at the elbow. Whaley correctly identified Commission Exhibit No. 150 as the shirt Oswald was wearing and noted a silver identification bracelet on his passenger's left wrist, which Oswald was wearing at arrest.

On November 22, Oswald told Captain Fritz that he rode a bus to a stop near his home and then walked to his roominghouse. The following morning, when questioned about a bus transfer found in his possession at arrest, he admitted receiving it. He also admitted to leaving the slow-moving bus and taking a cab to his roominghouse.

If Oswald left the bus at 12:44 p.m. and walked directly to the terminal, he would have entered the cab at 12:47 or 12:48 p.m. With a 6-minute cab ride, he would have reached his destination at approximately 12:54 p.m. If discharged at Neely and Beckley, the 5-minute walk would have him arriving at 12:59 to 1:00 p.m. From the 500 block, the walk would be slightly longer, but in either case he would have reached the roominghouse at about 1 p.m.—matching Earlene Roberts's account of when he entered.

Earlene Roberts, housekeeper at 1026 North Beckley, knew Oswald as "O.H. Lee" and had known him since he rented a room on October 14, 1963. On November 22, at about 1 p.m., Oswald entered in unusual haste after the President was shot. He stayed no longer than 3 or 4 minutes, hurried to his room, and left zipping up a jacket. He was seen a few seconds later at a bus stop on the east side of Beckley.

Oswald was next seen about nine-tenths of a mile away at the southeast corner of 10th Street and Patton Avenue, moments before the Tippit shooting. If he left the roominghouse shortly after 1 p.m. and walked at a brisk pace, he would have reached 10th and Patton shortly after 1:15 p.m. Tippit's murder was recorded on the police radio tape at about 1:16 p.m.

Patrolman J.D. Tippit, a Dallas officer since July 1952 described as "a very fine, dedicated officer," patrolled district No. 78 alone. Radio dispatches at 12:44, 12:45, 12:48, 12:54, and 12:55 p.m. directed officers including Tippit to the central Oak Cliff area and broadcast the suspect's description as a white male, approximately 30, 5'10", 165 pounds, slender. At about 1:15 p.m., Tippit stopped a man matching the description on 10th Street; as Tippit walked around the front of his car toward the left front wheel, the man pulled a revolver and fired several shots, killing Tippit instantly. The gunman retreated toward Patton Avenue, ejecting empty cartridges and reloading.

At least 12 persons saw the man with the revolver at or immediately after the shooting. By the evening of November 22, five had identified Oswald in police lineups, a sixth did so the next day, three others later identified him from a photograph, two said Oswald resembled the man, and one felt too distant to make a positive identification.

Eating lunch in his cab parked on Patton facing 10th and Patton, Scoggins saw a police car stop about 100 feet from the corner alongside a man in a light-colored jacket. After losing sight behind shrubbery, he heard three or four shots, saw the officer fall, and hid behind his cab as the gunman passed within 12 feet, muttering "Poor damn cop" or "Poor dumb cop." He identified Oswald in a four-man lineup the next day, though he acknowledged possibly having seen Oswald's newspaper picture before the identification.

Driving a pickup truck west on 10th Street, Benavides saw a policeman by the left door of the parked police car and a man at the right side. He heard three shots, saw the officer fall, and observed the gunman empty his gun and throw shells into bushes on the southeast corner lot. Using Tippit's car radio, he first reported the killing at 1:16 p.m. He retrieved two empty shells and gave them to arriving officers. He later testified that the television picture of Oswald resembled the shooter.

Standing on the northwest corner of 10th and Patton, Markham saw the man approach the right window of Tippit's car and lean on the ledge. As Tippit calmly got out and walked toward the front, the man pulled a gun; she heard three shots and saw Tippit fall near the left front wheel. The man "in kind of a little trot" headed down Patton toward Jefferson Boulevard. Markham ran to Tippit's side and later identified Oswald at a 4:30 p.m. lineup, becoming emotional when he entered. The Commission addressed prior alleged inconsistencies in her description and considered her testimony reliable, noting that even without it, ample evidence identifies Oswald as Tippit's killer.

In their apartment at the southeast corner of 10th and Patton, the Davis sisters heard gunfire and Helen Markham's screams, then ran to the door in time to see a man with a revolver cut across their lawn toward Patton. Barbara Jeanette saw him emptying his gun. Each woman found an empty shell near the house, which were delivered to police. Both identified Oswald in a four-man lineup that evening. Neither had been shown photographs beforehand, and Virginia Davis had not seen television or newspapers. Sitting alongside each other, each whispered Oswald's number to the detective, with each claiming to be the first to identify him.

William Arthur Smith, standing about a block east of 10th and Patton, heard shots and saw a man running west and a policeman falling. He did not come forward on November 22, but several days later reported what he saw to the FBI. After seeing Oswald on television—where his hair appeared blond—Smith later viewed a photograph of Oswald with brown hair and told the FBI the man in the picture more closely resembled the person he saw running from the scene.

Ted Callaway (manager of a used-car lot) and Sam Guinyard (a porter) heard shots and saw a man running south on Patton with a revolver held high. Callaway called out to the man, who halted briefly then continued west on Jefferson. The two found Tippit lying beside his car, picked up his fallen revolver, and attempted to pursue the gunman in a taxicab without success. That evening both positively identified Oswald from a four-man lineup as the man with the gun, and both testified they had not been shown photographs prior to the lineup.

The Dallas Police Department provided the Commission with photographs of the men who appeared in lineups with Oswald, and the Commission investigated both general Dallas Police lineup procedures and the specific procedures used in lineups involving Oswald. The Commission expressed satisfaction that the lineups were conducted fairly.

Four men at a used-car lot on the southeast corner of Patton and Jefferson—Warren Reynolds, Harold Russell, Pat Patterson, and L.J. Lewis—saw a white male carrying a revolver running south on Patton, then turning west on Jefferson. Reynolds and Patterson followed him until he turned north toward a service station parking area. Russell and Patterson identified Oswald from photographs; Reynolds later confirmed the identification before a Commission staff member; Lewis declined to make a positive identification due to the distance of his observation.

When arrested, Oswald possessed a Smith & Wesson .38 Special revolver (serial V510210), positively identified by three arresting officers. Four cartridge cases found at 10th and Patton were unanimously identified by FBI experts (Cunningham, Frazier, Killion) and by Illinois Bureau expert Nicol as having been fired from Oswald's revolver to the exclusion of all other weapons. Four lead bullets recovered from Tippit's body matched the revolver's rifling characteristics (five lands and grooves, right twist), but due to mutilation, experts could not definitively identify them as fired from Oswald's weapon—though Nicol concluded one bullet matched to the exclusion of all others. Ballistic and cartridge evidence suggested that five shots may have been fired, with one cartridge case or bullet unaccounted for.

FBI tracing identified George Rose & Co. of Los Angeles as a distributor of this revolver model. Seaport Traders, Inc. records showed that on January 3, 1963, a shipment of 99 guns was received, including the serial-numbered revolver, which was later shortened to a 2¼-inch barrel. A mail-order coupon signed "A.J. Hidell, aged 28" with a Dallas P.O. box was received after January 27, 1963, with the witness signature "D.F. Drittal." The revolver was shipped March 20, 1963. Treasury and FBI handwriting experts, along with Marina Oswald, identified the order and witness signature as Oswald's handwriting. Marina identified the revolver as her husband's and recognized it in Neely Street photographs; police recovered an empty holster matching the photos from Oswald's room.

Approximately 15 minutes before the shooting, Oswald was observed leaving his roominghouse wearing a zipper jacket he had not worn upon arriving home. At arrest he was in shirt sleeves, and shortly after the killing a light-colored zipper jacket was found along the escape route on Jefferson Boulevard by Captain Westbrook, who located it beneath a car in a parking lot behind a service station. Marina Oswald identified it as her husband's second jacket (a gray jacket; the blue one was found at the Texas School Book Depository). Witnesses varied in their descriptions of the jacket's shade, but the Commission's finding was that Oswald discarded the jacket while fleeing.

The Commission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald killed Patrolman J.D. Tippit, based on four findings: (1) two eyewitnesses to the shooting and seven eyewitnesses to the gunman's flight positively identified Oswald; (2) cartridge cases from the scene were fired from the revolver in Oswald's possession, to the exclusion of all other weapons; (3) the revolver belonged to Oswald; and (4) Oswald's jacket was recovered along the gunman's path of flight.

The Texas Theatre sits approximately eight blocks from the Tippit shooting scene and six blocks from where Oswald was last seen running west on Jefferson. Johnny Calvin Brewer, manager of Hardy's Shoestore near the theater, heard police sirens and observed a man standing in the recessed lobby of his store. After a police car made a U-turn and the sirens faded, the man—who wore a T-shirt beneath his outer shirt and no jacket—looked over his shoulder and walked west on Jefferson toward the theatre. Brewer described the man as having disheveled hair, appearing as though he had been running, looking scared.

Mrs. Julia Postal, selling tickets at the Texas Theatre box office, heard police sirens and saw a man duck into the outer lobby near her ticket office. She stepped to the curb where Johnny Brewer, who had followed the man from a nearby shoestore, told her the suspect had not purchased a ticket and had entered the theatre. After sending Brewer inside to locate the man and check the exits, Postal informed him of the assassination and called the police, noting that although she could not confirm his identity, the man was clearly fleeing from authorities. Brewer later pointed out Oswald to the arriving officers, identifying him as the man who had entered without paying.

At 1:45 p.m., a police radio bulletin reported that a suspect had entered the Texas Theatre on West Jefferson. Patrol cars bearing at least 15 officers converged on the building. Patrolman M. N. McDonald, accompanied by Patrolmen R. Hawkins, T. A. Hutson, and C. T. Walker, entered through the rear, while other officers searched the balcony through the front door. Detective Paul L. Bentley instructed the projectionist to raise the house lights, allowing officers to systematically search the theatre and locate the suspect seated alone in the rear of the main floor near the right center aisle.

McDonald approached Oswald, stopping abruptly in his row and ordering him to stand. Oswald rose with both hands raised and, as McDonald began searching his waist for a weapon, remarked, "Well, it's all over now." Oswald then struck McDonald between the eyes with his left fist while drawing a revolver with his right hand. A physical struggle ensued, with both men falling into the seats before three additional officers seized Oswald from the front, rear, and side. During the scuffle, McDonald felt the pistol graze his cheek and heard what sounded like the hammer snapping as he wrenched the weapon away; Detective Bob K. Carroll then seized the gun from McDonald.

Multiple officers corroborated McDonald's account of the struggle, though none confirmed hearing Oswald's remark except Deputy Sheriff Eddy R. Walthers, who arrived after Oswald had been knocked to the floor. Most officers heard a clicking sound they attributed to the revolver's hammer, though firearms testimony later established the hammer never contacted a shell; the sound likely resulted from the cylinder being pulled away during the struggle. Theatre patrons offered varying accounts: George Jefferson Applin, Jr., claimed an officer struck Oswald with the butt of a shotgun in the back, a detail not corroborated by any officer, patron, or by Oswald himself, and contradicted by Officer Ray Hawkins and Deputy Sheriff Walthers. John Gibson reported hearing a gun misfire but saw no shotgun, while Johnny Brewer confirmed witnessing the struggle over the revolver and reported hearing an officer say "Kill the President, will you," though the arresting officers were pursuing Oswald specifically for Tippit's murder. As Oswald was led out in handcuffs, he cursed and shouted accusations of police brutality.

At 1:51 p.m., police car 2 radioed that it was en route to headquarters with the suspect. Captain Fritz, returning from the Texas School Book Depository via a brief stop at the sheriff's office, arrived at headquarters at 2:15 p.m. and encountered Sgt. Gerald L. Hill and two detectives in the homicide and robbery bureau office. Hill recounted that Fritz had instructed detectives to obtain a search warrant for a Fifth Street address in Irving to apprehend Lee Oswald, citing his employment at the Book Depository and absence from the employee roll call. Hill informed Fritz that Oswald was already in custody.

Between approximately 2:30 p.m. on November 22 and 11 a.m. on November 24, Oswald was questioned intermittently for about 12 hours. Throughout these interrogations, he consistently denied any involvement in either the assassination of President Kennedy or the murder of Patrolman Tippit. Captain Fritz of the homicide and robbery bureau conducted most of the questioning without taking notes or producing stenographic or tape recordings. Representatives from the FBI and U.S. Secret Service were also present and occasionally participated in the interviews, with their reports compiled in appendix XI of the Commission proceedings.

On the evening of November 22, 1963, the Dallas Police Department conducted paraffin tests on Oswald's hands and right cheek to determine whether he had recently fired a weapon. The results were positive for the hands and negative for the right cheek. Expert testimony before the Commission characterized the paraffin test as unreliable for determining whether a person has fired a rifle or revolver. Accordingly, the Commission placed no reliance on the Dallas police's paraffin tests.

Oswald provided little information during his police questioning. When confronted with evidence he could not explain, he frequently resorted to statements known to be false. Although the Commission did not treat Oswald's untrue statements as positive proof of guilt, it found they had probative value in assessing the weight of his denials. Because independent evidence showed Oswald repeatedly and blatantly lied to police, the Commission gave little weight to his denials that he assassinated President Kennedy and killed Patrolman Tippit.

Oswald denied owning a rifle from the outset. When Captain Fritz confronted him on November 23 with evidence that he had purchased a rifle under the name "Hidell," Oswald denied it. He also denied having a rifle wrapped in a blanket in the Paine garage, and claimed that since leaving the Marine Corps he had fired only a small-bore .22 rifle. After obtaining a search warrant, Officers Moore, Stovall, and Rose found two photographs in the Paine garage showing Oswald with a rifle and pistol. When shown these photographs, Oswald sneered and claimed they were fakes, alleging police had superimposed a rifle and revolver onto photos taken the day before. Marina Oswald testified that she had taken the pictures with her husband's Imperial Reflex camera while they lived on Neely Street, and a photography expert confirmed the pictures were not composites.

During his first interrogation, Oswald claimed his only crime was carrying a gun and resisting arrest. When asked why he carried the revolver, he responded, "Well, you know about a pistol. I just carried it." He falsely stated that he bought the revolver in Fort Worth, when in fact he had purchased it from a mail-order house in Los Angeles.

Officers found a forged selective service card bearing Oswald's picture and the name "Alek J. Hidell" in his billfold. On November 22 and 23, Oswald refused to explain to Fritz why the card was in his possession. On November 24, he denied knowing A. J. Hidell, and when shown the card became angry, saying he had told Fritz all he intended to about it. At his last interrogation, Oswald admitted renting Dallas post office box 2915 to Postal Inspector Holmes, but denied receiving a rifle or any package addressed to Hidell at that box, and denied knowing that Hidell was listed on New Orleans post office box 30061. When asked why he lived at his roominghouse under the name "O. H. Lee," Oswald claimed the landlady simply made a mistake because he told her his first name was Lee. However, the roominghouse register revealed that Oswald had actually signed the name "O. H. Lee."

The Commission found that Oswald lied when he told Frazier he was returning to Irving to obtain curtain rods on the morning of November 22, 1963. When asked about the story, Oswald denied ever telling Frazier he wanted a ride to Irving to get curtain rods. He explained that a party for the Paine children had been planned for the weekend, and he preferred not to be in the Paine house at that time. The Commission noted that the Paine children's party had actually been held the preceding weekend, and Marina Oswald had suggested Oswald remain in Dallas. When told that Frazier and Mrs. Randle had seen him carrying a long heavy package, Oswald replied they were mistaken. He told Fritz the only sack he carried that day was a lunch sack kept on his lap during the ride, but Frazier testified Oswald carried no lunch sack that day.

During his first interrogation, Oswald told Fritz that at the time of the shooting he ate lunch in the first-floor lunchroom, went to the second floor for a Coke, encountered a police officer, then went outside and talked with Foreman Bill Shelley for 5 to 10 minutes before leaving for home. He said he left because Shelley told him no more work would be done that day. Shelley denied seeing Oswald after noon or at any time after the shooting. The next day, Oswald added that he had been having lunch with "Junior" at the time of the shooting. The only Depository employee named "Junior" was James Jarman, Jr., who testified that he ate lunch alone on the first floor around 11:55 a.m. and neither ate lunch with nor saw Oswald. Jarman did recall a brief morning conversation in which Oswald asked about people gathering on the corner, the President passing through Dallas, and the motorcade route, to which Oswald responded, "Oh, I see."

On the evening of April 10, 1963, Major General Edwin A. Walker, a controversial figure since his 1961 resignation from the U.S. Army, narrowly escaped death in Dallas when a rifle bullet fired from outside his home passed near his head while he sat at his desk. There were no eyewitnesses, though a 14-year-old neighbor claimed to have seen two men in separate cars drive from a church parking lot adjacent to Walker's home immediately after the shooting. A friend testified that two nights before, he had seen two men peering in Walker's windows, and Walker had given this information to police before the shooting. The bullet was recovered from Walker's house, but without a weapon, it was of little investigatory value. Walker hired two investigators, but the case remained unsolved until December 3, 1963. The Commission evaluated four categories of evidence to determine whether Oswald fired the shot: (1) a note Oswald left for his wife, (2) photographs found among his possessions, (3) firearms identification of the bullet, and (4) admissions and other statements Oswald made to Marina.

On December 2, 1963, Mrs. Ruth Paine turned over to police a Russian volume entitled "Book of Useful Advice" belonging to the Oswalds. Inside was an undated note in Russian, translated as an eleven-point set of instructions concerning a mailbox key, contacting the Soviet Embassy, paying rent and utilities, managing money, disposing of clothing, locating documents, and instructions in case Oswald was taken prisoner. The note's appearance suggested it was the work of a man expecting to be killed, imprisoned, or to disappear. FBI handwriting expert James C. Cadigan testified that the note was written by Lee Harvey Oswald. Marina testified that on the night of the Walker shooting, her husband left their Neely Street apartment shortly after dinner, and when he returned very late he was very pale and told her he had shot at General Walker and to ask no questions. He later expressed regret that he had missed Walker. Internal evidence—including references to house rent, water and gas payments, the post office on Ervay Street, and the phrase "you and the baby"—established that the note was written while the Oswalds lived on Neely Street in Dallas before moving to New Orleans, most likely on April 2 or 3, 1963, shortly before the shooting. Oswald had apparently mistaken the county jail for the city jail, as the Beckley bus route from Neely Street passed through the Commerce Street viaduct and Triple Underpass into downtown Dallas.

Marina Oswald testified that three days after the Walker shooting, Oswald showed her a notebook containing photographs of General Walker's home and a map of the area, though Oswald later destroyed the notebook. Three photographs found among Oswald's possessions after the assassination of President Kennedy were identified by Marina as photographs of Walker's house. Two were taken from the rear of the house, and the Commission confirmed by comparison with other photographs that they depicted the rear of Walker's home. An examination of the rear window, the wall the bullet passed through, and the fence behind the house indicated the bullet was fired from a position near where one of the photographs was taken. The third photograph showed the entrance to Walker's driveway from a back alley, including the fence on which the assailant apparently rested the rifle. Construction work visible in the background dated this photograph to between March 8 and 12, 1963, most likely March 9 or 10, shortly before Oswald purchased the rifle money order on March 12 and the rifle was shipped on March 20. An FBI photography expert determined this photograph was taken with the Imperial Reflex camera owned by Oswald. A fourth photograph of railroad tracks was identified by Marina as taken by her husband in connection with the Walker shooting; investigation placed it approximately seven-tenths of a mile from Walker's house. A fifth, unidentified photograph of railroad tracks was taken from a point slightly less than half a mile from Walker's house. Marina testified that when she asked Oswald what he had done with the rifle, he said he had buried it or hidden it in bushes near railroad tracks, and several days later he recovered the rifle and brought it back to their apartment.

Dallas police recovered a badly mutilated bullet from a room beyond where General Walker was sitting on the night of the shooting; the Dallas City-County Investigation Laboratory could not determine the weapon type due to the bullet's condition. On November 30, 1963, the FBI requested the bullet for ballistics examination, and Dallas police forwarded it on December 2. FBI ballistics expert Robert A. Frazier testified that he was "unable to reach a conclusion" as to whether the Walker bullet had been fired from the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository Building, but concluded that the general rifling characteristics were of the same type, and on that basis the bullet could have been fired from the rifle based on its land and groove impressions. Frazier explained that the FBI avoids the category of "probable" identification and will not draw conclusions as to probability unless a weapon can be identified to the exclusion of all others. However, Frazier found no microscopic characteristics or other evidence indicating that the bullet was not fired from Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano, and testified that relatively few types of rifles could produce the characteristics found on this 6.5-millimeter bullet.

Joseph D. Nicol, superintendent of the Illinois Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, independently examined the bullet that struck General Walker and concluded there was a "fair probability" it was fired from Oswald's rifle. Nicol distinguished his approach from the FBI's more conservative policy, arguing that in the absence of clear negative evidence, it was permissible to state that the bullet probably came from the weapon without claiming exclusion of all other firearms. The Commission acknowledged that neither expert could assert identification to the exclusion of all other rifles, but found Nicol's testimony probative when combined with other evidence linking Oswald to the shooting.

Marina Oswald's account of her husband's admissions was corroborated by several independent facts. A note and photographs of Walker's house and nearby railroad tracks matched her description of the planning. Marina testified that Oswald postponed the attempt until Wednesday because he wanted people present to mask his arrival and departure, and church officials confirmed that Wednesday services were regularly held. Marina also stated that Oswald used a bus to return home, and bus route analysis confirmed that multiple routes would have allowed him to reach Walker's house or the railroad tracks where the rifle may have been concealed.

Based on four elements—the April 10, 1963 note to Marina, the recovered photographs, firearms identification expert testimony, and Marina Oswald's testimony—the Commission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald attempted to take the life of Major General Edwin A. Walker on April 10, 1963. While the Commission regarded this finding as having probative value in its investigation, its ultimate conclusion about the identity of President Kennedy's assassin rested on evidence independent of the Walker attempt.

Marina Oswald testified that in April 1963, shortly before Oswald's departure for New Orleans, he dressed in a suit, armed himself with a pistol, and announced he intended to look in on Vice President Nixon's visit to Dallas. She physically struggled with him to dissuade him. Investigation revealed, however, that Nixon was not in Dallas at that time; the only Nixon visit to Dallas in 1963 occurred November 20–21, after the assassination. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson did visit Dallas on April 23, 1963, the day before Oswald's departure, and Marina later acknowledged possible confusion between the two figures. In the absence of corroborating evidence of intent, the Commission concluded the Nixon incident had no probative value in determining the identity of President Kennedy's assassin.

To determine whether Oswald could have fired the shots that killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally, the Commission evaluated four factors: the nature of the shots, Oswald's Marine Corps marksmanship training, his firearms experience after leaving the Marines, and the accuracy of the weapon with its ammunition.

From the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository, the presidential limousine moved slowly down a three-degree grade in nearly straight alignment with the rifle, at ranges of 177 to 266 feet. Four marksmanship experts—Major Eugene D. Anderson (Marine Corps), Robert A. Frazier (FBI), Ronald Simmons (U.S. Army), and M. Sergeant James A. Zahm (Marine Corps)—testified that the shots were not particularly difficult, especially with a four-power telescopic sight. The scope was characterized as ideal for moving targets and a "real aid" in rapid fire shooting. The combination of the target moving away, the downgrade, and the elevated shooter position made the shots "very easy" to "easy" in Zahm's assessment.

Oswald underwent standard Marine marksmanship training, including sighting, aiming, trigger manipulation, dry firing, and live fire on the rifle range at distances up to 500 yards. In December 1956, he scored 212, qualifying as a sharpshooter (two points above minimum). In May 1959, he scored 191, qualifying as a marksman (one point above minimum). Marine Corps records also documented his familiarity with the Browning Automatic Rifle, .45 caliber pistol, and 12-gage riot gun. Major Anderson characterized Oswald as a good shot—better than or equal to the average Marine—and good to excellent compared to an untrained civilian. Sergeant Zahm concluded that Oswald's training would have enabled him to sight in and fire the scoped rifle competently.

Oswald continued firearms practice after leaving the Marines. He hunted with his brother Robert using a .22 bolt-action rifle on multiple occasions, displayed average proficiency, and obtained a Soviet hunting license, joining a hunting club and hunting approximately six times. After purchasing the Mannlicher-Carcano, he told Marina he practiced with it, and she observed him taking the rifle from their home concealed in a raincoat. George De Mohrenschildt reported that Oswald said he went target shooting with the rifle. Marina also observed Oswald on their New Orleans porch at night, practicing with the telescopic sight and bolt. Cartridge case examination on the sixth floor indicated prior loading and ejection, suggesting Oswald practiced bolt operation.

Testing by the FBI and the U.S. Army Infantry Weapons Evaluation Branch using Mannlicher-Carcano rifle C2766 and over 100 rounds of Western Cartridge Co. ammunition—matching that used in the assassination—produced no misfires, confirming the weapon's operational reliability under the conditions relevant to the assassination.

The Infantry Weapons Evaluation Branch of the Ballistics Research Laboratory conducted a test to evaluate the assassination rifle under conditions simulating those of the assassination. Three NRA-rated master marksmen fired two series of three shots each from a tower at silhouette targets placed at 175, 240, and 265 feet, with the 265-foot target positioned to the right of the 240-foot target. None of the marksmen had prior practice with the assassination weapon beyond a 2–3 minute dry run to exercise the bolt. In the first series, the firers required time spans of 4.6, 6.75, and 8.25 seconds; in the second series, 5.15, 6.45, and 7 seconds. All marksmen hit the first target when given unlimited time, but for the first four attempts they missed the second shot by several inches, requiring movement in the basic firing position. This larger angle between the first and second shots was used to replicate eyewitness testimony that there was a shorter interval between shots two and three. As noted in chapter III, if the three shots had been fired within 4.8 to 5.6 seconds, they would have been evenly spaced without requiring sharp angular movement. Five of the six shots hit the third target, where the angle of weapon movement was small. Based on these results, Simmons testified that the probability of hitting targets at the relatively short range of the assassination was very high. The highest performance level required of the assassin would have been to fire three times and hit twice within 4.8 to 5.6 seconds, and one of the firers in the rapid-fire test accomplished this with times of 4.6 and 5.15 seconds. The others could have reduced their times with practice familiarizing themselves with the bolt and trigger pull. Simmons testified that such bolt familiarity could be achieved through dry practice, which Oswald had engaged in. If the assassin missed the first or third shot, he had between 4.8 and 5.6 seconds between the two hits, and a minimum total time of 7.1 to 7.9 seconds for all three shots. All three firers were able to complete their rounds within the available time frame.

Three FBI firearms experts tested the assassination rifle to determine the maximum speed at which it could be fired, rather than to replicate the assassination conditions. The three experts each fired three shots from the weapon at 15 yards in 6, 7, and 9 seconds, and one agent, Robert A. Frazier, fired two series of three shots at 25 yards in 4.6 and 4.8 seconds. At 15 yards, each man's shots landed within an area the size of a dime. Frazier's shots at 25 yards landed within areas of 2 inches and 5 inches respectively. Frazier later fired four groups of three shots at 100 yards in 5.9, 6.2, 5.6, and 6.5 seconds, with each series landing within 3 to 5 inches in diameter. Although the shots were a few inches high and to the right due to a defect in the scope, the FBI agents could have compensated for this if aiming at a bull's-eye; instead, they were testing firing speed and shot grouping. Frazier testified that while he could not determine when the defect occurred, a person familiar with the weapon could compensate for it. The defect would have assisted an assassin aiming at a target moving away, as Frazier explained that the high-set crosshairs would compensate for any necessary lead, though it would cause a slight miss to the right. This was notable because the President's car was curving slightly to the right when the third shot was fired.

Based on the tests conducted, the experts agreed that the assassination rifle was accurate. Simmons described it as "quite accurate," comparing it favorably to current military rifles. Frazier testified that the rifle was accurate, had less recoil than the average military rifle, and that one would not have to be an expert marksman to have accomplished the assassination with the weapon used.

The various tests established that the Mannlicher-Carcano was an accurate rifle and that the four-power scope substantially aided rapid, accurate firing. Oswald's Marine training in marksmanship, his other rifle experience, and his familiarity with this particular weapon demonstrated that he possessed ample capability to commit the assassination. Marine marksmanship experts Major Anderson and Sergeant Zahm concurred that Oswald had the capability to fire three shots with two hits within 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. Regarding the shot striking the President in the back of the neck, Sergeant Zahm testified that with Oswald's equipment and ability, "it was a very easy shot." Having fired this shot, the assassin was required to hit the target one more time within 4.8 to 5.6 seconds. The Commission concluded that Oswald was capable of accomplishing this second hit even if there was an intervening missed shot. The probability of a second hit would have been markedly increased if Oswald had missed the first or third shot, leaving a 4.8 to 5.6 second window between the two successful shots. The Commission agreed with Zahm's testimony that it was "an easy shot" to hit some part of the President's body, and that the expected hit zone at that range would include the President's head.

On the basis of the evidence reviewed in the chapter, the Commission found that Lee Harvey Oswald: (1) owned and possessed the rifle used to kill President Kennedy and wound Governor Connally, (2) brought this rifle into the Depository Building on the morning of the assassination, (3) was present at the time of the assassination at the window from which the shots were fired, (4) killed Dallas Police Officer J. D. Tippit in an apparent attempt to escape, (5) resisted arrest by drawing a fully loaded pistol and attempting to shoot another police officer, (6) lied to the police after his arrest concerning important substantive matters, (7) attempted to kill Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker in April 1963, and (8) possessed the capability with a rifle that would have enabled him to commit the assassination. On the basis of these findings, the Commission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin of President Kennedy.

Lee Harvey Oswald spent nearly all of his final 48 hours at the gray stone Police and Courts Building in downtown Dallas, which housed the Dallas Police Department headquarters and the city jail. After his arrest early Friday afternoon, he was brought immediately to this building and held there until Sunday morning, November 24, when he was scheduled for transfer to the county jail. At 11:21 a.m. that morning, in full view of millions of television viewers, Oswald was fatally shot by Jack Ruby, who emerged suddenly from a crowd of newsmen and police and fired a single shot during the transfer. The question of whether Oswald's killing was part of a conspiracy involving the assassination is addressed in chapter VI, but the events of November 22–24 also raise broader issues concerning law enforcement conduct, press responsibilities, the rights of the accused, and criminal justice administration, prompting the Commission to establish the facts and evaluate the actions of police and press involved.

The focal point of activity during Oswald's detention was the third floor of the Police and Courts Building, which housed the Dallas Police Department's main offices. Public elevators opened into a lobby at the midpoint of a 140-foot corridor running the length of the floor. At one end were the offices of Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry and his immediate subordinates, and at the other end was a small pressroom. Between them lay other police offices, including those of the major detective bureaus, with the homicide and robbery bureau—headed by Capt. J. Will Fritz—located between the pressroom and the lobby. Commission Exhibit No. 2175 illustrates this layout.

Oswald arrived at the police department around 2 p.m. on Friday and was held in the third-floor offices of the homicide and robbery bureau until Captain Fritz returned from the Texas School Book Depository. About 15–20 minutes later he entered Fritz' office for his first interrogation. Between approximately 4:05 p.m. and shortly after midnight he underwent two lineups, was searched (five cartridges were found), was arraigned before Justice of the Peace David L. Johnston for the murder of Patrolman Tippit at 7:10 p.m., provided fingerprints, palmprints, and a paraffin test, and at 11:26 p.m. was charged with the murder of President Kennedy. Around midnight he appeared briefly before the press in the basement, was placed in a maximum security cell on the fifth floor near an empty cell on each side and a guard, and was arraigned at about 1:30 a.m. on Saturday for the President's murder. On Saturday he was questioned twice in Fritz' office, received visits from his wife and mother and his brother Robert, tried unsuccessfully to reach attorney John Abt by phone, underwent another lineup, gave fingernail scrapings and hair samples, and spoke briefly with Dallas Bar Association president H. Louis Nichols, who offered him a lawyer but was declined. On Sunday morning he was signed out of jail at 9:30 a.m., taken to Fritz' office for a final interrogation, departed for transfer at about 11:15 a.m., and was shot at 11:21 a.m.; he was pronounced dead at Parkland Hospital at 1:07 p.m.

Between about 2:30 p.m. Friday and 11:15 a.m. Sunday, Oswald was interrogated for roughly 12 hours total. On Friday he was questioned intermittently for more than 7 hours and given 8–9 hours to rest that night; on Saturday he was questioned for about 3 hours across three sessions; and on Sunday he was questioned for less than 2 hours. The interrogations took place in Fritz' small 14-by-9½-foot office, which was typically crowded with as many as seven or eight people, including Dallas detectives, FBI and Secret Service investigators, and occasionally a post office inspector and the U.S. marshal—more than 25 different persons participated overall. Captain Fritz conducted most of the questioning but was frequently called away, leaving others to question Oswald in his absence. Interrogators disagreed on whether the corridor chaos affected the atmosphere inside; Oswald remained calm most of the time but refused to answer any questions he deemed pertinent to the investigation. As Chief Curry later acknowledged, "we were violating every principle of interrogation."

All available evidence indicates Oswald was not subjected to physical hardship during detention; he was fed, allowed to rest, and had his handcuffs switched from behind to front at his request. He made no complaints to officers about his treatment, and the visible marks over his right eye and under his left—sustained during his arrest at the Texas Theatre—were seen by all who encountered him. Before his first Friday interrogation, Fritz warned Oswald that he was not required to speak and that any statements could be used against him. He was arraigned by Justice of the Peace Johnston for the Tippit murder at 7:10 p.m. and for the President's murder about 6½ hours later, and on each occasion was advised of his right to counsel and to remain silent. Nevertheless, Oswald was never represented by counsel; at the midnight press conference he protested the lack of legal representation. ACLU representatives who visited Friday evening were assured Oswald had been informed of his rights and was free to seek a lawyer. On Saturday he repeatedly tried without success to reach New York attorney John Abt, declined an offer of counsel from H. Louis Nichols of the Dallas Bar Association, and as late as Sunday morning told Postal Inspector Harry D. Holmes he preferred to obtain his own lawyer.

Within an hour of Oswald's arrival at the police department on November 22, newsmen learned he was a suspect in both the Tippit murder and the President's assassination—by at least 3:26 p.m. a television report had carried this information. Reporters and cameramen flooded the building and congregated on the third floor corridor. Felix McKnight of the Dallas Times-Herald estimated that more than 300 news media representatives came to Dallas within 24 hours of the assassination, including foreign correspondents. District Attorney Henry M. Wade believed the crowd in the third floor hallway alone may have numbered 300, though most estimates, including those based on video tapes, placed upwards of 100 newsmen and cameramen in the corridor by Friday evening. An FBI agent present compared the scene to "Grand Central Station at rush hour," and Chief Curry described it as "pandemonium on the third floor." Television cameras with floodlights were set up in the lobby, cables ran through offices and out windows, and newsmen sat on desks, used police telephones, and wandered freely among police bureaus. The corridor became so jammed that movement required pushing, shoving, and stepping over cables and tripods, and police efforts to clear an aisle were described as a "constant battle." District Attorney Wade found it a "strain to get the door open" to the homicide office, and Secret Service Agent Forrest V. Sorrels felt the "press and the television people just * * * took over."

The third floor of the Police and Courts Building was a 140-foot, 7-foot-wide corridor with police offices along its length, including those of Chief Curry at one end, a small pressroom at the other, and the homicide and robbery bureau—headed by Captain J. Will Fritz—between the pressroom and the lobby. While Oswald was detained, newsmen packed this corridor: television trucks surrounded the building, cables ran through offices and out windows, and cameras on tripods, sound equipment, and handheld devices filled the hallway. Police efforts to control the crowd and maintain an aisle were largely unavailing, as newsmen continually pushed back into cleared spaces. Despite the chaos, Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor stationed guards at the elevators and stairway late Friday afternoon to exclude unauthorized persons, and the basement records room issued passes to those with legitimate business. Because the police had to continue normal operations across all five bureaus on the third floor, many unrelated visitors—relatives of prisoners, complainants, and witnesses—also had to navigate the crowded corridor.

Newsmen seeking admission to the third floor were required to identify themselves with personal press cards, but the department did not verify the authenticity of these credentials. Captain King explained that under the chaotic conditions—with constantly ringing telephones and crowds of people—positively identifying individuals was not feasible. While police officers testified they carefully checked credentials and most newsmen confirmed they were required to show press cards after Batchelor imposed security, other newsmen went unchallenged for the entire period before Oswald's death, even though some were known to officers or wore press badges.

After security procedures were instituted, people appearing to be unauthorized were present on the third floor, a fact supported by video evidence. Jack Ruby was present on the third floor on Friday night. Assistant Chief of Police N. T. Fisher testified that even on Saturday, anyone with a plausible reason could gain access to the third floor bureaus, indicating significant lapses in security.

When Oswald arrived at police headquarters at about 2 p.m. on Friday, reporters and cameramen were already present. Police formed a wedge around him and took him to the elevator, with several newsmen crowding inside. From Friday afternoon through Sunday, Oswald traversed the 20-foot corridor between the homicide office and the jail elevator at least 15 times, with escorting officers having to push through throngs of newsmen. The Dallas press normally sought permission before photographing prisoners, but this practice was abandoned with Oswald, as newsmen aggressively took pictures, thrust microphones at his face, and shouted questions during his movements, though reporters exercised somewhat more restraint on Saturday.

Oswald's most prolonged exposure occurred at the midnight Friday press conference in the basement assembly room, announced by District Attorney Wade after consulting with Chief Curry and Captain Fritz. An estimated 70 to 100 people, including Jack Ruby and other unauthorized persons, crowded the small room without any identification required. The space was so packed that Deputy Chief Stevenson and Captain Fritz could not enter. Despite Curry's instructions not to touch Oswald or get close, and his order to reporters not to interview him, the newsmen immediately began shouting questions and shoving microphones. Curry had insisted Oswald stand on the floor rather than the lineup platform, placing him in front of the one-way screen because cameramen complained about photographing through the screen. After a few minutes, Curry ordered Oswald removed because the newsmen "tried to overrun him."

In Dallas, the county sheriff ordinarily takes custody of prisoners charged with felonies shortly after the complaint is filed, though in cases of unusual importance the city police sometimes handle transport. Chief Curry decided to move Oswald to the county jail on Sunday morning, announcing this decision Saturday evening. When two reporters mentioned they didn't want to miss anything, Curry told them that returning by 10 o'clock Sunday morning would ensure they didn't miss the transfer. After consulting with Captain Fritz, who preferred daylight hours for security reasons, Curry made a similar announcement to the assembled reporters, indicating the transfer would occur around 10 a.m. Sunday.

The decision to move Oswald was reached by Chief Curry the preceding evening, after which he discussed timing with Captain Fritz. Fritz preferred not to transfer at night due to visibility concerns, and suggested waiting until daylight, a normal procedure. They agreed on approximately 10 a.m. Sunday, and Curry then informed the newspaper people they would be back in time if they returned by 10 o'clock.

Between 2:30 and 3 a.m. Sunday, the local FBI office and the sheriff's office received telephone calls from an unidentified man warning that a committee had decided "to kill the man that killed the President." An FBI agent notified the Dallas police of the anonymous threat, and both threats were communicated through the chain to Chief Curry.

After discussing the transfer with Sheriff Decker, Curry decided the police would handle the move since they had the investigation and the officers set up downstairs. With the overnight threats in mind, Curry proposed transporting Oswald in an armored truck, which Batchelor and Deputy Chief Stevenson agreed to. While Batchelor arranged the armored truck, Curry and Stevenson agreed on a tentative route to the county jail. Curry decided Oswald would leave via the basement, a decision reached shortly after his Sunday morning arrival. Two officers suggested alternative exits to leave the press waiting, and Forrest Sorrels suggested an unannounced time, but Fritz declined these proposals because Curry had promised the press they could take pictures and wanted to be upfront with them.

Preliminary arrangements began Saturday evening, with police reserves requested to provide 8 to 10 men Sunday morning, and additional reservists sought in the morning. Captain C. E. Talbert retained patrolmen in the building and ordered others from several districts to report to the basement. Deputy Chief Stevenson instructed all detectives to remain for the transfer at 9 a.m., and Sheriff Decker's men were ready at the county jail from early Sunday morning. Talbert undertook to secure the basement by placing policemen outside at the top of the Commerce Street ramp to keep spectators on the opposite side, and later assigned patrolmen to all street intersections along the transfer route, with his most significant measures aimed at excluding unauthorized persons from the basement.

The basement of the Police and Courts Building contains the jail office, police garage, and an auto ramp running from Main Street to Commerce Street, with three elevator doors, a door to the municipal building, and a fifth door to a sub-basement. Shortly after 9 a.m. Sunday, policemen cleared the basement of non-police personnel, stationing guards at the top of the Main and Commerce Street ramps, at each of the five garage doorways, and at the double doors near the jail office. Sergeant Patrick T. Dean directed 14 men in a thorough search of the garage, examining rafters, air conditioning ducts, closets, rooms, and the interiors and trunks of parked automobiles, while maintenance workers were directed to leave. The two passenger elevators were locked, and the service elevator was moved to the first floor with the operator instructed not to return it.

Despite the thoroughness of the search, weak points remained in controlling garage access. Testimony did not conclusively resolve whether the stairway door near the public elevators was locked both from inside and outside as required. Additionally, the hallway near the jail office was accessible from inside the Police and Courts Building without identification being necessary, allowing newsmen hurrying to photograph Oswald to run unchallenged through those double doors into the basement until seconds before Oswald was shot.

After the search, police allowed news representatives to reenter the basement area and gather along the garage entrance and east side of the Main Street ramp. Officers had instructions to admit only identified news media representatives, accepting any credentials that appeared authentic, with some officers checking for corroborating identification like pictures. Many newsmen reported being checked more than once, though a small number did not recall their credentials being checked. Chief Curry instructed that reporters and cameramen be kept out of the jail office and that television equipment remain behind the railing, and he was generally satisfied with Talbert's security measures.

By the time Oswald reached the basement, 40 to 50 newsmen and 70 to 75 police officers had assembled there. Three television cameras stood along the railing, with most newsmen congregated in that area and at the top of the adjacent decline into the garage. Captain O. A. Jones brought additional detectives from the third floor to line the walls on either side of the passageway, forming barriers along an aisle for the transfer party. With Batchelor's permission, Jones removed photographers who had gathered in the jail office and directed newsmen to remain behind an imaginary line from the southeast corner of the jail office to the east railing. The final security arrangement positioned about 20 people across the bottom of the Main Street ramp, approximately eight detectives along the south wall outside the jail office, three detectives along the north wall, and two officers in front of the double doors to the corridor.

Beginning Saturday night, the public was kept informed of the approximate time of the Oswald transfer. At approximately 10:20 a.m., Chief Curry told a press conference that Oswald would be moved in an armored truck and gave a general description of other security precautions. Newsmen were not informed of the transfer route, and the route was not disclosed to the driver of the armored truck until it arrived at the Commerce Street exit at about 11:07 a.m. Remaining newsmen on the third floor descended to the basement, and some may have glimpsed Oswald putting on a sweater through the glass windows of Captain Fritz' office.

Because the driver feared the truck might stall if started from the bottom of the ramp and because the overhead clearance appeared inadequate, Assistant Chief Batchelor had the truck backed only into the entranceway at the top of the ramp. Batchelor and others then inspected the inside of the truck.

When Chief Curry learned the truck had arrived, he informed Captain Fritz that security controls were in effect and inquired how long the questioning of Oswald would continue. At this point, Fritz learned for the first time of the plan to convey Oswald by armored truck and immediately expressed disapproval. He urged the use of an unmarked police car driven by a police officer for better speed and maneuverability. Curry agreed to Fritz' plan, with the armored truck to be used as a decoy. The armored truck would leave the ramp first, followed by a car containing only security officers, with the police car bearing Oswald following. After proceeding one block, the car with Oswald would turn off and proceed directly to the county jail, while the armored truck would follow a lead car to the jail along the previously agreed upon and more circuitous route.

Captain Fritz instructed Detectives C. W. Brown, C. N. Dhority, and a third detective to proceed to the garage and move the followup car and the transfer car into place on the auto ramp. He told Lt. Rio S. Pierce to obtain another automobile from the basement and take up a lead position on Commerce Street. Deputy Chief Stevenson went back to the basement to inform Batchelor and Jones of the change in plans.

Oswald was given his sweater, and then his right hand was handcuffed to the left hand of Detective J. R. Leavelle. Detective T. L. Baker called the jail office to check on security precautions in the basement and notify officials that the prisoner was being brought down.

On arriving in the basement, Pierce asked Sergeants James A. Putnam and Billy Joe Maxey to accompany him in the lead car. Since the armored truck was blocking the Commerce Street ramp, they had to drive out the Main Street ramp and circle the block to Commerce Street. Maxey sat on the back seat, and Putnam cleared a path through reporters so Pierce could drive up toward Main Street. At about 11:20 a.m., the car passed the reporters and Putnam entered the car on the right front side. Pierce drove to the top of the Main Street ramp and slowed momentarily as Patrolman Roy E. Vaughn stepped from his position to watch for traffic. After Pierce's car left the garage area, Brown drove another police car out of the garage, moved part way up the Commerce Street ramp, and began backing down into position to receive Oswald. Dhority also drove the followup car into position ahead of Brown.

As Pierce's car started up the ramp at about 11:20 a.m., Oswald, accompanied by Captain Fritz and four detectives, arrived at the jail office. Cameramen in the basement hallway took pictures of Oswald through the interior glass windows of the jail office as he was led through to the exit. Some cameramen ran through the double doors near the jail office and squeezed into the line which had formed across the Main Street ramp, while others remained just inside the double doors or proceeded through after Oswald and his escort emerged. When Fritz came to the jail office door, he asked if everything was ready, and a detective answered yes. Someone shouted "Here he comes!"; additional spotlights were turned on. A detective stepped from the jail office toward the transfer car, followed by Fritz, then Oswald with Detective Leavelle at his right, Detective L. C. Graves at his left, and Detective L. D. Montgomery at his rear. Newsmen near the double door moved forward. Detective Montgomery stated that "as soon as we came out this door this bunch here just moved in on us." Detective B. H. Combest described the newsmen pushing forward, poking sound mikes and flashbulbs at Oswald.

After Oswald had moved about 10 feet from the door of the jail office, Jack Ruby passed between a newsman and a detective at the edge of the straining crowd on the Main Street ramp. With his right hand extended and holding a .38 caliber revolver, Ruby stepped quickly forward and fired a single fatal bullet into Oswald's abdomen.

The killing of Lee Harvey Oswald in the basement of police headquarters in the midst of more than 70 police officers gave rise to immediate speculation that one or more members of the police department provided Jack Ruby assistance which had enabled him to enter the basement and approach within a few feet of the accused Presidential assassin.

The Commission assessed whether Jack Ruby received assistance in gaining access to the Dallas Police Department basement on November 24. Although more than a hundred policemen and newsmen were present in the basement during the 10 minutes before the shooting, none definitively observed Ruby's entry. The Commission concluded that Ruby entered the basement unaided, probably via the Main Street ramp, and no more than 3 minutes before the shooting of Oswald. Two commission exhibits are referenced: Exhibit No. 2177 showing the jail office and immediate vicinity in the basement, and Exhibit No. 2636 showing Ruby shooting Oswald on November 24.

Three Dallas policemen testified that approximately 30 minutes after his arrest, Ruby told them he had walked to the top of the Main Street ramp from the nearby Western Union office and descended the ramp as Lieutenant Pierce's police car emerged into Main Street. This information surfaced only days later because the officers did not promptly report it. Ruby refused to discuss his means of entry with other investigators on the day of his arrest, but in a December 21 interview and in a sworn deposition after his trial, he repeated the same explanation.

Minutes before Oswald appeared in the basement, Ruby was at the Western Union office on Main Street, approximately 350 feet from the top of the Main Street ramp. A money order time stamp and receipt establish that the order was accepted for transmission at almost exactly 11:17 a.m., after which Ruby was observed departing in the direction of the police building. Video tapes show Lieutenant Pierce's car cleared the crowd at the foot of the ramp 55 seconds before the shooting, and Ruby standing at the foot of the ramp on the Main Street side. The shooting occurred very close to 11:21 a.m., as confirmed by a clock in motion pictures of Oswald, Oswald's jail departure records, and ambulance records. Commission Exhibit No. 2635 shows Ruby in the basement immediately before the shooting.

The testimony of two witnesses partially corroborates Ruby's claim that he entered via the Main Street ramp. James Turner, a WBAP-TV Fort Worth employee, testified that approximately 30 seconds before the shooting, while standing near the railing on the east side of the ramp, he observed a man he was confident was Jack Ruby moving slowly down the ramp about 10 feet from the bottom. Two other witnesses testified they thought they saw Ruby on the Main Street side of the ramp before the shooting. The Main Street ramp was the most direct route from the Western Union office, requiring about 1 minute to reach the top and 20-25 seconds to descend.

Former police officer N. J. Daniels testified that 3 or 4 minutes before the shooting, he saw a man walk down the Main Street ramp in full view of patrolman R. E. Vaughn without being stopped or questioned. However, Daniels did not identify the man as Ruby, gave a description that differed importantly from Ruby's November 24 appearance, and testified he did not think the man was Ruby. On November 24, Vaughn telephoned Daniels who initially said he had not seen anyone enter, and Daniels did not come forward with his statement until November 29. The Commission found his testimony to have little credibility.

The Commission found no credible evidence to support any entry route other than the Main Street ramp. Two Dallas detectives believed they observed three men pushing a WBAP-TV camera into the basement minutes before the shooting, but films showed only two men pushing the camera. The third WBAP-TV employee apparently ran to help steady the camera as it entered. Since the camera entered close to 4 minutes before the shooting, it is virtually impossible that Ruby could have been in the basement at that time.

The Commission investigated alternative basement entry routes. Ruby could have walked to the Commerce Street ramp in about 2½ minutes, but video tapes show an armored truck blocking that entranceway with only narrow clearance, making it improbable that Ruby could have passed unnoticed. Any other route would have required passing through the Police and Courts Building or the Municipal Building and then through one of five secured doors into the basement, though testimony was not completely positive about one door.

The Commission found no evidence supporting the speculation that Ruby used a press badge to gain entry or concealed himself in a police car. Police found no press card on Ruby after his apprehension and no discarded badges in the basement. There is no evidence that any officer admitted Ruby under any pretense. Police vehicles in the basement were inspected, and all patrol cars and a patrol wagon that entered did so on official business more than 4 minutes before the shooting. No witnesses recalled any police car entering during the 4-minute period between Ruby's departure from the Western Union office and the shooting. Commission Exhibit No. 2710 is referenced.

The Dallas Police Department conducted an extensive investigation that revealed no information indicating complicity between any officer and Jack Ruby. Ruby denied receiving any form of assistance. The FBI interviewed every police department member on duty in the basement on November 24, and Commission staff took sworn depositions from many. While Ruby had rather free access to Dallas police quarters after the assassination, there was no evidence implicating police or newsmen in his actions. Although Chief Curry estimated that 25 to 50 of the department's 1,175 men knew Ruby, and Ruby was known to cultivate relationships by providing free coffee and discounts, the Commission found no evidence of suspicious relationships between Ruby and any officer.

The shooting of Oswald resulted from the failure of the Dallas Police Department's security precautions. The Commission assessed that the Dallas police took special security measures but did not include adequate control of the great crowd of newsmen that inundated the building. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sent a message to Chief Curry on November 22 urging that Oswald be afforded utmost security, though Curry did not recall receiving it. The police pursued their normal press admittance policy set forth in General Order No. 81, which required officers to render every assistance to accredited news representatives. In a February 7, 1963 letter, Chief Curry explained this policy placed on officers a responsibility to lend active assistance to the press. Under this policy, news representatives ordinarily had access to the Police and Courts Building, and once the large press crowd became entrenched on the third floor, no one suggested reversing the policy. Captain King later stated candidly that he simply became "accustomed to the idea of them being out there." Most department members believed in retrospect that the press should have been excluded after the assassination, but few thought so at the time. Because the newsmen carried individual press cards rather than Dallas police-issued identification, officers could not quickly verify their identities. Jack Ruby himself was able to gain entry to the third-floor corridor on Friday night, illustrating the security risk created by these conditions.

Critical security oversights included the third-floor corridor being the only access route between the homicide/robbery bureaus and the jail elevator, with no consideration given to questioning Oswald on another floor. Oswald faced repeated, unnecessary exposure to the press unrelated to investigation, including a Friday evening press conference attended by unauthorized persons such as Jack Ruby. Inadequate press credential checks allowed Ruby and other unauthorized individuals to enter secure areas, while large crowds of newsmen obstructed police ability to detect threats. Publicly announcing transfer plans also attracted unnecessary onlookers and continuous media coverage that could have compromised the operation.

The Dallas Police Department permitted unrestricted press access to Oswald during his custody, allowing hundreds of cameramen and reporters direct access to observe him rather than using alternative, lower-risk channels such as updates from visiting family members, the Dallas Bar Association, or community representatives to confirm his treatment and rights were respected. The department also failed to restrict press from the third floor, a measure that provided no unique investigative benefit that could not have been achieved via press releases or off-site press conferences.

No single Dallas police official assumed clear, full responsibility for planning and coordinating Oswald’s transfer. Chief Curry deferred to Captain Fritz, who led the Oswald investigation, to set transfer timing and logistics, while Fritz believed Curry was directing transfer arrangements. This lack of definitive leadership meant no official oversaw critical security details including vehicle positioning, press placement, and officer assignments in the basement prior to the transfer.

A last-minute, uncoordinated decision to switch Oswald’s transfer vehicle from an armored truck to an unmarked police car was implemented without notifying Captain Fritz, who objected to the change. Fritz was incorrectly told basement security arrangements were complete after he raised concerns. As a result, the transfer car had not been positioned as planned when Oswald entered the basement, leaving a large unprotected area where Ruby was able to approach and shoot Oswald. Captain Jones noted the confusion prevented officers from forming a secure line between the jail office and the vehicle in time to block access.

The Dallas Police Department operated under a formal policy of accommodating press representatives within police working quarters, requiring all officers to share case information with media unless it would interfere with an investigation or involve internal personnel matters. Chief Curry, who handled departmental press relations, took charge of all public case announcements during the Oswald custody period, releasing extensive investigation details to reporters through informal channels.

Police officials justified their extensive press disclosure by arguing that public transparency was necessary to avoid public accusations that they were fabricating a case against Oswald, abusing his rights, or acting unfairly. They believed excluding press from investigations would erode public trust in law enforcement and the legal system, and that widespread public awareness of the case was mandatory to maintain confidence in the fairness of the process.

All case updates were shared via informal, unplanned press conferences held in the third-floor hallway, where reporters surrounded officials to ask questions and request statements, which officials almost always provided. Chief Curry alone gave at least a dozen television and radio interviews between November 22 and 24, sharing detailed case progress updates despite not attending most of Oswald’s interrogations, with transcripts of these interviews included in the Commission’s official record.

Chief Jesse Curry of the Dallas Police Department gave multiple media interviews in the days after the assassination. He refused to share specific new case evidence, stating it could jeopardize the prosecution, and at one point claimed the case against Oswald was fully "secure" and that authorities were "sure of our case" without disclosing the underlying evidence supporting that assertion.

Captain Will Fritz gave fewer media interviews than Chief Curry, but still answered reporter questions and shared opinions on the investigation. On Saturday, he told reporters he was convinced beyond doubt that Lee Harvey Oswald had killed the President, and discussed limited evidence including the murder rifle, though his overall media contributions were far smaller than Curry's.

Dozens of other Dallas Police Department personnel, including high-ranking officials, detectives, and patrolmen who worked on specific parts of the case (such as Oswald's arrest at the Texas Theatre and evidence searches at the Texas School Book Depository) freely gave interviews to news crews, with almost no one declining to speak or be televised. District Attorney Henry Wade observed that reporters "interviewed anybody" on the police force, following staff everywhere they went.

District Attorney Wade made numerous public statements and television appearances in the days after the assassination. At one point he stated he would not reveal case evidence to avoid prejudicing jury selection, but on other occasions shared inaccurate, inadmissible, and unsubstantiated details: he repeated the false claim that the murder rifle was a Mauser, said Oswald's wife had told police a rifle was missing from the family's garage the morning of the assassination, claimed Oswald had prepared for the assassination months in advance and practiced marksmanship with the rifle, and after Oswald was shooting held a lengthy formal press conference where he repeated multiple errors, including the false claim that a map in Oswald's room was marked with the presidential motorcade route, and incorrectly stated that Oswald's name had been broadcast to police in descriptions before his arrest.

The Dallas Police Department's running public commentary on the investigation included widespread erroneous disclosures. The rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository was first misidentified as a Mauser 7.65 rather than a Mannlicher-Carcano 6.5 by a deputy constable who only saw the weapon from a distance and never handled it. Police also falsely stated that chicken bones found on the sixth floor were the remains of Oswald's lunch (they had been left by another employee who ate there 15 minutes before the assassination), repeated a false report that a Black man had picked up Oswald near the assassination scene and driven him across town, and misreported that a map in Oswald's room contained a marked motorcade route when it actually held markings of locations where Oswald had applied for jobs, including the Depository.

Concerns about the harms of unlimited public disclosures were raised as early as Saturday morning. District Attorney Wade received calls from lawyers in Dallas and other locations expressing worry about providing counsel for Oswald and the volume of case information being shared with the press by police and the DA. Chief Curry continued giving television and radio interviews through the rest of Saturday and Sunday morning. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover grew alarmed that FBI laboratory reports were being shared publicly by DPD officials almost immediately after the department received them, including details about gun identification and physical evidence. After Oswald was shot on Sunday, Hoover sent Curry a personal message requesting he stop making public statements until the case was resolved, and Curry agreed to the request.

After the shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald shocked the Dallas police department, the force largely halted public media appearances. Chief Curry made only one additional television appearance: a 1:30 p.m. announcement of Oswald's death where he refused to answer reporter questions and ended the press conference in less than a minute. When District Attorney Wade asked police brass to share case evidence for a public statement to address public doubts and criticism, Curry refused to speak per his promise to the FBI, and other senior police declined to provide Wade with additional case details.

The unchecked, inaccurate public disclosures from Dallas authorities formed the core of the widespread myths and rumors about the assassination that emerged soon after President Kennedy's death. The repeated need for authorities to correct misinformation generated public criticism of the DPD's competence and doubts about the truthfulness of police statements, and skeptics used the early inaccurate police claims to cast doubt on later verified evidence and promote their own alternative theories of the assassination.

Joe R. Molina, a Dallas-born Navy veteran and long-term credit manager at the Texas School Book Depository, was wrongfully harmed by the DPD's public disclosures. Due to his Depository employment and membership in the American G.I. Forum (which Dallas police considered potentially subversive), Molina's home was searched with his permission at 1:30 a.m. on November 23, and he was interrogated for 6 to 7 hours at police headquarters about his G.I. Forum membership and ties to Oswald, though he was never arrested, charged, or held in custody, and no evidence ever linked him to Oswald (he stated he had never spoken to Oswald). The FBI confirmed it had no file on Molina and never shared information about him with DPD, and DPD admitted it had no file on Molina, only a file on the G.I. Forum. Public statements and television reports incorrectly framed Molina as a second suspect in the assassination, leading to him losing his job in December (officials cited automation, but Molina believed the unfavorable publicity was the cause), and he struggled to find new employment at a lower salary until assisted by a church contact.

If Lee Harvey Oswald had been tried for the November 22 murders, the Dallas authorities' public disclosure policy would have caused severe harm to both the prosecution and defense. The widespread misinformation could have been used by the defense to undermine the reliability of the entire state's case, and the volume of early police misstatements would have helped a skilled defense attorney sway juror attitudes. The disclosures also critically endangered Oswald's constitutional right to an impartial jury: given the case's massive public profile and intense public emotion, the release of specific evidence linking Oswald to the killings led the public (the jury pool) to prejudge issues that would be decided at trial. Additionally, multiple pieces of inadmissible evidence (including Chief Curry's claim that Oswald had refused a lie detector test, District Attorney Wade's false statement that a paraffin test proved Oswald had fired a gun, and Wade's disclosure of Marina Oswald's statement about rifle ownership) were shared publicly, meaning jurors could have been familiar with these facts even if they were excluded from trial. Officials' repeated public assertions of Oswald's guilt further prejudiced the jury pool.

The American Bar Association declared in December 1963 that widespread publicizing of Oswald's alleged guilt and disclosed evidence details would have made it extremely difficult to impanel an impartial jury and ensure a fair trial, a view shared by local bar associations. The Commission agrees that Oswald's right to a trial by 12 jurors free of preconceptions of guilt or innocence would have been seriously jeopardized by the premature disclosure and public weighing of evidence against him. The Commission also notes that even if police had not released specific case evidence, biographical information shared independently by the press could still have had a prejudicial effect on the public.

In justifying their decision to share extensive investigation details with the press, Dallas authorities cited overwhelming public demand for information. Chief Curry stated "it seemed like there was a great demand by the general public to know what was going on," and Captain King wrote in a prepared statement that the department felt an obligation to share as much information as possible given the national and global interest in the assassination investigation, to demonstrate the scope of the work being done to address the crime.

The Commission acknowledges that the U.S. public and global audience had a legitimate interest in learning about the JFK assassination and the investigation, including which agencies were involved, the progress of the work, that Oswald had been apprehended and charged with the murders, and that no evidence linked other people to the killings. However, the Commission concludes that neither the press nor the public had a right to contemporaneous access to the specific details of evidence being gathered against Oswald from police or prosecuting authorities. While public curiosity about these details was understandable, it should not have been satisfied at the expense of the accused's right to an impartial jury trial, which is the appropriate forum for resolving criminal cases in the U.S. system. The Commission also notes that while withholding evidence details would have limited the public's ability to assess investigation adequacy or push for further official action, the hasty and often inaccurate public disclosure of evidence primarily created groundless rumors and public confusion, and the public could have been adequately informed of the general scope of the investigation and interagency cooperation without sharing specific evidence details.

The Commission assigns primary responsibility for failing to control press access and prevent the release of unvetted, unprocessed evidence to the public to the Dallas Police Department, noting it was the only agency positioned to establish orderly, appropriate operating procedures to manage the large influx of news personnel gathered in the police building following the assassination.

The Commission determines the news media bears partial responsibility for the negative circumstances following the President’s death, as the crowd of reporters generally failed to comply with police demands, frequently used third-floor police offices without permission, tied up critical facilities, disrupted normal police operations, and resisted efforts to clear corridor passageways.

Reporters repeatedly disregarded explicit police directives: they completely ignored Chief Curry’s order against asking Lee Harvey Oswald questions and crowding him during the November 22 press conference, and the following morning multiple reporters shouted questions at Oswald as he appeared in the basement despite instructions to direct no questions at him.

Constant, aggressive pressure from news representatives on public officials to disclose investigation details impacted police decision-making, as the department sought to maintain satisfactory relations with reporters and cultivate a positive public image of their handling of the assassination response.

One or two press representatives made veiled, unjustified threats to the police, implying the department had brutalized Oswald in custody, and stated these unsubstantiated claims would be shared with the public if reporters were not granted access to view him.

The Commission finds both the Dallas Police Department (for failing to impose appropriate, orderly conditions for press interaction) and the news media (for its lack of self-discipline and disregard for the requirements of a fair justice process) share responsibility for the law enforcement failures that resulted in Lee Harvey Oswald’s death.

At their April 1964 annual meeting, members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors expressed strong misgivings about the press’s conduct in Dallas in the immediate aftermath of the assassination, and voiced a commitment to demonstrating greater self-discipline and adhering to higher professional standards in future reporting.

The Commission calls for the promulgation of a formal, binding code of professional conduct governing all news media representatives, stating such a code would serve as evidence the press had learned from the mistakes of its conduct in Dallas following the assassination.

The Commission notes that state and local governments, the legal bar, and the general public all share responsibility for pushing to establish ethical conduct standards for the news media, to strike an appropriate balance between the public’s right to be informed and an individual’s right to a fair, impartial trial.

The Commission investigated every rumor and allegation of a conspiracy linked to Oswald, including claims he received support from domestic political groups across the ideological spectrum or foreign governments (specifically Cuba’s Castro regime and the Soviet Union). It scrutinized Oswald’s activities, writings, and possessions for evidence of espionage or coordination with others, tested all relevant evidence for potential fabrication or bias, and received support from federal agencies including the CIA, FBI, and State Department. All information the Commission relied on for its conclusions is included in the report, with only confidential source identities withheld in rare cases. The Commission also explored Oswald’s pre-assassination activities (including his 1959 defection to the Soviet Union, contacts with communist and socialist groups, visits to Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City, and ties to Russian-speaking community members in Dallas, as well as potential connections to right-wing Dallas activity critical of President Kennedy) and investigated whether Jack Ruby was part of a broader assassination conspiracy.

The Commission analyzed the required sequence of events for the assassination to occur as concluded in earlier chapters (the motorcade passing the Texas School Book Depository, Oswald accessing the building’s sixth floor, transporting the rifle, arranging his shooting position, and escaping before police secured building exits) to search for evidence Oswald received assistance in planning or executing the killing.

The Commission reviewed the Secret Service’s motorcade route selection process: the chosen route from Love Field to the Trade Mart via Main Street, Houston Street, Elm Street, and the Stemmons Freeway was selected for its directness, ability to allow large crowds to view the President, and alignment with the 45-minute schedule allocated for the trip. The route passed the Texas School Book Depository because required turns at Elm and Houston Streets and a concrete barrier blocking direct freeway access from Main Street made an alternate route bypassing the building impractical. The Commission concluded the route selection was appropriate, based on legitimate planning considerations, and unrelated to any conspiracy.

The Commission determined Oswald’s employment at the Texas School Book Depository was unrelated to the President’s Dallas trip. He secured the job in October 1963, shortly after arriving in Dallas from Mexico City, via a neighbor’s suggestion to Ruth Paine (with whom Oswald’s family was staying) while he was unemployed, his wife was pregnant, and his unemployment benefits were set to expire. He had previously applied to a printing company but was rejected due to a negative reference citing "communistic tendencies" and a record as a troublemaker. The motorcade route was not finalized until November 18, 1963, three days before the assassination, long after Oswald was hired, confirming his presence in the building was coincidental.

The Commission concluded Oswald carried the assassination rifle into the Depository on November 22, 1963, in a handmade brown paper bag. His coworker Buell Wesley Frazier provided him a ride to work as part of a long-standing, innocent arrangement arranged through Frazier’s sister (the same neighbor who suggested Oswald apply to the Depository). Oswald’s claim that he visited Irving on November 21 to retrieve curtain rods for a Dallas apartment explained the large package he carried back to work the next morning. The bag was constructed from Depository shipping materials Oswald had access to, and there is no evidence he received assistance bringing the rifle into the building beyond Frazier’s innocent ride.

The Commission investigated whether Oswald needed help arranging cartons at the sixth-floor window where he fired the shots. Most cartons in the area were already stacked by floor-laying crews to clear space for new flooring, with no organized arrangement. The four boxes at the shooting position (two 55-pound cartons, two 8-pound "Rolling Readers" block aids) could have been positioned by one person quickly: the 55-pound cartons had already been moved by the floor crew, and the lighter Rolling Readers were only moved 40 feet from their original positions. There is no evidence Oswald received assistance setting up the shooting position at the scene.

The Commission evaluated fingerprints on the four cartons found in and near the sixth-floor window. Three of Oswald's prints were developed on two cartons, and 25 additional identifiable prints were found, along with others too fragmentary to identify. The Commission determined that warehouse employees who customarily handled the cartons left no identifiable prints. All but one of the 25 identifiable prints belonged to an FBI employee and a Dallas Police Department member who handled the cartons during the investigation, with one palmprint remaining unidentified. The presence of unidentified prints was deemed unremarkable given that the cartons contained commercial products handled by many people in manufacturing, warehousing, and shipping. The Commission also noted that the FBI does not maintain a palmprint classification system and relied on the opinion of fingerprint supervisor Sebastian F. Latona that people could handle cartons without leaving developable prints. The Commission concluded the foreign fingerprints provide no indication of an accomplice at the window.

Two Depository employees were briefly present on the sixth floor between 11:45 a.m. and the assassination. Charles Givens, a floor-laying crew member, returned to the sixth floor to retrieve his jacket and cigarettes, saw Oswald walking away from the southeast corner, observed no one else, and left via elevator at approximately 11:55 a.m. Bonnie Ray Williams returned at about noon to eat lunch and watch the motorcade, positioned 20–30 feet from the southeast corner window near the third or fourth set of windows from the east wall. He remained for 5 to 12 minutes eating chicken and drinking soda, saw no one on the sixth floor (though stacks of books blocked his view of the east side), and left by elevator to the fifth floor, where he watched the motorcade with Harold Norman and James Jarman, Jr. Williams left chicken bones and a soda bottle near his eating spot.

Several witnesses outside the building claimed to have seen a person in the southeast corner sixth-floor window. Howard L. Brennan made a positive identification of Oswald, while other witnesses offered varying descriptions. Although the witnesses differed in their ability to describe the person, none testified to seeing more than one person in the window.

Arnold Rowland, an 18-year-old witness standing on the east side of Houston Street with his wife, testified in detail about seeing a man holding a rifle standing back from the southwest corner sixth-floor window. He described the man as slender, light-complexioned, with dark hair. Rowland initially believed the man was likely Secret Service. In his post-assassination affidavit, Rowland reported seeing this man but could not identify him. When testifying before the Commission on March 10, 1964, Rowland claimed for the first time to have also seen an elderly Negro man in the southeast corner window, describing him as very thin, 50 to 60 years old, 5'8" to 5'10", with fairly dark complexion and balding. Rowland said the man remained until 5 to 6 minutes before the motorcade. He claimed to have told FBI agents about the man on the weekend after the assassination, but no such statement appears in FBI reports. Mrs. Rowland testified that her husband never told her about the second man, that she did not hear him mention it during the FBI interview (though she acknowledged not hearing everything), and that she herself saw no one in the sixth-floor windows. She also stated her husband is "prone to exaggerate." An FBI investigation found that Rowland made numerous false statements about verifiable matters including school subjects, grades, high school graduation, and college admission. The Commission rejected Rowland's testimony about the elderly Negro man due to his delayed reporting, lack of corroboration, and credibility issues.

Roger D. Craig, a Dallas County deputy sheriff, offered potential corroboration for Rowland's story. Craig testified that about 10 minutes after the assassination, Rowland told him he had seen two men on the sixth floor about 15 minutes before the motorcade—one with a rifle and telescopic sight and another person. Craig claimed Rowland said the men were white, walking back and forth in front of the window, and that one had a scoped rifle. According to Craig, Rowland said the other man left and only the man with the rifle remained. This account is contradicted by the testimony of both the Rowlands and by every recorded post-assassination interview with them conducted by law enforcement agencies.

The Commission investigated every employee of the Texas School Book Depository Building to evaluate Rowland's allegation and the accomplice question. Only two employees generally matched the description of an elderly bald or balding Negro man, and both were on the first floor before and during the assassination. All employees were asked whether they saw any strangers in the building that morning. Only one employee reported seeing a stranger—a feeble man who had to be helped up the front steps, used a public restroom, and left five minutes later, about 40 minutes before the assassination.

The Commission analyzed Oswald's movements between the assassination and the shooting of Patrolman Tippit using testimony from seven witnesses: Patrolman M. L. Baker and Roy Truly on the second floor within 2 minutes; Mrs. R. A. Reid less than 1 minute later; busdriver Cecil J. McWatters and Mrs. Mary Bledsoe seeing him board a bus around 12:40 p.m. and exit 4 minutes later; cabdriver William W. Whaley driving him to Oak Cliff; and Earlene Roberts seeing him enter the roominghouse at about 1 p.m. Oswald was always alone. Analysis of his departure showed the building was probably first sealed off no earlier than 12:37, and Officer W. E. Barnett estimated 3 minutes between the last shots and his guarding the front door, during which "people were going in and out." The Commission concluded 3 minutes was sufficient for Oswald to descend and leave without assistance. James R. Worrell, Jr. claimed to see a man running from the rear but could not identify him, and two other rear-watching witnesses saw no one leave. Craig's claim of seeing Oswald leave about 15 minutes after the assassination was addressed—Craig may have seen someone entering a station wagon, but it was not Oswald. Mrs. Roberts' testimony about a police car with its horn honking at 1026 North Beckley around 1 p.m. was investigated, but no evidence supported the presence of such a vehicle. She never saw Oswald enter a car and last saw him at a bus stop shortly after 1 p.m. The Commission found no evidence Oswald had prearranged escape plans or assistance from others.

Finding no evidence of other participants immediately surrounding the assassination, the Commission conducted an intensive investigation into Oswald's life to detect any traces of conspiracy, compiling a detailed chronological biography set forth as appendix XIII. The period from Oswald's 1939 birth through his 1956–1959 military service revealed no association with any sinister or subversive organization. The Commission noted that Oswald was young, inexperienced, had limited education, was unable to establish relationships with others, resented authority and discipline, demonstrated the ability to act secretively and alone (as in his defection to the Soviet Union), and did not appear to be the type of person normally selected as a conspirator.

Lee Harvey Oswald was openly committed to Marxist ideology, defected to the Soviet Union in 1959, and resided there until June 1962, eventually returning to the United States with a Russian wife. To evaluate rumors that Oswald may have been a Soviet agent, the Commission investigated the facts of his stay in Russia, fulfilling its obligation to probe all possibly relevant facts without suggesting that Soviet rulers believed the assassination would advance their interests. Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified on June 10, 1964 that he had seen no evidence the Soviet Union considered Kennedy's removal in its interest or was involved in any way.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified that he had not seen or heard of any evidence indicating that the Soviet Union had any desire to eliminate President Kennedy or participated in any such event. Standing back and looking at the question objectively despite ideological differences between the two systems, Rusk stated he could not see how such an effort could be to the interest of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, objectively considered, has an interest in the correctness of state relations, particularly among the great powers with which its major interests are directly engaged. Even from the Soviet point of view, there must be some shape and form to international relations, and it is not in their interest to have the world structure dissolve into complete anarchy. Great states, and especially nuclear powers, must be able to deal with each other, transact business, and meet problems together, which requires the maintenance of correct relations and access to leadership on all sides.

Although grave differences existed between the Communist world and the free world, a certain mutual respect had developed between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy through both good and bad experiences. Both leaders were aware that any Chairman of the Soviet Union and any President of the United States bear special responsibility for the general peace of the world—indeed, without exaggeration, the existence of the northern hemisphere in the nuclear age.

It would have been an act of rashness and madness for Soviet leaders to undertake an assassination of the President as an active policy, because everything would have been put in jeopardy or at stake by such an act. Madness has not characterized the actions of the Soviet leadership in recent years. The Commission accepted Rusk's estimate as reasonable and objective, though recognizing that a precise assessment of Soviet intentions or interests is most difficult, and therefore examined all known facts regarding Oswald's defection, residence in the Soviet Union, and return to the United States to determine whether Soviet authorities may have directly or indirectly influenced Oswald's actions.

The Commission examined all known facts regarding Oswald's defection, residence in the Soviet Union, and return to the United States, seeking to determine at each step whether there was any evidence supporting a conclusion that Soviet authorities may have directly or indirectly influenced Oswald's actions in assassinating the President. The Commission's findings on Soviet involvement were supported by evidence other than material provided by the Soviet Union or Oswald's writings, with the CIA also contributing data on normal Soviet practices for handling American defectors.

Although evidence is inconclusive as to what motivated Oswald to go to the Soviet Union, there is no indication he was prompted by agents of that country. He may have begun studying Russian while stationed in Japan (August 1957 to November 1958) and told several persons in Moscow in October 1959 that he had been planning defection for two years. Statements to American newspaper reporters and others about his motivations were somewhat at variance, and which version was more accurate remains unknown. No evidence shows he received outside financing; he likely saved from his Marine Corps salary (earning $3,452.20 over his service) and his known frugal habits suggest he could finance the trip. He studied Russian in Japan and California, scored "Poor" on an Army aptitude test in February 1959, and could barely speak the language upon arrival; after extensive study and lessons from a Soviet-assigned interpreter, he eventually spoke well, though with grammatical errors and poor writing. The Commission investigated his visa acquisition in Helsinki in October 1959 and found nothing indicating he was a Soviet agent; the relatively prompt visa may have reflected normal procedures after the summer rush ended. His defection and disloyal public statements eliminated any possibility of his gaining access to confidential U.S. information—itself persuasive evidence he was not recruited as an agent prior to defection.

Two months and twenty-two days elapsed from Oswald's arrival in Moscow until he left for Minsk, and the Commission considered whether he was accepted for residence and sent to Minsk unusually soon because he had been expected or developed an undercover relationship with the Soviet Government. The Commission relied primarily on Oswald's "Historic Diary" (which likely began in Minsk, not Moscow, based on Marina Oswald's testimony and supporting evidence), American Embassy records in Moscow, Embassy officials' testimony, and notes from reporters Aline Mosby and Priscilla Johnson, with the diary's authenticity verified through handwriting and stylistic analysis showing no indication of other writers. On October 16, 1959, the day he arrived, Oswald told his Intourist guide Rima Shirokova he wished to renounce citizenship; the KGB, which in 1959 had informants among virtually all Intourist guides, undoubtedly investigated him fully. On October 21 he was informed his visa had expired and he would be required to leave within two hours. According to his diary, Oswald attempted suicide when his citizenship application was denied, which would suggest no undercover relationship existed at that time; this is supported by medical records from Botkinskaya Hospital (October 21–28) treating a self-inflicted wrist wound, the autopsy scar consistent with such an attempt, Marina Oswald's testimony that he became angry when asked about the scar, and witnesses' observations of his arrogant, untrusting character. He appeared at the American Embassy on October 31 without mentioning his recent hospitalization, providing the first U.S. Government notification of his presence in Russia.

On October 31, 1959, Oswald visited the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and declared his wish to renounce his U.S. citizenship. Consul Richard E. Snyder refused to accept the renunciation, telling Oswald he would need to return with proper paperwork. During the approximately 40-minute interview, Oswald handed over his passport and a handwritten statement requesting that his citizenship be "revoked" and affirming his allegiance to the Soviet Union. The FBI confirmed the note was in Oswald's handwriting, and Snyder testified that its phrases were consistent with Oswald's speech and demeanor. Oswald also informed Snyder that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and had told a Soviet official he would share any information he possessed about the Marines and radar operations.

In a letter to the U.S. Embassy dated November 3, 1959, Oswald again requested that his American citizenship be revoked and protested the Embassy's refusal to accept his renunciation on October 31. Oswald never filed a formal renunciation. A comparison of this letter and the October 31 note with Section 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act suggests Oswald had read the statute but understood it imperfectly; he attempted to use three of the four statutory methods of surrendering citizenship but succeeded in none.

Both at the Embassy and in a subsequent interview with American journalist Priscilla Johnson, Oswald displayed familiarity with Communist ideological arguments, leading those he spoke with to speculate that he may have received instruction from Soviet authorities. His familiarity with citizenship renunciation law, observed by Embassy officials, could also be read as evidence of Soviet coaching. However, Oswald was known to be an avid reader who had read Communist literature on his own while in the Marine Corps and before. His "Historic Diary" indicates he did not tell his Intourist guide about his planned Embassy visit because he feared she would disapprove. While Snyder received a favorable impression of Oswald as an intelligent person, journalist Priscilla Johnson, who spent about five hours with him, described him as someone who liked to create the pretense of engaging in abstract discussion but lacked the capacity for sustained logical argument.

Persuasive evidence that Oswald's conduct was not carefully coached by Soviet agents comes from some of his own actions at the Embassy. His statement that he had volunteered to a Soviet official to share all he knew about radar work would have prejudiced any possibility of his serving as an effective pro-Communist agent. Although his behavior brought him exceedingly close to expatriation, it was unlikely to have increased his value to the Soviet Union, since a defector could have considerable propaganda value without expatriating himself, and expatriation would have made his eventual return to the United States more difficult or impossible. Snyder testified he had every reason to believe Oswald would have carried through a formal renunciation immediately if permitted. Reporters also noted Oswald's ambivalence—stormily demanding to renounce while failing to complete the necessary paperwork—behavior that could have detracted from his propaganda value.

According to Oswald's "Historic Diary" and documents furnished by the Soviet Government, Oswald was not told he had been accepted as a Soviet resident until about January 4, 1960. Although on November 13 and 16 he told journalists Aline Mosby and Priscilla Johnson that he had been granted permission to remain indefinitely, the diary indicates he had been told only that he could remain "until some solution is found with what to do with me." The diary is more consistent with Oswald's December 17 letter to his brother Robert saying he was about to leave his hotel more than a month after seeing Johnson and Mosby. A short note to his mother, received in Texas on January 5, and a returned money order suggest the timeline. Oswald's conflicting statements to correspondents are reconcilable with his desire to appear important. As long as Oswald stayed in a Moscow hotel, the inference is that Soviet authorities had not yet decided to accept him—a view supported by CIA information on handling of other defectors. Thus Oswald likely waited until at least November 16, and probably until January 4, before his application was granted. When the Soviet Government finally acted, it did not grant him Soviet citizenship but only year-to-year residency.

Asked to comment on the 2-month-and-22-day period that likely passed before Oswald was granted the right to remain in the Soviet Union, the CIA advised that when compared to five other defector cases the procedure seemed unexceptional. Of the five, two defectors from U.S. Army intelligence units in West Germany with prior KGB connections received citizenship immediately; one was accepted within five weeks and given a stateless passport; another was immediately permitted to stay and granted citizenship three months later; and the third was allowed to stay but waited nearly two months for acceptance, with his documentation arriving five or six months after application. The only known case of an American requesting Soviet citizenship without taking up residence involved a defector who changed his mind and returned to the United States within three weeks. The Department of State similarly reported that a two-month waiting period is not unusual, citing one case in which the Supreme Soviet decided within two months to grant Soviet citizenship. The Department noted that the Soviet Government never publicizes the proceedings or reasons in such cases and that defection by American citizens is extremely unusual. Information about Oswald's suicide attempt suggests his original application was probably rejected about six days after arrival, with the KGB likely making the initial rejection. Permission for him to remain after his hospital release suggests a different Soviet ministry intervened, possibly out of concern for publicity over rejecting a high-profile convert to the Communist cause.

According to the "Historic Diary" and Soviet-supplied documents, Oswald resided in Minsk from January 1960 until June 1962. His life in Minsk is the portion of his life about which the least is known, with primary sources being his own writings and Marina Oswald's testimony.

Evidence establishes beyond doubt that Oswald was in fact located in Minsk on at least two occasions. The Commission obtained two photographs taken by American tourists in Minsk in August 1961 that show Oswald; the tourists did not know or speak with him. Oswald was also noticed in Minsk in the spring of 1961 by a University of Michigan student traveling with the band on a tour of Russia. Oswald corresponded with the American Embassy in Moscow from a Minsk address and wrote letters from Minsk to his family in the United States. He and his wife had many photographs showing Minsk backgrounds and identifiable residents. After returning to the United States, Oswald conversed about the city with Russian-born American citizens familiar with it, and Marina Oswald was also familiar with it. The Commission independently verified the existence of many of the acquaintances Oswald and his wife said they knew in Minsk.

After being accepted as a resident alien, Oswald received considerable benefits beyond those of ordinary Soviet citizens in his position. Upon being informed he could remain and being sent to Minsk, he was given 5,000 rubles (about $500) by the Soviet "Red Cross" for expenses; he used 2,200 rubles to pay his hotel bill and 150 rubles for a train ticket, leaving him feeling "like a rich man." Although he did not receive the free quarters the "Mayor" of Minsk had promised, about six weeks after arrival he was given a pleasant apartment for 60 rubles ($6) per month—considered "almost rent free." He received a job at the Byelorussian Radio and Television Factory, where his piecework pay ranged from 700 to 900 rubles ($70–$90) per month, which Marina Oswald said was average for his occupation and good by general Soviet standards. In addition to his salary, Oswald regularly received 700 rubles ($70) per month from the Soviet "Red Cross." His only recorded complaint was that there was "no place to spend the money."

The Commission found no basis for associating Oswald's preferred income with Soviet undercover activity. Marina Oswald testified that foreign nationals are commonly given special treatment in the Soviet Union, and the CIA confirmed it is standard practice to subsidize Americans and other foreign defectors from countries with higher standards of living, apparently to prevent disillusionment and return home. The Commission also assumed it is customary for Soviet intelligence agencies to keep defectors under surveillance through periodic interviews of their neighbors and associates, and Oswald once mentioned that Soviet police questioned his neighbors occasionally. Oswald learned about the supplementary "Red Cross" funds from his own writings alone; he recognized during his return trip that the "Red Cross" subsidy had nothing to do with the International Red Cross and stated the money was paid to him for having "denounced" the United States and came from the "MVD." The "Red Cross" subsidy was terminated as soon as Oswald wrote the American Embassy in February 1961 asking to be permitted to return. Marina Oswald confirmed he was no longer receiving the monthly grant by the time she knew him, though he had accumulated some savings from the months he had received it.

Oswald was employed at a large Minsk factory manufacturing electronic parts and radio and television sets. Marina Oswald testified he was an "apprentice machinist" who ground small metallic parts for radio receivers on a lathe. Oswald never straightforwardly described his Soviet job to acquaintances in the United States. Some Dallas and Fort Worth acquaintances believed he was disappointed at being assigned a menial job rather than to an institution of higher learning. Marina Oswald confirmed this and testified that her husband was not interested in his work and was not regarded at the factory as a very good worker. Soviet-supplied documents, including a report from Oswald's factory superior, were consistent with her testimony and critical of his job performance. His employment and job performance were consistent with his known occupational habits in the United States and otherwise afforded no ground for suspicion.

Oswald's membership in a hunting club while residing in the Soviet Union drew particular Commission interest. A Russian émigré testified that gun ownership for pleasure was impermissible in the USSR, raising suspicions about Oswald's participation. However, the Commission's investigation found that hunting societies were common and frequently sponsored by factories, as was the case with Oswald's club. The CIA confirmed that hunting societies were popular, and that Soviet citizens and foreigners were permitted to own shotguns without joining a society provided the weapons were registered at the local militia office.

CIA experts examined Oswald's club membership certificate and gun permit and determined that their terms and numbers were consistent with other information the CIA possessed about Soviet practices. This examination supported the conclusion that Oswald's documents were ordinary and unremarkable in form.

Marina Oswald testified that her husband went hunting only once during their marriage. However, Oswald joined the Byelorussian Society of Hunters and Fishermen in the summer of 1960, before their April 30, 1961 marriage, suggesting he could have been more active as a bachelor. Oswald openly discussed his hunting club membership with friends after returning to the United States, mentioned it in a speech at a Jesuit Seminary in Mobile, Alabama in summer 1962, corresponded with his brother Robert about it, and retained his membership certificate and gun permit until his death.

Given Oswald's open and repeated references to his hunting club membership in multiple contexts, the Commission concluded it was unlikely that the membership was contrived to conceal secret training. The lack of secrecy surrounding the activity undermined any theory of covert purpose.

The CIA informed the Commission that it possessed considerable information on the location of secret Soviet training institutions and that no such institution existed in or near Minsk during the period Oswald resided there. This further supported the conclusion that the hunting club membership was not cover for espionage training.

Oswald's marriage to Marina Prusakova on April 30, 1961 warranted consideration. A foreigner living in Russia could not marry without Soviet governmental permission. The Commission observed that it seemed unlikely Soviet authorities would have permitted Oswald to marry and take his wife to the United States if they were contemplating using him alone as an agent, as a Russian wife would likely increase American security surveillance, make him more conspicuous as "an ex-Russian," and decrease his mobility. Marina's lack of English training and ignorance of the United States would also have made her unsuitable as a member of an "agent team" sent on a dangerous foreign enterprise.

Soviet law required that a foreigner residing in Russia obtain governmental permission before marrying. This requirement was a significant barrier and control point exercised by Soviet authorities over foreign residents.

The Soviet rationale for permitting Marina to emigrate to the United States with Oswald was not established through direct evidence, but the Commission inferred from the circumstances that allowing the marriage and emigration suggested Oswald was not being used as a covert agent by Soviet authorities, since the presence of a Russian wife would only complicate any such operation.

Marina Oswald's lack of English training and her complete ignorance of United States customs would scarcely have recommended her to the Soviet authorities as a suitable member of an agent team to be sent to the United States on a difficult and dangerous foreign enterprise. Her profile was inconsistent with that of a trained operative.

On February 13, 1961, the American Embassy in Moscow received a letter from Oswald postmarked Minsk, February 5, requesting readmission to the United States. This marked the Embassy's first contact with or about Oswald since November 16, 1959, ending a 15-month silence. The letter was not designed to ingratiate Oswald with Embassy officials; it incorrectly implied a prior unanswered letter, stated he would return only if assured no legal charges awaited him, and reminded officials of their responsibility to help him as an American citizen.

The end of the 15-month communication gap came only a few days after the Department of State in Washington had forwarded a request to the Moscow Embassy on February 1, 1961, informing the Embassy that Oswald's mother was worried about him and asking that he contact her if possible. The simultaneity of these two events appeared coincidental. Marguerite Oswald's request was transmitted from Washington to Moscow by sealed diplomatic pouch with no evidence the seal had been tampered with, and the responsible State Department officer testified that the message was not forwarded to the Russians upon arrival in Moscow.

The Embassy's response to Oswald's letter was to invite him to come personally to Moscow to discuss the matter. Oswald initially protested because of the difficulty of obtaining Soviet permission and wrote two additional protesting letters over the following four months, receiving no indication that the Embassy would handle the matter by mail. While the Department of State was clarifying its position, Oswald unexpectedly appeared at the Embassy in Moscow on Saturday, July 8, 1961. On Sunday, Marina Oswald flew to Moscow and was interviewed by Embassy officials on Tuesday.

The Commission asked the State Department and CIA to comment on whether the Oswalds' travel to Moscow without permission signified special Soviet treatment. Since Marina Oswald possessed a Soviet citizen's internal passport, she did not require prior approval to make the trip. Soviet law did require her husband, as the holder of a "stateless passport," to obtain advance permission, but his failure to do so would not normally have been considered a serious violation.

The Commission assessed the Oswalds' unauthorized travel to determine whether it reflected special treatment. Based on State Department and CIA responses, the Commission concluded that the travel did not appear to signify special treatment. The CIA advised that bearers of Soviet "passports for foreigners" and "stateless passports" were normally required to obtain travel authorization from OVIR or PRO, but unauthorized travel did occur and typically resulted in mere reprimand.

The Department of State and CIA provided testimony and information regarding Oswald's travel. The State Department noted that other U.S. nationals living in the Soviet Union (a priest, minister, correspondents, students, and technical advisers) were required to obtain permission before traveling. A 1960 defector later reported making seven unauthorized trips from Kiev and was apprehended twice but merely reprimanded each time. The State Department believed that if Oswald's unauthorized travel had been known, he would have been fined or reprimanded rather than severely punished, though the Soviet authorities probably knew about the trip through militia guards at the Embassy.

Marina Oswald's unauthorized trip to Moscow was explained by her possession of a Soviet citizen's internal passport, which did not require advance permission for such travel. The CIA confirmed that there would have been no restrictions against her making the trip to Moscow based on her documentation.

The CIA informed the Commission that persons holding Soviet "stateless passports" were required to obtain travel authorization from the Visa and Registration Department (OVIR) or Passport Registration Department (PRO) in smaller towns if they desired to leave the city or oblast where they were domiciled. Despite this requirement, enforcement was often lax, with police at railroad stations spotchecking identification papers of approximately every tenth traveler. Persons caught evading registration requirements were typically returned to their home towns and sentenced to short jail terms and fines, with more severe sentences for repeated violations.

When Oswald arrived at the Embassy in Moscow, he met Richard E. Snyder, the same officer with whom he had dealt in October 1959. Primarily based on Oswald's interview with Snyder on Monday, July 10, 1961, the American Embassy tentatively concluded that Oswald had not expatriated himself. On this basis, Oswald was given back his American passport, which he had surrendered in 1959. The document was due to expire in September 1961, and Oswald was informed that renewal would depend upon the ultimate State Department decision on expatriation. On July 11, Marina Oswald was interviewed and steps toward obtaining her American visa were begun. In May 1962, after 15 months of dealings, Oswald's passport was renewed and permission for his wife to enter the United States was granted.

To leave Russia, the Oswalds also needed Soviet governmental permission. Marina Oswald, though her memory was unclear, said she and Oswald first made their intentions to go to the United States known to Soviet officials in Minsk in May 1961, even before the July Moscow trip. Soviet documents showed formal applications from July 15 to August 21. The key question for Soviet authorities was whether to allow Marina to accompany her husband.

Marina Oswald was called to the local passport office in Minsk on December 25, 1961, and told that authority had been received to issue exit visas to her and Oswald. On January 11, 1962, Marina was issued her Soviet exit visa, marked valid until December 1, 1962. The Oswalds did not leave Russia until June 1962, but the additional delay was caused by U.S. Government problems and the birth of a child in February. Permission from Soviet authorities, once given, was never revoked.

Marina Oswald's reported interview with MVD Colonel Aksenov in late 1961, which was arranged at her own request, may have served the purpose of determining whether she or her husband had access to confidential information. This conference, together with Oswald's predeparture MVD interview, appeared to be standard assessment activities. Oswald told the FBI in July 1962 that he had been interviewed by the MVD twice—once when he first arrived in the Soviet Union and once just before departing. Marina testified that the second interview did not occur in Moscow and that they dealt with MVD visa officials frequently in Minsk.

The Department of State and CIA compiled data for the Commission on Soviet wives of American citizens receiving exit visas. The State Department had sufficient information to measure waiting times in 14 cases, noting that the sampling carried a bias toward lengthy periods since cases were typically brought to State Department attention only when delays occurred. Of the 14 cases, 6 involved women who applied after 1953, with approximate waiting periods of 13 months, 6 months, 3 months, 1 month, and 10 days. The CIA examined 11 cases with known or inferable time periods, finding that Soviet wives typically waited from 5 months to a year for exit visas. The Oswalds' experience of at least 5½ months was consistent with these normal waiting periods.

This section addresses the pressure that Soviet authorities allegedly applied to Marina Oswald to dissuade her from emigrating to the United States. While Lee Harvey Oswald claimed in correspondence with the American Embassy and his brother, in his diary, and in post-return conversations that the pressure was so intense Marina was hospitalized for five days for "nervous exhaustion," Marina testified that no such hospitalization occurred. She did confirm being questioned occasionally and made to feel that her government was displeased with her decision; her aunt and uncle in Minsk did not speak to her for a long time, and she was dropped from the Komsomol. A student who took Russian lessons from her in Texas recalled Marina describing that period as "a very horrible time." Despite this pressure, Marina testified that she was surprised their visas were granted so quickly—particularly her own.

Based on the evidence presented, the Commission concluded that there was no reason to believe the Oswalds received unusually favorable treatment in being permitted to leave the Soviet Union. Rather, the evidence indicated that Soviet authorities first attempted to dissuade Marina from going to the United States and then, when she failed to respond to the pressure, permitted her to leave without undue delay. The Commission noted that the Soviet treatment of another recent defector who left the USSR to return to the United States resembled that accorded to the Oswalds.

This section introduces the broader topic of the Oswalds' associations in the Dallas-Fort Worth community after their return from Russia in June 1962, setting the stage for detailed discussion of the Russian-speaking community, the De Mohrenschildts, and the Paine family.

The Russian-speaking community in the Dallas-Fort Worth area consisted of a loosely knit group of Russian-born or Russian-speaking persons who were drawn together by common background, language, and culture. Many were well-educated, accomplished, and industrious, with several connected to the oil exploration, production, and processing industry in the area. These individuals assisted the Oswalds in various ways: providing gifts of food, clothing, and baby furniture; arranging medical and dental appointments and transportation; housing Marina and the child during Oswald's job search and marital difficulties. The Commission thoroughly investigated the backgrounds of these individuals and Oswald's relationships with them.

The Commission found no basis to suppose Oswald came to Fort Worth specifically to establish contacts with the local Russian-speaking community; his mother had lived nearby, his brother Robert resided in Fort Worth, and he had spent several grammar-school years there. Upon arrival, Oswald did not know any members of the small community. He obtained the names of two Russian-speaking persons from the Texas Employment Commission. The first contact attempt failed, but the second—Peter Paul Gregory, a consulting petroleum engineer and part-time Russian-language instructor at the Fort Worth Public Library—proved productive. Gregory introduced the Oswalds to George Bouhe and Anna Meller of Dallas, through whom other members of the community became acquainted with the Oswalds.

The Oswalds met approximately 30 persons in the Russian-speaking community, of whom 25 testified before the Commission or its staff. The relationship between Oswald and the community was short-lived and strained. During separations in October and November 1962, Marina and the baby stayed with various community members, including Elena Hall. Oswald openly resented the help his wife's "Russian friends" provided and their efforts to induce Marina to leave him; George Bouhe, who had tried to dissuade Marina from returning to Oswald in November 1962, became displeased with her when she did. Relations had practically ceased by the end of 1962, as Katherine Ford summarized. After Oswald's move to New Orleans in April 1963, only minor contact occurred until November 22, 1963, when Ilya Mamantov served as interpreter for Dallas Police questioning of Marina.

George De Mohrenschildt and his wife continued to see the Oswalds on occasion until Oswald's trip to New Orleans on April 24, 1963. De Mohrenschildt was apparently the only Russian-speaking Dallas resident for whom Oswald had appreciable respect, despite his having helped Marina leave Oswald briefly in November 1962. The Commission examined an incident shortly after Oswald shot at General Walker: on April 13, 1963, the De Mohrenschildts visited the Oswalds' Neely Street apartment to bring an Easter gift. Mrs. De Mohrenschildt spotted a scoped rifle in a closet, and Mr. De Mohrenschildt made a joking remark asking if Oswald had "take[n] a pot shot at Walker." Oswald visibly reacted with an uncomfortable expression and claimed he did "targetshooting." The De Mohrenschildts departed shortly afterward and never saw the Oswalds again, eventually leaving for a business venture in Haiti. The Commission's extensive investigation of both De Mohrenschildts found no signs of subversive or disloyal conduct and no evidence linking them to the assassination of President Kennedy. George De Mohrenschildt's background includes birth in the Russian Ukraine in 1911, flight from Russia in 1921, education in Europe, emigration to the United States, work in petroleum engineering, and a 1960 hike from the U.S.-Mexican border to Panama. Jeanne De Mohrenschildt was born in Harbin, China, of White Russian parents, came to New York in 1938, and became a dress designer before marrying George in 1959.

The Commission examined the Oswalds' relations with Michael and Ruth Paine of Irving, Texas, who were not part of the Russian-speaking community but became connected through Ruth's Russian language skills. Ruth Paine met the Oswalds at a February 1963 party, became friendly with Marina, and provided considerable assistance—including housing Marina and the child for over two weeks in late April and early May 1963, paying their travel expenses to New Orleans, corresponding during the Oswalds' time there, and retrieving Marina and the child in late September 1963. The Commission considered whether Ruth's New Orleans trip was meant to assist Oswald with his Mexico City venture, but the evidence showed it was not: prior correspondence made no mention of the trip, and Oswald deceived both women about his plans. Marina knew of the deception but joined in it. Oswald continued the deception upon his October 4 arrival at the Paine home. Marina lived with Ruth Paine through the birth of her second daughter on October 20, 1963, and until the assassination of President Kennedy, while Oswald obtained a room in Dallas and visited on weekends. The section ends noting that Ruth Paine was interviewed by FBI agents on November 1 and 5, 1963.

Mrs. Paine's Withheld Information When contacted by the FBI in early November 1963, Mrs. Paine informed the agent that Oswald made periodic weekend visits and was employed at the Texas School Book Depository Building, providing enough information to locate him at his job. She did not, however, volunteer Oswald's Dallas telephone number, which she did know, nor his Dallas address, because she was not asked.[C6-368][C6-369]

Oswald's Letter to the Soviet Embassy On November 10, Ruth Paine discovered a draft of a letter Oswald had written the day before to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, in which he claimed to have conferred with "comrade Kostine" at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.[C6-370] Although the Paines initially assumed the letter was Oswald's invention, it caused Mrs. Paine considerable misgivings.[C6-371] She made an unknown copy of the draft intending to deliver it to the FBI if agents returned, but they did not return before the assassination.[C6-372][C6-373] On November 19, Mrs. Paine learned Oswald was living in a Dallas roominghouse under an assumed name but did not report this because she had no occasion to see the agents and did not think it important enough to call.[C6-374][C6-375]

Background of the Paines The Commission thoroughly investigated both Paines.[C6-376] Mrs. Paine was born Ruth Hyde in New York City on September 3, 1932. Her parents moved to Columbus, Ohio, in the late 1930s and divorced in 1961.[C6-377] She graduated from Antioch College in 1955.[C6-378]

Ruth Paine's Quaker Activities and Russian Interest Mrs. Paine first became interested in Quaker activities in high school and became a Quaker in 1951.[C6-379] In 1952, after her sophomore year at Antioch, she was a delegate to two Friends conferences in England.[C6-380] In 1955, when the Paines met, Mrs. Paine was active in the Young Friends Committee of North America, which worked with the State Department to ease U.S.–Soviet tensions through cultural exchanges and pen-pal correspondence.[C6-381] During this period she became interested in the Russian language,[C6-382] participated in a Russian-American student exchange,[C6-383] and corresponded with a Russian schoolteacher.[C6-384] Though her active East-West work ceased with her December 1957 marriage, she has continued to hold to Quaker tenets.[C6-385]

Michael Paine's Background and Politics Michael Paine is the son of George Lyman Paine and Ruth Forbes Paine (now Ruth Forbes Young, wife of Arthur Young of Philadelphia); his parents divorced when he was four.[C6-386][C6-387] He testified that during his late grammar and early high school years his father was active in the Trotskyite faction of the U.S. Communist movement and that he attended some of those meetings, but his father has not influenced his political thinking and their later visits did not touch on communism.[C6-388][C6-389] Since moving to Irving, Texas, in 1959, Michael has worked as a research engineer for Bell Helicopter Co. in Fort Worth, where he holds security clearance.[C6-390][C6-391] A longtime ACLU member, though unsympathetic to rightist aims he attended a few Dallas far-right meetings to learn about them and to encourage left-right communication.[C6-392][C6-393]

Paines' Finances and Loyalty Assessment The Commission's investigation of the Paines' finances found their income came from legitimate, traceable sources and expenditures were consistent with their income.[C6-394] Though they assumed roughly $500 in food and transportation costs for the Oswalds during their relationship, they made no direct payments to and received no money or valuables from the Oswalds.[C6-394] The Commission found nothing in the Paines' background, activities, or finances suggesting disloyalty to the United States, and concluded that Ruth and Michael Paine were not involved in any way with the assassination of President Kennedy.[C6-402]

Mrs. Paine's Cooperation with the Commission Prior to November 22, Mrs. Paine possessed information about Oswald's alias, his telephone number, and his Soviet Embassy correspondence that she did not pass to the FBI, but this failure must be viewed against what she then knew.[C6-395] There is no evidence contradicting her testimony that she was unaware of Oswald's attack on General Walker, the rifle on her garage floor, his pistol, or the firearms photographs, so she reasonably assumed he was not potentially violent and that the FBI already knew his history.[C6-396][C6-397] It was Mrs. Paine herself who informed the Commission of the information she held.[C6-398] Throughout the investigation she was completely cooperative, voluntarily producing all correspondence, memoranda, and written communications with Marina Oswald; her 1963 date book and calendar; and her address and telephone notation books, along with purely personal material.[C6-399][C6-400][C6-401]

Oswald's Political Activities Upon Return After returning from the Soviet Union, Oswald had dealings with the Communist Party, U.S.A., the Socialist Workers Party, and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, plus minor contacts with at least two other politically interested organizations. To determine whether any of these provided advice, encouragement, or assistance in planning or executing the assassination, the Commission fully investigated the nature and extent of Oswald's relations with them, and also investigated whether persons and organizations hostile to President Kennedy had any connection with Oswald or the shooting.

Communist Party and Socialist Workers Party Contacts In August 1962 Oswald subscribed to the Worker, a Communist Party publication, and wrote to obtain pamphlets.[C6-404][C6-405] He attempted further dealings with the Communist Party but received limited response, including a letter from Arnold S. Johnson stating the party had no "organizational ties" with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.[C6-406][C6-407] In September 1963 Johnson suggested Oswald contact the party after relocating to Baltimore, and replied to Oswald's inquiry about operating "underground" that "often it is advisable for some people to remain in the background, not underground."[C6-408][C6-409] A November 1 letter from Oswald reporting his move to Dallas and asking the party's view of the ACLU was not received until after the assassination.[C6-410] Oswald also offered his photographic services to the Worker and the Hall-Davis Defense Committee but was never called upon.[C6-411] On his Cuba visa application in Mexico City, Senora Silvia Duran noted that Oswald claimed Communist Party membership and displayed documents, though she likely misunderstood because some papers were in Russian and further investigation indicated he was not a member.[C6-412][C6-413][C6-414] Oswald also carried on limited correspondence with the Socialist Workers Party, attempting to join in October 1962 (rejected because there was no Dallas chapter), offering poster assistance, and subscribing to the Militant in December 1962.[C6-416][C6-417][C6-418] A March 1963 letter and clipping sent to the party cannot be located.[C6-419] Investigation produced no plausible evidence of other significant contacts; FBI and federal security agencies, along with numerous confidential informants, found no such evidence.[C6-420] Arnold S. Johnson of the Communist Party, James T. Tormey of the Hall-Davis Defense Committee, and Farrell Dobbs of the Socialist Workers Party all testified under oath that Oswald was not a member of their organizations.[C6-421]

Oswald's Attempt to Contact Attorney John J. Abt Upon his arrest after the assassination, Oswald attempted to contact New York attorney John J. Abt to request representation. Abt was not in New York at the time and was never reached. Abt testified that he had at no time had any dealings with Oswald and had never heard of Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination.[C6-415]

Socialist Labor Party Contact In November 1962 Oswald wrote to the Socialist Labor Party in New York requesting literature. Horace Twiford, a Texas national committeeman at large, was informed by New York headquarters in July 1963 and mailed literature to Oswald's old Dallas post office box on September 11, 1963.[C6-422] En route to Mexico City in September 1963, Oswald attempted to reach Twiford at his Houston home, briefly speaking with Twiford's wife and identifying himself as a Fair Play for Cuba Committee member, but Twiford was out of town.[C6-423] National secretary-treasurer Arnold Peterson reported no record of Oswald in national headquarters files, since routine literature requests are destroyed.[C6-424] The Socialist Party–Social Democratic Federation likewise reported no records or correspondence relating to Oswald.[C6-425]

Fair Play for Cuba Committee Activities in New Orleans From late April to late September 1963, while in New Orleans, Oswald engaged in activity on behalf of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC), a New York-based organization critical of U.S. policy toward Castro's Cuba.[C6-426] In May 1963 he applied for and was granted membership,[C6-427] and wrote to national headquarters proposing to rent a small office at his own expense to form a New Orleans chapter and requesting a charter.[C6-428] With his membership card he received a copy of the FPCC chapter constitution and bylaws and a May 29 letter advising that Louisiana seemed restricted for Fair Play activities, that the organization was not adverse to a very small chapter but would expect at least twice the members needed for a legal executive board, and recommending that chapters operate semi-privately from a home with a P.O. Box rather than risk identification by the "lunatic fringe" in their community.[C6-429]

Oswald corresponded with FPCC national headquarters, submitted membership application forms, printed "Hands Off Cuba!" circulars, and announced plans to print chapter membership cards, later reporting he was evicted from his claimed office and operated out of a PO box, sustaining public interest but attracting no new members. He distributed printed handbills on at least three occasions, was once arrested and fined during a disturbance with anti-Castro Cuban refugees he had previously approached for information on anti-Castro groups, claimed to police his FPCC chapter had 35 members, appeared on local New Orleans radio as an FPCC spokesman, and listed the FPCC as authorized to receive mail at his PO box after returning to Dallas. The purported New Orleans FPCC chapter he led was entirely fictitious: national headquarters never authorized the chapter or provided funding, ceased correspondence after May 29, 1963, and Oswald’s later reports exaggerated his activity scope and public reception. There is no evidence he ever operated an office at the 544 Camp St. address stamped on his materials, and all FPCC-branded materials were printed commercially without national approval. His membership card listed "A. J. Hidell" as chapter president, a known alias Oswald used, and no other chapter members were ever identified; the only other people seen distributing FPCC materials with him on August 9, 1963, were two transient individuals he paid briefly, one of whom testified he had no prior connection to Oswald, and the FBI found no prior knowledge of Oswald among undercover Cuban groups in New Orleans.

The Commission evaluated potential links between Oswald and right-wing groups hostile to President Kennedy, noting three provocative incidents surrounding Kennedy’s Dallas trip: the October 1963 attack on U.S. Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson during his Dallas visit, the November 22 full-page black-bordered "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" paid advertisement in the Dallas Morning News, and the November 20-21 distribution of the "Wanted for Treason" handbill across Dallas. There is no evidence Oswald was aware of the advertisement or handbill, though he was aware of the Stevenson incident. The only evidence of Oswald’s engagement with rightist groups is his alleged attendance at a rally featuring Major General Edwin Walker the night before Stevenson’s Dallas appearance, which he referenced in a November 1, 1963 letter to Communist Party information director Arnold Johnson, noting significant political friction between left and right groups in Dallas. General Walker did speak at the rally but had no prior knowledge of Oswald, and there is no evidence Oswald attended other rightist meetings or was affiliated with conservative organizations.

The November 22 "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" advertisement was a paid full-page black-bordered piece in the Dallas Morning News, purportedly sponsored by the fictitious "American Fact-Finding Committee," with Bernard Weissman listed as chairman and a Dallas PO box as the only contact address. The ad was created by four men: Bernard Weissman, William Burley III, Larrie Schmidt, and Joseph Grinnan. Weissman, Burley, and Schmidt had served together in the U.S. Army in Munich, Germany in 1962, where they devised plans to build a conservative political organization (CUSA) and business entity (AMBUS) by infiltrating existing right-wing groups to seize their leadership. Schmidt moved to Dallas in October 1962, became active in local conservative politics, and repeatedly urged Weissman and Burley to join him to capitalize on publicity from upcoming protests, including the Stevenson demonstration and Kennedy’s planned visit. After the Stevenson demonstration made a physical protest of Kennedy’s visit unfeasible, the four men decided to place the advertisement to boost conservative morale in Dallas, adapting a pamphlet of 50 critical questions about U.S. policy for the ad’s content. Grinnan raised the $1,465 ad cost from three wealthy Dallas businessmen, at least one of whom required a suggested question be included. Weissman believed the ad was a John Birch Society initiative, though Schmidt and Grinnan maintained they acted solely as private individuals. The ad received 50-60 responses: mail postmarked before the assassination was favorable, post-assassination mail was hostile and threatening, and mail postmarked weeks later was again favorable. The four men denied any prior connection to Oswald or Jack Ruby, and the Commission found no evidence linking any of them to Oswald, Ruby, or the assassination conspiracy. An unsubstantiated allegation that Weissman met with Ruby and Patrolman J.D. Tippit at Ruby’s Carousel Club on November 14, 1963, was made by attorney Mark Lane, who declined to name his informant or provide supporting evidence; Commission investigation found no evidence such a meeting occurred.

The "Wanted for Treason" handbill, distributed in Dallas 1-2 days before President Kennedy’s arrival, featured front and profile photos of Kennedy alongside a series of inflammatory charges against him. Robert A. Surrey, a 38-year-old printing salesman for Dallas’s Johnson Printing Co., was identified as the handbill’s author. Surrey had long been associated with General Edwin Walker in political and business activities, served as president of American Eagle Publishing Co. (a partnership with Walker) that used Johnson Printing Co.’s PO box, and stored Walker’s political and promotional materials at Walker’s headquarters.

Production of "Wanted for Treason" Handbills Surrey prepared the handbill's text and used Johnson Printing Co. facilities to produce a proof. He then enlisted Klause, a Lettercraft Printing Co. of Dallas salesman he had met while both worked at Johnson Printing, to print the handbills "on the side." Klause stated Surrey first contacted him roughly 2 to 2.5 weeks before November 22, 1963, and delivered two slick paper magazine prints of front and profile photographs of President Kennedy alongside the textual proof approximately one week before the assassination. Unable to create the photographic negative needed for the printing plate, Klause had the work completed at a local shop, then arranged the Kennedy halftone images at the top of the text to mimic a police "man wanted" placard, and produced a photographic printing plate of the combined image. Overnight, Klause and his wife surreptitiously printed approximately 5,000 copies on Lettercraft's offset printing equipment without their employer's knowledge, and delivered the finished handbills to Surrey the following day for a total charge of $60 including expenses.

Handbill Investigation and Lack of Oswald Connection At the start of the investigation, Klause told federal agents he did not know his customer's name and incorrectly described the individual, but confirmed the customer did not resemble Lee Harvey Oswald or Jack Ruby. He disclosed Surrey's identity shortly before his Commission testimony, explaining no transaction record was kept because he saw an opportunity to earn extra money on the side. Klause's account is partially corroborated by Bernard Weissman's testimony that he saw a copy of the "Wanted for Treason" handbill in General Walker's station wagon shortly after November 22, and other details of the handbill's printing process were verified. Weissman testified that neither he nor his associates had any involvement with the handbill, nor were they acquainted with Surrey, Klause, Lettercraft Printing Co., or Johnson Printing Co. Klause, Surrey, and General Walker all stated they were unacquainted with Oswald and had not heard of him prior to the afternoon of November 22, and the Commission found no evidence linking the handbill's creators to Oswald or the assassination.

Contacts With Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City and Washington, D.C. Eight weeks before the assassination, Oswald traveled to Mexico City to visit both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies, a trip his wife Marina was aware of before he departed but denied knowledge of during her Commission testimony. The Commission launched an intensive investigation to determine Oswald's purpose and activities on the trip, including evaluating reports that he was an agent of the Cuban or Soviet governments, and concluded it had reconstructed and explained most of his actions during the journey, with a full chronological account included in the report's appendix XIII.

Oswald's September 1963 Trip to Mexico Oswald was in Mexico from September 26, 1963, to October 3, 1963. Marina Oswald testified that he told her the trip's purpose was to evade the U.S. prohibition on travel to Cuba and reach the country, and he had previously planned to hijack a New Orleans-bound airliner to do so before she urged him to abandon the scheme. Bus passengers traveling with Oswald to Mexico City testified he stated he intended to reach Cuba via Mexico and hoped to meet Fidel Castro upon arrival. When meeting Cuban and Soviet consular officials, Oswald claimed he was traveling to the Soviet Union and requested an in-transit Cuban visa to enter Cuba on September 29 en route to the U.S.S.R. Marina testified these statements were deceptions designed to secure access to Cuba, and available evidence suggests it is more likely Oswald intended to remain in Cuba rather than continue on to the Soviet Union.

Oswald's Visa Applications at Cuban and Soviet Embassies At the Cuban Embassy, Oswald requested an in-transit visa to travel to Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union, but was informed he could not obtain a Cuban visa without first securing a Soviet visa. The Soviet Embassy told him his visa application would take approximately 4 months to process. Oswald presented forged or false documents to both embassies, including proof of his prior 3-year residence in the Soviet Union, his marriage to a Soviet national, and materials purporting to show he was a leader of the New Orleans Fair Play for Cuba Committee, to curry favor with consular staff. He had a sharp argument with Cuban Consul Eusebio Azcue when his demand for a visa was refused; Azcue stated that if it were up to him, he would not grant Oswald a visa, as "a person of his type" was harming the Cuban Revolution. Oswald left Mexico City on October 2 without obtaining either visa, and Marina testified he was disappointed and discouraged by his failure to reach Cuba upon his return to the U.S.

Senora Duran's Testimony on Oswald's Embassy Visits Senora Silvia Tirado de Duran, a 26-year-old Mexican national employed in the Cuban Embassy visa section, provided critical testimony about Oswald's visits to Mexican authorities shortly after the assassination. She recalled Oswald came to the Cuban Consulate in late September or early October 1963 to apply for an in-transit visa to Cuba en route to Russia, presenting his passport, Russian-language labor card, Russian letters, proof of his marriage to a Russian woman, and claims of leadership of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. She informally contacted the Soviet consulate to try to expedite Oswald's Soviet visa, but was told there would be a 4-month processing delay. When Oswald learned he could not get a Cuban visa without a Soviet visa, he became very angry and argued with Consul Azcue. Duran gave Oswald a slip of paper with her name and the consulate's phone number, and his visa application was forwarded to the Cuban Foreign Ministry, which sent a routine reply 15 to 30 days later approving the visa only on the condition he first obtained a Soviet visa. Duran could not recall if Oswald later contacted her at the consulate. While Duran and her husband have far-left political leanings and sympathize with the Castro government, no significant inaccuracies have been found in her statements, and documents matching her description of Oswald's submitted materials were found in his possessions after his arrest.

Verification of Testimony and Trip Details The Cuban Government provided documentation confirming the core details of Duran's testimony, including a copy of Oswald's Cuban visa application and the Cuban government's conditional reply. CIA handwriting analysis confirmed the visa application was signed by Oswald, and the faint handwritten notations on the document are likely Duran's. The clothing Oswald wore in the visa application photo matches items found in his effects after the assassination, and the photo appears to be from the same negative as a photo found among his belongings; no signs of document forgery were detected. Highly reliable U.S. confidential sources in Mexico confirmed Duran's testimony was truthful and accurate in all material respects, and their identities are withheld to protect their future utility. The Commission also verified the exact timeline of Oswald's trip, his transportation, his Mexico City hotel, and a nearby restaurant he frequented. All individuals Oswald may have interacted with in Mexico, including fellow bus passengers and hotel staff and guests, were interviewed; no credible witness reported seeing him with any unidentified person, and he was observed traveling alone to and from Mexico City, at his hotel, and at the restaurant. One hotel guest sat with Oswald at the restaurant due to lack of empty tables but they did not speak because of a language barrier. Two Australian bus passengers stated Oswald sat next to elderly itinerant preacher Albert Osborne, though Osborne denied this; Osborne was found to be an unreliable witness with no credible link to the assassination. The hotel Oswald stayed at showed no unusual ties to Cuban nationals or extremist groups, and no evidence indicated Oswald visited the Cuban Airlines office in Mexico City despite its phone number being in his notebook.

Allegations of Oswald-Cuban Conspiracy The Commission investigated dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial relationship between Oswald and the Cuban government, including claims that Oswald made a prior early September 1963 trip to Mexico City to receive assassination funds and orders, was flown to a secret airfield in or near the Yucatan Peninsula, met with a U.S. communist in Mexico City shortly before the assassination, and was paid $7,000 by a Cuban agent to kill the President. Other allegations included a claim that Fidel Castro referenced a prior secret trip by Oswald to Cuba in a speech delivered 5 days after the assassination, and a letter from someone in Cuba alleging the assassination was part of a plot to kill other non-Communist leaders in the Americas. No credible evidence supporting these conspiracy claims was found.

This section outlines the range of unsubstantiated conspiracy rumors alleging foreign connections to Oswald in the JFK assassination. These include claims that anti-Castro groups killed the President as part of a bargain to receive illicit firearms from criminal organizations, that Oswald was active in pro-Cuban activities in Miami, Florida at various points, that Chinese Communists operated jointly with Cubans to carry out the assassination, that Oswald met with the Cuban Ambassador in a Mexico City restaurant and drove off with him for a private discussion, and that Fidel Castro requested files on Oswald’s dealings with two Cuban diplomatic mission members in the Soviet Union two days after the assassination, implying a secret ongoing subversive relationship. All these allegations were proven to have no factual foundation.

This section details the investigation of false allegations from a young Latin American secret agent codenamed "D," who claimed to have witnessed Lee Harvey Oswald receive $6,500 from a tall, thin red-haired Black man at the Cuban consulate in Mexico City to assassinate the President. "D" alleged he overheard a partial conversation in English and Spanish between the man and Oswald, and that he attempted to warn the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City of a planned killing of a prominent U.S. figure prior to the assassination but was told to stop wasting time. Intensive investigation found "D" had no verifiable record of the assignment he described, and Mexican authorities confirmed he admitted in writing that his entire narrative was fabricated to gain U.S. entry to support anti-Castro action against Fidel Castro. Discrepancies in his story, including Oswald’s limited Spanish skills, verifiable alibi evidence that Oswald was in New Orleans on the date "D" claimed to have seen him, and no Embassy records of "D"’s purported calls, confirmed his account was false. A later retraction of his recantation, in which he claimed Mexican police pressured him to lie, was also disproven via polygraph testing and evidence inconsistencies.

This section presents the Commission’s conclusive findings that there is no evidence linking Oswald’s September 1963 trip to Mexico City to the JFK assassination, nor any evidence of Cuban government involvement in the assassination. CIA and FBI sources corroborated the account of Senora Duran in all material respects, confirming the Cuban government had no relationship with Oswald beyond what Duran described. Secretary of State Rusk testified that Cuba expressed very significant concern after the assassination about being held responsible for the attack and the potential impact on its own safety and position.

This section documents Oswald’s confirmed contacts with the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. after his return to the United States in June 1962. It notes that Oswald wrote to the Embassy requesting information on subscriptions to Russian newspapers and magazines, which he ultimately pursued, and that his wife Marina, as a Soviet citizen living abroad, was required by Soviet law to maintain regular contact with the Embassy for administrative purposes. In 1963, after Oswald faced repeated employment difficulties, the couple submitted a formal request for permission to return to the Soviet Union: Marina’s February 17, 1963 letter stated she wished to return to Russia while her husband would remain in the U.S. as an American national. The Soviet Union provided the Commission with its full correspondence with the Oswalds, which contained no detectable codes, and no suspicious content aside from a November 1963 letter from Oswald to the Embassy discussed later in the chapter.

This section analyzes Oswald’s November 9, 1963 letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., which referenced his meetings with Soviet Embassy official Comrade Kostin (identified by the CIA as KGB officer Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov) in Mexico City, and mentioned a Cuban consul (identified as Eusebio Azque, who was permanently transferred from Mexico to Cuba on November 18, 1963, four days before the assassination) with whom Oswald had a dispute. Comparing the final letter to a preliminary draft found among Oswald’s possessions, the Commission found Oswald intentionally altered details to make his Mexico trip appear more mysterious and important than it was. For example, he falsely claimed he left Mexico due to expiring 15-day visa restrictions (his tourist card still had a full week of validity when he departed on October 3) rather than because he found the trip useless, and falsely claimed he returned to the U.S. using his real name to request a new visa when he had used his real name for all official dealings during the trip. The Commission concluded the letter was a clumsy attempt to ingratiate himself with the Soviet Embassy, with no conspiratorial implications.

This section investigates Oswald’s use of post office boxes and aliases after his return from the Soviet Union, to assess if he used these tools for clandestine contact with potential assassination co-conspirators. It notes Oswald opened three post office boxes between 1962 and 1963: a Dallas box opened October 9, 1962 (closed May 1963, used to receive the assassination rifle and Smith & Wesson revolver under the alias A. Hidell), a New Orleans box opened June 3, 1963 (closed September 1963, listed Marina Oswald and A.J. Hidell as authorized recipients), and a Dallas Terminal Annex box opened November 1, 1963 (listed the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and American Civil Liberties Union as authorized recipients). Investigation found no evidence any box was used for surreptitious messages or accessed by anyone other than Oswald or his family: the box active on the day of the assassination was under constant surveillance from 5 p.m. November 22 to midnight November 24, and contained only a Russian magazine addressed to Oswald. Oswald rented all boxes using his real name, provided box numbers to family, employers, and government agencies, and his use of boxes was consistent with his frequent address changes and receipt of political literature. The Commission attached no conspiratorial significance to his post office box use. The section also covers Oswald’s well-documented use of the alias A.J. Hidell (and variants) for purposes including listing a fake Fair Play for Cuba Committee president, a fake doctor on a counterfeit vaccination certificate, and job references, with no evidence he used the alias for undercover contact with others.

This section details findings on the counterfeit identification documents Oswald produced using his A.J. Hidell alias, including a counterfeit selective service card and international certificate of vaccination. Treasury Department questioned document expert Alwyn Cole testified the false ID could be produced using elementary photographic printing techniques, equipment that was available to Oswald during his 1962 to early 1963 employment at Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, a Dallas commercial advertising photography firm where he learned the skills needed for photographic enlargement, contraction, and image distortion. The counterfeit ID exhibited limited skill and multiple detectable errors, consistent with Oswald’s known poor performance with precise photographic work that led to his dismissal from the firm. Retouched negatives used to make the counterfeit selective service card and a rubber stamping kit used for the fake vaccination certificate were found among Oswald’s personal effects. The Commission concluded there is strong evidence Oswald produced all counterfeit identification himself, with no assistance from other people.

Oswald used multiple aliases beyond the "Hidell" pseudonym he used for firearm purchases. These include "Lee" (used on his Mexico City tourist card and bus reservation, likely stemming from a clerical error where a clerk misread his printed name "Lee H. Oswald" as a last name), "O. H. Lee" (used when registering at a mid-October 1963 Irving roominghouse), "Osborne" (used to order Fair Play for Cuba Committee handbills in May 1963), "D. F. Drittal" (used as a certifying witness on his Smith & Wesson revolver mail-order coupon), and "Lt. J. Evans" (used as a reference on a New Orleans employment application). While his repeated use of false names aligns with his antisocial and criminal tendencies (including hiding his firearm ownership via the Hidell alias), the Commission found no evidence linking his alias use to a broader conspiracy with other parties.

The Commission investigated a claim that Oswald had a telescopic sight mounted and boresighted on a second rifle at the Irving Sports Shop in Irving, Texas in the first two weeks of November 1963, with the only supporting evidence being an undated repair tag bearing the name "Oswald" provided by shop employee Dial D. Ryder. The claim is highly dubious: Ryder never brought the tag to his employer's attention until after the assassination, could not confirm the transaction occurred, could not identify Oswald in a photograph as someone he had seen in person, gave inconsistent statements about when he found the tag and his interactions with reporters, and the unnamed source cited by anonymous tipsters to direct the FBI to the shop could not be verified. Neither Ryder nor his employer recalled working on Oswald's known Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, and no other person named Oswald in the Dallas-Fort Worth area was found to have had a rifle repaired at the shop.

The credibility of the Irving Sports Shop repair tag allegedly linking Oswald to a second rifle is undermined by multiple inconsistencies: Ryder claimed he found the tag while cleaning his workbench on November 23, 1963, but never mentioned it to his employer until November 28 after media coverage, and initially told the FBI the tag was dated November 1-14 1963 only because his employer was on vacation and could not recall the transaction. Ryder denied speaking to reporters before the November 28 Dallas Times-Herald story ran, but a reporter testified he obtained all details of the alleged transaction from Ryder via phone that day, supported by a second witness to the call. No evidence corroborates the anonymous tip that led the FBI to the shop, and neither shop employee could recall Oswald as a customer or the repair transaction.

Two women, Edith Whitworth (owner of the Irving Furniture Mart) and Gertrude Hunter, testified they saw a man they believed was Oswald at the store in early November 1963, first asking about a gun part (reportedly a "plunger" or firing pin) before returning with a woman and two young children to browse furniture for 30-40 minutes. Their testimony is not credible: they initially claimed the man sought a firing pin, work unrelated to the Irving Sports Shop repair tag, but could not recall this detail at their depositions; Whitworth gave inconsistent statements about the younger child's birthdate, and Hunter claimed the man drove a car similar to one a friend from Houston was supposedly coming to visit, but the friend confirmed she never planned a November 1963 trip to Dallas and noted Hunter has a pattern of inserting herself into high-profile events with unsubstantiated claims. Marina Oswald was identified by the women as the woman with the man, but she testified she had never been to the store, Hunter could not identify Oswald in a photo, and Whitworth only identified some photos of Oswald. Additionally, Oswald could not drive, had no record of leaving his job at the Texas School Book Depository during business hours to visit the store, and Ruth Paine stated she never took Marina to the Furniture Mart in late 1963.

A mechanic at an Irving service station, Robert Adrian Taylor, reported three weeks after the assassination that he believed Oswald sold a U.S. Army rifle to him in March or April 1963 to pay for car repairs, as a passenger in a vehicle at the station. Taylor later expressed doubt the man was Oswald, and a second station employee who recalled the incident believed the passenger was not Oswald despite a slight resemblance.

Multiple witnesses reported seeing a man resembling Oswald practicing with a rifle in fields, wooded areas, and ranges around Dallas in the weeks before the assassination, with some claiming he was alone and others saying he was accompanied. Most of these sightings lack substantial basis to confirm the man was Oswald, though a group of witnesses reported seeing a man matching Oswald's description at the Sports Drome Rifle Range in Dallas between September and November 1963, with consistent descriptions of the man's rifle and his accuracy with it.

Four witnesses (Malcolm H. Price Jr., Garland G. Slack, Sterling C. Wood, and Dr. Homer Wood) expressed confidence they saw Lee Harvey Oswald at the Sports Drome Rifle Range in Dallas between September and November 1963: Price adjusted the scope on the man's rifle, Slack had an altercation with him for shooting at Slack's target, and the Woods spoke with the man about his rifle. Two other witnesses reported seeing a person resembling Oswald firing a similar rifle at a range near Irving two days before the assassination. However, the sightings are inconsistent with known details of Oswald's life: Price recalled adjusting the scope for the man on September 28, 1963, when Oswald was confirmed to be in Mexico City, and Slack claimed to have seen the same man at the range on November 10, when Oswald was at the Paine home in Irving and did not leave. The man Price assisted drove an old 1940 or 1941 Ford, but Oswald could not drive and had no access to such a vehicle. None of the witnesses' descriptions of the man (blond hair, wearing a "Bulldogger Texas style" hat, chewing gum or tobacco) matched Oswald's known appearance, and no sign-in record for Oswald or his known aliases was found at the Sports Drome range, though many patrons did not sign the register. Reports of companions with the man were inconsistent and unsubstantiated, and a bearded man reportedly present with the man was located and had no connection to Oswald.

The testimony of witnesses who claimed to have seen Oswald at the Sports Drome Rifle Range is undermined by internal inconsistencies and contradictions with established facts: Slack recalled the man had blond hair when interviewed on December 2, 1963, and Price recalled the man wore a "Bulldogger Texas style" hat and had bubble gum or chewing tobacco in his cheek when interviewed on December 3, neither of which match Oswald's known appearance. The date Price adjusted the scope for the man (September 28, 1963) conflicts with confirmed records that Oswald was in Mexico City that day, and Slack's claimed November 10 sighting conflicts with evidence Oswald was at the Paine residence that day and did not travel to the range. The witnesses' descriptions of the man's rifle (a Mauser-type bolt-action rifle with an ammunition clip in front of the trigger and a mounted scope) align with Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano, leading the Commission to conclude the witnesses likely misidentified the man they saw due to this similarity, rather than actually observing Oswald.

This section presents evidence demonstrating that the weapon observed being fired by an individual at a Texas rifle range (testified to by witnesses Price, Slack, and Dr. Sterling Wood and his son) did not match the assassination rifle (Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano). Key differences included: a shortened barrel from "sporterizing," missing pieces on the top of the weapon, flames spouting from the weapon when fired, and a sling (which Price and Slack believed absent, though Sterling Wood recalled it being present). The scope also differed: the range rifle had a scope reportedly Japanese in origin, purchased for $18 and mounted in a non-existent Cedar Hills gunshop, while the Mannlicher-Carcano's Japanese-made scope was worth slightly more than $7 and came pre-mounted from a Chicago mail-order firm. The Mannlicher-Carcano bore the markings "MADE ITALY" on its top, which Price's brief examination did not reveal. No shell casings fired from Oswald's rifle were found in areas where he may have practiced, and evidence from chapter IV indicated Oswald did not remove the rifle from the Paine garage in Irving prior to November 22, 1963.

This section examines the testimony of Albert Guy Bogard, a former Lincoln-Mercury automobile salesman in Dallas, who claimed that on the early afternoon of November 9, 1963, he attended a customer he believed was Lee Harvey Oswald, who test-drove a car on the Stemmons Freeway at 60-70 mph and stated he would have funds to purchase a car in several weeks. Bogard wrote the name "Lee Oswald" on a business card, which he reportedly discarded after November 22. Corroboration came from Frank Pizzo (assistant sales manager), Eugene M. Wilson (salesman), and Oran Brown (who also wrote the name and recalled it being in his possession). However, significant inconsistencies undermined Bogard's testimony: Bogard stated the customer wanted to pay cash and declined credit, while Pizzo and Wilson indicated the customer attempted to purchase on credit, with Wilson recalling a sarcastic remark about returning to Russia to buy a car. No paper bearing Oswald's name was found when showroom refuse was searched on November 23, and Brown's paper was also never located. Pizzo later expressed serious doubts upon examining photos of Oswald (particularly regarding the hairline), Wilson recalled the customer as approximately 5 feet tall, multiple witnesses testified Oswald was unable to drive (though Mrs. Paine noted some improvement by November), and the established whereabouts of Oswald on November 9 made the showroom visit impossible.

This section details the Commission's investigation into Oswald's alleged contacts with Mexican or Cuban individuals, principally through the testimony of Mrs. Sylvia Odio (born Havana 1937, member of the anti-Castro JURE organization). Mrs. Odio testified that in late September 1963, three men visited her Dallas apartment: two appearing Cuban or Mexican (one identifying himself as "Leopoldo") and an American introduced as "Leon Oswald," allegedly an excellent ex-Marine shot interested in the Cuban cause. Leopoldo later called to describe the American as "kind of nuts" and reported him saying Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs. Mrs. Odio and her sister were certain the American was Oswald, fixing the date as September 26 or 27 based on her October 1 move. The Commission established, however, that Oswald was provably in New Orleans on September 23 and cashed an unemployment check there between 8 a.m. and 1 p.m. on September 25, before traveling by Continental Trailways bus from New Orleans to Houston (arriving 10:50 p.m. on September 25) and then boarding bus No. 5133 from Houston to Laredo at 2:35 a.m. on September 26, crossing the border between 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. that day as confirmed by Mexican immigration records. No evidence indicated Oswald flew between New Orleans and Dallas, no Dallas-to-Laredo bus tickets were sold September 23-26, and Oswald told bus passengers he had come from New Orleans directly. A September 25 phone call to Houston further undermined the Dallas presence theory. Despite the Commission's conclusion that Oswald was not in Dallas at the relevant time, the FBI conducted further investigation, locating Loran Eugene Hall (an anti-Castro activist) who acknowledged visiting Mrs. Odio in September 1963 with Lawrence Howard and William Seymour (whom Hall described as resembling Oswald and speaking little Spanish). The Commission concluded Oswald was not at Mrs. Odio's apartment. Additional testimony from bartender Evaristo Rodriguez (Habana Bar, New Orleans) describing Oswald with a Latin-appearing man was undermined by inconsistencies with bar owner Orest Pena's prior FBI statements and evidence that Oswald did not drink to excess. Finally, attorney Dean Andrews's testimony about Oswald visiting his New Orleans office with a Mexican companion was uncorroborated, with no records located and his secretary having no recollection of such visits.

Although Oswald dealt with several agencies of the U.S. Government—including the State Department (passport, citizenship, repatriation loan, wife's immigration), the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the FBI (three interviews of Oswald and inquiries of Mrs. Paine), and the CIA (monitoring of his Fair Play for Cuba Committee and Mexico City consulate activities)—the Commission found no evidence that he served as a paid informant or undercover agent. Rumors to this effect, advanced by Oswald's mother Marguerite Oswald and by Pauline Bates (a Fort Worth stenographer who reported Oswald claimed to be a "secret agent"), were investigated and either unsubstantiated or contradicted by sworn testimony. Director John A. McCone and Deputy Director Richard Helms of the CIA, and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover along with Agents John W. Fain, John L. Quigley, and James P. Hosty, Jr., all testified under oath and provided affidavits affirming that Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant and was never assigned a symbol number or paid any funds by the Bureau. The Commission independently reviewed the complete CIA and FBI files on Oswald, which corroborated these statements. The presence of Agent Hosty's name, office address, telephone number, and license plate number in Oswald's address book was traced to a November 1, 1963, visit by Hosty to Ruth Paine, who handed the slip of paper to Oswald; the FBI office address itself was readily available from public sources. The Commission concluded there was absolutely no informant or undercover relationship between any U.S. Government agency and Oswald at any time.

The Commission conducted a thorough audit of Oswald's finances from his return from the Soviet Union on June 13, 1962, through his arrest on November 22, 1963, with assistance from the Internal Revenue Service and the FBI. Investigators queried banks, telegraph companies, employers, landlords, credit associations, hospitals, utility companies, government offices, post offices, periodicals, newspapers, and employment agencies across New Orleans, Fort Worth, Dallas, Houston, and Laredo, finding no bank accounts or safe deposit boxes tied to Oswald during this period. Marina Oswald testified she knew of no income beyond his wages and unemployment compensation, and the Commission's analysis confirmed this: the Oswalds received $3,665.89 in cash (including $63 brought from the Soviet Union), spent an estimated $3,501.79, and left a balance of $164.10—within $19 of the $183.87 actually found in Oswald's possession at arrest. Oswald's lifestyle reflected extreme frugality: he and his family lived in modest $60–$75-per-month apartments, frequently stayed rent-free with relatives and acquaintances, owned no major appliances or automobile, used dental and hospital clinics, obtained baby furniture as gifts, did not smoke or drink, used public libraries for reading material, and subsisted on meager groceries. He repaid his $435.71 State Department travel loan and $200 loan from his brother Robert by January 1963, financed the $21.45 assassination rifle and $31.22 revolver in March 1963 using his own funds, and spent approximately $23 on Fair Play for Cuba Committee materials during the summer. His Mexico City trip in September 1963 was financed by roughly $200 in accumulated savings, consistent with an estimated $85 in trip expenses. The Commission also considered testimony from Leonard E. Hutchison of Hutch's Market in Irving, who claimed a man he believed to be Oswald attempted to cash a $189 personal check in early November 1963; no source of such a check was identified, and although Oswald did cash a $33 Texas Unemployment Commission check at another Irving supermarket on November 1, the discrepancy in instrument type makes confusion unlikely, leaving the matter unresolved.

The Commission closely examined the testimony of Henry H. Hutchison, a grocery store owner in Irving, Texas, who claimed that Oswald tried to cash a $189 personal check at his store shortly before the assassination. Multiple inconsistencies undermined Hutchison's account: he placed Oswald in the store on a Wednesday evening with Marina Oswald and Marguerite Oswald, but Oswald was not known to have been in Irving on any Wednesday evening during that period; neither Marina nor Marguerite acknowledged ever visiting the store; and neither of the store's two checkers recalled such a visit. Hutchison's claim that Oswald regularly shopped at the store between 7:20 and 7:45 a.m. on weekday mornings purchasing cinnamon rolls and milk was contradicted by evidence that Oswald was usually in Irving only on weekends and that Buell Wesley Frazier, who drove Oswald, would have dropped him far from Hutchison's store before 7:20 a.m. Hutchison's testimony about Ruth Paine was likewise doubtful, as her appearance did not match his description and she disputed his claim. In light of these strong reasons for doubt and the absence of any other evidence that Oswald possessed such a check, the Commission concluded it could not establish that Oswald ever received one.

The Commission investigated a report that Oswald may have received unaccounted funds through Western Union money orders before the assassination. C.A. Hamblen, an early-night manager at the Western Union office in Dallas, initially claimed to have seen Oswald sending a telegram to Washington and collecting small money orders. Hamblen signed a statement detailing two specific incidents, but during later testimony he could not clearly recall the events and was unsure whether the person involved was Oswald. A second employee recalled one of the incidents but could not identify the man as Oswald, while the employee Hamblen cited in connection with the second incident was certain that no such unusual event occurred and that she never saw Oswald in the office. Federal investigators and Western Union officers conducted an exhaustive search of records in Dallas and other cities for money orders and telegrams in Oswald's name or aliases, as well as all YMCA-addressed money orders and Dallas-to-Washington telegrams from the relevant period. No matching records were found, and Hamblen himself was unable to identify any such transactions. Hamblen's superiors concluded that the entire matter was a product of his imagination, an assessment the Commission accepted.

This section addresses the widespread speculation that arose immediately after Jack Ruby shot Lee Harvey Oswald on Sunday, November 24, 1963, in the basement of the Dallas Police Department. Suspicions centered on whether Ruby had acted on behalf of a conspiracy that killed President Kennedy and wanted to silence Oswald, or whether Ruby had accomplices in the slaying of Oswald himself. To evaluate these possibilities, the Commission undertook a detailed reconstruction of Ruby's movements from November 21 through November 24, 1963, under the premise that conspiratorial involvement would likely have been reflected in his activities and associations. The Commission did not attempt to determine when Ruby first decided to attack Oswald or to resolve the psychiatric and legal questions arising from the assault. Beyond the chronology presented here, the chapter also analyzes rumors that Ruby and Oswald knew each other and examines Ruby's background and associations for any conspiratorial ties, with a more detailed biographical account provided in Appendix XVI.

The Commission undertook a meticulous reconstruction of Jack Ruby's movements from November 21 through November 24, 1963, in order to assess whether his actions reflected any conspiratorial involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy or the slaying of Oswald. While the Commission did not seek to determine when Ruby first decided to attack Oswald or to address the psychiatric dimensions of the case, it scrutinized his activities and associations over the three-day period for evidence of conspiratorial connections. The detailed account that follows examines Ruby's routine as a nightclub owner in the days leading up to the assassination, his presence at the Dallas Morning News when the President was shot, the disputed allegation that he visited Parkland Hospital afterward, and his decision to close his establishments in the aftermath of the tragedy.

On Thursday, November 21, 1963, the day before the President's visit, Jack Ruby followed his customary routine as proprietor of two Dallas nightspots: the Carousel Club, a downtown striptease venue, and the Vegas Club, a rock-and-roll establishment in the Oaklawn section. Ruby arrived at the Carousel around 3 p.m., conferring with his handyman Larry Crafard, meeting a young woman who was job hunting, paying rent, addressing a peace bond related to a fight with one of his dancers, consulting an attorney about federal tax issues, distributing membership cards, and speaking with an assistant district attorney about insufficient-fund checks before submitting advertising copy to the Dallas Morning News. That evening he drove Crafard to the Vegas Club, spoke with a Chicago businessman at the Carousel, had dinner with his close friend and financial backer Ralph Paul, briefly encountered Dallas Morning News employee Don Campbell, served as master of ceremonies, peacefully ejected a troublesome patron, and later joined his guest at the Bon Vivant Room of the Dallas Cabana. Neither Paul nor the Chicago businessman recalled Ruby mentioning the President's trip to Dallas. After closing the Carousel and the Vegas Club, Ruby was seen eating at a restaurant as late as 2:30 a.m.

Jack Ruby learned of the shooting of President Kennedy while at the Dallas Morning News on Friday, November 22, where he had gone to place regular weekend advertisements for his two nightclubs. Arriving around 11 or 11:30 a.m., Ruby briefly discussed diet pills with two employees, obtained a brochure from columnist Tony Zoppi, and then spoke with advertising employee Don Campbell from about noon to 12:25 p.m. about business matters, including the financial troubles of his clubs. Campbell did not recall Ruby mentioning the Presidential motorcade or behaving unusually. About ten minutes after the shooting, before news reached the second floor, John Newnam observed Ruby sitting where Campbell had left him, having completed his advertisement and reading a newspaper. Ruby criticized the black-bordered "Welcome, Mr. Kennedy" advertisement associated with Bernard Weissman, a topic he had earlier raised with his sister Eva Grant by phone. At around 12:45 p.m., when an employee announced shots had been fired at the President, Ruby displayed what Newnam described as "stunned disbelief." As advertisers canceled their weekend business, Ruby suggested the Weissman ad had motivated some cancellations. Ruby appeared visibly shaken and pale, made only brief calls to his assistant Andrew Armstrong and his sister, telling Armstrong to close the Carousel, and remarked to Newnam that he would have to leave Dallas. He departed the building in tears, with Newnam estimating his departure at about 1:30 p.m.

The Commission investigated claims that Jack Ruby visited Parkland Hospital at approximately 1:30 p.m. on November 22, 1963, when press secretary Malcolm Kilduff announced President Kennedy's death. Reporter Seth Kantor reported and testified that Ruby briefly stopped him at the hospital entrance during that window and tugged at his coattails. The only other person who claimed to have seen Ruby at the hospital did not come forward until April 1964, had never seen him before, allegedly saw him only briefly with an obstructed view, and was uncertain of the time. Ruby firmly denied going to Parkland, asserting he went directly to the Carousel Club, and video tapes of the hospital scene do not show Ruby. Telephone records and Armstrong's testimony established that Ruby arrived at the Carousel by no later than 1:45 p.m., limiting the period when Kantor could have encountered Ruby at Parkland to only a few minutes before or after 1:30 p.m. Even if Ruby had driven from Parkland to the Carousel in the nine or ten minutes possible under normal conditions, his presence at the Morning News until after 1 p.m. and at the Carousel before 1:45 p.m. would have made his hospital visit exceedingly brief, especially given likely traffic congestion. The Commission concluded it was improbable that Kantor saw Ruby at Parkland at that time and suggested that Kantor may have confused his encounter, perhaps recalling instead an event at a midnight press conference at the Dallas Police Department on November 22, when both men were present.

Upon arriving at the Carousel Club shortly before 1:45 p.m. on November 22, Ruby instructed Andrew Armstrong to notify employees that the club would be closed that night. During the following hour, Ruby made several telephone calls, spoke with Armstrong and Larry Crafard about the assassination, and watched television. At 1:51 p.m., he called his close friend and financial backer Ralph Paul in Arlington, Texas, urging him to close his drive-in restaurant as well. Unable to reach former girlfriend Alice Nichols, who was at lunch, Ruby telephoned his sister Eileen Kaminsky in Chicago, who described him as completely unnerved and crying over the President's death. When Nichols returned the call, Ruby cut short the conversation with his sister to speak with her, expressing shock over the assassination despite their not having socialized in some time. At 2:37 p.m., Ruby called his boyhood friend Alex Gruber in Los Angeles, briefly discussing a dog he had promised to send, a potential carwash business, and the assassination before losing composure and ending the three-minute conversation. Two minutes later, he telephoned Ralph Paul once again.

After leaving the Carousel Club around 3:15 p.m. and briefly visiting Eva Grant's home, Ruby returned to the club and instructed Larry Crafard to prepare a "closed" sign, but to delay posting it to avoid alerting competitors. He later purchased cold cuts at a nearby delicatessen. Upon returning to his sister's apartment, Ruby decided to close both clubs for three days following a phone conversation with Dallas Times-Herald columnist Don Saffran. He then called the Dallas Morning News to modify his advertisement accordingly, and informed Saffran that the clubs would be closed Friday, Saturday, and Sunday.

While at Eva Grant's apartment, Ruby continued making rapid telephone calls, ate sparingly, became ill, and tried to rest. He called Cecil Hamlin, sounding "broken up," explaining that he had closed the clubs out of concern that people would not patronize them and expressing worry for President Kennedy's "children." He also made two calls to determine service times at Temple Shearith Israel, placed a second call to Alice Nichols confirming his attendance, and phoned Larry Crafard at the Carousel Club to check for messages. Eva Grant testified that Ruby looked like a "broken man" and said he had "never felt so bad in my life, even when Ma or Pa died."

Ruby is uncertain whether he went directly from his sister's home to his apartment or to his club. While at least five witnesses believed they saw him on the third floor of police headquarters between 6 and 9 p.m., the Commission found it doubtful he was there before 11 p.m., as the descriptions of his appearance and the witness reliability were questionable. Ruby has denied being at police headquarters before approximately 11:15 p.m. He returned to his own apartment before 9 p.m., unsuccessfully tried to persuade Ralph Paul to attend synagogue services, and called his brother Hyman Rubenstein and sisters in Chicago, expressing distress about Dallas and considering selling his business. He attended services at Temple Shearith Israel, arriving near the end, where Rabbi Silverman noted Ruby appeared depressed. After services, he drove by night clubs, purchased kosher sandwiches and soft drinks intending to feed officers at police headquarters, and attempted to deliver food to KLIF radio station employees before heading downtown.

Ruby made his way to the third floor of the Dallas Police Department by about 11:30 p.m., where reporters gathered near the homicide bureau. Newsman John Rutledge described seeing Ruby flanked by two out-of-state reporters, walking rapidly, hunched over, and writing on a piece of paper. Detective Augustus M. Eberhardt recalled Ruby carrying a note pad and professing to be a translator for the Israeli press, while remarking on the tragedy for Dallas. Video tapes confirmed Ruby's presence on the third floor when Chief Jesse E. Curry and District Attorney Henry M. Wade announced that Oswald would be shown to newsmen at a basement press conference. Ruby stated his original purpose was to locate a KLIF employee but was "carried away with the excitement of history."

Ruby accompanied the newsmen to the basement press conference, established by television tapes and at least 12 witnesses. When Oswald arrived, Ruby stood atop a table alongside other reporters. After Oswald's brief appearance, Ruby remained to hear reporters question District Attorney Wade, who stated Oswald would likely be moved to the county jail the following week and that Oswald belonged to the "Free Cuba Committee." Ruby was among the voices correcting Wade on the organization's name. After the conference, Ruby introduced himself to Wade, who did not initially recognize him, and also met Justice of the Peace David L. Johnston, giving him a Carousel Club business card. He obtained the KLIF "hot line" number from a KBOX representative, facilitated a phone interview between KLIF and Wade, and directed Russ Knight to Wade for a second interview.

Ruby left police headquarters and drove to radio station KLIF, arriving at approximately 1:45 a.m. and remaining about 45 minutes. He distributed his sandwiches and soft drinks, settled in the newsroom for the 2 a.m. newscast, and was credited with suggesting that Russ Knight ask Wade whether Oswald was sane. Speaking with Danny Patrick McCurdy, Ruby mentioned closing his clubs, saying he would rather lose $1,200 or $1,500 than remain open, and McCurdy noted Ruby looked pale and kept looking at the floor. To Glen Duncan, Ruby expressed satisfaction that evidence was mounting against Oswald and seemed pleased about his earlier contact with the investigation. Upon leaving, Ruby gave Knight a "Heroism" radio script from the "Life Line" program and suggested that the radio station owner should editorialize against a group of "radicals" he believed partially responsible for the assassination.

At about 2:30 a.m., Ruby entered his automobile and departed KLIF, heading for the Dallas Times-Herald Building. En route, he stopped for about an hour to speak with Kay Helen Coleman and Harry Olsen at a parking garage at the corner of Jackson and Field Streets, where the couple were crying and extremely upset about the assassination. Ruby later explained he had not mentioned this meeting in his first two FBI interviews because he did not want to involve Olsen, who was reportedly having a secret relationship with Coleman. The Olsens, who later married about six weeks after the assassination, denied the specific remarks attributed to them but confirmed their lengthy conversation with Ruby and his expressed sympathy for Mrs. Kennedy and her children.

At the parking garage at Jackson and Field Streets, Ruby spoke for approximately one hour with police officer Harry Olsen and dancer Kay Helen Coleman, who were emotionally distraught over the assassination. According to Ruby, Olsen remarked that "they should cut this guy [Oswald] inch by inch into ribbons," and Coleman said "in England they would drag him through the streets and would have hung him." Ruby did not mention this encounter in his first two FBI interviews, explaining he did not want to expose Olsen's secret relationship with Coleman. The Olsens acknowledged the conversation and their upset state but disputed the specific remarks, claiming instead that Ruby had cursed Oswald and expressed sympathy for the Kennedy family.

Ruby arrived at the Dallas Times-Herald around 4 a.m., speaking for about 15 minutes with composing room employee Roy Pryor, who had just ended his shift. Ruby described seeing Oswald, correcting Wade about the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and arranging a phone interview with Wade, stating he believed he was in good favor with the district attorney. Pryor recalled Ruby calling Oswald a "little weasel of a guy" and being emotionally concerned about the President's family, shaking a newspaper for emphasis. Ruby also spoke with Arthur Watherwax, seeking his views on closing the clubs and his plan to persuade other owners to follow suit, and with foreman Clyde Gadash. Ruby displayed a "twistboard" exercise device he had promised to Gadash, leading to demonstrations and merriment, though Gadash agreed Ruby's general mood was one of sorrow. Ruby also expressed his view that the Weissman advertisement was an effort to discredit Jews.

At about 4:30 a.m., Ruby drove from the Dallas Times-Herald to his apartment, where he awakened his roommate George Senator. Ruby discussed the Weissman advertisement and a signboard urging Chief Justice Earl Warren's impeachment, then telephoned Larry Crafard at the Carousel Club, instructing him to meet them at Nichols Garage with a Polaroid camera. The three men then drove to the "Impeach Earl Warren" sign near Hall Avenue and Central Expressway, where Ruby had Crafard take three photographs of the billboard, believing the sign and the Weissman ad might be connected. Ruby noted on the back of an envelope a name and post office box number appearing on the sign.

Ruby examined a billboard and a related newspaper advertisement, and told associates he believed the two were the work of the John Birch Society, the Communist Party, or a combination of both. He drove to a post office to ask a postal employee for the name of the person who rented the mailbox featured on the billboard, but the employee refused to provide the information; Ruby found the mailbox stuffed with mail. He then went to a coffeeshop with three associates to discuss the two advertisements for roughly 30 minutes. Afterward, Crafard was taken to the Carousel Club, and Ruby returned to his apartment with an associate named Senator, going to bed around 6 a.m.

At 8 or 8:30 a.m. on November 23, Crafard—who had been tasked with feeding Ruby’s dogs—called Ruby to ask about food for the animals. Ruby, who had forgotten he planned to stay up late, reprimanded Crafard for waking him. A few hours later, Crafard gathered his few belongings, took $5 owed to him from the Carousel Club cash register, left a receipt and thank-you note, and began hitchhiking to Michigan. Later that day, Andrew Armstrong found the note and telephoned Ruby.

Ruby did not return to bed after Crafard’s call. During the morning, he watched a televised eulogy for President Kennedy delivered by a rabbi, who spoke of Kennedy serving in battles around the world before being shot in his own country; Ruby told the Commission the eulogy created a "tremendous emotional feeling" for him and that he was "carried away" by the remarks, crying during the broadcast. An employee who called Ruby that morning noted his voice was shaking when he spoke of the assassination.

Between noon and 1:30 p.m., Ruby drove to Dealey Plaza, where a police officer who noted Ruby’s solemnity pointed out the window from which the rifle shots were fired the previous day. Ruby inspected memorial wreaths placed for the President and spoke emotionally with the officer. He introduced himself to a KRLD radio reporter working from a mobile news unit at the plaza, mentioned his prior help connecting KLIF radio with Henry Wade for an interview, and pointed out Capt. J. Will Fritz and Chief Curry in the area, after which the reporter interviewed and photographed the officers. Ruby said he then drove home before returning downtown to Sol’s Turf Bar.

Evidence indicated that after leaving Dealey Plaza, Ruby went to the Nichols Parking Garage adjacent to the Carousel Club. Attendant Tom Brown believed he saw Ruby around 1:30 p.m. and heard him mention Chief Curry’s name in a telephone conversation from the garage; before departing, Ruby asked Brown to inform acquaintances that the Carousel would be closed. Garage general manager Garnett C. Hallmark testified Ruby arrived at the garage around 3 p.m., walked to a telephone, asked if a competing burlesque club would be closed that night, and said he was "acting like a reporter." Hallmark overheard Ruby address the call recipient as "Ken" and discuss the transfer of Oswald, referring to him only as "he" and telling the recipient, "you know I’ll be there."

KLIF announcer Ken Dowe confirmed he was likely the "Ken" Ruby called from the Nichols Garage, receiving at least two calls from Ruby that Saturday afternoon. In one call, Ruby asked when Oswald would be moved; in the other, he stated he would attempt to locate Henry Wade. After finishing the calls, Ruby walked onto Commerce Street, passed the Carousel Club, then returned a few minutes later to retrieve his car.

Shortly after 3 p.m., Ruby went to Sol’s Turf Bar on Commerce Street, staying for roughly 45 minutes. A nondrinker, Ruby said he visited to speak with his accountant, who normally prepared the bar’s payroll on Saturday afternoons, though the accountant only saw Ruby briefly and reported no business conversation. Jeweler Frank Bellochio, who first noticed Ruby at the bar, began berating Dallas residents for the assassination; Ruby disagreed and tried to calm Bellochio when he said he might close his jewelry business and leave the city, arguing there were many good citizens in Dallas. Bellochio pointed to a copy of the Bernard Weissman advertisement, and Ruby claimed the ad was designed to stoke anti-Semitic sentiment in Dallas, saying he learned from the Dallas Morning News it was paid for partly in cash. Ruby then showed Bellochio photos he had taken that morning of the "Impeach Earl Warren" sign and railed against the sign, seemingly taking contradictory sides and appearing incoherent to Bellochio. When Bellochio asked for a copy of the photos, Ruby refused, calling them a "scoop," then left without saying goodbye.

Ruby likely left Sol’s Turf Bar to call Stanley Kaufman, a friend and attorney who had represented him in civil matters. Kaufman testified that around 4 p.m., Ruby called about the Bernard Weissman advertisement, saying he was particularly struck by the ad’s black border as a potential tipoff that the assassin knew of the planned assassination. Ruby told Kaufman he had tried to locate Weissman by visiting the post office, and that he was attempting to assist law enforcement authorities.

Significant confusion exists about where Ruby placed the call to Kaufman and his activities after leaving Sol’s Turf Bar. Eva Grant stated the call was made from her apartment around 4 p.m., but Ruby believed it was placed from the Turf Bar. Ruby said he went from the Turf Bar to the Carousel Club then home, and provided no further details of his activities between 4 and 9:30 p.m. Robert Larkin saw Ruby downtown around 6 p.m., and Andrew Armstrong testified Ruby visited the Carousel Club between 6 and 7 p.m., staying for roughly an hour.

Eva Grant testified that for most of the period between 4 and 8 p.m., Ruby was at her apartment. Grant said Ruby was still upset about the Weissman ad when he arrived, showed her the photo of the "Impeach Earl Warren" sign, and recounted his argument with Bellochio about Dallas. When Grant asked if he had found Bernard Weissman in the Dallas city directory, Ruby said he had not, and the pair speculated the ad and Warren sign were the work of "Commies or the Birchers" designed to discredit Jewish people. Mid-conversation, Ruby called KLIF’s Russ Knight to ask who Earl Warren was. Grant testified that Ruby later retired to her bedroom to make phone calls and sleep.

At 9:30 p.m., Ruby was back at his apartment when he received a call from striptease dancer Karen Bennett Carlin, who had been driven to Dallas from Fort Worth with her husband by fellow dancer Nancy Powell; the trio had stopped at the competing Colony Club earlier. Carlin testified she called Ruby to ask if the Carousel would be open that night and to request part of her salary. Ruby became angry at the suggestion the Carousel might be open for business, but said he would come to the club in about an hour. After waiting a long time for Ruby, the Carlins returned to the Nichols Garage, where Mr. Carlin called Ruby to say they needed money to return to Fort Worth. Ruby agreed to advance a small sum, asked to speak to Mrs. Carlin, and told her to call him on Sunday if she needed more money. At Ruby’s request, garage attendant Huey Reeves gave Mrs. Carlin $5, and she signed a receipt under her stage name "Little Lynn" timestamped 10:33 p.m. November 23.

After the call with Carlin, Ruby called his sister Eva Grant in a depressed mood, and she suggested he visit a friend. In response, Ruby called Lawrence Meyers, a friend from Chicago he had visited two nights prior. Meyers testified Ruby asked what he thought of the "terrible thing" (the assassination), then criticized his competitors Abe and Barney Weinstein for failing to close their clubs on Saturday night, saying "I’ve got to do something about this." Meyers initially thought the remark referred to the Weinsteins, but after Oswald was shot, he was unsure if Ruby was referring to his competitors or the assassination, as Ruby had also spoken at length about Mrs. Kennedy, repeatedly saying "those poor people, those poor people." Meyers declined Ruby’s invitation for coffee but invited him to his motel; when Ruby also declined, the two agreed to meet for dinner the following evening.

Conflicting testimony exists about Ruby’s activities in the 45 minutes after his call with Meyers. Eva Grant testified she did not see Ruby after 8 p.m. that Saturday and denied calling Ralph Paul that night, but phone company records show a call was placed to Ralph Paul’s Bull Pen Drive-In in Arlington, Texas from Grant’s apartment at 10:44 p.m. that night, the only such call from her apartment that weekend. Grant recalled Ruby making a call to Paul that weekend, and Paul testified Ruby called him from Grant’s apartment that night, saying he and his sister were crying. Nineteen-year-old Wanda Helmick, a former waitress at the Bull Pen, reported in June 1964 that she overheard the cashier answer a call for Paul, saying "It is for you. It is Jack." Helmick claimed she heard Paul mention a gun the caller had and exclaim "Are you crazy?" She said Paul repeated this account to employees the next day after Oswald was shot, identifying Ruby as the caller. Paul denied Helmick’s allegations, and both he and Helmick agreed Paul left for home around 11 p.m.

Shortly after 11 p.m., Ruby arrived at the Nichols Garage, repaid Huey Reeves, and retrieved the receipt Mrs. Carlin had signed. Outside the Carousel, he greeted Police Officer Harry Olsen and Kay Coleman, whom he had seen late the previous night. He went upstairs to the club and made five brief long-distance calls: the first to the Bull Pen Drive-In at 11:18 p.m. lasting 1 minute, followed by a 3-minute call to Paul’s home in Arlington at 11:21 p.m., a 2-minute call to Paul’s home at 11:36 p.m., a 2-minute call to entertainer Breck Wall in Galveston at 11:44 p.m., and a final 1-minute call to Paul’s home. Ruby has not provided details of these calls to the Commission, but has denied ever indicating to Paul or Wall that he planned to shoot Oswald, saying he did not consider such action until Sunday morning. Paul did not mention the late calls in his November 24, 1963 FBI interview, later testifying Ruby called to say no business was being done. Wall testified Ruby called to ask if the American Guild of Variety Artists (AGVA) had met regarding a dispute Ruby had with the union over the Weinsteins’ enforcement of AGVA’s ban on striptease contests and amateur performances, and that Ruby was upset the Weinsteins had not closed their clubs out of respect for President Kennedy.

After finishing the calls to Paul and Wall at 11:48 p.m., Ruby drove to the Pago Club, a 10-minute trip from the Carousel Club. He took a table near the middle of the club, ordered a Coke, and asked the waitress in a disapproving tone why the club was open. When manager Robert Norton joined him a few minutes later, Ruby expressed concern about whether it was proper to operate the club that evening, noting the Carousel was closed but not criticizing Norton for staying open. Norton brought up President Kennedy’s death, saying no one had the right to take another’s life, and Ruby expressed no strong opinion before saying he was going home because he was tired. Ruby later told the Commission he knew "something was wrong" with him in the mood he was in that night.

Ruby’s Sunday morning activities are the subject of conflicting testimony. Ruby and his roommate George Senator maintained he did not leave their apartment until shortly before 11 a.m., supported by two other witnesses, while three WBAP-TV technicians claimed to have seen Ruby near the Police and Courts Building between 8 a.m. and 11 a.m. These technician identifications are largely discredited: none had prior familiarity with Ruby, made only brief observations, and gave inconsistent descriptions of Ruby’s appearance that conflict with verified details of his attire that morning. Testimony also indicates Ruby received a confused, seemingly distraught phone call from his cleaning lady Elnora Pitts between 8:30 and 9 a.m., and after breakfast he paced the apartment, mumbled unintelligibly, and spoke with his entertainer Karen Carlin at 10:19 a.m. to arrange sending her $25 via telegraph, mentioning he would be downtown that day.

Leaving his apartment a few minutes before 11 a.m. with his dachshund Sheba and a portable radio, Ruby drove downtown, passing Dealey Plaza and noting crowds outside the county jail (which he assumed meant Oswald had already been transferred) and the Police and Courts Building. He parked his car across from the Western Union office, left his keys and billfold in the trunk (containing approximately $1,000 in cash) and the trunk key in the glove compartment, and did not lock his car doors. He then walked to the Western Union office, where he completed a $25 telegraph money order for Carlin at 11:17 a.m. CST, retaining a time-stamped receipt. After the transaction, Ruby walked toward the police department, entered the basement via the auto ramp, and stood behind newsmen and police awaiting Oswald’s transfer. When Oswald emerged from a basement office at approximately 11:21 a.m., Ruby moved forward and fired a single fatal shot into Oswald’s abdomen before being subdued by officers.

An examination of Ruby’s conduct in the days surrounding President Kennedy’s assassination found no evidence he was involved in the assassination itself. His pre-assassination activities were routine, and his public expressions of grief and shock were consistent with his known character, as were his concerns about the impact of the assassination on his businesses. Ruby’s obsession with the "Impeach Earl Warren" sign and Bernard Weissman ad was openly expressed, and no links between Ruby and any political organization were found. Larry Crafard’s sudden departure from Dallas on November 23, which raised initial conspiracy speculation, was determined to be innocent: Crafard had planned to leave Ruby’s employ prior to the assassination, had a minor argument with Ruby the morning of November 23, and had longstanding ties to family in Michigan that motivated his hitchhiking trip, with no connections to the assassination or Oswald’s shooting. Allegations that Ruby’s Saturday night phone calls to friends Ralph Paul and Breck Wall discussed shooting Oswald were unsubstantiated: phone records showed no suspicious activity, both men had no known subversive ties, and the sole source of the claim (Wanda Helmick) had delayed reporting it for months, with no corroborating witnesses. An investigation into Ruby’s 10:19 a.m. call with Carlin also found no evidence it was prearranged to provide Ruby an excuse to be near the police department or convey information about Oswald’s transfer.

Rumors that Ruby and Oswald were previously acquainted, fueled by claims that Oswald appeared to recognize Ruby as he approached in the police basement, were investigated and found to have no merit. Review of television tapes and film of the shooting found no facial expression from Oswald indicating recognition, and Oswald’s view of Ruby would have been obstructed by the bright flash of camera lights as he walked from a dark corridor into the basement. All specific allegations that Oswald was seen at Ruby’s Carousel Club or in his company prior to November 22 were investigated, and none were credible: in most cases, the original source of the claim denied making it or admitted there was no basis for it, sources were often individuals with erratic memory or poor mental stability, and unsubstantiated rumors had no identifiable sources or corroborating witnesses.

This section introduces witness accounts claiming to have seen Jack Ruby in the company of a man resembling Lee Harvey Oswald in the weeks before the assassination of President Kennedy, noting these claims warrant further examination.

Dallas electronics salesman Robert K. Patterson stated that on November 1, 1963 (per sales records), Ruby visited his store accompanied by a man who resembled Oswald, though Patterson did not positively identify the man as Oswald, and two associates present at the time also could not confirm the identification. Additional evidence indicates Ruby’s companion was Larry Crafard, who lived and worked for Ruby at the Carousel Club from mid-October to November 23, 1963, and stated he accompanied Ruby to an electronics store for equipment purchases in late October or early November. Ruth Paine testified Crafard bore a strong resemblance to Oswald, and employment records confirm Oswald worked a full day on November 1, 1963.

William D. Crowe Jr., a nightclub master of ceremonies who began a 4- to 5-week engagement at the Carousel Club on November 11, 1963, was the first person to report a possible Ruby-Oswald association. He mentioned the "possibility" of seeing Oswald at the club to news media representatives gathered outside the club shortly after Oswald was shot on November 24, and his account was publicized after he appeared on television. Crowe testified he never definitively identified the man as Oswald, stating the face only seemed familiar and he had associated it with a patron he saw a week prior. He noted his memory act repertoire did not improve his memory, and his identification of the man was uncertain.

After Crowe’s account was publicized, four additional people reported seeing Oswald at the Carousel Club. One witness claimed to have seen Ruby and a man resembling Oswald seated together, addressed as "Bettit" or "Pettit" by a blond-haired waitress, but could provide no description of the man beyond his resemblance to the man shot by Ruby, and could not describe the club’s interior or give its precise location. A Tennessee resident claimed to have seen an Oswald lookalike at the club on November 10, but Ruth Paine testified Oswald spent the entire November 9–11 holiday weekend at her home in Irving, Texas. Two former Ruby employees, Karen Carlin and Billy Joe Willis, believed they saw a man resembling Oswald at the club but were not certain it was Oswald, and neither reported a connection between the man and Ruby. No other Carousel employees recalled seeing Oswald or a person resembling him at the club.

Wilbryn Waldon (Robert) Litchfield II claimed to have seen a man resembling Oswald enter Ruby’s office at the Carousel Club in late October or early November 1963. While there is evidence Litchfield did see Ruby at the club around that time, there is strong reason to believe he did not see Oswald: Litchfield described the man as having pockmarks on the right side of his chin, a feature Oswald did not have, and Litchfield’s credibility is in doubt. He did not mention his observation to public officials until December 2, 1963, despite being present at an FBI interview of another witness on November 29, and had prior convictions for offenses involving forged checks. He stated he first noticed the resemblance while watching television coverage of Ruby shooting Oswald on November 24, but none of the three friends he was playing poker with at the time recalled him making such a remark, and two stated Litchfield’s accounts were often untrustworthy.

The Commission analyzed all claims that Ruby and Oswald were seen together, noting none of the witnesses had particular reason to pay close attention to the men, substantial time elapsed before the sightings became meaningful, and unlike eyewitnesses to the November 22 assassination, none reported their observations soon after Oswald was arrested. The Commission encountered numerous clear identification errors during its investigation, including at least four people other than Larry Crafard who were mistaken for Oswald, and others misidentified as Jack Ruby. Under all available evidence, there is no substantial likelihood that the man witnesses claimed to have seen with Ruby was actually Lee Harvey Oswald.

The Commission examined other potential evidence of a Ruby-Oswald connection beyond witness sightings. Both men lived in the Oak Cliff section of Dallas, just over a mile apart after Oswald returned from Mexico, but none of their numerous interviewed neighbors knew of any association between them. Their daily schedules and travel routes did not overlap: Oswald worked 8 a.m. to 4:45 p.m. weekdays, took public transportation that did not pass near Ruby’s home or Carousel Club, returned directly to his roominghouse after work, and was not known to visit nightclubs; Ruby stayed at his apartment until after 9 a.m. each day, drove to his club via a nearby freeway, and was at the Carousel Club from 9 p.m. to after 1 a.m. While they occasionally patronized the same stores, no evidence indicates they met there, and a restaurant Ruby frequented where Oswald occasionally ate breakfast had widely separated patronage times with no employee awareness of an acquaintance. They held post office boxes at the same Dallas terminal annex, but their divergent schedules made even a coincidental encounter unlikely, and Oswald’s withdrawn personality made a conversation improbable if they had crossed paths. Investigation of possible social links found no evidence of acquaintance: John Carter, a boarder at Oswald’s former roominghouse, was friendly with Wanda Joyce Killam (a former Ruby employee), but Killam stated Carter never visited the Carousel Club and likely did not know Ruby, and Carter confirmed he had never heard of Ruby until the shooting. Earlene Roberts’ sister Bertha Cheek visited Ruby at the Carousel Club on November 18, 1963, to discuss backing a new nightclub venture with Ruby and an interior decorator, but Cheek stated she had not heard of Oswald before November 22, and there is no evidence Ruby associated with Roberts. William F. Simmons, a pianist who worked at the Carousel Club and lived near Ruth Paine’s home (where Oswald’s family resided), stated he did not know Oswald and never saw him at the club. Rumors that both men were homosexual and thus acquainted were unsupported by evidence, with close acquaintances of both denying the claims, and Ruby’s clubs were not known to be frequented by homosexuals. Finally, Marguerite Oswald testified that before the assassination, FBI Agent Bardwell D. Odum showed her a photograph she believed was Jack Ruby, but investigation determined the photo Odum showed was not of Ruby: it was a CIA photo of a man potentially linked to Oswald, taken outside the U.S. between July 1 and November 22, 1963 (when Ruby was in the country), trimmed differently than the copy shown to Marguerite during Commission testimony.

This section covers Jack Ruby’s background and associations, noting that study of his history (detailed further in appendix XVI) leads to the firm conclusion he had no ties to individuals or groups that would have eliminated the need for direct contact with Oswald near the time of the assassination. Ruby was a rigorously independent person who moved from his family home at age 16, relocated from Chicago to Dallas in 1947 with only sporadic contact with most of his family, and was almost continuously self-employed for most of his working life, preferring to operate independently even when he had temporary business partners.

This section details Ruby’s business activities. Ruby’s primary income sources were his two Dallas nightclubs, the Carousel Club and the Vegas Club, though he frequently pursued short-lived independent business promotions. At the time of the assassination, he owed approximately $44,000 in delinquent U.S. taxes and was in substantial debt to his brother Earl and friend Ralph Paul, but there was no indication either party was pressuring him for payment, and his tax liabilities were likely susceptible to acceptable settlement. He operated his clubs on a cash basis, often carrying large amounts of cash, so the roughly $3,000 found on him and in his car at arrest had no particular significance. His meager financial records showed no unexplained large transactions, he used bank accounts infrequently, and no entries were made to his safe-deposit boxes in over a year before the Oswald shooting. There is no evidence he received funds after his arrest except small defense contributions from friends, sympathizers, and family, and royalties from a syndicated newspaper article about his life.

This section details Ruby’s political activities. Ruby considered himself a Democrat, possibly influenced by his brother Hyman’s involvement in Chicago Democratic ward politics. When arrested, police found 10 political cards in his apartment urging election of the "Conservative Democratic slate," but there is no evidence Ruby distributed this literature or ever campaigned for political candidates. None of his friends or associates recalled him belonging to groups interested in political issues, or discussing political problems except on rare occasions.

Ruby's early politically adjacent activities included participating in poolhall associate-led attacks on German-American Bund meetings in Chicago, registering a 1942 copyright for an unpromoted "Remember Pearl Harbor" placard, and attempting to sell Franklin D. Roosevelt busts. His synagogue rabbi believed he was too unsophisticated to hold meaningful political views. The overwhelming majority of witnesses reported Ruby held considerable respect for President Kennedy prior to the assassination, with no reports of hostility toward him.

There is no reliable evidence Ruby was ever associated with communist or radical causes. His Polish-born parents maintained no ties to European relatives after emigrating to the U.S. in the early 1900s, Ruby denied communist connections, and FBI nationwide files contained no records of subversive activity by Ruby prior to the Oswald shooting. A review of all 1963 subversive activity reports from the Dallas-Fort Worth FBI office found no entries related to Ruby or his known acquaintances.

The Commission investigated an allegation that Ruby was involved in Communist Party activities in Muncie, Indiana between 1943 and 1947, based on a former resident's claim that a man resembling Ruby (known as Jack Rubenstein) visited the area and associated with suspected Communists. The claim was unsupported: military records confirm Ruby was on active duty in the South during the alleged first two visits, there is no evidence Ruby owned or managed a Chicago nightclub as the witness claimed, the alleged list of communists including Rubenstein was never located, all named associates denied knowing Ruby or participating in communist activities, and the witness never reported the allegation to authorities prior to testifying. The Commission found no basis to accept the witness's testimony.

The Commission investigated allegations that Ruby was associated with ultraconservative political activity in Dallas. Ruby was found to have two right-wing radio scripts promoted by highly conservative figure H.L. Hunt in his possession at arrest; he had acquired the scripts at a Texas Products Show a few weeks earlier, reportedly became enraged upon discovering them, and threatened to send one to Kennedy, though he did not act on this prior to giving one to a radio announcer on November 23, when he also seemed to confuse extreme right and far left organizations. On November 21, Ruby drove a woman to the office of H.L. Hunt's son Lamar for a job interview, stating he wanted to meet Hunt to establish a business connection but did not enter the office. An allegation that Ruby visited the home of resigned Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker was fully discredited: the claimant, who had previously denied knowing Ruby or Oswald when questioned by the FBI in January 1964, made the claim in May 1964 before being discharged from the military for fraudulent enlistment.

Right-Wing Association Allegations and Related Inquiries The Commission investigated Mark Lane's claim that an unnamed informant reported a more than 2-hour November 14, 1963 meeting between Ruby, Patrolman J.D. Tippit, and Bernard Weissman at the Carousel Club. No Carousel Club employees had knowledge of the meeting, Ruby and Weissman denied it occurred, and Tippit's widow was unaware her husband ever visited the club. Ruby's November 22 remark that he knew "the Tippit who had been shot by Oswald" was later clarified as a reference to G.M. Tippit, a Dallas Police special services officer who occasionally visited Ruby's establishments; Larry Crafard, a Carousel employee, could not identify J.D. Tippit in photographs and had no recollection of the alleged meeting, though he initially identified a photo of Weissman as resembling a man Ruby called "Weissman" before later acknowledging he may have mixed up the individual. Ruby's November 22-23 conduct, including his public hostility to the "Impeach Earl Warren" advertisement that listed Weissman as a contact and his attempts to trace the ad's post office box and locate Weissman in a city directory, corroborated his denial of knowing Weissman, as it would be unlikely he would draw attention to Weissman if they were involved in unlawful activity together.

Tippit's Post-Assassination Encounter With Oswald Investigation found no evidence Officer J.D. Tippit was acquainted with either Ruby or Oswald. Tippit did not frequent nightclubs, had no reason to enter Ruby's clubs as part of his police duties, was not a member of any political organization, rarely discussed politics with others, and telephone records for his household after September 26, 1963 showed no suspicious long-distance calls. His November 22 encounter with Oswald was consistent with standard Dallas Police Department procedure: following the assassination, Tippit was directed as part of general orders to all officers to patrol the Oak Cliff area, where he came across Oswald, who matched the general suspect description broadcast to all police cars 15 minutes after the shooting. There is no basis to infer Tippit was acting outside his official duties when he approached Oswald.

Investigation of Pro- and Anti-Castro Activity Allegations No evidence substantiates rumors linking Ruby to pro- or anti-Castro Cuban activities, except a 1959 incident where Ruby made preliminary inquiries as a middleman for a potential surplus jeep sale to Cuba and a prisoner release request, which never progressed beyond a preliminary possibility. Ruby stated the inquiry was a money-making opportunity amid favorable U.S. sentiment toward Cuba at the time. A passing acquaintance of Ruby who returned from Havana in 1959 had no known ties to the jeep transaction or to Oswald, and a 1963 phone call from the Carousel Club to the acquaintance's ex-wife yielded no relevant information. Ruby's 1959 social trip to Havana with gambler Lewis J. McWillie was unrelated to political activity, and there is no evidence McWillie engaged in pro- or anti-Castro activity after leaving Cuba or was involved in Ruby's abortive jeep transaction. A 1962 telegram charged to Ruby's brother Earl's business telephone to Havana had no substantiated links to Ruby or subversive activity. FBI and CIA records for 1963 found no connections between Ruby, his closest associates, and Cuban revolutionary or subversive groups.

Investigation of Ruby's Possible Organized Crime Connections The Commission investigated Ruby's potential ties to organized crime and illegal activity, with full details provided in Appendix XVI. Ruby grew up in a Chicago neighborhood where he knew local criminals, and his nightclub businesses brought him into contact with people convicted of various offenses, though his personal friendships were largely limited to professional gamblers. There is no credible evidence Ruby gambled beyond social activity or had unpaid gambling debts. He had no felony charges prior to shooting Oswald: his only prior Chicago legal issues were ticket scalping and unauthorized sale of copyrighted music, while his Dallas law violations (excluding traffic charges) stemmed from club operations or temper outbursts. Ruby denied ties to organized criminal activities, and law enforcement agencies confirmed this denial.

Background and Activities of Ruby's Roommate George Senator George Senator, Ruby's 50-year-old roommate and close friend in Dallas, was born September 4, 1913, in Gloversville, New York, had an eighth-grade education, worked in New York and Florida restaurants before enlisting in the Army in August 1941, and met Ruby around 1955-1956 while visiting Ruby's Vegas Club. Ruby provided Senator with financial support and room and board at multiple points, and Senator moved into Ruby's apartment on November 1, 1963, after his previous roommate married. The Commission found no evidence Senator ever engaged in political activity. During post-assassination questioning, Senator omitted mentioning he accompanied Ruby to photograph the "Impeach Earl Warren" sign on the morning of November 22, which he attributed to oversight in later interviews. He also omitted mentioning that shortly after Ruby left their apartment on the morning of November 23, he offered to make breakfast for friends Mr. and Mrs. William Downey, an offer he denied after the Downeys recalled the interaction. Senator was unable to account for large portions of his time on November 22 and 23, admitted to heavy drinking on those days but denied being intoxicated, and the Commission was unable to verify his accounts of his activities and visits on those days.

Ruby testified that at about 10:15 a.m. on Sunday, November 24, he said in the Senator's presence, "If something happened to this person, that then Mrs. Kennedy won't have to come back for the trial." Ruby identified this as the most explicit statement he made concerning Oswald that morning. The Senator denies any knowledge of Ruby's intentions.

The Senator's general response to the shooting did not resemble that of a person seeking to conceal guilt. Shortly before it was known that Ruby was the slayer, the Senator visited the Eatwell Restaurant in downtown Dallas. Upon being informed that Ruby was the attacker, he exclaimed "My God" in what appeared to be genuine surprise, ran to a telephone, returned to gulp down his coffee, and quickly departed. He drove to the home of attorney and friend James Martin, whose concern was for Ruby and not for himself. Both men then drove to the Dallas Police Department, where the Senator voluntarily submitted to police questioning and gave interviews to newspaper and television reporters.

Beyond a broad investigation into Ruby's background and associations, the Commission examined Ruby's pattern of activities during the two months preceding President Kennedy's Dallas visit to determine whether unusual conduct might be linked to the President's trip.

The Commission specifically accounted for Jack Ruby's presence in Dallas on every day after September 26, 1963, except five: September 29, 30, and October 11, 14, and 24, with no evidence he left the Dallas-Fort Worth area on those days. One report placing Ruby in Dallas on September 28 suggests he likely remained on September 29 and 30, when Oswald was in Mexico City. The Commission found no evidence Ruby traveled to Mexico at that time, and both Ruby and Ralph Paul stated he did not leave the Dallas-Fort Worth area during September, October, or November 1963.

During October and November 1963, Jack Ruby maintained his usual vigorous pace of business activities, directing considerable attention to his two nightclubs and other business promotions. In the final month before the Kennedy trip, his time was increasingly occupied with personnel problems at both clubs, with no indication he devoted less than full attention to these matters or appeared preoccupied with other affairs. Acquaintances felt Ruby seemed depressed and concerned that his friends were deserting him, but there were no signs of secretive conduct.

Scrutiny of Ruby's activities during the several days preceding the President's arrival revealed no indication of unusual activity. Ruby discussed the impending trip with only two persons and only briefly. Two newspapers describing expected motorcade routes through Dallas and Fort Worth were found in Ruby's car at his arrest, but such papers circulated widely in Dallas, and Ruby's car, like his apartment, was so cluttered with other newspapers, notebooks, brochures, cards, clothing, and personal items that the papers carry no special significance.

Multiple reasons undermine the theory that Ruby would have shot Oswald as part of a conspiracy. By striking in the city jail, Ruby was certain to be apprehended, creating exceptionally grave dangers for any co-conspirators. If the attempt had failed, Oswald might have disclosed his confederates; if it succeeded, the additional killing might have produced a trail to them. Moreover, Ruby was regarded by most acquaintances as moody and unstable, hardly the type to inspire confidence among those involved in a sensitive conspiracy.

Since his apprehension, Jack Ruby has provided federal authorities with several detailed accounts of his activities both preceding and following the assassination of President Kennedy, showing no reluctance to answer any questions. The accounts he provided are consistent with evidence available to the Commission from other sources.

The Commission concluded there is no credible evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald was part of a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. Examination of the assassination itself revealed no indication Oswald was aided in planning or execution. Review of Oswald's life since 1959, while illuminating his character, produced no meaningful evidence of conspiracy. The Commission found no evidence the Soviet Union or Cuba were involved, and no grounds for believing Ruby's killing of Oswald was part of a conspiracy. Rumors of a connection between Ruby and Oswald proved groundless, and examination of Ruby's background, behavior, and activities during the November 22-24 weekend yielded no evidence he conspired with anyone. The same conclusion was independently reached by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, CIA Director John A. McCone, and Secret Service Chief James J. Rowley.

This introductory section frames the inquiry into Oswald's motives. The Commission notes that since Oswald is dead, no definitive determination of legal sanity is possible, and that his complete state of mind and character are unknowable. However, material from his writings and life history offers insight. The most striking feature of Oswald's psychology is his profound alienation: he had few close relationships, difficulty finding a meaningful place in the world, and dissatisfaction with every environment he inhabited—resenting capitalism in the United States, criticizing Communist Party privilege in the Soviet Union, and expressing ambivalence toward his wife. Despite appearing meek to acquaintances, Oswald imagined himself as "the Commander" and a future political leader, combining grandiose fantasies with feelings of oppression. He displayed a striking disregard for consequences through acts including his defection, the shooting of General Walker, attempts to reach Cuba, and ultimately the assassination of President Kennedy. His commitment to Marxism, which he adopted as a teenager and held as an "irrevocable" but largely theoretical conviction, was an important influence on his adult conduct and possibly on his decision to assassinate the President. The section concludes by previewing the chapter's structure, which will examine Oswald's early life, his time in New York and the Marines, his interest in Marxism, his defection and return, and his activities after mid-1962.

This section, "The Early Years," traces the formative experiences of Oswald's childhood. His father died of insurance-related causes two months before Lee was born in New Orleans on October 18, 1939, plunging the family into financial hardship. His mother Marguerite placed Lee's older brothers John Pic and Robert in an orphans' home, and sent Lee there as well on December 26, 1942, when he was three. When Lee was four, Marguerite withdrew him and moved with her sons to Dallas in anticipation of her 1945 marriage to Edwin A. Ekdahl, to whom Lee became closely attached, finding in him a father figure he had lacked. After stormy relations, Marguerite and Ekdahl divorced in the summer of 1948, and she complained bitterly about her treatment as a widow with three children, even though John Pic felt her circumstances were not unusually difficult. To supplement income, she had Pic falsely swear he was 17 so he could join the Marine Corps Reserves, and she later took miscellaneous jobs, sometimes bringing Lee along and leaving him alone in the car, or training him to return to an empty house rather than play with other children. An early indication of Lee's character appeared in spring 1950, when he visited relatives in New Orleans and refused to play with children his own age. Pic later observed that Lee was raised in an atmosphere of constant money problems, which surely affected him deeply.

This section, "New York City," examines the deterioration of Lee's adjustment after he and his mother moved to New York in August 1952, shortly before his thirteenth birthday. Although his school record in Louisiana and Texas had been average with no major behavioral issues, Lee's behavior worsened sharply in the Bronx. After an incident in which he allegedly pulled a pocketknife on his brother John Pic's wife, the Pics asked the Oswalds to leave, and relations between Lee and his previously idolized brother became strained. Enrolling at P.S. 117, Lee was teased for his "western" clothes and Texas accent, and began staying home to read magazines and watch television. Despite intervention by school authorities and his mother, his truancy continued, and he was charged as "beyond the control" of his mother. From April 16 to May 7, 1953, he was held at Youth House for psychiatric observation, where Chief Psychiatrist Dr. Renatus Hartogs and social worker Mrs. Evelyn Strickman Siegel evaluated him. Contrary to later reports, the examination did not describe Oswald as a potential assassin or recommend institutionalization. Hartogs diagnosed him with a "personality pattern disturbance with schizoid features and passive-aggressive tendencies," describing a tense, withdrawn, emotionally starved boy with intense anxiety, shyness, feelings of awkwardness and insecurity, and a vivid fantasy life centered on omnipotence and power. Mrs. Siegel noted his serious detachment and sense of being unloved by a mother who treated him as a burden. Lee himself spoke of a "veil" between himself and others that he preferred to keep intact, and admitted to fantasies of being powerful and of hurting or killing people, which he refused to discuss. Psychologist Irving Sokolow's human figure-drawing test corroborated findings of insecurity, limited social contact, and particular anxiety in relation to the maternal figure. Hartogs recommended probation with treatment by a male psychiatrist to substitute for the absent father, alongside family guidance, with commitment only if probation failed.

Lee Oswald scored an IQ of 118 on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, which psychologist Sokolow characterized as indicating intellectual functioning in the upper range of bright normal intelligence. Sokolow noted that although Oswald appeared disinterested in school subjects, he operated on a much higher than average level. On the Monroe Silent Reading Test, Oswald demonstrated no retardation in reading speed or comprehension, and he showed better than average ability in arithmetical reasoning for his age group.

Oswald told his probation officer Carro that he preferred solitude because he had too much difficulty making friends. Reports from Carro and Mrs. Siegel indicated an ambivalent attitude toward authority on Oswald's part. Upon returning to school in fall 1953, he became disruptive, refused to salute the flag, and did virtually no schoolwork. He resisted the authorities' efforts to draw him out of his shell. He told Mrs. Siegel he would run away if sent to boarding school, yet also expressed a wish that his mother had been firmer in trying to get him to return to school.

The New York authorities' reports indicated that Lee's mother gave him very little affection, did not serve as a substitute father, and did not understand her own relationship to his psychological problems. Mrs. Siegel described Marguerite Oswald as a smartly dressed, gray-haired, self-possessed, and superficially affable woman, but essentially defensive, rigid, and self-involved, with difficulty accepting and relating to people and little understanding of Lee's behavior. Dr. Hartogs reported that Mrs. Oswald did not understand Lee's withdrawal was a form of violent but silent protest against her neglect and the absence of real family life. When questioned about his mother, Lee said, "well I've got to live with her. I guess I love her." John Pic reported that Lee slept with his mother until approximately age ten or eleven.

The personality factors observed in Lee Oswald in New York revealed great difficulty adapting to the city, with his typical reaction being withdrawal. These factors indicated a severe inability to enter into relationships with others, and similar problems were apparently already present before he went to New York. This failure to adapt to his environment was a dominant trait that would persist throughout his later life. However, it would be incorrect to believe that the personality aspects observed in New York could have led anyone to predict his later outburst of violence.

Probation officer Carro was the only one of Oswald's three principal observers in New York to recommend placement in a boys' home or similar institution. However, Carro specified that his recommendation was based primarily on adverse environmental factors, including Lee's lack of friends, the unavailability of agency assistance, and his mother's ineffectuality, rather than any particular mental disturbance in Lee himself. Carro testified that there was nothing when he saw Lee at age 12 that would have led him to believe there were "seeds of destruction for somebody."

Mrs. Siegel concluded her report by stating that despite Oswald's withdrawal, he gave the impression of being not so difficult to reach as he appeared, and that patient, prolonged effort in a sustained relationship with one therapist might yield results. She indicated he had suffered serious personality damage that could be repaired with timely help. However, Lee Oswald never received such help; few New York social agencies were equipped to provide the intensive treatment he needed, and when a clinic found room for him, the opportunity was never utilized. When his mother failed to cooperate with school authorities after Lee became a disciplinary problem, the court began considering placement in a boys' home, but the Oswalds left New York in January 1954 before any action was taken.

After returning to New Orleans, Oswald was teased at school for his northern accent, and he concluded school had nothing to offer him. His mother exercised little control and let him decide for himself whether to continue his education. Neighbors recalled an introverted boy who read extensively, took walks, visited museums, and rode a rented bicycle in the park on Saturdays. Mrs. Murret believed he talked at length with a girl on the telephone, but he had no known dates, and a friend testified he was more bashful about girls than anything else. Witnesses described Oswald as non-aggressive overall, though he was involved in some fights: he was beaten by white boys for sitting in the Negro section of a bus out of ignorance, and he fought two brothers who claimed he had picked on the younger one. A large high school student later punched him in the mouth on his way home from school, loosening a tooth. From this incident stemmed a "mild friendship" with Edward Voebel. Voebel recalled Oswald once proposed breaking into a store on Rampart Street to steal a pistol, though they never carried out the plan. Voebel characterized Oswald as someone who would not start fights but would ensure they ended on his terms if provoked. On his ninth grade personal history record, Oswald wrote the names Edward Vogel and Arthor Abear, then erased them and indicated he had no close friends. The phonetic misspellings suggest a reading-spelling disability that appears throughout his writings.

During this period, Oswald began reading Communist literature obtained from the public library. Fellow employee Palmer McBride stated that Oswald said he would like to kill President Eisenhower for exploiting the working class. Oswald praised Khrushchev and suggested he and McBride join the Communist Party to take advantage of their social functions. Oswald also joined the New Orleans Amateur Astronomy Association, where, according to the association's then-president William E. Wulf, he loudly expounded Communist doctrine, praised communism as the only way of life for the worker, and expressed dismay at being unable to find a Communist cell to join or anyone showing interest in him as a Communist. After an argument with Wulf's father about communism, Oswald was asked to leave the house.

Despite his apparent interest in communism, Oswald tried to join the Marines at age 16, a year before his actual enlistment and approximately two and a half years after leaving New York. He wrote a note in his mother's name to school authorities saying he was leaving because they were moving to San Diego, but in reality he had quit school to obtain his mother's assistance in enlisting. Although she apparently made a false statement about his age, he could not convince the authorities he was really 17. Evidence indicates he was greatly influenced by his brother Robert's enlistment three years earlier; he studied Robert's Marine Corps manual until he knew it by heart. Marguerite Oswald said Lee lived for the day he could turn 17 and join the Marines. John Pic believed Oswald was motivated in large part by a desire to escape the "yoke of oppression" from his mother. Oswald's ongoing difficulty forming meaningful relationships and dissatisfaction with his environment probably contributed to his intense desire to join the Marines and escape his surroundings. His study of Communist literature, though seemingly inconsistent with military service, may have been another manifestation of his rejection of his environment.

Oswald's difficulty relating to others and general dissatisfaction continued during his Marine Corps service. Kerry Thornley testified that the Marine Corps was not what Oswald had expected, and that Oswald seemed to guard against developing close friendships. Daniel Powers testified that Oswald seemed always striving for a relationship but that his general personality alienated groups against him. Other marines confirmed Oswald had few friends and kept to himself. Although his military records showed no psychological unfitness, he did not adjust well to the service and never rose above private first class despite passing the qualifying examination for corporal. His attitude that he was a man of great ability and intelligence and that many superiors were incompetent hindered his career. While he did not object to authority in the abstract, he believed he should be the one to exercise it. Former officer John E. Donovan testified that Oswald believed the Marine Corps should recognize talent like his without requiring a college degree. Oswald baited officers into discussions of foreign affairs where his knowledge exceeded theirs, then regarded them as unfit to command him. Nelson Delgado testified Oswald tried to "cut up" higher-ranking marines in such arguments and make himself come out on top. Thornley described Oswald's extreme personal sloppiness as fitting a general pattern of doing whatever was not wanted of him, a recalcitrant trend. Thornley characterized Oswald as someone who would go out of his way to get into trouble, then used the resulting "special treatment" as evidence of being picked on and as a means of gaining sympathy. Thornley believed Oswald labored under a persecution complex, tending toward but not reaching paranoia. Powers considered Oswald meek, easily led, and capable of being brainwashed, but firm in his beliefs once formed. Powers described him as reserved, like a "frail, little puppy in the litter," and he had the nickname "Ozzie Rabbit." Oswald read serious literature such as Whitman's "Leaves of Grass" rather than westerns, and told Powers that the Marines only taught you to kill and that afterward you might be good gangsters. Powers believed that acquiring a girlfriend in Japan gave Oswald a sense of male status, making him more self-confident, aggressive, and pugnacious, transforming him from "Oswald the rabbit" to "Oswald the man." Oswald told Powers he did not care if he returned to the United States.

In Japan, Oswald's newfound self-confidence and pugnaciousness led to an incident in which he spilled a drink on one of his sergeants and abusively challenged him to fight. At the resulting court-martial, Oswald testified he had been drunk, felt the sergeant had a grudge against him, had unsuccessfully sought a transfer from the sergeant's unit, and had only wanted to discuss the matter with the sergeant, spilling the drink accidentally. The hearing officer accepted the latter claim but found Oswald guilty of wrongfully using provoking words and sentenced him to 28 days, canceling the suspension of a 20-day sentence from an earlier court-martial for possessing an unauthorized pistol with which he had accidentally shot himself.

At his own request, Oswald was transferred from active duty to the Marine Corps Reserve under honorable conditions in September 1959, three months before his regularly scheduled separation date, ostensibly to care for his mother who had been injured in an accident at her work. After it was learned that he had defected to the Soviet Union, he was given an undesirable discharge from the Marine Corps Reserve, where he had been assigned on inactive status following his active-duty transfer. In an attempt to reverse this discharge, Oswald wrote to then-Secretary of the Navy Connally on January 30, 1962, stating that he would employ all means to right this gross mistake or injustice.

Analysis of Oswald’s undesirable military discharge finds he knew neither President Kennedy nor Governor Connally were directly responsible for his discharge, and he never expressed hostility toward either man prior to the assassination. Marina Oswald testified Lee never spoke ill of Kennedy, and while in the Soviet Union he spoke positively of Connally, even stating he would vote for him for Governor when he returned to the U.S. Oswald remained concerned about his discharge, which he felt was unjust as it was not tied to his active duty conduct and he received no notice of the original proceedings due to his unknown whereabouts; he petitioned the Navy Discharge Review Board, which declined to modify the discharge in a July 25, 1963 letter. While the Commission considered whether Connally was Oswald’s target due to the indirect connection to his discharge, analysis shows it would have been nearly impossible for Oswald to hit Connally without first hitting the President, and Oswald had far more favorable opportunities to target Connally on other occasions. It is therefore concluded that any motivation from the discharge was general hostility toward the U.S. government and its representatives, not a grudge against a specific individual.

Oswald first developed an interest in Communist ideology after moving with his mother from New York to New Orleans, where he began reading Communist literature. He told a reporter he became interested in Marxism around age 15 after receiving a pamphlet about the Rosenbergs, marking the start of his ideological engagement.

Oswald fully adopted Marxist beliefs after joining the Marines, and his pro-Soviet sympathies became widely known in his unit: associates called him “comrade” or “Oswaldskovitch,” he consistently chose red chess pieces citing a preference for the “Red Army,” studied Russian, read Russian-language newspapers, and followed developments in the Soviet Union. Associate Jerome Thornley testified Oswald held an “irrevocable conviction” in the correctness of his Marxist beliefs that could not be shaken by years of formal argument. This conviction was demonstrated in an incident after Thornley read Oswald’s suggested copy of George Orwell’s *1984*: when Thornley joked that a revolution would fix the stupid mandatory parade requirement, Oswald screamed “Not you, too, Thornley” in visible distress, interpreting the comment as a criticism of his political views, and the two never spoke again.

Associate testimonies further detail Oswald’s ideological positions: Lieutenant Donovan testified Oswald believed there were grave international injustices, had a specific interest in Latin America and Cuba, opposed the Batista regime, and sympathized with Fidel Castro, though he never expressed a desire to personally address injustices or identify as a Communist. Fellow Marine Carlos Delgado testified Oswald believed the U.S. government was fundamentally flawed and offered little to its people, but did not support the Communist way of life; the two often discussed Cuba, imagining themselves as Cuban military or government leaders leading expeditions to free other Caribbean islands.

Thornley testified that Oswald’s Marxist beliefs shaped an extraordinary view of history in which future generations would act as a tribunal judging his actions; he wanted to be on the “winning side” so that 10,000 years in the future, people would view him as ahead of his time, with the “eyes of the future” serving as a stand-in for the eyes of God. Thornley believed this concern with his historical image was the reason Oswald chose his high-profile defection method, as it would get his name in the press and broadcast his identity widely. Thornley also testified Oswald desired both physical comfort and historical recognition, and if he could not have both, he wanted to die with the knowledge that he was “somebody.”

Oswald’s public embrace of Marxism led some people to avoid him, though his wife Marina suggested his interest may have been motivated by a desire for attention. He used his Marxist and related activities as excuses for difficulties he faced in personal and professional life, which were usually caused by unrelated factors; this pattern is most evident in his employment relations after returning from the Soviet Union. His reliance on these excuses worsened his real problems by preventing him from identifying and addressing their root causes. Most significantly, his commitment to Marxism contributed to his 1959 defection to the Soviet Union, 1963 activities on behalf of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and September 1963 attempt to travel to Cuba.

After leaving the Marine Corps in September 1959 (ostensibly to care for his mother), Oswald immediately traveled to the Soviet Union to attempt to renounce his U.S. citizenship, a striking demonstration of his commitment to his beliefs at age 19. While his defection was partly driven by his Marxist ideology, personal and psychological factors also played a role. In an August 17, 1963 radio debate, Oswald stated that while he began reading Marx and Engels at age 15, his service in Japan was the decisive factor: poor local living conditions convinced him the U.S. system was flawed and Marxism was the answer, leading him to decide to go to Russia to observe a Marxist society firsthand. At least one associate who knew Oswald after his return believed his defection had a more personal, psychological basis, a view supported by Oswald’s own writings: in a November 26, 1959 letter to his brother Robert shortly after arriving in the USSR (before Soviet authorities granted him permission to stay indefinitely), Oswald wrote he had always considered the Soviet Union his own country, traveled there to find freedom, and could never be personally happy in the U.S. He also wrote he would never return to the U.S., a country he hated. To finance his trip, Oswald saved enough money from his low salary as an enlisted Marine, though there is no proof he saved the $1,500 he claimed.

Oswald’s motivations for defecting are further clarified by his intense hatred of the United States, most clearly expressed in his November 26, 1959 letter to his brother Robert. In the letter, he argued the U.S. capitalist government exploited workers, and used art, culture, religion, and education to suppress dissent over its unfair economic system and plans for war. He complained about U.S. segregation, unemployment, automation, and military aggression against other populations, and stated he fought for communism, called the U.S. a dying country he did not want to be part of, and said he did not defect for personal material gain, as he did not believe the USSR would offer more material comfort than the U.S. at its stage of development. He wrote he had been a pro-communist for years without ever meeting a communist in the U.S., and that his observations and Marxist studies led him to the Soviet Union, which he always considered his own. He laid out strict terms for his relationship with his brother: he would kill any American fighting for the U.S. government in wartime, had no attachments in the U.S., intended to live a normal, happy, peaceful life in the USSR for the rest of his life, and viewed his mother and brother only as examples of U.S. workers, not objects of affection.

When Soviet authorities initially denied Oswald’s request to remain in the USSR, he was shocked, as he had waited two years to be accepted. He immediately attempted suicide: soaking his hands in cold water to numb the pain, slashing his left wrist, then soaking the wound in hot water, and writing in his diary that he thought death would be easy and sweet, accompanied by the sound of a violin. He was discovered in time, taken to a Moscow hospital, and held there until October 28, 1959.

Still determined to remain in the Soviet Union, Oswald visited the American Embassy on October 31, 1959 to formally renounce his U.S. citizenship. Consular official Richard E. Snyder testified Oswald was extremely confident, knew his mission, and took charge of the conversation from the start. Oswald presented a signed note requesting revocation of his U.S. citizenship, stating he entered the USSR to apply for Soviet citizenship via naturalization, his application was pending before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he took these steps for political reasons after long consideration, and affirmed his allegiance to the USSR. His stated principal reason for renouncing citizenship was that he was a Marxist. He also referenced hardships his mother experienced as a worker that he did not want for himself, noted his Marine service in Okinawa and elsewhere allowed him to observe “American imperialism,” showed sensitivity about not achieving a higher rank in the Marine Corps, and offered to provide Soviet officials with any information he had about Marine Corps operations, hinting he might have special knowledge. His self-styled “Historic Diary” also describes the event.

Oswald's Soviet Residence and Treatment After Soviet authorities permitted him to remain in the country, Oswald was assigned to work as a metal worker at a radio and television factory in Minsk. He was denied admission to a Moscow university, but received a monthly 700-ruble subsidy in addition to his factory salary, plus living quarters far better than those provided to average Soviet citizens of his age and social standing, giving him a total income roughly equal to that of the factory's director. Despite this preferential treatment, he resented the better accommodations and resources afforded to Communist Party officials, a dynamic that echoed his earlier resentment of superiors during his time in the U.S. Marine Corps.

Oswald's Disillusionment with Soviet Society Oswald grew increasingly disillusioned with life in the Soviet Union during his time in Minsk. Members of the Russian community in Dallas later reported that Oswald was widely disliked in the USSR, and he confided to the De Mohrenschildts that he had returned to the U.S. because he "didn’t find what I was looking for." His personal historic diary entries detailed his frustration with mandatory collective work duties, the hollow joviality of party officials, and the lack of personal recreation or meaningful ways to spend his income, leading him to reconsider his desire to stay in the country less than 18 months after his defection.

Return to the United States Less than 18 months after his defection to the Soviet Union, and roughly six weeks before meeting his future wife Marina Prusakova, Oswald initiated negotiations with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to arrange his return to the United States. His repatriation marked a stark reversal of his earlier public rejection of American society and formal renunciation of his U.S. citizenship, representing what the chapter describes as the utter failure of the most significant, defining act of his life up to that point.

Oswald's Post-Return Psychological State Marina Oswald confirmed that Lee underwent severe psychological changes immediately upon returning to the U.S., becoming a recluse, highly irritable, and explosively temperamental from late 1962 through early 1963. A comparison of his writing from his time in the Soviet Union (the coherent, descriptive manuscript *The Collective*) and his disjointed, hostile writing produced after his departure illustrates the profound psychological turmoil he experienced as a result of his total disillusionment with both American and Soviet society.

Oswald's Rejection of Capitalism and Communism After his return from the Soviet Union, Oswald articulated a total rejection of both capitalism and communism, viewing both systems as inherently unacceptable and oppressive. He wrote that no person who had lived under both systems could choose between them, as one offered systemic oppression and the other poverty, both stained by imperialistic injustice and forms of slavery. He also expressed broader hatred for American culture, traditions, and the American people at large, rather than limiting his criticism to the U.S. government, in contrast to most other American political dissidents of the era.

Oswald's Hypothetical Press Conference Preparations In preparation for a potential press conference upon his return to the U.S., Oswald drafted two sets of identical questions paired with vastly different answers. The first set reflected his genuine beliefs: he stated he defected to the Soviet Union as a protest against U.S. foreign policy, that he was fundamentally a communist who hated the Soviet system but believed Marxism could work under different circumstances, and that living standards and freedoms were roughly equivalent between the two superpowers. The second set contained far more conventional, palatable answers designed to minimize harm to his reputation as he reintegrated into American life, including denying he was a communist and praising U.S. freedoms over Soviet ones.

Oswald's Ongoing Soviet Engagement Despite his stated hatred of the Soviet Union after his return, Oswald maintained active engagement with the country. He wrote to the Soviet Embassy in Washington shortly after his arrival requesting Russian periodicals and bulletins for U.S.-based Soviet citizens, and subsequently subscribed to several Soviet journals. He also pressed for a Soviet visa for himself and his wife multiple times: in July 1963, when he told New Orleans police he hated America and planned to return to Russia, during his September 1963 trip to Mexico City, and in a November 9, 1963 letter to the Soviet Embassy. While his primary long-term goal may have been travel to Cuba, his repeated requests for Soviet visas demonstrated his continued interest in the country.

Oswald's Personal Relations in Texas Upon returning to Texas in June 1962, Oswald had no close friends or associates outside of his immediate family, though he came to respect George De Mohrenschildt, a nonconformist peripheral member of the local Russian-speaking community. He connected with the wider community through Peter Gregory, a Russian-speaking petroleum engineer he met via the Texas Employment Commission office in Fort Worth. Oswald generally disliked other members of the Russian community, with particularly hostile relations with George Bouhe, due in large part to his resentment of the substantial financial and material support his wife received from the group, which he felt he could not provide for her himself.

After returning from the Soviet Union, Oswald's marriage quickly deteriorated. George Bouhe, a Russian-speaking acquaintance, attempted to "liberate" Marina from Oswald, and around early November 1962 the De Mohrenschildts helped Marina move out with the baby; Oswald resisted, threatening to destroy her clothing and the baby's furniture, but ultimately acquiesced. He subsequently persuaded Marina to return after about a two-week separation, a decision that so angered Bouhe that nearly all contact between the Oswalds and the Russian community in Dallas ceased, with only occasional meetings with the De Mohrenschildts continuing through spring 1963. Oswald also severed relations with his mother, Marguerite, soon after returning from the USSR; he had told American Embassy officials in Moscow that he defected partly because of the capitalist system's "exploitation" of his mother, and he initially denied to Marina that he even had a mother. Although the Oswalds lived briefly with his brother Robert and then briefly with Marguerite in Fort Worth, Oswald soon moved out on his own. Marguerite's efforts to help furnish the apartment and buy gifts for Marina were rebuffed—Oswald resented what he viewed as evidence of his inability to provide for his family—and after moving to Dallas around October 8, 1962, he cut off all contact with her until after the assassination. In April 1963, however, Oswald visited elderly relatives of his deceased father in New Orleans and his father's gravesite in an apparent first attempt to learn about his family background, obtaining a large portrait of his father that contrasted with his earlier indifference to his father during the defection.

Oswald experienced persistent employment problems that he blamed on his Soviet past but that the evidence attributes largely to his own shortcomings. He held a satisfactory job as a sheet metal worker in Fort Worth from July 1962 until he voluntarily left on October 8, 1962, despite telling Marina he had been fired. The next day he registered with the Texas Employment Commission in Dallas, expressing a desire to write rather than work in industry; aptitude testing placed him in the upper range on verbal and clerical measures, and counselors described him as well-groomed and articulate. He was referred to a commercial advertising photography firm on October 11 and began work as a trainee on October 12, 1962, but his employer found his output imprecise and his relations with coworkers strained, and he was discharged on April 6, 1963, ostensibly for inefficiency and a difficult personality. A supervisor conceded that bringing a Russian-language newspaper to the workplace did not drive the firing decision but "didn't do his case any good." After moving to New Orleans on April 24, 1963—leaving Marina and the child with Ruth Paine in Irving, Texas—Oswald took a job on May 10, 1963 as a greaser and oiler at the William B. Reily coffee company, though he told his wife and Paine that he was working as a commercial photographer; he was dismissed on July 19, 1963 for unsatisfactory work and for spending work time in a neighboring garage reading rifle and hunting magazines. Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba Committee activities, publicly identified only after August 9, 1963, made finding further work harder: a Louisiana placement interviewer declined to provide references after seeing him on television, and his October 1963 application to another Dallas photography firm failed when its president warned a prospective employer that Oswald was "kinda peculiar," knew Russian, and might be a Communist. He finally obtained work at the Texas School Book Depository, where he performed satisfactorily.

The Commission concluded that on April 10, 1963—two weeks before Oswald moved to New Orleans and shortly after his discharge from the photography firm—Oswald shot at Major General Edwin A. Walker, an event the chapter examines in detail because of its relevance to Oswald's possible motive for the assassination. Oswald had been planning the attack for one to two months, recording details in a notebook, studying Dallas bus routes to and from Walker's home, and posing with his rifle and pistol alongside copies of the Worker and the Militant; he told Marina he wanted to send the photographs to the Militant and save one for his daughter June. After the unsuccessful attempt, Oswald returned home to find Marina had discovered his explanatory note; she testified she had no advance knowledge of the plot, became angry upon learning what he had done, and extracted a promise that he would not repeat it. Although Marina urged him to destroy the notebook, Oswald delayed and only later burned it after apparently worrying that it could incriminate him; some photographs he had pasted into the book survived among his effects and were found after the assassination. Marina testified that Oswald said he wanted to leave "a complete record" so that the details would be available, and she speculated he wished to appear brave if arrested. The Commission finds that the materials Oswald left at home—particularly the photographs showing him armed with the rifle and Communist and Socialist Workers Party publications—suggest a strong concern for his place in history and indicate he had considered the possibility of capture, considerations the Commission treats as significant alongside other evidence in assessing his motivation for the assassination. Marina reported that Oswald compared Walker to Adolf Hitler, arguing that killing a figure he characterized as a fascist leader would save lives, thereby indicating the kind of political reasoning he regarded as sufficient justification for taking a life.

Oswald's post-defection political activity centered on Cuba and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Aside from a single, apparently uneventful distribution of Committee materials in Dallas between April 6 and April 24, 1963, Oswald's first public association with the cause came in New Orleans, where under the name "Lee Osborne" he had printed a "Hands Off Cuba" handbill along with an application form and membership card for the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. He distributed these materials uneventfully near the U.S.S. Wasp at the Dumaine Street wharf on June 16, 1963, distributed literature downtown on August 9, 1963—which led to his arrest after a dispute with three anti-Castro Cuban exiles—and distributed again on August 16. After his arrest he was interviewed by police and, at his request, by an FBI agent; on August 17 he appeared briefly on a radio program, and on August 21 he debated Carlos Bringuier, one of the Cuban exiles arrested with him, over radio station WDSU in New Orleans. Bringuier further alleged that on August 5, 1963, Oswald had attempted to infiltrate the anti-Castro organization with which Bringuier was affiliated. While the Commission found no credible evidence of conspiracy, it treats these activities as revealing aspects of Oswald's character and as pertinent context for evaluating his possible motive for the assassination.

Oswald's "organization" was a product of his imagination. The nonexistent New Orleans chapter's imaginary president was named A. J. Hidell—the same name Oswald used when purchasing the assassination weapon. Marina Oswald testified that she signed the name "Hidell," apparently chosen because it rhymed with "Fidel," on her husband's FPCC membership card, claiming he threatened to beat her if she refused. The chapter was never chartered by the national FPCC organization, and despite Oswald's statements to New Orleans police that it had 35 members with five typically attending monthly meetings, it was a solitary operation.

Oswald's letters to FPCC national director V. T. Lee were misleading and sometimes untruthful, reflecting his reluctance to describe events accurately and his need to present himself in a more favorable light. In an August 1, 1963 letter, Oswald claimed an office he had previously said he rented was "promptly closed 3 days later," asserted that "thousands of circulars were distributed," and described receiving inquiries through his post office box that he endeavored to answer. He attributed his lack of support to an attack by Cuban exiles in a street demonstration and being "officially cautioned" by the police, which he said "robbed me of what support I had leaving me alone."

The Commission found no evidence supporting Oswald's claims. No one was found to have attacked any street demonstration in which Oswald was involved prior to the Bringuier incident, which occurred eight days after his August 1 letter. Bringuier was unaware of any such incident, and police reports reflected no Oswald activity before August 9, 1963, except the uneventful Dumaine Street wharf literature distribution in June. The 544 Camp Street address stamped on some of Oswald's literature could not be connected to him; an anti-Castro organization had occupied those offices until early 1962. There was no basis for his claim of distributing "thousands" of circulars, since he had printed only 1,000 of the claimed 2,000, and no evidence of substantial material support from FPCC national headquarters.

Oswald falsely claimed in an August 17, 1963 letter to V. T. Lee that he had appeared on William Stuckey's 15-minute WDSU-TV program "Latin American Focus," stating this resulted in being "flooded with callers and invitations to debate's ect. as well as people interested in joining the F.P.C.C. New Orleans branch." In fact, WDSU had no program by that name. Stuckey had a radio program called "Latin Listening Post," on which Oswald was heard for less than five minutes that day. Oswald apparently received only one caller in response to all his FPCC activities—an agent of Bringuier's investigating the true nature of the alleged organization.

The WDSU radio debate on August 21, 1963, brought out the history of Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, which was uncovered independently by William Stuckey and Edward Butler of the Information Council of the Americas. Confronted with this at the debate's outset, Oswald was forced onto the defensive and stated that Fair Play for Cuba was "not at all Communist controlled regardless of the fact that I had the experience of living in Russia." Stuckey testified that publicly linking FPCC to "a fellow who had lived in Russia for 3 years and who was an admitted Marxist" effectively ended Oswald's ability to recruit members. Nevertheless, Stuckey described Oswald as a very logical, intelligent, and clean-cut fellow who handled himself well—appearing more like a young attorney than someone associated with FPCC.

Following the disclosure of his defection, Oswald sought advice from the Communist Party, U.S.A. He had previously sent unsolicited photographic samples to the Party newspaper, the Worker, offering free contributions. He presented Arnold Johnson, Gus Hall, and Benjamin J. Davis honorary membership cards in his nonexistent New Orleans FPCC chapter. Arnold Johnson, director of the Party's information and lecture bureau, replied that the Party had no organizational ties with FPCC. Marina Oswald testified that such correspondence from those he considered important meant much to Oswald, providing proof that "there were people who understood his activity." In an August 28, 1963 letter to the central committee, Oswald asked whether he should "always remain in the background, i.e. underground" given his compromised position, and Johnson advised that it was often "advisable for some people to remain in the background, not underground."

By August 1963, after only three months in New Orleans, Oswald had fallen on difficult times. He had disliked and quit his job greasing coffee processing machinery after slightly more than two months and had not found another. His wife was expecting their second child in October, with associated financial concerns. His FPCC efforts had won no support; the Bringuier altercation and arrest upset him and caused him to "cool off a little." Most damaging, his defection history was now public, leaving him vulnerable to attack. Following Johnson's advice to "remain in the background" was impossible since there was no background to his one-man "organization," and he had received no letters from FPCC national headquarters since May 29, 1963, despite writing four detailed letters to V. T. Lee and keeping the headquarters informed of address changes.

By August 1963, Oswald had been considering leaving the United States again. On June 24, 1963, he applied for a new passport. In late June or early July, he told his wife he wanted to return to the Soviet Union with her, weeping as he said nothing kept him in the United States, that he would not lose anything by returning, and that it would be better to have less and not worry about tomorrow. Marina then wrote the Soviet Embassy regarding her earlier February 17, 1963 request for permission for herself and June to return—now stating that "things are improving" because her husband wished to return together. Unknown to his wife, Oswald enclosed a note requesting his wife's entrance visa be expedited while asking that his own be considered "separately," suggesting his true intentions were not to go directly to the Soviet Union, if at all, but rather to Cuba. In Marina's words, "all the rest of it was window dressing for that purpose."

Oswald left for Mexico City on September 25, 1963, arriving September 27, and went almost directly to the Cuban Embassy to apply for a visa in transit to Russia, representing himself as head of the New Orleans FPCC branch and seeking acceptance as a "friend" of the Cuban Revolution. The Cubans refused to issue a visa until he obtained a Soviet one, which involved months of delay. When Oswald became greatly agitated, he unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a Soviet visa at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and angrily argued with the Cuban consul, who told him a person like him "in place of aiding the Cuban Revolution, was doing it harm." Oswald left Mexico City on October 2, 1963, thoroughly disillusioned, rejected by officials of both Cuba and the Soviet Union. The U.S. Government would not permit travel to Cuba, and the bureaucratic rebuffs left him with no apparent route to the communist ideal he had sought.

Oswald's emigration attempts and FPCC activities shared a common motivation: hostility toward the United States and attachment to a country he believed embodied his committed political principles. Marina testified that he engaged in FPCC work "primarily for purposes of self-advertising," wanting to be arrested and appear in newspapers so he would be known when he got to Cuba; he even asked her to help hijack an airplane for that purpose, abandoning the plan only when she refused. He practiced operating his rifle's bolt on his apartment's screened porch, reviewed Spanish in September, and arranged for his family to return to Irving, Texas, to live with Ruth Paine. Mrs. Paine was told Oswald was going to Houston or possibly Philadelphia for work, while Marina knew of his Mexico City and Cuba plans. His interest in Cuba appears to have grown alongside the frustration of successive failures—in jobs, political activity, and personal relationships—making his emigration attempt a final "escape hatch" from the mediocrity and defeat that plagued his life.

This section investigates whether Oswald was motivated to assassinate President Kennedy by a desire to aid the Castro regime. The chapter notes that Kennedy had publicly and aggressively criticized the Castro government, while Castro had in turn bitterly attacked Kennedy over the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, the travel ban, the economic embargo, and broader U.S. policy. The Militant and the Worker, both publications to which Oswald subscribed, carried strongly critical coverage of Kennedy's Cuba policy, his civil rights record, his position on automation, and his efforts to ease U.S.–Soviet tensions. During a New Orleans radio debate on August 21, 1963, Oswald declined to endorse Castro's characterization of Kennedy as a "ruffian and a thief," and one witness testified that Oswald had actually approved of Kennedy's civil rights stance shortly before the assassination. The Commission also observed that Marina Oswald testified that her husband had grown disillusioned with Cuba after bureaucratic difficulties and his unhappy experience with the Cuban consul in Mexico City, which dampened his enthusiasm for the Castro regime. The fact that Oswald was carrying only $13.87 at his arrest, while leaving $170 behind at his wife's room in Irving, suggested he had no practical plan to flee to Cuba, casting doubt on the theory that he expected to be received there as an assassin.

This section addresses the suggestion that Dallas's anti-Kennedy climate may have influenced Oswald. The chapter describes hostile incidents involving Vice President Johnson during the 1960 campaign, the assault on Ambassador Adlai Stevenson in late October 1963, and the extreme anti-Kennedy newspaper advertisement and handbills that circulated in Dallas before the President's visit. The Commission found no evidence, however, that any of these rightwing groups or the broader climate of hate in Dallas had any connection to Oswald's actions. While Oswald was demonstrably aware of this political ferment, as shown by a letter he wrote to Communist Party U.S.A. representative Arnold Johnson describing his attendance at an ultraright meeting led by General Edwin A. Walker, the Commission could not establish any direct contact between Oswald and the personalities or groups representing the rightwing. Oswald's writings, reading habits, and his own attempt to shoot General Walker all reflected, the Commission concluded, an extreme personal dislike of the rightwing rather than any affinity with it.

This section examines Oswald's relationship with his wife Marina as a possible window into his motives. The Commission describes a stormy union: a brief courtship of about six weeks, a marriage partly motivated by Oswald's desire to hurt a girl who had rejected him, and Marina's possible hope that marriage to an American would let her leave the Soviet Union. Although relations appeared to improve somewhat after Oswald returned from Mexico, with Marina noting he "changed for the better" and was more attentive, the underlying tensions persisted. Oswald was described as overbearing, dictating many details of their life, striking his wife on occasion, opposing her drinking, smoking, and use of cosmetics, and apparently wanting her to remain unable to speak English so she could not build an independent American life. Marina, for her part, complained about Oswald's inability to provide more material things, ridiculed his political views and grandiose self-image, and reportedly told friends that Oswald "was not a man" and that their sexual relations were unsatisfactory. Despite this, the period from Oswald's return from Mexico until mid-November 1963 appears to have been relatively calm, until Marina asked him not to visit the Paine home the weekend of November 16–17 because Michael Paine was present and Oswald disliked him. The chapter also recounts the November 17, 1963 incident in which Oswald was not reached by a call placed under his real name because he was registered at his roominghouse under the alias O. H. Lee. Marina was angry about the alias, and Oswald justified it by claiming he feared the FBI, whose visits he claimed had cost him jobs and which he exaggerated as evidence of his own importance. The Commission concluded that this claimed FBI warning was another of Oswald's fabrications, noting that Agent Hosty had not spoken to him between August 10, 1963, and the assassination and that Oswald's account of his wife's strong protest to the Bureau was largely invented.

Oswald's justifications for using an alias suggest he believed he was caught in an increasingly complex conspiracy against him, fearing the FBI would expose his defection to the Soviet Union as had occurred in New Orleans. However, his expressed concerns about the FBI may have been a fabricated story to support his use of a fake name. These arguments failed to persuade Marina Oswald, who saw no issue with people knowing he had lived in Russia, and criticized his repeated "foolishness" and use of a fictitious name.

Marital conflict between Oswald and Marina centered on his use of an alias, leading to a heated phone argument on Monday, November 18, 1963, during which Marina hung up on him and refused to speak to him. After the argument, Oswald stopped his usual twice-daily calls to her, and traveled to her home in Irving on Thursday, November 21, 1963, claiming he was lonely and wanted to reconcile.

Marina Oswald testified about her husband's November 21, 1963 visit to her Irving home. She stated Oswald said he was lonely and wanted to make peace, but she remained angry and refused to speak to him. He attempted to win her over by performing chores (putting away diapers, playing with their children on the street) and repeatedly proposed renting a Dallas apartment so the family could live together again, which she declined, preferring to stay with Ruth Paine until the holidays and asking him to buy a washing machine instead. That night, Oswald went to bed before Marina retired, and the next morning he left for work before the rest of the household awoke, leaving his wedding ring in a dresser cup and $170 in a wallet, while taking $13.87 and the long brown package he later carried to the Texas School Book Depository.

This section addresses unanswerable questions about Oswald's mindset in the week before the assassination. It notes that after his November 15 argument with Marina over his alias, he skipped his usual weekend visit to Irving, only returning on November 21. He asked coworker Frazier for a ride to Irving that morning, falsely claiming he needed to pick up curtain rods for a new apartment. The Commission states he had likely planned the attack by November 21 at the latest, and that public reporting of the presidential motorcade route (which would pass the Texas School Book Depository) starting November 15 made the target accessible to him. It also explores Oswald's long-standing personal struggles: his sense of isolation, failed attempts to find belonging in the U.S. Marine Corps, the Soviet Union, and Cuba, his strained marriage, and his feeling of being unwelcome at the Paine home, all of which may have shaped his state of mind. The Commission clarifies that marital conflict alone did not cause the assassination, as Oswald's underlying hostility and desire for historical recognition predated his marriage.

Oswald's actions following the assassination provide limited insight into his motives. He took only $13.87 with him when he left Irving on November 22, suggesting he did not expect to escape far, similar to a note he sent his wife before his earlier attempt to kill General Walker. After the assassination, he returned to his roominghouse to retrieve his revolver, killed Patrolman J.D. Tippit when Tippit attempted to question him, and was arrested at the Texas Theatre after resisting arrest. Officers testified that at the time of his arrest, he stated "it's all over now." During interrogation, he was overbearing and arrogant, consistently denying involvement in the assassination or Tippit's murder, and handling questioning with composure while lying about other matters, with his denials holding no probative value given the overwhelming evidence against him.

The Commission concludes that no single motive can explain Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy, but identifies multiple contributing factors: his overriding hostility to his environment, inability to form meaningful relationships, perpetual discontent with American society, long-held hatred for the U.S., commitment to Marxism and communism, desire to be recognized as a "great man" ahead of his time, and willingness to act decisively without regard for consequences when pursuing his goals. These combined traits produced a man capable of carrying out the assassination.

Over the 100 years prior to 1963, four U.S. presidents were assassinated (Abraham Lincoln, James A. Garfield, William McKinley, John F. Kennedy), and three other prominent political figures survived assassination attempts: Theodore Roosevelt during his 1912 campaign, President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933, and Harry S. Truman in 1950. This means one in five presidents since 1865 was assassinated, and one in three faced an assassination attempt. Prompted by these statistics, the Commission launched its inquiry into presidential protection practices at the time of Kennedy’s assassination to identify improvements that could reduce the risk of future attacks. The Commission’s review led to a 1964 Treasury Department planning document requesting additional personnel and resources for the Secret Service, which was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget for approval in August 1964.

The section outlines the inherently complex nature of the presidential protective assignment, rooted in the president’s four core roles: Head of State, Chief Executive, Commander in Chief, and leader of their political party, all of which require extensive public travel and engagement, a longstanding cornerstone of American democratic tradition. While absolute security for the president could theoretically be achieved through complete isolation from the public, this is incompatible with the demands of the presidency and core American values. Effective protection requires a deliberate compromise between security and the president’s need to interact with the public, relying on cooperation between the president, protective personnel, and the public, a framework outlined in a post-assassination memo from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.

This section introduces the Commission’s structured evaluation of protective measures in place during Kennedy’s Dallas trip, organized around three core lines of inquiry: 1) the intelligence processes used to identify potential threats to the president in advance, including information available about Lee Harvey Oswald and failures to share that information with the Secret Service; 2) the adequacy of advance security preparations for the Dallas visit, largely led by the Secret Service; and 3) the performance of the protective team responsible for Kennedy’s safety on November 22, 1963.

A foundational element of presidential protection is identifying and mitigating potential threats before they materialize, a function the Secret Service carried out via its Protective Research Section (PRS) and requests for information from other federal and local law enforcement agencies. The Commission concluded that the Secret Service’s threat identification systems were critically deficient at the time of the Kennedy assassination.

At the time of the assassination, the Secret Service’s Protective Research Section (PRS) was a small unit of 12 specialists and 3 clerks, processing a rapidly growing volume of threat-related information (over 32,000 items in 1963, up from 9,000 in 1943). PRS maintained 50,000 manually indexed general case files (with no automated data processing) covering individuals flagged as potential threats, with 400 people subject to periodic status reviews, 100 classified as serious risks, and 12–15 considered highly dangerous mobile risks. The Service also had arrangements to be notified of the release or escape of roughly 1,000 incarcerated high-risk individuals. For the Dallas trip, PRS only reviewed geographically indexed files (the 100 serious risk cases and 400 under regular review), as the general unindexed files were not organized by location and could not be used for trip-specific advance planning. PRS’s criteria for accepting and retaining threat information were overly broad, inconsistently documented, and its limited staffing and manual systems undermined its ability to effectively track and respond to emerging threats ahead of presidential travel.

The Secret Service's requests to other federal agencies for intelligence information were as broad and unspecific as its internal instructions to its own agents and the White House mailroom. The head of PRS testified that the Service asked other agencies to provide "any and all information that they may come in contact with that would indicate danger to the President." These requests were not made in writing; instead, the Service relied on personal liaison maintained by PRS with the headquarters of federal intelligence agencies—particularly the FBI—and at the working level with personnel of various field offices. The Secret Service also participated in training programs of other law enforcement agencies, with agents from those agencies attending regular Secret Service training schools, where presidential protection was a major topic.

In the absence of more specific instructions from the Secret Service, other federal agencies interpreted the informal requests as relating principally to overt threats or specific manifestations of hostility toward the President. The FBI Handbook in effect at the time of the assassination, carried by every special agent, specified that investigation of threats against the President, immediate family, President-Elect, and Vice-President fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Secret Service. The Handbook required agents to refer any such information immediately by the most expeditious means of communication to the nearest Secret Service office, to advise the Bureau by teletype, and to refrain from evaluating the information. Written threats required a copy to be given to local Secret Service with the original forwarded to the Bureau for Secret Service headquarters.

The State Department advised the Secret Service of all crank and threat letter mail, crank visitors, and reports concerning any assassination or attempted assassination of a foreign ruler or major official. Several military intelligence agencies reported crank mail and similar threats involving the President. According to Special Agent in Charge Bouck, the Secret Service had no standard procedure for the systematic review of its requests for, and receipt of, information from other federal agencies.

The Commission concluded that the facilities and procedures of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service prior to November 22, 1963, were inadequate. PRS's efforts were too largely directed at the "crank" threat. Although the Service recognized that advance preventive measures must encompass more than obvious dangers, it made little effort to identify factors in the activities of an individual or organized group—other than specific threats—suggesting a source of danger against which timely precautions could be taken. Except for its special "trip index" file of 400 names, no cases in the PRS general files were available for systematic review on a geographic basis when the President planned a particular trip.

When the special file was reviewed on November 8, it contained no names of persons from the entire Dallas-Fort Worth area, despite Ambassador Stevenson having been abused by pickets in Dallas less than a month before. Bouck explained the failure to investigate the Stevenson incident on the ground that PRS required a more direct indication of a threat to the President, which did not exist until the President's scheduled Dallas visit became known. The Commission found that this approach seriously undermined the precautionary nature of PRS work, since the presence of the Stevenson pickets might have created a danger for the President on any Dallas visit, and PRS should have investigated and been prepared to guard against it.

Other agencies occasionally provided information to the Secret Service about potentially dangerous political groups—e.g., the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico—but only after members had resorted to political violence. The vague requests made by the Secret Service to federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies were not well designed to elicit information about persons other than obvious threats. The requests shifted responsibility for evaluating difficult cases from the Service—the agency most responsible for performing that task—to other agencies, with no specific guidance provided. Although the CIA had on file Treasury Department requests for information on counterfeiting and certain smuggling matters, it had no written specification of what foreign intelligence information the Secret Service desired in advance of Presidential trips outside the United States.

No information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald appeared in PRS files before the President's trip to Dallas, but Oswald was known to other federal agencies with which the Secret Service maintained intelligence liaison. The FBI had been interested in him, to some degree, since his defection in October 1959. It had interviewed him twice shortly after his return to the United States, again a year later at his request, and was investigating him at the time of the assassination. The Commission took testimony from Bureau agents who interviewed Oswald after his return, the agent assigned to his case at the time of the assassination, the Director of the FBI, and the Assistant to the Director in charge of all investigative activities. The CIA Director and Deputy Director for Plans testified about that Agency's limited knowledge of Oswald. The Commission reviewed the complete pre-assassination files on Oswald from the Department of State, Office of Naval Intelligence, FBI, and CIA.

The FBI opened a file on Oswald in October 1959 when news reports appeared of his defection to the Soviet Union. The file was opened "for the purpose of correlating information inasmuch as he was considered a possible security risk in the event he returned to this country." The State Department, CIA, and Office of Naval Intelligence also opened files. Until April 1960, FBI activity consisted of placing information about Oswald's relations with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and background data on his prior military service into his file. In April 1960, Marguerite Oswald and Robert Oswald were interviewed during a routine FBI investigation of money transfers to Lee Harvey Oswald in Russia. Over the next two years, the FBI continued to accumulate information through periodic reviews of State Department and ONI files, learning that Oswald had attempted to renounce his U.S. citizenship, applied for Soviet citizenship, described himself as a Marxist, offered to give the Soviet Union any useful information he had as a marine radar technician, displayed an arrogant attitude at the U.S. Embassy, and had been discharged from the Marine Corps Reserve as undesirable in August 1960. In June 1962, the Bureau was advised of Oswald's plan to return and instructed the Dallas office to interview him to determine whether he had been recruited by a Soviet intelligence service.

Oswald was first interviewed by FBI Agents John W. Fain and B. Tom Carter on June 26, 1962, in Fort Worth. Fain reported that Oswald was impatient, arrogant, and unwilling to answer questions about his motive for going to the Soviet Union, though he denied denouncing his U.S. citizenship or applying for Soviet citizenship. Oswald discussed his contacts with Soviet authorities, denied involvement with Soviet intelligence agencies, and promised to advise the FBI if he heard from them. Fain was not satisfied and arranged a second interview on August 16, 1962. While Oswald remained somewhat evasive, he was not antagonistic and seemed to be settling down. He again agreed to notify the FBI of any suspicious approaches. Fain concluded that Oswald was not a security risk or potentially dangerous or violent and recommended the case be placed in closed status—an administrative classification indicating no further work was scheduled but not precluding reopening if warranted.

From August 1962 until March 1963, the FBI continued to accumulate information about Oswald but conducted no active investigation. Agent Fain retired in October 1962, and the closed Oswald case was not reassigned. However, pursuant to a Bureau practice of interviewing certain immigrants from Iron Curtain countries, Fain's assignment to interview Marina Oswald was transferred to Agent James P. Hosty, Jr., of the Dallas office. In March 1963, while attempting to locate Marina, Hosty was told by a former landlady, Mrs. M. F. Tobias, that other tenants had complained of Oswald drinking to excess and beating his wife. A file review revealed Oswald had become a subscriber to the Worker, a Communist Party publication. Hosty recommended reopening the case based on the alleged personal difficulties and the Worker contact, and the recommendation was accepted. He decided not to interview Marina at that time but determined the Oswalds were living at 214 Neely Street in Dallas. On April 21, 1963, the New York field office was advised that Oswald was in contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and had claimed to have distributed its pamphlets in Dallas. This information did not reach Hosty until June, and he considered it "stale" and did not attempt to verify the statement, having earlier found no evidence of Fair Play for Cuba Committee activity in Dallas.

In mid-May 1963, Agent Hosty checked Oswald's last known residence and found he had moved. Oswald was tentatively located in New Orleans in June, and Hosty asked the New Orleans FBI office to determine his address and activities. The New Orleans office investigated, located Oswald, and learned his address and former place of employment on August 5, 1963. A confidential informant advised the FBI that Oswald was not known to be engaged in Communist Party activities in New Orleans.

On June 24, 1963, Oswald applied in New Orleans for a passport, stating he planned to depart by ship for an extended tour of Western European countries, the Soviet Union, Finland, and Poland. The Passport Office in Washington had no listing for Oswald requiring special treatment, and his application was approved the following day. The FBI had not asked to be informed of any passport application by Oswald, as it might have under existing procedures, and did not know of the application. According to the Bureau, it did not request that Oswald be placed on a watch list because the facts relating to his activities at that time did not warrant such action, and the investigation had disclosed no evidence that he was acting under the instructions or on behalf of any foreign government.

On August 9, 1963, Oswald was arrested and jailed by the New Orleans Police Department for disturbing the peace after a street fight broke out when he was accosted by anti-Castro Cubans while distributing Fair Play for Cuba Committee leaflets. The next day, Oswald asked the New Orleans police to arrange an FBI interview, and Agent John L. Quigley was sent to the police station. The police had not given Oswald's name to the Bureau, so Quigley did not know of his prior FBI record during the interview. Quigley found Oswald receptive about his general background but evasive about specific Fair Play for Cuba Committee details. After the interview, Quigley learned that Agent Milton R. Kaack had been conducting a background investigation of Oswald at Hosty's request, and Quigley gave Kaack a detailed memorandum. Kaack recognized inconsistencies between Oswald's statements and information already in Bureau files—for example, Oswald claimed his wife's maiden name was Prossa and that they had married and lived in Fort Worth, and he had told arresting officers he was born in Cuba. On August 22, the Bureau learned Oswald had appeared on a radio program on August 21, and on August 30, William Stuckey reported that Oswald had told him he had worked and been married in the Soviet Union. Neither these discrepancies nor the fact that Oswald had initiated the FBI interview was considered sufficiently unusual to require another interview. Assistant to the Director Alan H. Belmont explained that the Bureau's interest was in determining whether Oswald's activities constituted a threat to internal security, that Oswald's false statements became a matter of record, and that there was no law violated by lying to the Bureau, so the matter would be handled in due course as required by the investigation. On August 21, 1963, Bureau headquarters instructed the New Orleans and Dallas field offices to conduct an additional investigation, and FBI informants in the New Orleans area reported that Oswald was unknown in pro-Castro or Communist Party circles there.

In early September 1963, the FBI transferred principal responsibility for the Oswald case from its Dallas office to the New Orleans office. On October 1, 1963, the Bureau learned from the Oswalds' New Orleans apartment rental agent that the family had vacated the unit, with Marina Oswald and the couple's two children leaving in a Texas-registered station wagon. On October 3, Dallas FBI Agent Hosty reopened the case to support the New Orleans office; he checked Oswald's former neighborhood and the broader Dallas-Fort Worth area but was unable to locate him. On October 10, the CIA notified the FBI that an individual tentatively identified as Oswald had contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City earlier that month, the first indication the Bureau had that Oswald had left the United States. The FBI arranged to follow up with the CIA to verify Oswald's entry into Mexico, while the State Department Passport Office, which knew Oswald had obtained a U.S. passport on June 25, 1963, did not share this information with either the CIA or FBI. On October 25, the New Orleans FBI office learned Oswald had provided a September forwarding address at 2515 West Fifth Street in Irving, Texas; after receiving this information on October 29, Hosty attempted to locate Oswald, interviewed neighbors on Fifth Street, and learned the address belonged to Ruth Paine. He initiated a limited background check on the Paines with plans to interview Mrs. Paine about Oswald's whereabouts. On November 1, Hosty interviewed Paine, who stated Marina Oswald and the couple's two children were staying with her, and Lee Oswald was living alone in the Dallas Oak Cliff area but she did not have his exact address. She disclosed Oswald worked at the Texas School Book Depository at 411 Elm Street, and said she would try to obtain his Dallas address. Hosty gave Paine his name and office phone number, and assured a visibly alarmed Marina Oswald via Paine (as interpreter) that the FBI would not harm or harass her. On November 4, Hosty confirmed Oswald worked at the Depository and had provided Paine's Irving address as his own, and transferred principal case responsibility back to the Dallas FBI office. On November 5, Hosty visited the Paine residence again; Paine added only that Oswald had recently self-identified as a "Trotskyite Communist," a statement she found illogical and amusing. Hosty never learned Oswald's Dallas address or phone number during either interview. Paine later testified she learned Oswald's Beckley Street roominghouse phone number in mid-October, shortly after he rented the room on October 14, but did not share it with Hosty, assuming the FBI could easily locate him on its own. Hosty took no further investigative action on the case until after the assassination. On November 1, he had received a New Orleans office report containing Agent Quigley's August 10 jail interview memo noting Oswald provided false biographic information, and planned to wait for New Orleans to forward related paperwork before conducting a detailed interview with Marina Oswald. Official Bureau files confirm no active investigation occurred between November 5 and the assassination. On November 18, the FBI learned Oswald had recently contacted the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and shared this information with the Dallas office, which Hosty received the afternoon of November 22, 1963.

The Commission evaluated whether the FBI should have alerted the Secret Service to Oswald's presence in Dallas ahead of President Kennedy's visit, as the two agencies disagreed on whether Oswald met the criteria for referral as a potential threat to the President. Secret Service Protective Research Section (PRS) head Robert I. Bouck testified that cumulative information about Oswald (his continued association with the Russian Embassy after returning from the Soviet Union, ties to Castro groups, past Marine court-martial for illegal handgun possession, hunting experience in Russia, and unreliable character) would have raised concern for the Secret Service if all the information was known, especially paired with the fact that Oswald was employed in a building overlooking the motorcade route. He noted no single factor met formal PRS referral criteria on its own, but the combination would have signaled meaningful risk. Agent Hosty testified he was aware of the pending Presidential Dallas visit, and that Dallas FBI head J. Gordon Shanklin had instructed staff twice (including a November 22 biweekly conference) to immediately notify the Secret Service in writing of any indication of planned violence or demonstrations against the President or Vice President. Hosty confirmed he transmitted two pieces of information related to the visit to the Secret Service. He stated he did not know until the evening of November 21 that a motorcade was planned, did not review detailed motorcade route reports, and never realized the route passed the Texas School Book Depository. He testified that even if he had recalled Oswald's employment was on the route, he would not have referred Oswald, as his understanding of the instructions required evidence a person planned to take action against the President or Vice President. He judged no information in FBI files (Oswald's defection, Fair Play for Cuba activities in New Orleans, lies to Agent Quigley, recent Mexico City trip) indicated he was capable of violence, and his initial reaction to Oswald being named a suspect in the assassination was complete shock, as he had no reason to believe Oswald could be a Presidential assassin. After Oswald's arrest, Hosty's superior sent him to observe Oswald's interrogation. At Dallas police headquarters, Hosty told Dallas Police Lt. Jack Revill the FBI knew of Oswald's Dallas presence and employment at the Depository. Revill testified Hosty also stated the FBI had information Oswald was capable of committing the assassination, and that he would share this with homicide bureau Lt. Wells; Revill made a written memo of the conversation that afternoon, which was seen by Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry and District Attorney Henry M. Wade. Hosty unequivocally denied making these statements, testifying he never indicated Oswald was capable of violence or had information suggesting this. The only other witness to the conversation, Detective V.J. Brian, did not hear Hosty make such a statement, as he was out of earshot for parts of the discussion due to commotion at headquarters. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and assistant Alan H. Belmont defended Hosty's interpretation of referral criteria, concluding no pre-assassination FBI information indicated Oswald was a danger to the President. Hoover noted the first indication of Oswald's capacity for violence was the shooting of General Walker, which the FBI only learned of after the assassination. Belmont emphasized the State Department had permitted Oswald's return to the U.S., that his post-return behavior indicated he had settled down, and no pre-assassination information suggested a potential for violence, so there was no basis for a Secret Service referral. The Commission concluded the FBI took an unduly restrictive view of its preventive intelligence responsibilities: while there were no formal Secret Service criteria requiring referral of Oswald's case, the cumulative information the FBI held (his defection, hostility to the U.S., pro-Castro activity, lies to agents, Mexico City contact with Soviet officials, employment at the Depository on the motorcade route) should have prompted an alert agency to list him as a potential Presidential threat. The Commission concluded that a more careful review of Oswald's case by the FBI could have led to a Secret Service referral, and might have prompted additional investigation between November 5 and November 22, including more vigorous efforts to locate his Dallas roominghouse address and interview him about unresolved matters related to his Mexico City visit and false biographic information.

At the time of the assassination, formal FBI instructions to agents outlining information to refer to the Secret Service were excessively narrow. While the Secret Service bears primary responsibility for this failure, the FBI guidelines did not fully reflect the Secret Service's need for intelligence on a wide range of potential threats, only referencing "the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President." Post-assassination FBI efforts have demonstrated clear awareness of the necessity of sharing a far broader scope of intelligence information with the Secret Service.

The narrow FBI guidance was misinterpreted by at least some personnel, including Special Agent Hosty, who construed the handbook language as requiring evidence of a formal plan or conspiracy to harm the President, rather than the broader threat intelligence the Secret Service required. This misinterpretation further restricted the flow of relevant threat information to the Secret Service prior to the assassination.

Despite both agencies having testified to the Commission that their pre-assassination liaison was close and fully sufficient, the Commission found that the liaison between the FBI and Secret Service was not as effective as it should have been in the period leading up to the assassination.

The FBI Manual of Instructions set formal requirements for interagency liaison, including that each Special Agent in Charge (SAC) designate specific agents responsible for developing and maintaining relationships with other federal agencies. These liaisons were required to consider shared agency interests, agency headquarters locations, and agency representative responsiveness, with goals of fostering close friendly relationships, mutual understanding of FBI and agency jurisdictions, and willingness to coordinate activities and discuss shared problems. Field offices were also required to identify local federal agencies with which liaison should be conducted.

Official testimony indicates that the special agent in charge of the Dallas FBI office formally discussed liaison responsibilities related to the President's visit on two separate occasions prior to the assassination.

Agent Lawson of the Dallas Secret Service field office was responsible for working out a great many arrangements for the President's trip. The Service normally prefers to have two agents perform advance preparations, but because President Kennedy had scheduled visits to five Texas cities and other parts of the country immediately before, there were not enough men available to assign two agents to all the advance work. Consequently, Agent Lawson did the advance work alone from November 13 to November 18, when he was joined by Agent David B. Grant, who had just completed advance work on the President's trip to Tampa.

The Commission concludes that the most significant advance arrangements for the President's trip were soundly planned. The motorcade route selected by Agent Lawson, upon the advice of Agent in Charge Sorrels and with the concurrence of the Dallas police, was entirely appropriate in view of the known desires of the President, even though there were far safer freeway routes directly to the Trade Mart. Much of Lawson's time was spent establishing adequate security along the motorcade route and at the two places where the President would stop, Love Field and the Trade Mart. The arrangements worked out at the Trade Mart with the cooperation of the Dallas police and other local law enforcement agents were carefully executed, and the Commission regards the security arrangements at Love Field as entirely adequate.

The Commission believes the Secret Service has inadequately defined the responsibilities of its advance agents, who have been given broad discretion to determine what matters require attention and what action to take. Agent Lawson was not given written instructions concerning the Dallas trip or advice about any peculiar problems it might involve; all instructions from higher authority were communicated orally. He did not have a checklist of tasks he was expected to accomplish, and the only systematic supervision was a requirement that he file interim and final reports. Agent Lawson's interim report was received by Agent Kellerman on November 20, the day before departure. The Secret Service advised the Commission that no unusual precautions were taken for the Dallas trip, and Special Agent in Charge Sorrels testified that the advance preparations were "pretty much the same" as those followed in 1936 during a trip by President Roosevelt. The Commission concludes that standard procedures in use for many years may not be sufficient given the constant change in the nature of threats to the President, and recommends constant reevaluation of procedures with attention to special problems and the development of trip-specific instructions.

Liaison with local law enforcement was indispensable to the Secret Service in carrying out its duties. The Service had 28 agents participating in the Dallas visit, and Lawson's advance planning called for the deployment of almost 600 members of the Dallas Police Department, Fire Department, County Sheriff's Department, and the Texas Department of Public Safety. Despite this dependence on local authorities, the Secret Service did not at the time of the assassination have any established procedure governing its relationships with them, no prepared checklist of matters to be covered, and no written description of the role the local police were expected to perform. Discussions and requests were entirely informal. The Commission believes a more formal statement of assigned responsibilities, supplemented to reflect the peculiar conditions of each trip, is essential. The absence of formal guidance led to varying interpretations, as illustrated by the undefined term "unauthorized personnel" used in instructing police to guard overpasses, with railroad and yard terminal workmen permitted to remain at the overpass overlooking the assassination scene. Assistant Chief Batchelor of the Dallas police and Agent Lawson both agreed that a formal statement of assigned responsibilities would be desirable.

Agent Lawson did not arrange for a prior inspection of buildings along the motorcade route, since it was not the usual practice of the Secret Service to do so. The Chief of the Service explained that, except for inaugurations and certain Washington parades, the Service has not made surveys or checks of buildings along a Presidential motorcade route because such surveys of hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows is not practical with available men and time. In Dallas, the route necessarily involved passing through the principal downtown section between tall buildings, and arrangements for building and roof security were made only at Love Field and the Trade Mart. The Commission found this justification not persuasive, noting that President Kennedy himself had mentioned the danger from a concealed sniper that morning, as had Agent Sorrels. Levels of risk can be determined, as confirmed by building surveys made since the assassination, and an attempt to cover only the most obvious points of possible ambush might well have included the Texas School Book Depository Building. The Commission further found that substitute measures, such as depending on local law enforcement personnel and on agents in the motorcade scanning buildings, were of limited value: television films showed foot patrolmen facing the passing motorcade rather than adjacent crowds and buildings, and the three officers assigned to the intersection of Elm and Houston were focused on traffic and crowd control. Captain Lawrence did not instruct his men to watch buildings. Agents Sorrels, Lawson, and Kellerman, riding in or near the lead car, had limited opportunities to scan nearby buildings, and the Commission concluded that agents in the followup car, who must concentrate on crowd threats, do not provide a significant safeguard against dangers in nearby buildings.

In the early morning hours of November 22, 1963, in Fort Worth, a breach of discipline occurred among Secret Service agents officially traveling with the President. After the President retired at his hotel, nine off-duty agents went to the nearby Fort Worth Press Club at midnight or slightly thereafter seeking food. Finding no food, all stayed for a drink of beer or, in several cases, a mixed drink; according to affidavits, no one consumed more than three glasses of beer or 1½ mixed drinks, and no agent was inebriated or acted improperly. They remained from 30 minutes to an hour and a half, and the last left by 2 a.m. Two agents returned to their rooms, while the other seven went to the Cellar Coffee House, where no intoxicating drinks were consumed. During the night, three members of the midnight-to-8 a.m. White House detail shift also visited the Cellar during their half-hour relief breaks, but none had any beverage there. The agents involved had duty assignments beginning no later than 8 a.m., and several had key responsibilities in Dallas, including assignments at Love Field, the Trade Mart, and the followup car. Chief Rowley testified he was satisfied that each agent reported for duty on time, with full possession of his mental and physical capabilities, and that their conduct did not impede their actions or prevent them from taking any action that might have averted the tragedy. However, Chief Rowley did not condone the action, since it violated a Secret Service regulation prohibiting the use of intoxicating liquor of any kind, including beer and wine, by members of the White House Detail and special agents cooperating with them on Presidential protective assignments while in travel status.

Rigorous security precautions were arranged at Love Field with local law enforcement authorities by Agents Sorrels and Lawson, including reserving a ceremonial area for the Presidential party, stationing police on the rooftops of buildings overlooking the reception area, and detailing police in civilian clothes throughout the sizable crowd. When President and Mrs. Kennedy shook hands with members of the public along the fences, they were closely guarded by Secret Service agents who responded to the unplanned event with dispatch. During the motorcade, the President directed that his car stop on two occasions so that he could greet members of the public; agents from the Presidential follow-up car stood between the President and the public, and on one occasion Agent Kellerman left the front seat to take a similar position. The Commission regards such impromptu stops as presenting an unnecessary danger but finds that Secret Service agents did all that could have been done to take protective measures.

The limousine used by President Kennedy in Dallas was a convertible with a detachable, rigid plastic "bubble" top that was neither bulletproof nor bullet resistant. The last Presidential vehicle with any protection against small-arms fire had left the White House in 1953, and it was not replaced because the state of the art did not permit development of a bulletproof top of sufficiently light weight to permit removal when the President wished to ride in an open car. The Secret Service believed it doubtful that any President would ride regularly in a vehicle with a fixed top, even though transparent. Since the assassination, the Secret Service, with the assistance of other Federal agencies and private industry, has developed a vehicle for the better protection of the President.

On occasion the Secret Service has been permitted to have an agent riding in the passenger compartment with the President, but Presidents have made it clear they did not favor any arrangement that interferes with their privacy; the Secret Service has therefore suggested this practice only on extraordinary occasions. The Presidential vehicle in use in Dallas had no special design or equipment permitting the Secret Service agent in the driver's compartment to move into the passenger section without hindrance or delay; a metal bar some 15 inches above the back of the front seat and passengers in the jump seats interfered with such access. In contrast, the Vice Presidential vehicle, although not specially designed for that purpose, had no passenger in a jump seat between Agent Youngblood and Vice President Johnson to interfere with Youngblood's ability to take a protective position before the third shot was fired. The assassination suggests it would have been of prime importance for the Presidential car to permit immediate access to the President by a Secret Service agent at the first sign of danger. Analysis of the Zapruder film reveals that Agent Clinton J. Hill first placed his hand on the Presidential car at frame 343, approximately 1.6 seconds after the President was shot in the head, and had both feet on the car about 3.7 seconds after the fatal wound.

The Secret Service informed the Commission that it consistently follows two general principles in emergencies involving the President: agents in the motorcade must attempt to cover the President as closely as possible and shield him, and agents must remove the President as quickly as possible from known or impending danger. Agents are instructed not to investigate or evaluate present danger but to consider any untoward circumstances as serious and afford maximum protection at all times; their primary responsibility is to stay with and protect the President, not to identify or arrest an attacker. Beyond these principles, the Secret Service believes detailed contingency planning is not feasible due to the variations possible, though various steps are taken to permit appropriate responses, including manning the lead car with agents familiar with the area and local law enforcement, maintaining an elaborate radio net, and including a doctor in the motorcade. The Commission finds this basic approach sound, as detailed contingency plans might inhibit quick and imaginative responses. It also finds that the Secret Service agents immediately responsible for the President's safety reacted promptly at the time the shots were fired, demonstrating the courage and devotion to duty the Nation can expect from agents of the Secret Service.

The Commission's review of the provisions for Presidential protection at the time of President Kennedy's trip to Dallas demonstrates the need for substantial improvements. Since the assassination, the Secret Service and the Department of the Treasury have properly taken the initiative in reexamining major aspects of Presidential protection, with many changes already made and others contemplated, some in response to the Commission's questions and informal suggestions. The Commission proceeds to make specific recommendations concerning making assassination a Federal crime, establishing a Cabinet-level committee or National Security Council mechanism to oversee protective activities, and clarifying the responsibilities for Presidential protection.

At the time of the assassination there was no Federal criminal jurisdiction over the killing of President Kennedy. While conspiracy to injure a Federal officer had long been a Federal crime, murder of the President had never been covered by Federal law, so once it became reasonably clear the killing was the act of a single person, the State of Texas had exclusive jurisdiction. The Commission finds it anomalous that Congress has legislated in other ways touching upon the safety of the Chief Executive without making an attack on the President a crime; threatening harm to the President and advocacy of overthrow by assassination are already Federal offenses, as is murder of certain other Federal officers, and the Secret Service is authorized to arrest without warrant for certain offenses. The Commission agrees with the Secret Service that it should be authorized to make arrests without warrant for all offenses within its jurisdiction. There have been multiple prior efforts to make assassination a Federal crime, particularly after the assassination of President McKinley and the attempt on President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt, including 1902 bills that passed both Houses but failed when the Senate refused to accept the conference report, and bills introduced immediately after President Kennedy's assassination. The Commission recommends Congress adopt legislation punishing the murder, manslaughter, attempt, conspiracy, kidnapping, or assault of the President, Vice President, or other officer next in the order of succession, the President-elect, and the Vice-President-elect, whether or not the act is committed in the performance of official duties. Such a statute would also insure that any suspects arrested would be Federal prisoners, subject to Federal protection, and that the investigation would be conducted by Federal law enforcement officials.

As Government has become more complex, agencies other than the Secret Service have become involved in phases of the overall problem of protecting national leaders, with the FBI serving as the major domestic investigating agency and the CIA having primary responsibility for collecting intelligence overseas. The Commission believes it is necessary to improve cooperation among these agencies and to emphasize that Presidential protection is a matter of broad national concern. The Commission suggests consideration be given to assigning to a Cabinet-level committee or the National Security Council the responsibility to review and oversee the protective activities of the Secret Service and other Federal agencies assisting in safeguarding the President, with the committee to include the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General. The foremost assignment of such a Committee would be to insure that the maximum resources of the Federal Government are fully engaged in Presidential protection by defining responsibilities clearly and overseeing their execution, and it would be able to provide guidance in defining the general nature of domestic and foreign dangers to Presidential security and act as a final review board for improvements in advance detection of potential threats. The Commission observes that the Secret Service has functioned largely as an informal part of the White House staff, limiting its practical influence over security precautions surrounding Presidential activities, and that a Cabinet-level committee actively concerned with these problems could discuss them more effectively with the President.

The assignment of responsibility for protecting the President to an agency of the Department of the Treasury was largely a historical accident. The Secret Service was organized as a division of the Department of the Treasury in 1865 to deal with counterfeiting, and in 1894, while investigating a plot to assassinate President Cleveland, the Service assigned a small protective detail of agents to the White House. Secret Service men then accompanied the President and his family to their vacation home in Massachusetts, with special details protecting him in Washington, on trips, and at special functions. These informal and part-time arrangements led to more systematic protection in 1902, after the assassination of President McKinley, when the Secret Service, then the only Federal investigative agency, assumed full-time responsibility for the safety of the President. Since that time, the Secret Service has had and exercised responsibility for the physical protection of the President and for the preventive investigation of potential threats against him.

The FBI, established within the Department of Justice in 1908, has played an increasingly important role in presidential protection. Since 1910, an annual appropriation item for the "protection of the person of the President of the United States" has recurred under the FBI’s budget. Although the FBI is not responsible for the physical protection of the President, it shares an assignment with other government agencies in the field of preventive investigation regarding presidential security. The Bureau has attempted to fulfill this role by codifying in its Handbook the procedures agents must follow when receiving information indicating a possible attempt against the President or other protected persons.

With two federal agencies operating in the same general field of preventive investigation, questions inevitably arise about the scope of each agency’s authority. J. Edgar Hoover and other Bureau officials testified that the FBI did not believe its directive required notification to the Secret Service of substantial information about Lee Harvey Oswald before the President reached Dallas. The Secret Service had no knowledge of Oswald, his background, or his employment at the Book Depository. Robert I. Bouck of the Secret Service’s Protective Research Section believed the FBI’s accumulation of facts should have constituted sufficient basis to warn the Secret Service of the risk.

The Commission concluded that both the FBI and the Secret Service have too narrowly construed their respective responsibilities. Too much emphasis has been placed by both agencies on investigating specific threats by individuals, and not enough on dangers from other sources. The Secret Service particularly tends to be the passive recipient of threat information, and its Protective Research Section is not adequately staffed or equipped to conduct the wider investigative work required for presidential security today.

During the period of its deliberations, the Commission received several proposals to improve presidential protection arrangements. These included suggestions to locate exclusive responsibility in one government agency, clarify the division of authority between agencies, or retain the existing system while expanding the scope and operations of the Secret Service and FBI.

A debate emerged over whether to transfer preventive investigative functions to the FBI, leaving the Secret Service with only physical protection responsibilities. Proponents argued the FBI is properly manned and equipped for extensive information gathering, and that building equivalent Secret Service capabilities would take substantial time. Opponents urged that all protective functions be committed to an elite, independent corps whose agents are intimately associated with the Presidential family. They contended that an organization limited to receiving information gathered by others could not maintain the esprit de corps or alertness required for such unique responsibilities.

The Commission determined that it was not within its responsibility to make specific recommendations on the long-range organization of presidential protection, except as conclusions flow directly from its examination of the assassination. Unlike the Hoover Commission in 1949, this Commission was not asked to determine the optimum organization for presidential protection. Because protection is in a real sense a Government-wide responsibility shared by the State Department, FBI, CIA, military intelligence, and Secret Service, and because any change in the Secret Service’s intimate association with the President and his family raises imponderable questions, the Commission concluded that determination of responsibility relocation should be left to the Executive and Congress, perhaps upon recommendations from the Cabinet-level committee or the National Security Council.

Pending any determination on long-range reorganization, the Commission is convinced of the necessity for better coordination and direction of all government agencies furnishing information and services related to presidential security. The Commission believes the Secret Service, FBI, State Department, and CIA—when the President travels abroad—could improve their existing capacities and procedures to lessen the chances of assassination. Without reaching final conclusions on long-range organization, the Commission identifies specific measures flowing from the assassination facts that can and should be recommended.

The intimacy of the Secret Service’s relationship to the White House and the dissimilarity of its protective functions to most Treasury Department activities have made close and continuing supervision difficult. The Commission believes the recommended Cabinet-level committee will help correct major deficiencies of supervision, but other measures are also needed to improve overall operation.

Daily supervision of Secret Service operations within Treasury should be improved. The Chief of the Service currently reports to the Secretary through an Assistant Secretary whose duties also include direct supervision of the Bureau of the Mint and the Department’s Employment Policy Program, and who has no technical qualifications in presidential protection. The Commission recommends that the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a special assistant responsible for supervising the Service. This assistant should have sufficient stature and experience in law enforcement, intelligence, or allied fields to provide effective continuing supervision and keep the Secretary fully informed on all significant developments relating to presidential protection.

Actions by the Secret Service since the assassination indicate awareness of the need for substantial administrative improvement. A formal description of the advance agent’s responsibilities is in preparation, and work is progressing toward formal understandings of the respective roles of the Secret Service and collaborating agencies. The Commission urges the Service to continue overhauling and defining its procedures, noting that while manuals are no guarantee of effective operations, no sizable organization can achieve efficiency without careful analysis and demarcation of responsibility reflected in definite and comprehensive operating procedures.

The Commission recommends that the Secret Service consciously maintain the highest standard of excellence and esprit for all personnel. This requires tight and unswerving discipline and promotion of outstanding dedication and loyalty to duty. While the Commission finds no causal connection between the assassination and the breach of regulations on the night of November 21 at Fort Worth, such widespread participation is inconsistent with the standards the Secret Service is required to meet.

In attempting to identify individuals who might pose a danger to the President, the Secret Service has largely been the passive recipient of threatening communications and reports from other agencies that independently evaluate their information for potential dangers. This resulted from the Service’s lack of an adequate investigative staff, inability to process large amounts of data, and failure to provide specific descriptions of the kind of information it sought.

The Secret Service’s passive intelligence role was the consequence of inadequate investigative staffing, inability to process large data volumes, and failure to articulate clear information requirements. Both the Secret Service and FBI have recognized that PRS files can no longer be limited largely to persons communicating actual threats to the President. New FBI instructions issued on December 26, 1963 require agents to report immediately information concerning subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists meeting specified criteria regarding emotional instability, threats, anti-U.S. sentiments, or violent tendencies. The volume of referrals increased substantially after these instructions took effect, with more than 5,000 names referred in the first four months of 1964 and approximately 9,000 Communist Party member reports received by mid-June 1964. The FBI now transmits information on all defectors—a category that would have included Oswald. However, both Hoover and Belmont expressed concern that improper handling of referrals could result in interference with personal liberty.

The Secret Service has embarked on a complete overhaul of its research activities. The Protective Research Section (PRS) staff has been augmented, a Secret Service inspector placed in charge, and outside consultants engaged—including the Rand Corporation, IBM, and a panel of psychiatric and psychological experts—along with assistance from the President’s Office of Science and Technology, ARPA, the CIA, and Walter Reed Hospital. The planning document submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Bureau of the Budget on August 31, 1964 makes several significant recommendations in this field.

Tentative new criteria issued by the Secret Service are useful in clarifying that its interest goes beyond information on individuals or groups threatening to harm or embarrass the President, extending to those demonstrating interest coupled with expressed or implied determination to use unlawful means to satisfy grievances. However, these criteria appear unduly restrictive in continuing to require manifestation of animus against a government official, and it is questionable whether they would have resulted in referral of Oswald. Chief Rowley believed they would, citing Oswald’s demonstrated hostility toward the Secretary of the Navy, though even with hindsight that letter does not appear to express determination to use unlawful means. The Commission recognizes that no meaningful set of criteria will yield the names of all potential assassins, noting that Guiteau, Czolgosz, Schrank, and Zangara—all acting alone—were men without serious prior violence records, failures in work and relations, victims of delusions that society had thwarted them.

The Secret Service’s liaison with agencies supplying information has been too casual. Since the assassination, the Service has recognized that these relationships must be far more formal, with each agency given clear understanding of the assistance the Secret Service expects. This is especially necessary with the FBI and CIA, which carry major responsibility for supplying information about potential threats from organized groups within their special jurisdiction. Since these agencies already evaluate such group activities, they should be responsible for advising the Secret Service of developments indicating assassination plots or events suggesting group danger to the President.

Once the Secret Service formulates new standards for information collection, it should enter into written agreements with each federal agency and leading state and local agencies that might be information sources. These agreements should describe in detail the information sought, the manner of provision, and respective responsibilities for any further investigation. Detailed formal agreements should be worked out with the FBI and CIA. The Secret Service should not seek to duplicate intelligence capabilities of other agencies but should use their data for its special duties. After gaining experience with federal and leading state and local agencies, the Secret Service should negotiate similar arrangements with other local law enforcement agencies through its field offices. These agreements will be of little value without a system for frequent formal review of activities thereunder.

The Commission approves recent and proposed Secret Service measures to improve liaison arrangements. An interagency committee including representatives from the White House Office of Science and Technology, Department of Defense, CIA, FBI, and Secret Service has been established to develop more effective liaison criteria, and the Department of the Treasury has requested five additional Protective Research Section (PRS) agents to serve as liaison officers with law enforcement and intelligence agencies, a step the Commission endorses as the only effective way to ensure adequate ongoing liaison. As an initial step to improve local law enforcement liaison, the Secret Service directed field representatives on August 26, 1964, to send standardized intelligence information request forms to all local, county, and state law enforcement agencies in their districts. The Commission recommends these and other proposed liaison measures be pursued vigorously.

The Commission identifies the Secret Service's obsolete manual filing system for protective intelligence data as a critical gap, noting it cannot effectively handle growing volumes of interagency information and lacks use of modern automatic data processing capabilities widely adopted in other government and private sector operations. The Department of the Treasury has requested approval to hire five staff to plan and develop an automated file and retrieval system for the PRS, plus $100,000 for a feasibility study to fund consultants, equipment leasing, or pilot system testing. The Commission recommends prompt favorable consideration of this request, and advises the Secret Service to coordinate its data processing planning closely with federal agencies it receives data from to build compatible systems. It also recommends the President order an interagency inquiry to explore opportunities for broader coordinated, mutually compatible data processing across federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, without interfering with individual agency core missions.

Post-assassination Secret Service procedures now require a PRS agent to accompany every advance survey team to liaise with local intelligence gathering agencies, evaluate incoming protective intelligence, and establish informal local liaison committees to coordinate all protective intelligence activities. The Secret Service has requested additional PRS personnel to make this arrangement permanent without disrupting field office operations, a change the Commission regards as a highly useful innovation and urges be continued.

The Commission notes that Secret Service guidance to local police for Presidential visit protection has historically been delivered informally, and recommends the Service develop formal, standardized instructions for all levels of local authorities, including master protective plans for specific city visits and instruction booklets for patrol officers outlining expected cooperation. While the Service has raised concerns that written instructions could leak to local newspapers and compromise protective precautions, the Commission argues instructions will be shared with local police regardless of format, and lack of clear, prepared guidance creates risk of protective lapses, such as the confusion over public access to overpasses during the 1963 Dallas motorcade. The Commission notes such standardized instructions should be adapted as needed and not override professional judgment in unique circumstances.

Since President Kennedy's assassination, the Secret Service has tested new techniques for inspecting buildings along Presidential motorcade routes, including identifying structures that pose elevated risk. The Commission strongly encourages these efforts to improve motorcade route protection, and recommends the Service continue to leverage personnel from other federal law enforcement agencies stationed in relevant localities to ensure adequate manpower for building inspections, noting that resource constraints are not an acceptable justification for failing to implement improved advance protective precautions in this critical area.

Testimony and evidence before the Commission indicates the Secret Service is overstretched due to understaffing and inadequate modern equipment. Secret Service field agents average a caseload of 110.1, far higher than the FBI's average of 20-25 cases per agent, and Secret Service agent salaries are lower than those of the FBI and leading municipal police forces. While Congress approved a 1964 appropriation for 25 new field office positions, the Secret Service has proposed a 20-month, $3 million plan to add 205 total agents: 17 for the PRS, 145 for field offices to handle increased security investigations and support Presidential and Vice Presidential travel protection, 18 for a rotating training pool to supplement the White House detail for unexpected needs, and 25 to provide full-time protection for the Vice President. The Commission urges the Bureau of the Budget to review this proposal with the Secret Service and support a supplemental appropriation request as soon as the plan can be fully justified.

Prior to the assassination, the Secret Service rarely requested assistance from other federal law enforcement agencies for protective duties, but post-assassination it has piloted and expanded short-term use of personnel from other agencies. In the four months after the assassination, the FBI provided 139 agents across 16 separate occasions to assist with Presidential visit protection, and other agencies contributed 9,500 hours of support between February 11 and June 30, 1964. The FBI has agreed to continue this assistance, and the Commission endorses formalizing these arrangements through formal agreements between the Secret Service and relevant federal agencies, with potential eventual codification via executive order, to allow the Secret Service to better plan long-term personnel requirements. The Commission also notes that shared protective responsibility across agencies improves security outcomes, and recommends formalizing existing permanent arrangements with the Office of Science and Technology and other federal agencies that provide scientific and technological support to the Secret Service, potentially via executive order or memoranda of understanding.

The Commission acknowledges that no protective procedures can guarantee absolute security for the President, given the varied and complex demands of the office and the deep-seated democratic traditions that limit security restrictions. However, it is confident that its recommended improvements to Secret Service procedures, if adopted, would materially reduce the risk of a future assassination compared to the procedures in place at the time of President Kennedy's death. The Commission emphasizes that successful implementation will require active cooperation from responsible agencies and public understanding of the demands placed on the presidency, and that its recommendations will advance presidential security without infringing on fundamental American liberties.

This appendix reproduces the full text of Executive Order 11130, issued by President Lyndon B. Johnson on November 29, 1963, which formally appoints the Warren Commission (the Commission to report upon the assassination of President John F. Kennedy). The commission membership includes Chief Justice Earl Warren (Chair), Senators Richard B. Russell and John Sherman Cooper, Representatives Hale Boggs and Gerald R. Ford, and Hon. Allen W. Dulles and Hon. John J. McCloy. The order tasks the commission with investigating the facts of President Kennedy's assassination and the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination, evaluating all related evidence, and reporting findings and conclusions to the President. It authorizes the commission to set its own procedures, hire necessary staff, draw on the Presidential Emergency Fund for operating expenses, and requires all federal departments and agencies to provide requested cooperation and resources.

This appendix reproduces the November 29, 1963 White House press release announcing President Johnson's appointment of the Special Commission to investigate President Kennedy's assassination. The release notes the President consulted Senate and House majority and minority leadership prior to the announcement, lists the commission's members, outlines that the commission will review all evidence gathered by the FBI and all information available to federal agencies, with cooperation from the Texas Court of Inquiry convened by the Texas Attorney General. The commission may conduct additional investigation as it deems necessary, and is tasked with uncovering all relevant facts and reporting its findings to the President, the American people, and the global community.

This appendix reproduces the full text of Public Law 88-202 (S.J. Res. 137), a joint resolution approved by Congress on December 13, 1963, which authorizes the Warren Commission (established by Executive Order 11130) to compel witness attendance and testimony, as well as the production of evidence, for its investigation into President Kennedy's assassination.

Subsection (b) grants the Commission, or Commission members authorized by the full Commission, the power to issue subpoenas requiring witness attendance, testimony, and production of evidence related to matters under Commission investigation. The Commission, its members, or designated agents/agencies are authorized to administer oaths, examine witnesses, and receive evidence. Witnesses and evidence may be compelled from any location within the United States to a designated hearing site.

Subsection (c) establishes court enforcement for Commission subpoenas. If a person commits contumacy or refuses to obey a Commission subpoena, any U.S. court with jurisdiction over the location of the Commission's inquiry, or the person's residence, business location, or where they are found, may issue a court order on Commission application requiring the person to appear before the Commission to produce evidence or testify. Failure to comply with the court order may be punished as contempt of court.

Subsection (d) sets rules for service of Commission process and papers. Service may be completed in person, via registered mail, telegraph, or by leaving a copy at the recipient's residence, principal office, or place of business. A verified return of service from the individual who completed service, or a post office/telegraph receipt for registered service, serves as proof of service. Witnesses summoned before the Commission, and individuals taking depositions for the Commission, are entitled to the same fees and mileage as witnesses and officials in U.S. federal courts.

Subsection (e) addresses the privilege against self-incrimination. No person may refuse to attend, testify, or produce evidence in response to a Commission subpoena on the grounds that the required testimony or evidence may incriminate them or subject them to penalty or forfeiture. However, an individual compelled to testify or produce evidence after claiming this privilege cannot be prosecuted or penalized (except for demotion or removal from office) for the matters they address in their testimony, though they remain liable for perjury committed during such testimony.

Subsection (f) specifies venue for serving court process related to Commission investigations. All court process issued under the authorizing Act may be served in the judicial district where the person required to be served resides or may be found.

The authorizing act for the Commission was approved on December 13, 1963. Its legislative history, as recorded in the Congressional Record, Volume 109 (1963), notes the bill passed the Senate on December 9, 1963, and was considered and passed by the House of Representatives on December 10, 1963.

This appendix provides biographical information and acknowledgments for individuals associated with the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, including Commission members, senior legal counsel, and support staff.

This section lists the seven members of the Commission, with full biographical entries for each: Chief Justice Earl Warren (Commission Chair), Senator Richard B. Russell, Senator John Sherman Cooper, Representative Hale Boggs, Representative Gerald R. Ford, Allen W. Dulles, and John J. McCloy. Entries include details on their birth dates, education, professional careers, and relevant public service experience.

This section provides the biographical entry for J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel of the Commission. It notes his birth in Hartington, Nebraska, education at the University of Nebraska, legal career, prior government service as Assistant Attorney General (Office of Legal Counsel) and Solicitor General of the United States, and his appointment as General Counsel for the Commission on December 8, 1963, after entering private practice in New York City in 1961.

This section lists the 13 Assistant Counsels for the Commission, with biographical entries for each: Francis W. H. Adams, Joseph A. Ball, David W. Belin, William T. Coleman Jr., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Burt W. Griffin, Leon D. Hubert Jr., Albert E. Jenner Jr., Wesley J. Liebeler, Norman Redlich, W. David Slawson, Arlen Specter, and Samuel A. Stern. Entries include details on their birth dates, educational backgrounds, legal careers, and relevant professional qualifications and experience.

This section lists key Commission staff members, with biographical entries for three individuals: Philip Barson, a certified public accountant and Internal Revenue Service special agent/group supervisor based in Philadelphia; Edward A. Conroy, an Internal Revenue Service senior inspector based in Washington, D.C.; and John Hart Ely, a 1963 magna cum laude graduate of Yale Law School who was scheduled to serve as a law clerk to Chief Justice Warren during the 1964-65 term.

This section includes concise biographical summaries of 9 individuals affiliated with the Commission's work, spanning historians, legal professionals, and government investigators. Each entry outlines birth date and location, educational credentials (undergraduate, graduate, and law degrees where applicable), professional experience (including military service, academic roles, and government positions), and notable accomplishments such as editorial appointments, bar admissions, and publication contributions. Key figures include U.S. Air Force historians Alfred Goldberg and Arthur Marmor, legal professionals Murray J. Laulicht, Richard M. Mosk, Stuart R. Pollak, Charles N. Shaffer Jr., and Lloyd L. Weinreb (many with federal judicial clerkships and roles in the Department of Justice), Internal Revenue Service investigator John J. O'Brien, and Alfredda Scobey, a law assistant for the Georgia Court of Appeals.

This section documents the Commission's formal acknowledgments of support received during testimony collection across the United States. It extends special gratitude to U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Texas Harold Barefoot Sanders Jr. and his assistant Martha Joe Stroud for their dedicated assistance, followed by a list of 62 lawyers, secretaries, and clerks who contributed extensive effort to the Commission's operations.

This section presents a full roster of 552 witnesses who provided testimony to the Commission, organized in a table with columns for witness name, brief description of their role or connection to the events under investigation, and the volume and page number of their testimony in the Commission's official records. Notation codes indicate the format of each witness's contribution: "C" for in-person appearances before Commission members, "D" for depositions taken by Commission legal staff, "A" for submitted affidavits, and "S" for provided statements. The included excerpt features entries for a wide range of individuals, including law enforcement officers, medical personnel, acquaintances of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby, government officials, and subject matter experts.

Lists members of the Dallas Police Department cited in the Commission report volumes, including their assigned ranks, job functions, and corresponding volume and page references for their testimony or mention in investigation materials.

Lists Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents and staff referenced in the Commission report volumes, including their roles within the Bureau and corresponding volume and page citations for their relevant statements, testimony, or investigative work.

Lists U.S. Secret Service agents cited in the Commission report volumes, including their assigned roles and corresponding volume and page references for their accounts of protective detail operations or related investigation materials.

Lists employees of the Texas School Book Depository (TSBD) referenced in the Commission report volumes, including their job roles at the building and corresponding volume and page citations for their testimony about events on the day of the assassination.

Lists medical staff and personnel at Parkland Hospital cited in the Commission report volumes, including their clinical roles and corresponding volume and page references for their treatment of assassination casualties or related testimony.

Lists members of Lee Harvey Oswald's immediate and extended family referenced in the Commission report volumes, including their familial relationships to Oswald and corresponding volume and page citations for their statements about Oswald's life and actions.

Lists individuals residing in Texas who were acquaintances of the Oswald family, cited in the Commission report volumes with corresponding volume and page references for their relevant statements about the Oswalds.

Lists individuals associated with the Oswalds or the assassination investigation based in New Orleans, cited in the Commission report volumes with corresponding volume and page references for their relevant accounts.

Lists individuals connected to Lee Harvey Oswald via his service in the U.S. Marine Corps, referenced in the Commission report volumes with corresponding volume and page citations for their testimony about Oswald's time in the service.

Lists individuals associated with Jack Ruby, cited in the Commission report volumes including their relationships to Ruby and corresponding volume and page references for their statements about Ruby's activities and connections.

Lists witnesses to the assassination of President Kennedy, the subsequent shooting of Dallas Police Officer J.D. Tippit, or other related events, referenced in the Commission report volumes with corresponding volume and page citations for their eyewitness testimony.

Lists firearms identification experts and wound ballistics specialists cited in the Commission report volumes, including their professional affiliations and corresponding volume and page references for their expert analysis of evidence related to the assassination.

Lists U.S. and international government officials referenced in the Commission report volumes, including their official roles and corresponding volume and page citations for their relevant statements or actions related to the investigation.

Lists reporters, news editors, photographers, and other news industry personnel cited in the Commission report volumes, including their roles in covering assassination-related events and corresponding volume and page references for their reporting or testimony.

Lists medical examiners, doctors, and other medical professionals referenced in the Commission report volumes, including their roles in treating assassination casualties, performing autopsies, or providing expert medical testimony, with corresponding volume and page citations.

This appendix contains the formal rules and procedures adopted by the Commission for the taking of testimony from witnesses. It consists of two main resolutions: the first governs the questioning of witnesses by members of the Commission staff and addresses both sworn depositions and sworn affidavits, while the second resolution governs hearings conducted for the taking of testimony or production of evidence, including rules for the presence of Commissioners, administration of oaths, issuance of process, witness rights to counsel, and the production of stenographic transcripts.

This is the title heading of Appendix VI, establishing the Commission's formal procedures for gathering testimony from witnesses during the investigation. The section frames the two resolutions that follow, which together prescribe the rules for sworn depositions, sworn affidavits, and formal hearings conducted by the Commission.

Adopted pursuant to Executive Order No. 11130 of November 29, 1963, this resolution authorizes individual members of the Commission staff to question witnesses and sets forth the rules governing two methods of obtaining testimony: sworn depositions and sworn affidavits. The resolution establishes procedural protections including written designation of witnesses, advance notice requirements, the right of witnesses to be accompanied by counsel, and the preparation of stenographic verbatim transcripts.

This section establishes the detailed rules for taking sworn depositions. It authorizes individual staff members to administer oaths and examine witnesses; requires that witnesses be designated in writing by the Commission, a Commissioner, or the General Counsel; mandates stenographic verbatim transcripts; sets notice requirements of at least three days (waivable by the witness); guarantees the right of witnesses to be accompanied by counsel who may advise on legal rights and make brief objections; requires that the nature of the inquiry be read into the record at the opening of any deposition; and provides procedures for handling refusals to answer questions, including submission of the transcript to the General Counsel for review.

This section provides the rules for obtaining sworn affidavits from designated witnesses. Members of the Commission staff are authorized to obtain sworn affidavits from witnesses who have been designated in writing by the Commission, a member of the Commission, or the General Counsel as witnesses whose testimony will be obtained in this manner. A copy of the affidavit shall be provided to the affiant or his counsel.

Adopted pursuant to Executive Order No. 11130, this resolution establishes nine rules governing hearings conducted for the taking of testimony or production of evidence. The rules require: (1) the presence of at least one Commissioner at all hearings, with the Chairman designating presiding order; (2) authority for members, agents, or agencies to administer oaths and examine witnesses; (3) advance notice of at least three days for process and papers; (4) waiver of the notice period by the witness; (5) reading of a statement of the inquiry's nature at the opening of each hearing with copies provided to witnesses; (6) the right of witnesses to be accompanied by counsel who may advise on legal rights and make brief objections, with counsel permitted to clarify testimony at its conclusion; (7) the right of every witness to make an oral statement and file a sworn statement relevant to the hearing; (8) rulings on objections or procedural questions by the presiding Commissioner; and (9) the preparation of stenographic verbatim transcripts available for inspection or purchase by the witness or counsel at prescribed rates from the official reporter.

This appendix provides a brief history of presidential protection in the United States, documenting the assassination of four Presidents within less than 100 years and unsuccessful attempts on the lives of two other Presidents, one President-elect, and one ex-President. It chronicles the timeline of these attacks and notes the statistical frequency of such incidents.

The section documents attacks on American Presidents, noting that four Presidents have been assassinated since 1865, with additional attempts on two other Presidents, one President-elect, and one ex-President. The timeline of actual attempts includes: Andrew Jackson (January 30, 1835); Abraham Lincoln (April 14, 1865, died April 15, 1865); James A. Garfield (July 2, 1881, died September 19, 1881); William McKinley (September 6, 1901, died September 14, 1901); Theodore Roosevelt (October 14, 1912, wounded but recovered); Franklin D. Roosevelt (February 15, 1933); Harry S. Truman (November 1, 1950); and John F. Kennedy (November 22, 1963, died that day). The section concludes with statistical observations: attempts have been made on the lives of one of every five American Presidents, one of every nine Presidents has been killed, since 1865 attempts have been made on one of every four Presidents with one of every five successfully assassinated, and during the last three decades three attacks were made.

In the early Republic there was remarkably little concern for presidential safety. Early presidents received threats and threatening letters similar to those faced by later chief executives but moved about freely without protective escorts. Thomas Jefferson walked alone from his boarding house to the Capitol for his inauguration, and Washington had no police authority until 1805 when a high constable and 40 deputies were appointed. John Quincy Adams was threatened in person at the White House by an Army sergeant yet continued his solitary walks and early morning swims in the Potomac. Andrew Jackson contemptuously endorsed his many threatening letters and sent them to the Washington Globe for publication; he was once assaulted by a former Navy lieutenant, Robert B. Randolph, but refused to prosecute. In January 1835, Richard Lawrence, an English-born house painter, accosted Jackson at the Capitol and fired two pistols at him, both of which misfired; Lawrence was found not guilty by reason of insanity and confined for life. The attack produced no protective action. Martin Van Buren walked to church alone and rode horseback alone in the woods near the White House. After an intoxicated painter threw rocks at President John Tyler on the White House grounds in 1842, Congress passed an act establishing an auxiliary watch of a captain and 15 men, though the measure appeared aimed more at protecting the White House building than the President.

Even before his inauguration, Abraham Lincoln was thought to be the target of plots and conspiracies, with evidence that extremists plotted to attack him as he passed through Baltimore en route to Washington. For the inauguration, the Army took unprecedented precautions, stationing soldiers at strategic points along the procession route and at the Capitol while armed men in plain clothes mingled with the crowds; Lincoln rode in a carriage with President Buchanan, surrounded by such dense masses of soldiers he was nearly hidden from view. Lincoln lived in peril throughout his presidency, receiving a high volume of threatening letters that yielded little when investigated. He was reluctant to accept guards and often sought to evade protection, reflecting a characteristic presidential instinct for personal privacy and freedom to meet the people. Protection during the war varied with Lincoln's susceptibility to warnings; military units were sometimes assigned to guard the White House and accompany him on travels, and his friend Ward H. Lamon, upon becoming marshal of the District of Columbia in 1861, took personal charge of presidential protection but grew so exasperated at Lincoln's lack of cooperation that he offered his resignation, which Lincoln refused. In November 1864, four Washington policemen were assigned as bodyguards, though Lincoln tolerated them reluctantly and demanded they remain inconspicuous. In the war's closing days, John Wilkes Booth, a fanatical Confederate sympathizer, hardened his earlier plot to kidnap Lincoln into a plot to kill him after the Confederacy's fall. On Good Friday, April 14, 1865, Booth learned Lincoln would attend Ford's Theater that night; the assigned bodyguard, Patrolman John F. Parker, abandoned his post outside the Presidential box to watch the play and visit a saloon, leaving the President totally unprotected. Shortly after 10 p.m., Booth entered the Presidential box and shot Lincoln in the head; the President died the next morning. Booth was captured on April 26 at a farm near Bowling Green, Virginia, died of a bullet wound hours later, and a military tribunal sentenced four associates to death and four others to imprisonment. A congressional committee conducted an extensive investigation but called for no protective action for the future, reflecting a tendency to view Lincoln's assassination as a unique crisis unlikely to recur.

For a short time after the war, War Department soldiers and Metropolitan Washington policemen continued to protect the White House, with a permanent police guard reduced to three assigned to the White House; there was no special group of trained officers to protect the President's person, and presidents continued to move about Washington virtually unattended, with White House doormen providing such protection as existed. This lack of personal protection was tragically highlighted by the shooting of President James A. Garfield in 1881 by Charles J. Guiteau, a self-styled "lawyer, theologian, and politician" who believed his illusory efforts in the 1880 campaign entitled him to a consular appointment in Europe. Bitterly disappointed by Garfield's repeated rejection of his requests and obsessed with megalomania, Guiteau resolved to kill the President, testified at his trial that the "Deity" had commanded him to do so, and apparently suffered from delusions and hereditary mental problems. Guiteau later testified he had three prior unguarded opportunities to attack Garfield within three weeks, and on July 2, 1881, shot Garfield in the back as the President walked to a train at the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Station in Washington; Garfield lingered until September 19. Guiteau was convicted despite evidence of serious abnormality and hanged on June 30, 1882. The New York Tribune predicted the assault would make the President "the slave of his office," but no protective steps were taken, and President Chester A. Arthur once took a public conveyance hailed in front of the White House to a ceremony at the Washington Navy Yard. During Grover Cleveland's second administration, the volume of threatening letters increased markedly and Mrs. Cleveland persuaded the President to expand the White House police force from 3 to 27; in 1894, while investigating a plot by Colorado gamblers to assassinate Cleveland, the Secret Service informally assigned operatives to protect him, including agents who accompanied him and his family to their Massachusetts vacation home, and for a time two agents rode in a buggy behind his carriage until opposition newspaper attention forced discontinuation. During the Spanish-American War the Secret Service stationed a continuous detail at the White House for McKinley, and after the war the guards remained at least part-time; between 1894 and 1900, the assassinations of European leaders and concern that anarchist police action in Europe was driving anarchists to the United States led the Secret Service to increase the number of guards and require one to accompany the President on all trips. Despite being guarded, McKinley was shot on September 6, 1901, at a public reception in the Temple of Music at the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo by Leon F. Czolgosz, a 28-year-old American-born factory worker and self-styled anarchist who concealed a pistol under a handkerchief; although detectives, soldiers, and Secret Service agents were stationed nearby, two agents had been asked to step back to allow McKinley's secretary and the exposition president to flank him. Czolgosz, who did not believe in rulers of any kind and was found by alienists to have suffered from delusions, including that it was his duty to assassinate the President, was swiftly tried, convicted, condemned, and electrocuted 45 days after McKinley died of blood poisoning on September 14; investigations found no accomplices or plot.

The assassination of McKinley, only 36 years after Lincoln's death, shocked the nation and heightened awareness of the uniqueness of the Presidency and its grim hazards. While the first congressional session after McKinley's assassination gave more attention to legislation concerning attacks on the President than any previous Congress, it passed no protective measures. Nevertheless, in 1902, the Secret Service, then the only significant Federal general investigative agency, assumed full-time responsibility for presidential safety as one of its major permanent functions, assigning two men to its original full-time White House detail and providing additional agents when the President traveled or vacationed.

Theodore Roosevelt, the first president to receive extensive Secret Service protection, expressed ambivalent views in a 1906 letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. Roosevelt described the Secret Service men as "a very small but very necessary thorn in the flesh," acknowledging that they would not prevent an assassination but were essential for managing the daily intrusions of carriages, pedestrians, cranks, and others. He quoted Lincoln's observation that although it would be safer for a president to live in a cage, doing so would interfere with his duties.

After leaving office, Roosevelt was the target of an assassination attempt on October 14, 1912, in Milwaukee, during his presidential campaign. John N. Schrank, a 36-year-old German-born ex-tavern keeper, shot Roosevelt in the breast. The bullet was stopped by Roosevelt's folded manuscript speech and the metal eyeglass case in his coat pocket. Schrank claimed that in 1901, the ghost of McKinley had appeared to him and instructed him to prevent Roosevelt—who he believed had murdered McKinley—from becoming president. Schrank was found insane and committed to mental hospitals in Wisconsin for life.

The Secret Service began full-time presidential protection in 1902, but Congress did not provide funds or sanction for this role until 1906, when the Sundry Civil Expenses Act for 1907 included protection funding. After William Howard Taft's election in 1908, the Secret Service began protecting the president-elect, a practice that received statutory authorization in 1913. That same year, Congress authorized permanent protection of the President, though the authority required annual renewal in appropriations acts until 1951.

The United States' entry into World War I in 1917 heightened concerns about presidential safety, prompting Congress to enact a "threat statute" making it a crime to threaten the President by mail or any other means. In the same year, Congress also authorized the Secret Service to protect the President's immediate family.

As the presidency expanded in scope during the 20th century, the Secret Service faced increasing protection challenges. In 1906, Theodore Roosevelt became the first sitting president to travel outside the United States when he visited Panama accompanied by Secret Service agents. In 1918-19, Woodrow Wilson broadened the precedent by traveling to Europe with a Secret Service escort of 10 men for the Versailles Peace Conference.

On February 15, 1933, President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt was the target of an assassination attempt at a political rally in Miami's Bayfront Park. Giuseppe Zangara, a bricklayer with stomach problems who had planned to travel to Washington to kill President Hoover but stayed in Miami for his health, shot five rounds at Roosevelt. Roosevelt slid down into his seat just before Zangara could take aim; the shots missed him but mortally wounded Chicago Mayor Anton Cermak and injured four others. Zangara was electrocuted 33 days later, and no evidence of accomplices emerged despite sensational speculation about a Chicago gangster conspiracy.

Protection of the White House had been provided by the Washington Metropolitan Police since the Civil War, growing to 54 men by 1922. In that year, Congress established the White House Police Force as a separate organization under the President's direct control, initially supervised by the President's military aide. In 1930, Congress placed supervision under the Chief of the Secret Service, and in 1962, Congress transferred control and supervision to the Secretary of the Treasury, who delegated supervision back to the Chief of the Secret Service.

The White House detail grew slowly from 2 men in 1902 to 5 in 1914, and was increased to 10 during World War I. After the war, the detail grew to 16 agents and 2 supervisors by 1939. World War II dramatically increased demands due to the President's trips to Grand Strategy Conferences at Casablanca, Quebec, Tehran, Cairo, and Yalta, prompting expansion to 37 men early in the war.

The volume of mail reaching the White House grew enormously under Franklin D. Roosevelt, including threatening letters. In 1940, the Secret Service established the Protective Research Section to analyze White House mail and other sources for information about people potentially capable of violence against the President, allowing the Service to anticipate and prevent many potential incidents.

On November 1, 1950, Puerto Rican Nationalists Oscar Collazo and Griselio Torresola attempted to force their way into Blair House, where President Truman was residing during White House repairs. Despite no advance warning, Secret Service protective measures proved effective, and the assassins never fired directly at the President. In a gun battle lasting less than three minutes with approximately 27 shots fired, Torresola and one White House policeman were killed, while Collazo and two White House policemen were wounded. A Secret Service agent inside covered the front doorway with a submachine gun. Collazo was sentenced to death in 1951, which Truman commuted to life imprisonment in 1952. No broader Nationalist conspiracy was established.

The Blair House attack led to 1951 legislation permanently authorizing the Secret Service to protect the President, his immediate family, the President-elect, and the Vice President (upon his request). Vice Presidential protection had actually begun in January 1945 when Harry S. Truman assumed the office.

In 1962, Congress further expanded the list of protected officials to include the Vice President (or next officer in line of succession) without requiring a request, the Vice President-elect, and a former President at his request for a reasonable period after leaving office. The Secret Service interpreted "reasonable period" as six months.

Amendments to the 1917 threat statute in 1955 and 1962 made it a crime to threaten to harm the President-elect, the Vice President, or other officers next in succession to either office. Notably, the President's immediate family was not included in the threat statute.

Congressional concerns about the potential uses of the Secret Service, first under Theodore Roosevelt and later under Woodrow Wilson, led to tight restrictions on the Service's functions and uses of funds. These restrictions likely prevented the Secret Service from becoming a general investigative agency, leaving the field open for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), established within the Department of Justice in 1908.

In 1949, a task force of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission) recommended that nonfiscal functions be removed from the Treasury Department, specifically proposing transfer of the White House detail, White House Police Force, and Treasury Guard Force from the Secret Service to the Department of Justice. However, the Commission's final report on the Treasury Department omitted this recommendation, leaving the protective function with the Secret Service. Former President Hoover commented that "the President will object to having a 'private eye' looking after these fellows and would rather continue with the service."

The FBI, which grew rapidly in the 1920s and beyond to become the largest U.S. government investigative agency, had an annual appropriations item for "protection of the person of the President" beginning in 1910, but the Justice Department never exercised direct responsibility for presidential protection. According to J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI provided protection to Vice President Charles Curtis during 1929-1933 at his request. The FBI's overall contribution to presidential protection consisted primarily of referring potentially dangerous individuals to the Secret Service.

In 1963, the Secret Service was one of several investigative agencies in the Treasury Department, with major functions including combating counterfeiting and protecting the President, his family, and other designated persons. The Chief of the Secret Service administered operations through four divisions—Investigation, Inspection, Administrative, and Security—and 65 field offices nationwide, each headed by a special agent in charge reporting directly to Washington. The Security Division supervised the White House detail, White House Police, and Treasury Guard Force. In fiscal year 1963, the Secret Service had an average strength of 513, including 351 special agents, while the White House Police had an average strength of 179.

Medical records from Parkland Memorial Hospital in Dallas, Texas, document the treatment of President John F. Kennedy following his arrival in the Emergency Room at 12:43 p.m. on November 22, 1963. Governor Connally, in the front seat of the same limousine, was taken to room two, while the President was placed in room one. Dr. James Carrico was the first physician to see the President, noting slow, agonal respiratory efforts, a heartbeat without pulse or blood pressure, and two external wounds—a lower anterior neck wound and an occipital skull wound with extruding blood and brain tissue. Additional physicians including Dr. Malcolm Perry, Dr. Charles Baxter, Dr. Ronald Jones, Dr. M. T. Jenkins, Doctors Giesecke and Bunt, Dr. Robert McClelland, Dr. Paul Peters, Dr. Kemp Clark, and Dr. Fouad Bashour participated in the resuscitation effort, which included endotracheal intubation, a tracheostomy, chest tubes, and closed chest cardiac massage. Despite these efforts, the President's pupils were widely dilated and fixed, no deep tendon reflexes were present, and electrical silence of the heart was observed. President Kennedy was pronounced dead at 1:00 p.m. by Dr. Kemp Clark, Director of Neurological Surgery. The records, including a separate statement from Dr. M. T. Jenkins, Chairman of the Department of Anesthesiology, were designated as Commission Exhibit No. 392.

Dr. M. T. Jenkins's resuscitation report concludes the emergency treatment of President Kennedy. The intermittent positive pressure breathing apparatus was exchanged for an anesthesia machine to better control artificial ventilation. Doctors Akin and Giesecke assisted with the change from orotracheal to tracheostomy tube, while Doctors Hunt and Giesecke connected a cardioscope to assess cardiac activity. The emergency room cart was placed in Trendelenburg position, a venous cutdown was performed on the right saphenous vein, and additional IV fluids and blood were administered. By approximately 1245, external cardiac massage continued under Doctor Clark with a palpable peripheral pulse, but no electrocardiographic evidence of cardiac activity was present. Examination revealed a massive right temporal and occipital laceration with extensive skull defect, herniation and laceration of brain tissue, and protrusion of the cerebellum. Fragmented brain sections were found on the drapes. Restoration of adequate cardiac compression produced a great flow of blood from the cranial cavity, indicating severe vascular damage. Despite expeditious and efficient resuscitation efforts, the magnitude of cranial and intracranial damage proved irreversible. President Kennedy was pronounced dead at 1300.

Dr. Robert Shaw's operative record dated 11-22-63 documents Governor John Connally's thoracic surgery in Room 220. The pre-operative and post-operative diagnoses were gunshot wound of the chest with comminuted fracture of the fifth rib, with post-operative findings adding laceration of the right middle lobe and hematoma of the lower lobe. The operation (thoracotomy, removal of rib fragment, and wound debridement) ran from 1335 to 1520 under general anesthesia administered by Dr. Giesecke. In the emergency room, a sucking right chest wound had been partially controlled by occlusive dressing, and a tube had been placed through the second interspace in the mid-clavicular line connected to a water-seal bottle to evacuate the pneumothorax and hemothorax. Examination revealed the entrance wound just lateral to the right scapula near the axilla, with the missile shattering approximately ten cm of the lateral and anterior portion of the right fifth rib before exiting below the right nipple. The ragged fifth rib ends were cleaned with a rongeur, and the pleural cavity was opened widely with a self-retaining retractor. Approximately 200 cc of clot and liquid blood were removed. The middle lobe had a linear rent with an open bronchus; this was repaired with running sutures of #000 chromic gut rather than removing the lobe. A laceration in the engorged lower lobe was closed with a single suture of #3-O chromic gut. Drains were placed in the second interspace midclavicular line and through a stab wound in the eighth interspace posterior axillary line, both connected to water-seal bottles. The diaphragm was found uninjured, with no evidence of mediastinal injury. Penicillin and Streptomycin were instilled into the wound before closure with chromic gut sutures and black silk skin sutures. Patient condition was satisfactory.

Dr. Charles Gregory's operative record dated 11-22-63 addresses Governor Connally's orthopedic surgery for comminuted fracture of the right distal radius, open secondary to gunshot wound. The operation (debridement of gunshot wound and fracture reduction) ran from 1600 to 1650 under general anesthesia. The dorsal wrist entrance wound measured approximately two cm with tissue loss and contusion at margins, while the exit wound was on the volar surface about two cm above the wrist flexion crease. The wound was developed through muscles and tendons from the radial side to the bone, revealing a transected abductor pollicis longus tendon. Two small bone fragments were removed, along with various small bits of metal submitted to Pathology. Throughout the wound, particularly in superficial layers and tendon sheaths on the radial side, fine bits of cloth consistent with Mohair were identified, corresponding to the patient's Mohair suit. After thorough debridement and irrigation, the volar exit wound was closed primarily with wire sutures, while the radial entrance wound was only partially closed and left open for drainage due to the Mohair contamination. The radial artery was found intact and pulsating normally; median and ulnar nerve integrity was presumed but not clearly established. A long arm cast was applied with skin tape traction to the thumb and index finger, with the limb suspended from an overhead frame postoperatively. A handwritten note adds a partial transection of the superficial radial nerve or extensor pollicis brevis.

Dr. Tom Shires's operative record dated November 22, 1963, documents the exploration and debridement of Governor Connally's left thigh gunshot wound, running from 16:00 to 16:20 under general anesthesia. A 1 cm punctate missile wound was located over the juncture of the middle and lower third, medial aspect of the left thigh. X-rays revealed a bullet fragment embedded in the distal third of the femur. The wound was excised and the bullet tract explored, showing the missile coursed through subcutaneous fat into the vastus medialis. Necrotic fat and muscle were debrided down to the femur. The wound's direction was judged not to be in the course of the femoral vessel, as it was distal and anterior to Hunter's canal. Following complete debridement and saline irrigation, the wound was closed using three simple through-and-through stainless steel Aloe #28 wire sutures encompassing skin, subcutaneous tissue, and muscle fascia. The dorsalis pedis and posterior tibial pulses in both legs were quite good. This soft tissue repair was completed while the chest procedure had already concluded and the compound fracture debridement of the arm was still in progress.

Dr. Tom Shires's operative record dated 11/24/63 for Lee Harvey Oswald (Unit # 25260, age 24) documents surgery for gunshot wound of upper abdomen and chest with massive bleeding, with post-operative diagnosis of major vascular injury in abdomen and chest. The operation (exploratory laparotomy, thoracotomy, efforts to repair aorta) ran from 1142 to 1307 under general anesthesia. Anesthesiologists were Drs. M. T. Jenkins, Gene Akin, and Curtis Spier; assistants were Drs. Perry, McClelland, and Ron Jones. Preoperative inspection revealed an entrance wound over the left lower lateral chest cage and an exit identified by subcutaneous palpation of the bullet over the right lower lateral chest cage. Preoperatively, the patient was without blood pressure, with heart beat heard infrequently at 130 beats per minute; an endotracheal tube was placed and oxygen administered via anesthesia before transfer to the operating room. Two counted sponges were noted missing when the body was closed, though the square pack count was correct. Massive pharmacological intervention included calcium chloride (3 vials), Cedilanid (12), one molar lactate (6), Isuprel (24), and Adrenalin 1:1000 (3). IV fluids included 3,000 cc of lactated Ringer's solution, 16 units of 500 cc whole blood, and 6,000 cc of 5% dextrose in lactated Ringer's solution. The patient expired at 1307 with a measured blood loss of 8,376 cc.

The Description of Operation, signed by Dr. Tom Shires, recounts the emergency exploratory laparotomy performed under endotracheal oxygen anesthesia. A long mid-line abdominal incision exposed approximately 2 to 3 liters of liquid and clotted blood in the peritoneal cavity. The bullet pathway was traced as it shattered the upper medial surface of the spleen and entered the retroperitoneum, producing a large hematoma near the pancreas. The missile then exited through the inferior vena cava, traversed the superior pole of the right kidney and the lower right lobe of the liver, and lodged in the right lateral body wall. The right kidney was dissected free and the caval hole clamped with a Satinsky partial-occlusion clamp; packing controlled renal bleeding. On the left side, the spleen and left colon were mobilized to access a massive mid-line retroperitoneal hematoma, revealing a shattered mid-portion of the pancreas and aortic bleeding, which was controlled with finger pressure by Dr. Malcolm O. Perry. The superior mesenteric artery had been sheared off the aorta and was cross-clamped with a curved DeBakey clamp, after which the aorta was occluded above and below with straight DeBakey and Potts clamps. With major hemorrhage controlled, blood pressure reached approximately 100 systolic, but the pulse dropped from 80–90 to 40 and then to zero, with no aortic pulse. The left chest was opened through the fourth intercostal interspace using a Finochietto retractor; the heart was flabby and motionless, with no hemopericardium, no hemothorax, and a pre-existing left closed chest tube. The pericardium was opened, cardiac massage restored a pulse, and calcium chloride followed by epinephrine-Xylocaine were injected into the left ventricle. Standstill converted to fibrillation, and defibrillation was accomplished at progressively higher voltages (240, 360, 500, 750 volts), but no effective heartbeat could be established. A pacemaker inserted into the right ventricular wall produced only a feeble localized muscular response. Dr. Jenkins then confirmed absence of life: fixed and dilated pupils, no retinal blood flow, no respiratory effort, and no effective pulse even with massage. The President was pronounced dead at 1:07 P.M. Anesthesia was limited to oxygen; the patient was never conscious. The subcutaneous bullet was extracted from the right side during rotated defibrillation attempts, with cardiac massage and defibrillation carried out by Drs. McClelland, Perry, and Jones, and cardiologist Dr. Bashour providing assistance.

Appendix IX introduces the Autopsy Report and Supplemental Report under Clinical Record Autopsy Protocol A63-272 (JJH:ec). The President died on 22 November 1963 at 1300 (CST) and the full autopsy was performed the same day at 2000 (EST) at the Naval Medical School. The document identifies CDR J.J. Humes, MC, USN (497831) as the prosector, with CDR "J" Thornton Boswell, MC, USN (439878) and Lt. Col. Pierre A. Finck, MC, USA (04 043 322) as assistants. The record is approved and signed by CDR J.J. Humes, MC, USN, with the military organization noted as "President, United States." It also begins the physical and demographic descriptors of the body, recording height at 72½ inches, weight at 170 pounds, blue eyes, and reddish brown hair.

The Pathological Diagnoses section states the cause of death as a gunshot wound to the head. The section carries the approved signature of CDR J.J. Humes, MC, USN, and notes the autopsy number A63-272 for the 46-year-old Caucasian male.

The Patient's Identification section identifies the deceased as Kennedy, John F., examined at the Naval Medical School, with autopsy number A63-272.

The Clinical Summary describes the circumstances of the wounding: President John F. Kennedy was riding in an open car in a motorcade during an official visit to Dallas, Texas, on 22 November 1963. The President sat in the right rear seat with Mrs. Kennedy to his left, Governor John B. Connally sat directly in front of the President, and Mrs. Connally sat directly in front of Mrs. Kennedy. The vehicle moved at a slow rate of speed down an incline into an underpass leading to a freeway route to the Dallas Trade Mart, where the President was to speak. Three shots were heard, and the President fell forward bleeding from the head. Governor Connally was seriously wounded by the same gunfire. A Dallas "Times Herald" photographer, Bob Jackson, reported seeing a rifle barrel disappearing into a window on an upper floor of the nearby Texas School Book Depository Building (as reported in the "Washington Post" of 23 November 1963). The car was driven to Parkland Hospital, where Dr. Malcolm Perry attended the President in the emergency room. In a telephone communication on 23 November 1963, Dr. Perry described a massive head wound and a second smaller wound of the low anterior neck in approximately the midline; a tracheostomy was performed by extending the latter wound, revealing an injury to the right lateral tracheal wall with bubbling bloody air. Bilateral upper anterior chest wall incisions were made to address possible subcutaneous emphysema, and intravenous blood and saline were administered with oxygen. Despite these measures, cardiac arrest occurred and closed chest cardiac massage failed to restore cardiac action. The President was pronounced dead approximately thirty to forty minutes after receiving his wounds. The remains were transported via the Presidential plane to Washington, D.C., and then to the Naval Medical School, National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, for postmortem examination.

The General Description of the Body records that the body was that of a muscular, well-developed, well-nourished adult Caucasian male, measuring 72½ inches and weighing approximately 170 pounds. There was beginning rigor mortis, minimal dependent livor mortis of the dorsum, and early algor mortis. The hair was reddish brown and abundant; the eyes were blue, with the right pupil measuring 8 mm in diameter and the left 4 mm. There was edema and ecchymosis of the inner canthus of the left eyelid measuring approximately 1.5 cm in greatest diameter, and diffuse edema and ecchymosis over the right supra-orbital ridge with abnormal mobility of the underlying bone. The scalp was to be described in more detail with the skull. The external ears contained clotted blood; the ears, nares, and mouth were otherwise unremarkable. The teeth were in excellent repair, with pallor of the oral mucous membrane. A 7 × 4 mm oval wound was situated on the upper right posterior thorax just above the upper border of the scapula, measured 14 cm from the tip of the right acromion process and 14 cm below the tip of the right mastoid process. A 6.5 cm transverse wound with widely gaping irregular edges was situated in the low anterior neck at approximately the level of the third and fourth tracheal rings. Bilateral 2 cm transverse recent surgical incisions into the subcutaneous tissue were situated on the anterior chest wall in the nipple line, with the left 11 cm cephalad to the nipple and the right 8 cm cephalad to the nipple, without associated hemorrhage or ecchymosis. A similar clean 2 cm wound was on the antero-lateral aspect of the left mid arm, and 2 cm transverse incisions into subcutaneous tissue were on the antero-lateral aspect of each ankle. An old well-healed 8 cm McBurney abdominal incision was present, a 15 cm well-healed midline scar was over the lumbar spine, and an 8 cm well-healed scar was on the upper antero-lateral aspect of the right thigh.

The Missile Wounds section describes two wounds. The first involved a large irregular defect of the scalp and skull on the right, chiefly involving the parietal bone but extending into the temporal and occipital regions, with actual absence of scalp and bone producing a defect approximately 13 cm in greatest diameter. Stellate tears extended from the irregular margins of the scalp defect: (a) from the right inferior temporo-parietal margin anterior to the right ear to a point slightly above the tragus; (b) from the anterior parietal margin anteriorly on the forehead to approximately 4 cm above the right orbital ridge; (c) from the left margin of the main defect across the midline antero-laterally for approximately 8 cm; and (d) from the same starting point as (c) 10 cm postero-laterally. A 15 × 6 mm lacerated wound was situated in the posterior scalp approximately 2.5 cm laterally to the right and slightly above the external occipital protuberance, with a corresponding skull wound that exhibited beveling of the inner margins. Lacerated brain tissue exuded from the large defect, representing the major portion of the right cerebral hemisphere; the falx cerebri was extensively lacerated with disruption of the superior sagittal sinus. Multiple complete fracture lines radiated from both the vertex defect and the occipital wound, the longest measuring approximately 19 cm, producing fragments ranging from a few millimeters to 10 cm in greatest diameter. The complexity of these fractures was better appreciated in photographs and roentgenograms. The brain was removed and preserved for further study following formalin fixation. Three separate fragments of skull bone received from Dallas roughly approximated the dimensions of the large defect; one angle of the largest fragment showed a portion of a roughly circular wound presumably of exit, approximately 2.5 to 3.0 cm in diameter, with beveling of the outer aspect of the bone and minute metal particles visible on roentgenograms along its margin. Multiple minute metallic fragments were visible along a line joining the small occipital wound and the right supra-orbital ridge, and two small irregularly shaped metal fragments (7 × 2 mm and 3 × 1 mm) were recovered from the disrupted right cerebral cortex and placed in the custody of FBI Agents Francis X. O'Neill, Jr., and James W. Sibert, who executed attached receipts. The second wound, presumably of entry, was in the upper right posterior thorax, with ecchymosis of the subcutaneous tissue and musculature beneath the skin; the missile path through fascia and musculature could not be easily probed. The wound of exit in the low anterior cervical region, originally described by Dr. Malcolm Perry as "a few millimeters in diameter," was extended as a tracheostomy incision, distorting its character at autopsy. There was considerable ecchymosis of the right strap muscles of the neck and of the fascia about the trachea adjacent to the tracheostomy line. A third point of reference was in the apex (supra-clavicular portion) of the right pleural cavity, with contusion of the parietal pleura and the extreme apical portion of the right upper lobe measuring 5 cm in maximal diameter; both visceral and parietal pleura were intact overlying these areas.

The Incisions section notes that the scalp wounds were extended in the coronal plane to examine cranial content, and the customary Y-shaped incision was used to examine the body cavities.

The Thoracic Cavity findings indicated an unremarkable bony cage, with thoracic organs in their normal positions and relationships and no increase in free pleural fluid. The previously described area of contusion in the apical portion of the right pleural cavity was noted.

The Lungs were of essentially similar appearance, with the right weighing 320 grams and the left 290 grams. The lungs were well aerated with smooth glistening pleural surfaces and gray-pink color. A 5 cm diameter area of purplish red discoloration and increased firmness to palpation was situated in the apical portion of the right upper lobe, corresponding to the similar area in the overlying parietal pleura, and incision revealed recent hemorrhage into the pulmonary parenchyma.

The Heart findings described a smooth-walled pericardial cavity containing approximately 10 cc of straw-colored fluid. The heart had an essentially normal external contour, weighed 350 grams, and showed no abnormalities when the pulmonary artery was opened in situ. The cardiac chambers contained moderate amounts of postmortem clotted blood, and there were no gross abnormalities of any valve leaflets. The cardiac valve circumferences were: aortic 7.5 cm, pulmonic 7 cm, tricuspid 12 cm, mitral 11 cm. The myocardium was firm and reddish brown, with the left ventricular myocardium averaging 1.2 cm in thickness and the right ventricular myocardium 0.4 cm. The coronary arteries were of normal distribution, smooth walled, and elastic throughout.

The Abdominal Cavity findings indicated that the abdominal organs were in their normal positions and relationships, with no increase in free peritoneal fluid. The vermiform appendix was surgically absent, and a few adhesions joined the cecal region to the ventral abdominal wall at the site of the old abdominal incisional scar.

The Skeletal System findings indicated that, aside from the previously described skull wounds, there were no significant gross skeletal abnormalities.

The Photography section noted that black and white and color photographs depicting significant findings were exposed but not developed. These photographs were placed in the custody of U.S. Secret Service Agent Roy H. Kellerman, who executed an attached receipt.

The Roentgenograms section noted that roentgenograms were made of the entire body and of the three separately submitted fragments of skull bone. The films were developed and placed in the custody of U.S. Secret Service Agent Roy H. Kellerman, who executed an attached receipt.

The Autopsy Summary concluded that the deceased died as a result of two perforating gunshot wounds inflicted by high-velocity projectiles fired by a person or persons unknown, with the projectiles fired from a point behind and somewhat above the level of the deceased. The observations and available information did not permit a satisfactory estimate as to the sequence of the two wounds. The fatal missile entered the skull above and to the right of the external occipital protuberance, with a portion of the projectile traversing the cranial cavity in a posterior-anterior direction and depositing minute particles along its path, and a portion making its exit through the right parietal bone, carrying with it portions of cerebrum, skull, and scalp. The two skull wounds combined with the force of the missile produced extensive fragmentation of the skull, laceration of the superior sagittal sinus, and laceration of the right cerebral hemisphere. The other missile entered the right superior posterior thorax above the scapula, traversed the soft tissues of the supra-scapular and supra-clavicular portions of the base of the right side of the neck, produced contusions of the right apical parietal pleura and the apical portion of the right upper lobe of the lung, contused the strap muscles of the right side of the neck, damaged the trachea, and exited through the anterior surface of the neck. As far as could be ascertained, this missile struck no bony structures in its path through the body. The pathologists concluded that the wound of the skull produced such extensive damage to the brain as to preclude the possibility of the deceased surviving this injury.

The Supplementary Report Note stated that a supplementary report would be submitted following more detailed examination of the brain and of microscopic sections, but it was not anticipated that these examinations would materially alter the findings.

The supplementary pathological examination report (No. A63-272), titled "Supplementary Report of Autopsy Number A63-272 President John F. Kennedy," expands on the original autopsy findings with detailed descriptions and microscopic analyses of the brain, heart, lungs, liver, spleen, kidneys, and skin wounds, culminating in a final summary confirming the previously reported cause of death.

Following formalin fixation, the brain weighed 1500 gms and showed marked disruption of the right cerebral hemisphere, including a longitudinal parasagittal laceration approximately 2.5 cm right of the midline extending from the occipital to the frontal lobe, with loss of cortical substance especially in the parietal region. Additional lacerations radiated from the main wound and involved the corpus callosum, exposing the right lateral and third ventricles. The left hemisphere remained intact but exhibited meningeal vessel engorgement and subarachnoid hemorrhage. Basilar inspection revealed a midbrain laceration through the third ventricle floor and a 1.5 cm tear through the left cerebral peduncle, along with superficial basilar lacerations. To preserve the specimen, coronal sections were not made; instead, seven designated tissue samples were taken for microscopic examination, and thirteen photographs (seven black-and-white, six color) were exposed but not developed, with the negatives delivered to Rear Admiral George W. Burkley.

Microscopic examination of multiple representative brain sections showed extensive tissue disruption with associated hemorrhage, with no significant abnormalities beyond those directly attributable to the recent trauma.

Heart sections showed a moderate amount of sub-epicardial fat, with the coronary arteries, myocardial fibers, and endocardium all unremarkable.

Lung sections through the right upper lobe contusion exhibited disruption of alveolar walls and recent intra-alveolar hemorrhage; other sections were essentially unremarkable.

Liver sections showed well-preserved normal hepatic architecture, with parenchymal cells displaying markedly granular cytoplasm indicating high glycogen content—the characteristic "liver biopsy pattern" of sudden death.

Spleen sections showed no significant abnormalities.

Kidney sections showed no significant abnormalities apart from dilatation and engorgement of blood vessels of all calibers.

Microscopic sections of skin wounds in the occipital and upper right posterior thoracic regions were essentially similar, showing loss of epidermal continuity with coagulation necrosis at wound margins; the scalp wound additionally contained several small bone fragments in the subcutaneous tissue at its margins.

The final summary stated that the supplementary report documented in greater detail the extensive cerebral trauma sustained, but that neither the additional gross description nor the microscopic examinations altered the previously submitted report or added significant details to the cause of death. The report was signed by CDR J. J. Humes, MC, USN.

On 6 December 1963, J. H. Stover, Jr., Commanding Officer of the Naval Medical School, forwarded all copies of the final supplementary autopsy report to the White House Physician via the Commanding Officer of the National Naval Medical Center. The endorsement was then forwarded by C. B. Galloway, Commanding Officer of the National Naval Medical Center, to the White House Physician the same day.

Appendix X introduced expert testimony on firearms and firearms identification given by three witnesses: FBI's Robert A. Frazier (23 years in the field) and Cortlandt Cunningham (5 years), and Joseph D. Nicol of the Illinois Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (since 1941, trained in the Chicago police crime laboratory). Frazier testified about the rifle, rifle cartridge cases, and rifle bullets; Cunningham about the revolver, revolver cartridge cases, revolver bullets, and the paraffin test; and Nicol about all bullets, cartridge cases, and the paraffin test, reaching the same conclusions as the other experts except as noted.

This section explains the general principles underlying firearms identification. A cartridge comprises a primer, cartridge case, powder, and bullet; pulling the trigger causes the firing pin to detonate the primer, igniting the powder and propelling the bullet through the rifled barrel. Rifling imparts a stabilizing spin, and weapons of the same make and model share rifling characteristics (groove count, land count, and twist direction), all of which are engraved onto fired bullets. Beyond rifling, every weapon bears distinctive, weapon-unique microscopic characteristics on its barrel, firing pin, and breech face, arising from manufacturing processes (machining, grinding, filing), tool wear, and subsequent use, fouling, cleaning, and corrosion. Frazier explained that these accidental marks—scratches, nicks, dimples, and pattern variations—enable an examiner to identify a cartridge case or bullet as having been fired in a particular weapon to the exclusion of all others, as demonstrated by his comparisons of consecutively manufactured bolt faces and barrel pairs, which showed no shared individual microscopic characteristics. Identification is performed by comparing suspect and test-fired items under a comparison microscope, as illustrated by Frazier's examination of Commission Exhibit No. 543 (a cartridge case from the Texas School Book Depository), where corresponding numbered circles in the photograph highlight matching microscopic marks in the area immediately outside the firing pin impression of the 6.5 mm Mannlicher-Carcano rifle (Commission Exhibit No. 139).

Firearms identification of cartridge cases relies on microscopic examination of individual characteristics—dents, ridges, bumps, and depressions—left on the breech face and primer by the weapon. A photograph can show the location and type of marks but cannot convey their height, width, or relationship; actual identification requires a mental, visual comparison between the questioned and test specimens under a microscope. According to firearms expert Frazier, a layman could not perform this analysis because he would not know what to look for, the marks must be mentally sorted and compared across many areas, and irrelevant features (such as pre-existing depressions in the primer) could lead to erroneous conclusions. Identification is therefore a matter of expert interpretation rather than a simple point-for-point comparison. Even when individual marks differ between two cartridge cases fired from the same weapon—due to differences in metal flow, pressure, firing-pin wear, or primer hardness—identification is based on the overall pattern, contour, and nature of the similarities rather than the absence of dissimilarities. A bullet or cartridge case cannot always be identified with the firing weapon if it is too mutilated, if the weapon's microscopic characteristics have changed between firings due to wear, corrosion, or cleaning, or if the weapon marks bullets inconsistently.

The rifle recovered from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository shortly after the assassination was a bolt-action, clip-fed, 40.2-inch-long, 8-pound military rifle bearing the markings "CAL. 6.5," "MADE ITALY," "TERNI," "ROCCA," the numerals "1940" and "40," serial number C2766, and other inspector's and manufacturer's marks. It carried an inexpensive Japanese-made four-power Ordnance Optics Inc. sight and a non-standard sling too short for normal use but capable of providing some steadiness. The rifle was identified as a 6.5-millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano Italian military rifle, Model 91/38—a shortened version of the 1891 Mannlicher-Carcano series originally designed by Ritter von Mannlicher and Salvatore Carcano. The 6.5-millimeter Model 91/38 was produced during World War II when Italy faced an ammunition supply problem with the 7.35-millimeter Model 38. The identification was made through reference works, inscribed markings, chambering a 6.5-millimeter cartridge, taking a sulfur cast of the barrel measured with a micrometer, and was later confirmed by SIFAR (Italian Armed Forces Intelligence Service), which explained that "TERNI" designated the Terni Army Plant manufacturer. The Model 91/38 has been widely imported into the United States as surplus military equipment. The bolt-action mechanism operates by cycling the bolt handle up and back, forward, and down to chamber a round; the trigger releases a spring-driven firing pin. A leaf spring beneath the clip raises the next cartridge into loading position after each cycle. The rifle is designed to hold one to six cartridges in the clip with a seventh loaded directly into the chamber for a total capacity of seven rounds. The clip found in the rifle bore the markings "SMI" and the number "952."

When the rifle was found, one 6.5-millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano cartridge manufactured by the Western Cartridge Co. of East Alton, Illinois, was in the chamber. This cartridge is loaded with a full metal-jacketed, round-nosed, parallel-sided 160-161 grain bullet measuring just under 1.2 inches long and just over one-fourth inch in diameter, with a velocity of approximately 2,165 feet per second. The Western Cartridge Co. ammunition proved highly reliable in FBI and U.S. Army tests, with the C2766 rifle firing over 100 rounds with no misfires, and approximately 2 million rounds have been sold in the United States through mail-order houses and gun shops. The presence of a chambered cartridge does not necessarily indicate an intent to fire another round, as reloading may be reflexive. Three expended cartridge cases were found in the southeast portion of the sixth floor between the south wall and a high stack of boxes, slightly west of the southeast corner window. All three were identified as having been fired from the C2766 rifle through comparison with test-fired cases. Ejection-pattern tests demonstrated that the rifle ejects cases to the right at roughly a right angle to the line of sight (86 inches and 80° right when depressed at 45°; 80 inches and 90° right when held horizontally), rising no more than 2 or 12 inches above the ejection port depending on orientation. After initial landing, cases ricocheted between 8 inches and 15 feet, making their location consistent with firing from the southeast window of the building.

Three additional projectiles or projectile fragments were recovered outside the building: a nearly whole bullet weighing 158.6 grains found on Governor Connally's stretcher, and two bullet fragments weighing 44.6 and 21.0 grains found in the front of the President's car. The stretcher bullet was slightly flattened but otherwise unmutilated, weighing several grains less than the average Western Cartridge Co. 6.5-millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano bullet. The heavier car fragment was identified as a portion of a bullet's nose based on its rounded contour and markings, while the lighter fragment was a base portion identified by its shape and the presence of a cannelure. The fragments were too mutilated to determine from their features alone whether they constituted parts of one bullet or two separate bullets, but each retained sufficient unmutilated area for identification purposes. Based on comparison with test bullets fired from the C2766 rifle, all three—the stretcher bullet and both fragments—were identified as having been fired from the C2766 rifle.

The revolver taken from Oswald at his arrest was a .38 Special Smith & Wesson Victory Model revolver bearing serial number V510210, the only S. & W. revolver with that number since the company does not repeat serial numbers. Originally manufactured in the United States, the revolver bears English inspection/proof marks indicating it was shipped to England before being returned to the U.S. market. The revolver showed signs of use but was in good operating condition. It was originally designed to fire a .38 S. & W. cartridge—lighter and shorter than the .38 Special but with a larger diameter—but was rechambered for the .38 Special prior to U.S. sale. While not rebarreled, the barrel had been shortened by cutting off approximately 2¾ inches from its original 5-inch length, a modification serving only to facilitate concealment. The weapon is a conventional double-action revolver with a swing-out rotating cylinder holding one to six cartridges, allowing six consecutive shots when fully loaded. Empty cartridge cases are extracted by swinging out the cylinder and pushing the ejector rod, which ejects all cases simultaneously. Live cartridges can be separated from spent cases by tipping the cylinder before ejection because spent cases, having expanded against the chamber walls, are lighter and will not fall out, while live rounds will.

Six live cartridges were found in Oswald's revolver upon his arrest (three Western .38 Specials with copper-coated lead bullets, and three Remington-Peters .38 Specials with lead bullets), and five additional Western .38 Specials were found in his pocket. The two brands of .38 Special cartridges are virtually identical, with the copper coating on Western bullets serving mainly as sales appeal. Four expended cartridge cases recovered near the Tippit killing scene—two Remington-Peters and two Western .38 Specials—were identified, through comparison with test cases fired in the V510210 revolver, as having been fired in that revolver.

Four bullets were recovered from Officer Tippit's body. Nicol opined that one could be positively identified with the V510210 revolver and the other three could have been fired from it, while Cunningham believed all four could have been fired from it but none could be positively identified because consecutive test bullets from the revolver could not even be microscopically matched to each other. The probable cause was that the revolver had been rechambered for .38 Special cartridges without rebarreling, leaving the barrel slightly oversized and causing erratic microscopic markings. Based on grooves and knurling, three of the four bullets were Western-Winchester copper-coated lead bullets and one was a Remington-Peters lead bullet, a mix that did not match the two-and-two split of the recovered cartridge cases. Three possible explanations for the variance are offered, with hand-loaded ammunition deemed extremely unlikely because the cases showed no signs of resizing.

Officer McDonald testified that during his struggle with Oswald over the revolver he heard the hammer snap and felt a primer dent on misfire, but no such firing pin impression was found on any cartridge in the revolver. Technical analysis showed that the firing pin cannot strike a cartridge unless the hammer is drawn fully back by a complete trigger pull, making a misfire from such a trigger pull unlikely. Although a finger could theoretically be interposed between hammer and cartridge, the strong hammer spring would make the impact clearly felt. Because the cylinder and trigger are interconnected, Oswald could not have fully pulled the trigger if McDonald was firmly grasping the cylinder, and a sudden grab of the gun would have produced an audible trigger snap rather than a misfire.

The Dallas police performed a paraffin test on Oswald's hands and right cheek during interrogation; the hands reacted positively while the cheek did not. The test applies warm liquid paraffin to pick up surface residues, which are then tested with diphenylamine or diphenylbenzidine for nitrates, theoretically indicating recent firing of a weapon. The chapter explains at length that the test is completely unreliable: a positive reaction can be triggered by tobacco, Clorox, urine, cosmetics, matches, fertilizers, soil, or even mere weapon handling, while a person who has fired a rifle may show no reaction because a rifle's sealed chamber prevents nitrate-bearing gases from escaping back toward the shooter. FBI experiments demonstrated both kinds of unreliability, including an agent who fired three rounds of Mannlicher-Carcano ammunition and tested negative on both hands and cheek. Oak Ridge neutron-activation analysis of Oswald's paraffin casts found barium and antimony, but these elements were present in both rifle and revolver ammunition, were also found on the outside surface of the cheek cast (which had not touched Oswald), and could be traced to many common items, so their presence could not be linked to rifle firing.

On April 10, 1963, a severely mutilated bullet weighing 148.25 grains was recovered from General Walker's home after an attempt on his life. The bullet displayed the rifling characteristics of the C2766 rifle and otherwise matched the Western 6.5-millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano bullet, but Frazier concluded that the mutilation prevented a determination of whether it had been fired from that rifle. Nicol agreed that positive identification was impossible but concluded there was "a fair probability" the bullet came from the same rifle as the test bullets.

Two fingerprint and palmprint experts testified: Sebastian Latona, supervisor of the FBI's Latent Fingerprint Section with over 32 years of experience, and Arthur Mandella, a New York City police detective and fingerprint instructor with 19 years in the field. Both had extensive examination and courtroom experience, and their conclusions were identical except as noted in the chapter.

Fingerprints and palmprints are produced by permanent ridges that appear 2–3 months before birth and remain unchanged until death; a clear impression contains 85 to 125 identifiable points, and no two prints share the same points in the same relationships. Law-enforcement "inked prints" are carefully taken, while prints accidentally left at crime scenes are "latent prints," and identification requires finding no inconsistencies between latent and inked prints and sufficient similarity in points and their relative positions. While some foreign agencies require a minimum of 16 matching points, U.S. experts evaluate each print on its own merits with no fixed minimum. Palmprints are equally distinctive but are recorded less often because they are harder to classify, though they are common on heavy objects. Latent prints arise from perspiration (water, fatty or protein material, and salt) and can be developed by lighting, powder, or lifting with adhesive; absorbent surfaces like paper, unfinished wood, or unfinished metal usually require iodine fumes or silver nitrate solution to develop prints. Not every contact leaves a latent print, since smooth nonabsorbent surfaces, lack of perspiration, or evaporation can prevent a print from forming.

A number of objects recovered from the Texas School Book Depository Building were processed for latent prints by the FBI, sometimes after Dallas police processing; these included the homemade wrapping paper bag found near the southeast corner window, the C2766 rifle, three small cartons stacked near that window (marked Box A, Box B, and Box C), a fourth carton on the floor nearby (Box D), three 6.5-millimeter cartridge cases found near the window, and the cartridge found in the rifle. On the paper bag, the FBI developed a palmprint and a fingerprint using silver nitrate, and both were matched to the right palm and left index finger of Lee Harvey Oswald. The C2766 rifle's wood and metal proved too absorbent to record good prints, and the faint ridge formations the Dallas police developed on the metal magazine housing were insufficient for identification, but a latent palmprint lifted from the underside of the barrel was identified as the right palm of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Fingerprints on Shipping Cartons The FBI used the silver nitrate method to develop latent prints on the cartons containing the rifle. Box A yielded nine identifiable latent fingerprints and four palmprints, including Oswald's right index fingerprint and left palmprint; the remaining prints belonged to Studebaker and Lucy. Box B produced seven fingerprints and two palmprints, again largely from Studebaker and Lucy with one unidentified palmprint. Box C yielded two fingerprints and one palmprint from the same individuals. On Box D, the FBI developed two of Lucy's fingerprints, and the Dallas police developed by powder a palmprint identified as Oswald's right palmprint. Latona estimated the maximum age of that palmprint at three days and Mandella at a day and a half, because perspiration is absorbed into cardboard and can typically be powdered for no more than 24 hours after placement.

Fingerprints on Cartridge Cases and Rifle Cartridge No fingerprints were developed on the cartridge found inside the rifle or on the three expended cartridge cases.

Questioned Document Experts Two experts, Alwyn Cole and James C. Cadigan, testified regarding questioned documents. Cole apprenticed as a questioned document examiner from 1929 to 1935 and has served as examiner for the U.S. Treasury Department since then. Cadigan has been a questioned document examiner with the FBI for 23½ years following specialized training. Both have testified frequently in federal and state courts. Their conclusions were identical except as noted. They jointly examined the rifle mail order to Klein's Sporting Goods, the accompanying money order and envelope, the revolver mail order to Seaport Traders, post office box applications and change-of-address orders, the spurious Selective Service notice, Marine Corps certificate, and smallpox vaccination certificate in the name "Alek James Hidell," and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee card. Cadigan additionally examined Commission Exhibit No. 1, the Russian-language note Marina testified Oswald had left before the Walker attempt, and the homemade paper bag found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository.

General Principles of Handwriting Identification Questioned document examination rests on the principle that every person's handwriting is distinctive because mental and physical writing equipment differs between individuals, so each person develops unique writing habits. According to Cole, handwriting identification is confirmed by long observation of specimens and by formal responsibility for decisions subsequently tested against field-investigated results. Hand printing is subject to the same principles. Not every letter serves as a basis for identification, since most writing begins from standard copybook forms and is distinctive only insofar as it departs from them; variations within a single document are also normal. An identification requires a sufficient number of corresponding distinctive characteristics and a general absence of distinctive differences. Imitation by a forger is very remote, because the forger typically draws rather than writes, producing defects such as tremor, waver, patching, retouching, noncontinuous lines, and pen lifts in awkward places. To make an identification, the examiner first studies the questioned writing independently, then studies the known standards, and finally conducts a detailed comparison considering letter forms, proportion, pen pressure, and letter connections. The standards used by Cole and Cadigan included a wide variety of documents known to be in Oswald's handwriting, such as payroll endorsements, employment and passport applications, ACLU membership and library card applications, and letters to government agencies.

C2766 Rifle Mail Order Identification Klein's Sporting Goods photographed the mail order and envelope for the C2766 rifle on microfilm before destroying the originals, and an enlarged photograph was used as the basis for handwriting identification. Comparison with the standards established that the handwriting on the purchase order, the envelope, and the money order (retained by the post office after being cashed) was that of Lee Harvey Oswald. The identification rested on numerous specific characteristics in the return address, including the construction of the "A" in "A. Hidell," the elongated approach stroke and rightward slant of the "i," the larger second "l," the "B" in "Box" with a smaller upper lobe, the distinctive loop construction of the "D" in "Dallas," the flattened "s," and the "u" form of the "x" in "Texas." Both the questioned and standard writings also used the same erroneous mixture of capital and lowercase letters in words such as "Texas." The questioned writing showed no significant evidence of disguise, though the use of hand printing on the mail order may have served that purpose; Cole noted that persons using aliases frequently make no attempt to disguise their writing.

V510210 Revolver Mail Order Identification Based on comparison with the standards, the handwriting on the mail order sent to Seaport Traders, Inc., of Los Angeles in response to which the V510210 revolver was sent, was also identified as that of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Post Office Box Document Identification A post office box application consists of three parts: directions, applicant information, and instruction space concerning delivery and authorized users. Under postal regulations, the Dallas Post Office retained the second part of the application for box 2915 and destroyed the third part after the box closed. The signature "Lee H. Oswald" and other handwriting on that application were identified as Oswald's, with the balance filled in by the postal clerk. Two change-of-address orders signed "Lee H. Oswald" were also identified as Oswald's: one dated October 10, 1962, forwarding mail from 2703 Mercedes Avenue in Fort Worth to box 2915 in Dallas, and one dated May 12, 1963, forwarding mail from box 2915 in Dallas to 4907 Magazine Street in New Orleans. The New Orleans post office retained the third part of the application for box 30061, signed "L. H. Oswald" and naming "A. J. Hidell" and "Marina Oswald" as persons entitled to receive mail, and both the writing and signature on that card were identified as Oswald's.

Spurious Selective Service and Marine Corps Documents When Oswald was arrested, he possessed a Selective Service notice of classification and a U.S. Marine Corps certificate of service in the name "Alek James Hidell," along with corresponding documents in his own name. The Hidell cards were photographic counterfeits. After Oswald's arrest, retouched negatives were found in Michael Paine's garage at 2515 West Fifth Street in Irving, Texas, including retouched negatives of the Oswald cards. Comparison of these retouched negatives with both the Hidell and Oswald cards demonstrated that the Hidell cards had been produced by photographing the Oswald cards, retouching the resulting negatives, and making photographic prints from the retouched negatives.

Hidell Notice of Classification Examination The face of the Hidell notice of classification was produced from the face of the Oswald notice through a two-step photographic process. The counterfeiter first photographed the Oswald notice to make a basic intermediate negative, then opaqued out all typed or handwritten information, including Oswald's name, selective service number 41-114-39-532, the local board official's signature, and the mailing date. A second intermediate negative was made of the lowermost third of the Oswald notice, reproducing the printed legend exactly but at reduced size. The two intermediates were combined to produce a third negative identical to the basic intermediate except that the reduced legend created a square blank space in the lower left corner. A photographic print was then made from this third negative, and new material was inserted into the resulting blanks, including the typed name "ALEK JAMES HIDELL," selective service number 42-224-39-532, and mailing date "Feb. 5, 1962." Two typewriters were used, as shown by differences in the design of the typed figure "4" and by differences in impression strength, likely because the counterfeiter switched typewriters when the first ribbon proved insufficiently inked for the glossy photographic paper. The notice also bore uninked indentations visible only under strong side lighting, apparently made with the typewriter set at stencil, possibly as a dry run to center and align the inserted material. Sidelight photography revealed that "ALEK," "JAMES," and "HIDELL" had each been typed in stencil at least twice before being typed with the ribbon, a capital "O" had been stenciled prior to one of the "ALEK" attempts, and a serial number and mailing date had also been typed in stencil.

Forensic experts examined the Hidell Selective Service System Notice of Classification and Certificate of Service and concluded both were counterfeits produced from photographs of Oswald's genuine documents, with the original typed and handwritten material opaqued out of the negatives using a red opaque substance. The signature "Alek J. Hidell" was identified as Oswald's handwriting, while the signature "Good Hoffer" was illegible but not inconsistent with Oswald's writing. A photograph of Oswald was inserted into the lower left corner of the Hidell notice, and new information was typed into the resulting blanks, substituting values such as "GR" for "Blue" (eye color), "BROWN" for "Brn" (hair), "5'9"" for "5'11"" (height), and "155" for "150" (weight). On the Certificate of Service, the words "ALEK JAMES HIDELL" were typed in place of Oswald's name, with sidelight photographs revealing the words had been stencil-typed at least twice before ribbon-typing to check centering. A photo of Oswald was inserted in the signature space for the local board, and dates "OCT. 13 1958" and "OCT. 12 1961" were typed in for the beginning and end of active service, though the impression was faint and other stenciled dates appeared under microscopic examination. Vertical and diagonal indentations resembling a capital "H" appeared in the signature blank, possibly made by a sharp, non-inking instrument. Experts concluded the counterfeiting required only elementary photographic knowledge and modest practice—perhaps half a dozen attempts—with retouching practice possible using the balance of negatives found at the Paine garage.

A government-printed "International Certificates of Vaccination or Revaccination against Smallpox" was found among Oswald's belongings at 1026 Beckley Avenue, Dallas, purporting to certify that "Lee Oswald" had been vaccinated by "Dr. A.J. Hideel" with a New Orleans P.O. Box address. Handwriting examiner Cole identified all handwriting and the "A.J. Hideel" signature as Oswald's, while Cadigan identified all writing as Oswald's except the Hideel signature, which he considered too distorted to identify. The stamped material, including the three-line "DR. A.J. HIDEEL/P.O. BOX 30016/NEW ORLEANS, LA." stamp, was compared with a rubber stamping kit belonging to Oswald containing a stamp reading "L. H. OSWALD/4907 MAGAZINE ST/NEW ORLEANS, LA." Cole found a perfect agreement in measurement and design between the certificate's stamped letters and those of Oswald's kit, concluding the kit could have produced the impressions but was not necessarily the only one capable. Cadigan concluded that the words "NEW ORLEANS, LA." on the certificate had been stamped with Oswald's rubber stamp but could draw no conclusion about the remaining stamped material. The circular impression resembling a seal was found to consist of the words "BRUSH IN CAN" printed in reverse, apparently made with the top of a solvent or cleaning fluid container, with a mottled center similar to the blank areas on a date stamp from Oswald's rubber stamping kit.

The Fair Play for Cuba Committee card bore two signatures, "L. H. Oswald" and "A. J. Hidell." Both Cole and Cadigan identified the "L. H. Oswald" signature as Oswald's handwriting but were unable to identify the "A. J. Hidell" signature. Cadigan noted differences suggesting someone other than Oswald authored it, and Cole believed the signature was somewhat beyond Oswald's penmanship abilities. Based on a short English interlinear translation written by Marina Oswald, Cole felt she might have been the author, though the sample was insufficient for positive identification. In subsequent Commission testimony, Marina stated she was indeed the author of the Hidell signature, and Cadigan confirmed this by obtaining further samples of her handwriting and comparing them with the signature on the card.

Cadigan's examination confirmed Marina Oswald's testimony that the handwriting in Commission Exhibit No. 1, the unsigned note written almost entirely in Russian using the Cyrillic alphabet, was that of Lee Harvey Oswald. Because the note was in Russian, Cadigan employed not only Oswald's English language handwriting standards but also letters written by Oswald in the Russian language to make the comparison.

Examination of the homemade paper bag found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository following the assassination was conducted using multiple methods because the heavy brown paper and glue-bearing brown paper tape contained no watermarks or distinctive characteristics. Cadigan compared the questioned paper and tape with known samples from the shipping department of the Texas School Book Depository obtained on November 22, 1963, examining them under natural and electric light, ultraviolet light, and microscopically; measuring their felting patterns, thickness to one one-thousandth of an inch, and fiber composition; and performing spectrographic analysis of metallic ions. The questioned and known items were identical in all measured properties (a 25-thousandths-of-an-inch width difference in the tape was not significant), while a paper sample obtained from the shipping room on December 1, 1963, was readily distinguishable. Tape examination revealed that all but two of the strip ends were irregularly torn, indicating a long strip had been drawn from a dispensing machine and torn by hand; small half-inch markings in a railroad-tie pattern down the center of the tape, made by a ridged wheel in a tape dispenser, matched the markings on tape from a dispenser located in the Texas School Book Depository shipping room. The number of lines per inch and line length on the bag tape was identical to that on the shipping room dispenser tape.

In response to questions about whether the wounds to President Kennedy and Governor Connally could have been caused by the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository Building, the Commission requested a series of wound ballistics tests using Western Cartridge Co. bullets and fragments of the type recovered from the Governor's stretcher and the Presidential limousine. To analyze the trajectory, velocity, and penetration power of the bullets after they struck and exited their initial victims, the tests were conducted on substances resembling the wounded portions of the bodies of President Kennedy and Governor Connally under conditions which simulated the events of the assassination.

During the Commission's inquiry, questions arose about whether the wounds inflicted on President Kennedy and Governor Connally could have been caused by the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository Building and Western Cartridge Co. bullets and fragments of the type found on the Governor's stretcher and in the Presidential limousine. Further questions were posed on the bullet's velocity and penetration power after exiting from the person initially struck, requiring trajectory analysis after impact. To address these and related questions, the Commission requested that a series of tests be conducted on substances resembling the wounded portions of the bodies of President Kennedy and Governor Connally under conditions simulating the events of the assassination.

At the request of the Commission, the Wound Ballistics Branch of the U.S. Army Chemical Research and Development Laboratories at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, conducted an extensive series of tests. The tests were performed by Dr. Alfred G. Olivier under the general supervision of Dr. Arthur J. Dziemian, with consultation from Dr. Frederick W. Light, Jr. Dr. Olivier received his doctorate in veterinary medicine from the University of Pennsylvania in 1953 and has been engaged in wound ballistics research at Edgewood Arsenal since 1957, currently serving as chief of the Wound Ballistics Branch. Dr. Dziemian, chief of the Biophysics Division, holds a Ph.D. from Princeton (1939) and has been engaged in wound ballistics work at Edgewood Arsenal since 1947, with prior research fellowships in physiology and anatomy. Dr. Light received both his M.D. (1930) and Ph.D. (1948) from Johns Hopkins, worked as a pathologist, and has been studying the pathology of wounding at Edgewood Arsenal since 1951. All three scientists testified before the Commission.

The Commission provided the Edgewood scientists with all relevant facts about the wounds inflicted on President Kennedy and Governor Connally, including the President's autopsy report and the reports and X-rays from Parkland Hospital. Drs. Olivier and Light personally discussed the Governor's wounds with his attending surgeons, Drs. Robert R. Shaw and Charles F. Gregory, and viewed the Zapruder films with Governor and Mrs. Connally. The Commission also supplied all known data on the source of the shots, the rifle and bullets used, and the distances involved. The Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found on the sixth floor of the Depository Building was turned over to the Edgewood testers, who obtained Western bullets of the type used by the assassin for their experiments.

The Edgewood scientists compared the penetrating power of Western bullets fired from the assassination rifle with other ammunition types. Western bullets fired from the Mannlicher-Carcano through two gelatin blocks totaling 72½ centimeters traveled in a straight line through 1½ blocks before their trajectory curved, ultimately burying themselves in a mound of earth. For comparison, an M-80 NATO round fired from an M-14 rifle showed substantially less penetrating power with quicker tumbling and earlier energy release. A .257 Winchester Roberts soft-nosed hunting bullet became deformed almost immediately upon entering the gelatin and released its energy very rapidly. The tests concluded that the Western bullet fired from the Mannlicher-Carcano had "terrific penetrating ability" and would retain substantial velocity after passing through portions of the human body.

After reviewing the autopsy report, the Edgewood scientists simulated the portion of the President's neck through which the bullet passed, determining it traveled through 13½ to 14½ centimeters of tissue. They constructed three blocks—one 20-percent gelatin composition and two from different animal meats—to duplicate the neck tissue. Using the assassination weapon at a range of 180 feet (later confirmed between 174.9 and 190.8 feet), Western bullets were fired through the substances, producing an average entrance velocity of 1,904 feet per second. The materials were covered with clipped animal skin to simulate human skin, and the average exit velocities were 1,779 fps from gelatin, 1,798 fps from the first meat, and 1,772 fps from the second meat. The tests concluded that the bullet lost little velocity in penetrating the President's neck, retained most of its stability (producing only slightly elongated exit holes compared to round entry holes), and would have had substantial impact on the Presidential limousine or anyone else struck by the exiting bullet.

To approximate the Governor's chest injuries, an animal was shot with the assassination weapon using Western bullets at a distance of 210 feet (later determined to be 176.9 to 190.8 feet in the actual events). The average striking velocity of 11 shots at 210 feet was 1,929 feet per second, with an average exit velocity of 1,664 feet per second. One shot produced an injury on the animal's rib very similar to that inflicted on Governor Connally, with the bullet traveling along the eighth left rib and causing a similar fracture pattern. The X-ray of the animal wound (Commission Exhibit No. 852) showed remarkable similarity to the Governor's chest wound (Commission Exhibit No. 681). The bullet that produced this wound (Commission Exhibit No. 853) was flattened similarly to Commission Exhibit No. 399 found on Governor Connally's stretcher, though the animal bullet was somewhat flatter, indicating greater speed. After passing through the animal, the bullet left an imprint on the velocity screen nearly the length of the bullet, indicating it was traveling sideways or end over end. Accounting for the Governor's greater girth, the bullet's velocity reduction in passing through his body was estimated at 400 feet.

Following identical procedures used in the chest wound simulation, the wound ballistics experts reproduced the Governor's wrist wound by firing Western bullets from the assassination weapon at 210 feet into bone structures. The most similar test shot was analyzed in testimony, with X-rays (Commission Exhibits Nos. 854 and 855) showing a fracture very similar to the Governor's wrist wound depicted in Commission Exhibits Nos. 690 and 691. The average striking velocity was 1,858 feet per second, with an average exit velocity of 1,786 fps (measured for 7 of 10 shots). These tests demonstrated that Governor Connally's wrist was not struck by a pristine bullet, because the bone structure suffered greater damage than the Governor's wrist, and the bone structure exhibited a smaller entry wound and larger exit wound characteristic of pristine bullets, while the Governor's wrist showed a larger entry wound indicating a tumbling bullet with substantially reduced velocity. Additionally, if Commission Exhibit No. 399 (the bullet found on the Governor's stretcher) had caused the wrist wound as a pristine bullet, its nose would have been considerably flattened as was Commission Exhibit No. 856.

Both Drs. Olivier and Dziemian expressed the opinion that one bullet caused all of Governor Connally's wounds, with the wrist wound explained by the bullet passing through the chest, losing substantial velocity, tumbling through the wrist, and slightly penetrating the Governor's left thigh. The wound ballistics tests supported the conclusion of Governor Connally's doctors that all his wounds were caused by a single bullet. It was also deemed most probable that the same bullet passed through the President's neck and then inflicted all of the Governor's wounds. The wrist wound indicated that the bullet yawed in the air between the two men and lost substantially more than 400 feet per second passing through the Governor's chest, since a chest-exit velocity of 1,500 fps would have produced a more extensive wrist wound. A yawing bullet loses more velocity through the body than a pristine one, and the greater flattening of the animal bullet (CE 853) compared to CE 399 suggests the bullet entering the Governor's chest had already lost velocity passing through the President's neck. The large wound on the Governor's back was explained by a yawing bullet, though a tangential strike could also account for it. Dr. Light testified that the anatomical findings alone were insufficient for a firm opinion, but based on the relative positions in the automobile, he concluded it was probable the same bullet traversed the President's neck and inflicted all the Governor's wounds.

Ten shots were fired at reconstructed skulls (inert skulls filled with 20 percent gelatin and coated with additional gelatin to simulate soft tissue, draped with simulated hair) from a distance of 270 feet using the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle and Western bullets. Onsite tests later determined the President was struck from a distance of 265.3 feet. One skull was struck 2.9 centimeters to the right and almost horizontal to the occipital protuberance—virtually the precise point of entry described by the autopsy surgeons. The bullet blew out the right side of the reconstructed skull in a manner very similar to President Kennedy's head wounds. Two fragments from this test bullet closely resembled two fragments found in the front seat of the Presidential limousine (Commission Exhibits Nos. 567 and 569), with a group of small lead particles also similar to those recovered from under the left jump seat and from the President's head. Dr. Olivier concluded that the Western bullet fired from the Mannlicher-Carcano at 270 feet would produce the same type of wound found on the President's head. Although he had previously doubted such a stable bullet could cause a massive head wound, the tests showed that the skull bones were sufficient to deform the end of the bullet, causing it to expend great energy and blow out the side of the skull. The tests confirmed that the President's head wound was not caused by a dumdum bullet, that the fragments found on and under the front seat most probably came from the bullet that struck the President's head, and that damage to Governor Connally's wrist could not have resulted from a fragment of the head shot bullet.

Paul M. Stombaugh of the FBI, a specialist in hairs and fibers since 1960, testified on four objects: (1) the green and brown blanket found in the Paines' garage (Commission Exhibit No. 140); (2) the homemade paper bag found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository following the assassination (Commission Exhibit No. 142); (3) the shirt worn by Oswald on November 22, 1963 (Commission Exhibit No. 150); and (4) the C2766 rifle (Commission Exhibit No. 139). Stombaugh has made thousands of hair and fiber examinations and has testified in Federal and State courts in approximately 28 States.

This section introduces the general principles of microscopic forensic examination applied to hairs and fibers. It establishes that while individual hairs are not unique in the way fingerprints are, an expert can typically distinguish hairs between different individuals and between human races (Caucasian, Negroid, Mongoloid) based on multiple characteristics. Stombaugh is cited as having performed approximately 1,000 Caucasian hair comparisons and 500 Negroid hair comparisons without finding any indistinguishable Caucasian pair.

Hairs consist of a central medulla of air cells, a cortex containing pigment granules and cortical fusi, and a cuticle with an outer scale layer. Although not individually unique like fingerprints, human hairs can be distinguished from animal hairs, and hairs from different racial groups can be differentiated by color, texture, size, diameter fluctuation, cuticle thickness, pigment distribution, and cross-sectional shape. Experts can usually distinguish hairs of different individuals.

Both natural and artificial fibers can be distinguished microscopically, though individual fibers are not unique. Color is the major identifying characteristic, with microscopes revealing 50–100 shades of green or blue and 25–30 shades of black. Three fiber types are discussed: cotton (a natural fiber resembling a twisted soda straw, available mercerized or unmercerized), wool, and viscose (an artificial fiber typically containing a delustering agent appearing as tiny spots, with hundreds of possible diameter variations).

Commission Exhibit No. 140, received by Stombaugh on November 23, 1963, was composed of approximately 1–2% woolen, 20–35% cotton, and the remainder delustered viscose fibers. The viscose showed 10–15 different diameters and shade variations (suggesting scrap viscose), while the cotton showed seven to eight shades of green but uniform twist. The blanket was folded into a narrow right triangle shape with a safety pin and string tied in a granny knot with bow-knot dangling ends. A 10-inch hump in the blanket matched the length and shape of the C2766 rifle's telescopic sight. Foreign hairs and fibers were found, with several limb and pubic hairs matching Oswald's samples in numerous distinctive characteristics; other hairs did not match Oswald.

Commission Exhibit No. 142, received November 23, 1963, showed only fingerprint powder and insignificant white cotton fibers on its exterior. Inside, examiners found a minute wood fragment, a waxy particle, a single brown delustered viscose fiber, and several light-green cotton fibers. The brown viscose fiber matched blanket viscose fibers in shade, diameter, and delustering agent distribution, and each green cotton fiber matched blanket green cotton fibers in shade, twist, and unmercerized condition.

Commission Exhibit No. 150, received November 23, 1963, was composed of gray-black, dark blue, and orange-yellow cotton fibers. The orange-yellow and gray-black fibers were uniform in shade, while the dark-blue fibers came in three different shades. All fibers were mercerized with substantially uniform twist.

Commission Exhibit No. 139, received the morning of November 23, 1963, had been dusted for fingerprints, causing Stombaugh to doubt finding exterior fibers. Most fibers found were dirty, old, fragmented, and lodged in crevices or on greasy deposits. However, a "fresh" tuft of clean, unfragmented fibers had caught on a jagged edge where the metal butt plate met the wooden stock and was folded into the crevice by the fingerprint brush. The tuft contained six or seven orange-yellow, gray-black, and dark-blue cotton fibers that matched comparable shirt fibers in shade and twist. Stombaugh concluded the fibers could easily have come from the shirt, though identical shirts could not be excluded.

Two photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald holding a rifle were found in Mrs. Ruth Paine's garage at 2515 West Fifth Street in Irving, Texas: Commission Exhibit No. 133-A (rifle held in front of body) and 133-B (rifle held to his right). A negative of 133-B and photographs of General Walker's house rear were also found there. An Imperial reflex camera, which Marina Oswald testified she used to take the photographs, was later produced by Robert Oswald. FBI photographic expert Lyndal D. Shaneyfelt testified regarding the photographs, negative, and camera.

Photographs 133-A and 133-B share virtually identical background and lighting, differing mainly in pose. Photograph 133-A displays more rifle characteristics than 133-B. Shaneyfelt rephotographed 133-A and took new comparison photos of the C2766 rifle in matching poses. While he found the pictured rifle similar to the C2766, including a shared stock notch, he could not positively identify the 133-A rifle as the C2766 beyond other rifles of the same configuration. Photograph 133-B shows less of the rifle but reveals that the pictured rifle had a homemade rope sling, whereas the C2766 found post-assassination had a homemade leather sling.

Shaneyfelt examined the negative (Commission Exhibit No. 749) and determined that 133-B had been printed from it, either directly or through an indistinguishable internegative. He believed 133-B was printed directly from the negative, since copy negatives typically show detectable loss of detail and imperfections. Any intermediate print would have been virtually indistinguishable from 133-B.

The Imperial camera (Commission Exhibit No. 750) was a relatively inexpensive, fixed-focus, single-shutter-speed, U.S.-made box camera. Shaneyfelt compared the camera to the negative by examining the microscopic irregularities along negative image margins—shadowgraphs of the camera's film-plane aperture edge, illustrated in Commission Exhibit No. 751. Because manufacturing handwork and accumulated wear make each camera's aperture edges distinctive (analogous to rifle barrel characteristics), Shaneyfelt could determine whether the negative had been produced by this specific camera.

Shaneyfelt compared his photographic analysis methodology to toolmark identification, confirming the techniques were very similar. [A10-401]

Based on his examination of the shadowgraph visible on Commission Exhibit No. 749, Shaneyfelt determined that the negative had been taken with the Imperial camera. He also identified three edges of the shadowgraph of the film-plane aperture in one of the photographs of General Walker's house, confirming it was also taken with Oswald's Imperial Reflex camera. However, Shaneyfelt could not determine whether 133-A had been photographed with the Imperial camera because the negative was not found and the print did not show a shadowgraph area. [A10-402, A10-403]

During interrogations, Oswald had claimed 133-A was a composite, stating the face was his but the body was not. Shaneyfelt examined both 133-A and 133-B and concluded they were not composites, noting with very minor reservation that he could not entirely eliminate an extremely expert composite. He observed no inconsistencies in lighting, lens configuration, or other characteristics typical of composite photographs. [A10-404, A10-405]

Shaneyfelt confirmed that he used the technique of magnification in his analysis, which would normally reveal characteristic marks where the edge of an added head had not been entirely retouched out in a composite photograph. He found no such characteristics in 133-A and 133-B. [A10-405]

Shaneyfelt's examination of Commission Exhibit No. 749 showed absolutely no doctoring or composition. Since the negative was made in Oswald's Imperial camera (Commission Exhibit 750), creating a composite of 133-B would have required putting two pictures together and rephotographing them in the Imperial camera without leaving a discernible trace. Shaneyfelt characterized this scenario as "beyond reasonable doubt" and "in the realm of the impossible." [A10-406, A10-407, A10-408]

Following the assassination, photographs similar to 133-A appeared in various newspapers and magazines with minor differences from 133-A and from each other. Shaneyfelt examined several reproductions and concluded that individual publishers had taken reproductions of 133-A and retouched them for clarifying purposes, accounting for the observed differences. His conclusion was confirmed when one publisher submitted its original retouched photograph, and other publishers either confirmed their retouching practices or failed to contradict his testimony. [A10-409, A10-410, A10-411, A10-412, A10-413]

Appendix XI compiles reports relating to the interrogation of Lee Harvey Oswald at the Dallas Police Department. Oswald was interrogated for approximately 12 hours between 2:30 p.m. on Friday, November 22, 1963, and 11:15 a.m. on Sunday, November 24, 1963. There were no stenographic or tape recordings of these interviews. Several investigators present at the interrogations prepared memoranda of their recollections prior to testifying before the Commission. The appendix presents the most important of these reports, beginning with Capt. J.W. Fritz's report.

Capt. J.W. Fritz of the Dallas Police Department submitted a detailed report titled "Interrogation of Lee Harvey Oswald." The report describes the investigation at the Texas Book Depository Building on November 22, 1963, including the discovery of three empty cartridge cases, the rifle found partially hidden under boxes, and the notification from Mr. Roy S. Truly that Oswald had left the building. Fritz then traveled to City Hall with Dets. R.K. Sims and E.L. Boyd, where he learned of Officer J.D. Tippit's shooting in Oak Cliff and that Oswald had been brought in as a suspect. Fritz instructed officers to bring Oswald to his office, and during the interview he was joined by FBI agents Jim Bookhout and James P. Hosty, who had been requested by Gordon Shanklin, Agent in Charge of the FBI Dallas office. The report covers multiple interrogation sessions over November 22-23, 1963, including showups, complaints signed before the District Attorney's office, and Oswald's arraignments before Judge David Johnston.

During the initial interrogation, Fritz asked Oswald basic identifying questions about his employment at the Texas School Book Depository, his usual work location (second floor), and his location at the time of the shooting. Oswald claimed to be having lunch on the first floor, then later said he was on the second floor drinking a Coca-Cola when stopped by a police officer. Oswald explained leaving the building early by stating there was too much excitement for more work to be done that day. When asked about a rifle, Oswald denied ownership, claiming he had only seen one at the building a few days earlier being examined by Mr. Truly and employees. Oswald stated he went to his room at 1026 North Beckley, changed his trousers, got his pistol, and went to a picture show, carrying the pistol "like boys do when they have a gun." Fritz also noted that Oswald asked for an attorney and was told he could have any attorney he liked and use the telephone, with Oswald expressing a desire to talk to Mr. Abt, an attorney in New York. [References showups at 4:35 pm, 6:30 pm, and 7:55 pm]

Throughout the interrogations, Oswald consistently denied owning a rifle. He admitted to seeing a rifle at the building a few days before the assassination and claimed Mr. Truly and some employees were looking at it. When asked if he owned a rifle in Russia, Oswald responded that one cannot buy a rifle in Russia, only shotguns, and stated he had owned a shotgun in Russia. Marina Oswald had informed Fritz that she thought the rifle might have been brought from New Orleans, which Oswald denied. She also said the rifle looked like her husband's and that he had been keeping it in the garage at Mrs. Paine's home in Irving. Marina could not positively identify the rifle but said it looked like her husband's. Fritz instructed officers to conduct thorough searches of both the Paine garage and Oswald's room on Beckley.

Oswald provided various statements about his movements and belongings. He stated he left the building by bus, rode to a stop near home, and walked to his house, with a bus transfer found in his pocket at the time of arrest. When questioned about a cab driver (William Wayne Whaley) who thought he recognized him, Oswald admitted riding a cab, explaining the bus was traveling too slowly in heavy traffic, and recounted an incident where a lady also wanted a cab. Oswald said he reached home by cab, changed both his shirt and trousers before going to the show, and that his cab fare was 85 cents. He claimed to have put the changed clothing in the dirty clothes. Regarding the long package, Oswald denied bringing it to work, claiming he had only brought a cheese sandwich and some fruit for lunch. Oswald explained living in a room while his wife lived in Irving by stating that Mrs. Paine was learning Russian, his wife needed help with the baby, and it was a convenient arrangement. He stated he owned no car but that the Paines had two cars, and that he had left sea bags with personal belongings at the Paine garage after returning from New Orleans in September. Oswald also denied telling Buell Wesley Frazier why he had gone home a different night or anything about bringing back curtain rods.

When asked about his political beliefs, Oswald stated he had none but that he belonged to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, telling Fritz the organization had headquarters in New York and that he had been Secretary for the organization in New Orleans when he lived there. Oswald also stated that he supported the Castro Revolution. During a later interview, Fritz asked Oswald about a card from his purse showing membership in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which Oswald admitted was his. He was also questioned about another identification card in his pocket bearing the name "Alex Hidell," which he said he had picked up in New Orleans while working in the Fair Play for Cuba organization.

Agent Hosty asked Oswald if he had been in Russia, and Oswald replied that he had been in Russia for three years. When asked if he had written to the Russian Embassy, Oswald confirmed he had. Oswald became very upset and arrogant with Hosty during questioning, accusing him of accosting his wife two different times, and would hit his fist on the desk when Hosty attempted to talk to him. Oswald explained that Hosty had mistreated his wife when talking with her. Hosty also asked Oswald if he had been to Mexico City, which Oswald denied. Oswald stated he spoke Russian, corresponded with people in Russia, and received newspapers from Russia.

Interviews on November 22 were interrupted by showups where witnesses identified Oswald positively as the man who killed Officer Tippit. Showups were held at 4:35 pm, 6:30 pm, and 7:55 pm. At 7:05 pm, Fritz signed a complaint before Bill Alexander of the District Attorney's office, charging Oswald with the Tippit murder. At 7:10 pm, Tippit was arraigned before Judge Johnston. After reviewing all the evidence pertaining to the killing of President Kennedy before District Attorney Henry Wade, his assistant Bill Alexander, and Jim Allen, former First Assistant District Attorney of Dallas County, Fritz signed a complaint charging Oswald with the murder of President Kennedy at 11:26 pm. Oswald was arraigned before Judge David Johnston at 1:35 am on November 23, 1963, and was placed in jail about 12:00 midnight, then brought from jail for arraignment at 1:36 am.

On November 23 at 10:25 AM, Oswald was brought from jail for an interview. Present were FBI agent Jim Bookhout, Forrest Sorrells (special agent and in charge of Secret Service), United States Marshall Robert Nash, and Homicide officers. During this interview, Fritz talked to Oswald about his leaving the building and he told Fritz he left by bus, rode to a stop near home, and walked to his house, with a bus transfer found in his pocket at arrest. Oswald admitted the transfer was given to him by the bus driver. Regarding the cab ride, Oswald confirmed riding a cab due to slow bus traffic and recounted an incident where a lady also wanted a cab and he told her to "take another cab." Oswald said he reached home by cab, changed both his shirt and trousers, and his cab fare was 85 cents, with the changed clothing placed in the dirty clothes. About his location at the time of the President was killed, Oswald said he ate lunch with some of the "colored boys" who worked with him, including one called "Junior" and another short man whose name he did not know, eating a cheese sandwich and some fruit. He denied bringing the long package described by Mr. Frazier and his sister. Oswald explained living separately from his wife by stating Mrs. Paine was learning Russian, his wife needed help with the baby, and it was a convenient arrangement. He said he did not know Mr. Paine well but thought Mr. and Mrs. Paine were separated a great deal of the time. Oswald stated he owned no car, that the Paines had two cars, and that he had left sea bags with personal belongings at the Paine garage after returning from New Orleans in September.

Oswald stated he had a brother, Robert, who lived in Fort Worth (later found to be Denton), and described the Paines as close friends of his.

When asked about Communist Party membership, Oswald denied ever having a card but reiterated his membership in the Fair Play for Cuba organization. He also stated he belonged to the American Civil Liberties Union and paid $5.00 in dues. Oswald refused to answer questions about why he carried a pistol to the theater but disclosed he had purchased it several months earlier in Fort Worth, Texas.

Fritz observed that Oswald answered questions very quickly and asked if he had been questioned before. Oswald confirmed he had been questioned extensively by the FBI after returning from Russia, describing their use of hard, soft, and buddy methods, and asserting he was very familiar with interrogation techniques.

Oswald invoked his right to remain silent until speaking with his attorney, stating he lacked money to call Mr. Abt but was offered a collect call using the jail phone. He expressed preference for Abt specifically because of Abt's defense of people charged under the Smith Act, and expressed confidence the ACLU would provide counsel if Abt was unavailable. Oswald later thanked Fritz for allowing him telephone use during subsequent interviews.

Oswald reported living at 1907 Magazine Street in New Orleans and having worked for the William Riley Company near that address.

When asked about prior arrests, Oswald described a confrontation with anti-Castro individuals while working with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and recounted participating in a radio debate in New Orleans against anti-Castro opponents.

Oswald stated he had no views on President Kennedy personally but liked his family, and emphasized he held his own views on national policies. He refused to take a polygraph test, citing his prior refusal of an FBI polygraph. During this interview, FBI Agent Bookhout, Mr. Kelley, and the Marshall also questioned Oswald.

Fritz questioned Oswald about the various places he had lived in Dallas in an effort to identify where a photograph of him holding a rifle had been taken. Oswald discussed one residence but was evasive about the Neely Street address that Paine had described, which was later confirmed as the location where the photograph was made. Oswald stated his belongings were kept at Mrs. Paine's residence and at a location on Beckley, and was returned to jail at 1:10 PM.

At 6:00 PM, in the presence of Jim Bookhout, Homicide officers, and Inspector Kelley, Fritz showed Oswald an enlarged photograph of him holding a rifle and wearing a pistol, which had been enlarged by the Crime Lab from a picture found in Mrs. Paine's garage. Oswald denied the picture was his, claiming his face had been superimposed onto someone else's body. When informed the photograph was recovered from Mrs. Paine's garage, he stated it had never been in his possession. Examining the smaller version, Oswald claimed expertise in photography and alleged someone had constructed the image using photographs taken during his transfers at City Hall. He declared he would not answer further questions and was returned to jail around 7:15 PM.

At 9:30 AM on November 24, Fritz showed Oswald a map of Dallas recovered from his North Beckley room that bore a marking near where the President was shot. Oswald denied any connection to the assassination and said the map had been used to locate buildings where he sought employment. Inspector Kelley questioned Oswald about his religious views, to which he responded evasively, disagreeing with certain religious philosophies; when asked directly about belief in a Deity, Oswald declined to answer.

A federal officer asked Oswald whether Cuba would be better off following Kennedy's assassination. Oswald responded that someone else would likely assume the presidency, perhaps Vice-President Johnson, whose views would largely mirror Kennedy's. Fritz again questioned Oswald about the gun and the rifle photograph, prompting continued denials of any knowledge of the picture or rifle. Oswald denied ever living on Neely Street, dismissing friends' claims as mistaken. During this interview he declared himself a Marxist, stating "I am a Marxist, but not a Leninist-Marxist," identified the New Orleans radio station as one that carried Bill Stakey's program, again denied knowing Alex Hidell in New Orleans, and reiterated his support for Fair Play for Cuba.

Chief Jesse E. Curry arrived to confirm readiness for Oswald's transfer to the County Jail, and arrangements were made for security in the basement after Fritz objected to cameras obstructing the jail door. Oswald's original shirt had been sent to the Washington crime lab, and he was permitted to select a replacement shirt from his belongings, ultimately choosing a black Ivy League style shirt over a T-shirt. Despite Fritz's suggestion that a hat might camouflage his appearance during the transfer, Oswald declined. Officer J. R. Leavalle handcuffed Oswald's left hand to his right, and the group departed for the transfer.

Fritz noted that the report was prepared from rough notes and memory, acknowledging that questions attributed to particular interviews might actually belong to separate sessions. He described the adverse conditions of his 9-foot 6-inch by 14-foot office, which had only one front door and forced the prisoner through crowds of hundreds of people over approximately 20 feet during each transfer to the jail door. The office was surrounded by large glass windows with officers working nearby, lacked record-keeping facilities, and Fritz was frequently interrupted to speak with witnesses or gather information from other officers.

FBI Special Agents James P. Hosty Jr. and James W. Bookhout entered Captain Fritz's interview room at 3:15 PM to find Oswald already being interviewed. After being advised of his rights, Oswald adopted a hostile attitude toward the FBI and made uncomplimentary remarks; he requested that his handcuffs be moved from behind his back to in front, which Fritz accommodated. Oswald denied owning a rifle but mentioned observing Mr. Truely display one at the Texas Schoolbook Depository, and denied any visits to Mexico except Tijuana. He admitted residing in the Soviet Union for three years with many friends and relatives of his wife. He acknowledged being secretary of the New Orleans Fair Play for Cuba Committee, receiving a Marine Corps marksmanship award, living at 1026 N. Beckley under the name O. H. Lee, and being employed at the Texas Schoolbook Depository since October 15, 1963. He claimed to have eaten lunch on the first floor, gone to the second floor Coca-Cola machine, been on the first floor when the President passed, gone home by bus, changed clothes, and attended a movie, while carrying a pistol because he "felt like it." He admitted fighting the arresting officers and denied shooting Officer Tippit or President Kennedy; the interview concluded at 4:05 PM when Oswald was removed for a lineup. The document bears File # DL 89-43 and was dictated on 11/23/63.

Oswald was advised of his right to remain silent, that any statement could be used against him, and of his right to counsel before being asked for descriptive and biographical data. He declined to explain his possession of a Selective Service photograph card bearing the name "ALEK JAMES HIDELL." When the interview appeared prolonged, Oswald remarked that he recognized the agent's tactics, comparing them to a similar agency in Russia, before ultimately providing his employment information. The biographical data obtained included: white male, born October 18, 1939, in New Orleans, Louisiana; 5'9", 140 pounds, medium brown hair, blue-gray eyes, no tattoos or scars; mother Marguerite Oswald (practical nurse in Arlington, Texas, not seen for about a year), father Robert Lee Oswald (deceased August 31, 1939), wife Marina with two infant children, and brothers John Oswald (last known in Fort Worth five or six years earlier, working in pharmaceuticals) and Robert Oswald of 7313 Davenport, Fort Worth. His wallet contained his Social Security card and a Selective Service System card photo with "Notice of Classification" in the name "ALEK JAMES HIDELL" (SSN 42-224-39-5321), classification IV____ (?), dated February 5, 1962, from Texas Local Board 400 West Vickery, Fort Worth, bearing erasures, retyped information, and the longhand signature "ALEK J. HIDELL"; the reverse side referenced Local Board 114 for LEE HARVEY OSWALD (SSN 41-114-39-532), 3124 West 5th Street, Fort Worth, registered September 14, 1959, with clerk Mrs. Zola Z. Burger.

This section catalogs the personal identification documents and effects found on or associated with Lee Harvey Oswald. Items include a snapshot of an apparent wife and an infant, a consular card referencing the USSR Embassy in Washington, D.C., and a Department of Defense Identification Card (No. N4,271,617) listing Oswald's military service data. Additional items include a Dallas Public Library card, a U.S. Forces Japan identification card, a hotel complimentary card, a Certificate of Service in the U.S. Marine Corps (October 24, 1956 to September 11, 1959), and Fair Play for Cuba Committee membership cards issued in New York and New Orleans under both Oswald's name and the alias A. T. Hidell. A Selective Service classification card (IV-A, February 2, 1960, Fort Worth) and thirteen dollars in currency are also listed. The inventory concludes with Oswald's residential history (including 2515 West 5th Street in Irving and a room at 1026 North Beckley in Dallas) and his recent employment record at Jaggers-Chiles-Stovall, William B. Riley Company, and the Texas State Book Depository.

This section contains an FBI FD-302 report dated November 25, 1963 (dictated November 24, 1963), documenting an interview of Oswald at the Dallas Police Homicide and Robbery Bureau conducted by Captain J. W. Fritz in the presence of Special Agent James W. Bookhout. Oswald denied owning any rifle and stated that he had seen a rifle two days earlier at the Texas School Book Depository in the possession of Mr. Truly and two other gentlemen. Oswald described his activities on November 22, 1963, claiming that at the time of the building search he was on the second floor after purchasing a Coca-cola from a soft-drink machine. He stated that after being identified to a police officer by Mr. Truly, he took his Coke to the first floor, ate lunch in the employees' lunch room, stood outside with foreman Bill Shelly for five to ten minutes, and then went home. Oswald said he left work because, based on Shelly's remarks, he did not expect more work that day, and he subsequently went to a movie where he was arrested. He added that his regular hours were 8:00 a.m. to 4:45 p.m. and that his duties required him to visit multiple floors of the building.

This section reproduces a second FBI FD-302 report documenting an interview of Oswald at the Homicide and Robbery Bureau on November 23, 1963 (dictated November 24, 1963), attended by Captain Fritz, Special Agent Bookhout, Secret Service personnel T. J. Tully and David B. Grant, U.S. Marshal Robert I. Nash, and Dallas detectives. Oswald stated that after leaving the Book Depository he boarded a city bus, obtained a transfer, and ultimately took a cab from the bus to his North Beckley apartment after two blocks due to traffic; he described a fare of approximately 85 cents, a woman who asked the driver to call her a cab, and that he changed his reddish button-down shirt and gray trousers upon arriving home. He denied bringing any package to work, denied telling Wesley Frazier that he went to Irving to obtain curtain rods, and described eating a cheese sandwich and apple alone in the Depository lunch room. Oswald denied owning or possessing a rifle, denied keeping a rifle in Ruth Paine's garage (acknowledging stored sea bags, suitcases, and boxes), denied Communist Party membership, claimed membership in the ACLU, and stated he had purchased a pistol about six months earlier without disclosing the source. He denied shooting the President and asked to contact Attorney Abt in New York; he also declined a polygraph examination without counsel and admitted carrying a Selective Service card bearing the name Alek James Hidell without discussing its use.

This section contains an FBI FD-302 report dated November 25, 1963, documenting an interview of Oswald conducted at 6:35 p.m. on November 23, 1963, by Captain Fritz in the presence of Special Agent Bookhout. Captain Fritz exhibited to Oswald a photograph obtained by search warrant from the garage of Ruth Paine's Irving, Texas residence, depicting Oswald holding a rifle and wearing a holstered pistol. Oswald stated that he would not discuss the photograph without advice of an attorney, suggested that the head in the photograph could be his but that the body might be that of another person, and proposed the possibility that news media photographs had been used by police to "doctor up" the image. Oswald denied purchasing any rifle from Kleins Store in Chicago, Illinois. He also complained that during a lineup he had not been permitted to wear a jacket similar to those worn by other individuals in the lineup.

This section reproduces the first interview report prepared by U.S. Secret Service Inspector Thomas J. Kelley following the assassination. At approximately 10:30 a.m. on November 23, 1963, Kelley attended an interview with Oswald at the Homicide Division of the Dallas Police Department, attended by Special Agent Jim Bookhout, Captain Will Fritz, U.S. Marshal Robert Nash, Special Agent David Grant, Special Agent in Charge Sorrels, and Officers Boyd and Hall; the interview was unrecorded, with Sorrels and Kelley present as observers. Oswald recounted leaving work by bus, securing a transfer, and later changing his account to say he exited the bus after two blocks and took a cab home for an 85-cent fare after the driver told him the President had been shot. He described going home, changing into clean clothes, and placing a reddish button-down shirt in a dresser drawer, and said his lunch of cheese, bread, fruit, and apples was the only package he had brought to work. Oswald stated that Mrs. Paine practiced Russian by having his wife live with her, denied ever owning a rifle, identified his brother Robert's Fort Worth address, denied Communist Party membership, confirmed ACLU membership, and stated he had purchased the pistol found on him approximately seven months earlier, refusing to answer further questions about firearms until consulting a lawyer.

Section heading introducing a chronological record of the interviews conducted with Lee Harvey Oswald on November 23, 1963, in the offices of Captain Will Fritz of the Dallas Police Homicide Division. Inspector Kelley's narrative is presented in summary form, covering an earlier morning interview and two subsequent interviews that day.

At approximately 12:35 P.M. on November 23, 1963, Oswald was interviewed in Captain Fritz's office with Inspector Kelley, Detectives Senkel and Tiernon, and FBI SA James Bookhout present. Fritz sought to determine the location of Oswald's belongings in Dallas; Oswald stated that most of his personal effects, including a sea bag, were stored in the garage at Mrs. Paine's residence at 2515 West 5th Street, Irving, Texas. The interview ended at about 1:10 P.M., after which Homicide Division detectives obtained a search warrant and recovered the effects. Among the items seized were snapshot photographs of Oswald holding a rifle and copies of *The Militant* and *The Worker*, with a holstered revolver visible on his right side. These photographs were enlarged by the Dallas Police Laboratories and used as the basis for further questioning later that evening.

At 6:00 P.M. on November 23, 1963, in Captain Fritz's office, Oswald was shown the enlargements of the photographs depicting him holding a rifle and pistol. Oswald sneered at the images, claiming they were fakes produced by superimposing a rifle and pistol onto earlier police photographs of him. He engaged Fritz in an extended argument about photographic enlargement processes and refused to identify the images as himself or to disclose the location shown in the photograph. Despite Fritz's patience and tenacity, Oswald provided no further information, and the interview was terminated at about 7:15 P.M.

A Preliminary Special Dallas Report # 3, designated CO-2-34,030, dated November 29, 1963, from the U.S. Secret Service to Chief Inspector Kelley. The report covers Oswald's third interview on the morning of November 24, 1963, and the circumstances immediately following his shooting and death, and is signed "TJK:VS" by Inspector Kelley.

The third interview began at approximately 9:30 A.M. on Sunday, November 24, 1963, in Captain Fritz's office, with Postal Inspector Holmes, SAIC Sorrels, Inspector Kelley, and four Homicide Squad members present. When asked to identify where the photograph of him with the gun had been taken, Oswald refused to discuss the matter. Questioned about communism, Oswald stated he was a Marxist but not a Marxist-Leninist. He described his involvement with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, including his arrest for disturbing the peace during a demonstration, and denied knowing or seeing Alex Hidell. Oswald offered political commentary, stating Cuba should have full diplomatic relations with the United States and predicting no change in American policy toward Cuba under President Johnson. He described himself as an avid reader of Russian literature and a subscriber to *The Militant*. Asked whether, as a Marxist, he believed religion was an opiate of the people, Oswald affirmed this and suggested the Catholic Church was incompatible with communism. An Enco street map of Dallas found among his effects bore markings, which Oswald attributed to his job search. Kelley then privately approached Oswald, identifying himself as Secret Service and offering to interview him once counsel was obtained; Oswald declined pending attorney consultation. Captain Fritz terminated the interview after determining Oswald would not cooperate.

Following the interview, Oswald was provided with different clothing including a sweater. After Captain Fritz confirmed arrangements with the County Jail, he and Homicide Bureau detectives escorted Oswald from the third-floor Homicide Office to the basement, where Oswald was shot by Jack Ruby. SAIC Sorrels and Kelley rushed to the basement, where Kelley found Oswald unconscious and in very serious condition. Captain Fritz informed Kelley that Oswald had been shot by Jack "Rubio," a tavern operator known to police. Kelley accompanied the stretcher to the ambulance but was unable to board the following cruiser. Special Agents Warner and Patterson arrived at Parkland Hospital shortly after Oswald; one or the other remained in close proximity throughout treatment. Oswald made no statements after being shot, remained unconscious during transport and treatment, and died. At the time of his death, Kelley, Detective Daugherty, and Colonel Garrison of the Texas State Police were on the fifth floor arranging a security room. Kelley proceeded to the morgue and arranged for the family to view the body. Oswald's family, except brother Robert, viewed the body before autopsy, accompanied by the hospital chaplain. Burial arrangements were made through the chaplain and another clergyman, and the family was taken to a secluded location under the protection of Special Agents Kunkel and Howard and the Irving, Texas police. SAIC Bouck advised that President Johnson and the Attorney General were concerned for the family's safety; Kelley confirmed the family was already under Secret Service protection. Later, SA Robertson of the FBI inquired about the family's safety; Kelley confirmed protection was in place and the family was available for FBI interviews, though Robertson indicated no immediate interview was planned.

A formal report dated December 17, 1963, from U.S. Postal Inspector H. D. Holmes in Dallas, Texas, providing an informal memorandum of the interview he participated in with Lee Harvey Oswald on the morning of November 24, 1963.

The memorandum describes the interview conducted between approximately 9:25 a.m. and 11:10 a.m. on Sunday, November 24, 1963, with participants including Inspector Holmes, Captain Will Fritz of the Dallas Police, Forrest V. Sorrels (Local Agent in Charge, Secret Service), Thomas J. Kelly (Inspector, Secret Service), and three detectives assigned to guarding Oswald who did not participate in the interrogation.

Oswald's Interrogation Demeanor and Assassination Denial Holmes characterized Oswald as alert, composed, and mentally disciplined, quick to answer questions he wished to address and skillful at parrying those he did not. Holmes doubted Oswald would ever have confessed. Oswald emphatically denied any involvement in or knowledge of the shootings of Officer Tippit and President Kennedy, claiming his detention stemmed solely from having "popped a policeman in the nose in a theater on Jefferson Avenue."

P. O. Boxes Oswald was questioned about three rented post office boxes. Box 2915 at the Main Post Office was rented in his own name prior to his move to New Orleans, with two keys, and used solely by him. He denied ever ordering a rifle or money order through it and claimed he owned no rifle other than possibly a small-bore .22 since his Marine Corps days. A New Orleans box (30061) was used for subscriptions, including Russian publications, and the application listed Marina Oswald and A. J. Hidell as persons entitled to receive mail—Oswald explained his wife's inclusion but merely shrugged at Hidell's. Box 6225 at the Terminal Annex postal station, rented after his return to Dallas, listed "Fair Play For Cuba Committee" and "American Civil Liberties Union" as the corporation, details Oswald professed not to recall, though he admitted paying the rental himself.

Organizations - Membership In Oswald was evasive about ACLU membership. He described the Fair Play for Cuba Committee as a loosely organized group in New Orleans that he essentially served as secretary, writing letters and attempting to collect monthly dues of $1.00, while denying he was sent to Dallas to organize a local cell. He emphatically denied being a communist, insisting he was a pure Marxist and distinguishing communism as Lenin-Marxism. He stated Karl Marx was his religion, dismissed the Bible as uninteresting and philosophically weak, and claimed to have read nearly everything written by or about Marx.

Marine Corp Service Oswald bristled when Captain Fritz mentioned a dishonorable discharge, insisting his discharge had originally been honorable and was changed only because he had attempted to renounce his American citizenship while in Russia. When that renunciation did not materialize, he wrote to Secretary of the Navy Connally, who replied respectfully but indicated the matter would be referred to his successor (named by Oswald as Cork, Kurth, or something similar) since Connally was resigning to run for Governor of Texas. Oswald showed no particular animosity toward Connally during this discussion.

Map Oswald explained that a map of Dallas found among his effects was an old city map on which he had marked X's to denote the locations of firms advertising job vacancies, since he had no transportation and relied on walking or buses. Most of the marked locations were in the Industrial area. He stated he learned of his Texas School Book Depository job through general neighborhood information, primarily from people near Mrs. Payne's home, and the X at Elm and Houston marked the spot where he had been hired.

Activity Prior To and Following Assassination Attempt Oswald explained his unusual Thursday night (November 21) visit to his wife by saying he had learned she and Mrs. Payne were hosting a party for neighborhood children and he preferred not to be present. The next morning he brought a sack to work containing his lunch, which he said he placed in his lap or beside him on the front seat to avoid crushing it; he denied placing any package in the back seat, suggesting the driver was mistaken or recalling a different occasion. He described being invited to lunch by a Negro employee who went down and sent the elevator back; before he could descend, the commotion of the assassination began. After a brief questioning by a policeman—during which his boss vouched for him as an employee—he walked out the front door of the building.

A. J. Hidell Identification Card When Captain Fritz asked if Oswald knew anyone named A. J. Hidell, he denied it and denied ever using the name as an alias, claiming he had never heard it before. Upon being presented with the actual I. D. card found in his pocket bearing the name, Oswald flared up and declared, "I've told you all I'm going to about that card. You took notes, just read them for yourself, if you want to refresh your memory," adding that Holmes and Fritz already knew as much about it as he did.

Appendix XII: Speculations and Rumors Appendix XII addresses the myths and rumors that have surrounded the assassination. Noting that misconceptions often arise from mystery and sensational speculation, the Commission acknowledged that, lacking Oswald's testimony, it painstakingly reconstructed the facts and concluded that Oswald acted alone, without foreign or domestic conspiracy, and had no connection to Jack Ruby except as his victim. The Commission recognized that public judgment was shaped by various hypotheses and that the intense glare of worldwide publicity, combined with early press inaccuracies, local authorities' premature disclosures, typographical errors, and faulty tape transcriptions, contributed to a substantial body of misinformation. Witness accounts varied and were often influenced by the physical and emotional strain of the events. While many speculators acted in good faith and simply lacked complete information at the time, some informants recanted earlier claims of firsthand knowledge when speaking to official investigators. The Commission undertook critical examination of these theories, rumors, claimed sightings of Oswald or Ruby, and alleged overheard remarks, as detailed throughout its report.

The Commission examined and rejected speculations that some or all shots aimed at President Kennedy and Governor Connally came from the railroad overpass or from somewhere other than the Texas School Book Depository Building, including theories that shots came from both locations. Specific findings include: shots came from behind and above, with no evidence of shots fired from elsewhere than the Depository; the overpass was guarded by two Dallas policemen on November 22; no witnesses saw shots fired from the overpass—15 witnesses (2 policemen and 13 railroad employees) affirmed no shots came from there; no cartridge was recovered from the overpass; Mrs. Jean L. Hill's recollection of seeing a man running west was uncorroborated; no witness supports the claim of a motorcycle officer pursuing a couple from the overpass; the weight of evidence indicates three shots were fired; metal remains indicate at least two shots; no bullet was found on President Kennedy's stretcher (though an almost whole bullet was found on Governor Connally's); Deputy Sheriff Walthers denied finding a bullet; the Presidential car did not stop after the first shot; the windshield was not penetrated by any bullet; the throat wound was an exit wound, not an entry wound from the front; Parkland doctors did not turn the President over and were unaware of the neck wound until later; and motion pictures demonstrate all shots striking the President came from the rear after the car turned onto Elm Street.

The Commission addressed numerous speculations supporting the theory that Oswald could not have assassinated President Kennedy. Findings include: Oswald could have known the motorcade route because it was published in Dallas papers on November 19, at least 72 hours before he reported for work; the published route clearly showed the motorcade turning from Main onto Houston and then left onto Elm, with no mention of continuing on Main through the Triple Underpass; the route was decided on November 18 and not changed thereafter; the only permissible route from Main to the Stemmons Freeway was via Houston and Elm Streets, as a direct route from Main would have required an extremely difficult S-turn; Oswald likely did not carry curtain rods—the room had curtains and rods already, and no curtain rods were found in the empty package recovered near the window; Oswald did not spend the morning with other workers and was last seen on the sixth floor around 11:55 a.m. by Charles Givens; the chicken lunch remains on the sixth floor were eaten by Bonnie Ray Williams, not an accomplice; the chicken lunch was not 2 days old but left shortly after noon on November 22 by Williams; the 8-millimeter photograph shadow in the southeast corner window was from cartons, not silhouettes; the man on the front steps thought to be Oswald was actually Billy Lovelady; the post office box listing of "A. Hidell" cannot be verified because the relevant portion of the application was discarded, and "Hidell" was merely Oswald's alias; the Presidential car was traveling at approximately 11.2 miles per hour—a favorable target; and expert tests demonstrated Oswald could fire three shots from the Mannlicher-Carcano within 5½ seconds.

This section addresses speculations about Oswald's movements between 12:33 and 1:15 p.m. on November 22, 1963.

This section addresses speculations concerning the murder of Patrolman Tippit.

This section addresses speculations about Oswald after his arrest.

This section addresses speculations concerning Oswald's time in the Soviet Union.

This section addresses speculations concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City.

This section addresses speculations concerning Oswald and U.S. Government agencies.

This section addresses speculations about conspiratorial relationships.

This section addresses miscellaneous charges related to the assassination.

The Commission rejected speculation that Oswald lacked the marksmanship ability to commit the assassination. Oswald qualified as a marksman and sharpshooter with the M-1 rifle in the Marine Corps, and Marina testified he practiced operating the bolt of his rifle in New Orleans. Experts noted the scope was a substantial aid for rapid, accurate firing.

The Commission found that the rifle did not bear any manufacturer's name visible upon examination. An inscription indicated it was made in Italy. The weapon was identified as a 6.5 Mannlicher-Carcano by Captain Fritz and Lieutenant Day, who were the first to handle it.

Deputy Constable Seymour Weitzman speculated the rifle was a 7.65 Mauser, but the Commission found he did not actually handle the weapon and had only a brief glimpse of it. The Mauser and Mannlicher-Carcano are similar in appearance. Police laboratory technicians later correctly identified the weapon as a 6.5 Italian rifle.

The Commission found no evidence of a second rifle on the roof of the Texas School Book Depository or on the overpass, or in any other location. The shots that struck President Kennedy and Governor Connally came from the single rifle found on the sixth floor of the building.

While a work tag was found at the Irving Sports Shop indicating scope mounting on a rifle for "Oswald" in early November, the Commission found that the rifle found on the sixth floor had already had its scope mounting holes bored prior to shipment to Oswald in March 1963. The Commission concluded the tag's authenticity was doubtful and that Oswald owned only one rifle.

The Commission determined the ammunition was American-made by Western Cartridge Company, which still manufactures such ammunition. Experts fired the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle more than 100 times with the same type of ammunition without any misfires, demonstrating the ammunition's reliability.

The Commission confirmed the FBI's statement that the palmprint lifted from the rifle by Dallas police was Oswald's. The FBI informed the Commission that no agent made any statements to the press regarding the existence or nonexistence of this print.

The Commission found that the poor quality of the rifle's metal and wooden parts would have absorbed moisture from skin, making clear prints unlikely. There was no evidence Oswald wore gloves or wiped the rifle. Incomplete latent fingerprints were found but could not be identified.

The Commission found that the paraffin tests were conducted by Dallas Police and the Criminal Investigation Laboratory. The FBI stated that Special Agent Shanklin never made any public statement claiming the test was positive and proved Oswald fired a rifle, and the Commission found no evidence he made such a statement.

The Commission found no evidence that Marina Oswald ever told authorities she did not know her husband owned a rifle or pistol. On the afternoon of November 22, she told police he owned a rifle kept at the Paine garage in Irving. Before the Commission, she identified the Mannlicher-Carcano 6.5 as the "fateful rifle of Lee Oswald."

The Commission found that Life magazine, Newsweek, and the New York Times had retouched the photo of Oswald with the rifle, inadvertently altering configuration details. Photographic experts identified the rifle in the original print as a Mannlicher-Carcano 6.5, the same type found on the sixth floor. FBI experts testified the picture was taken with Oswald's camera.

The Commission found the picture was not a composite. Marina testified she took the photo with Oswald's Imperial Reflex camera and identified the man as her husband. Photographic experts concurred the image was not a composite.

Time tests demonstrated that Oswald could have placed the rifle behind a box and descended to the second-floor lunchroom before Patrolman Baker and Roy Truly arrived. Oswald was not holding a soft drink bottle or standing by the machine when confronted; he was entering the lunchroom as Baker glimpsed him through the door's glass panel.

Both Patrolman Baker and Roy Truly stated that Oswald was the only person in the lunchroom when they entered. No other witness to this incident was found by the Commission.

Police may have begun taking positions at building exits as early as 12:33 p.m., but full blocking was unlikely until at least 12:37 p.m. Oswald was seen near an exit at about 12:33 p.m. and likely had at least seven minutes to exit the building undetected.

The Commission addressed the thesis that Oswald could not have reached 10th Street and Patton Avenue in time to encounter Tippit by 1:16 p.m. Reenactments confirmed Oswald could reach his roominghouse at 1026 North Beckley Avenue by approximately 1 p.m. or earlier, then walk the nine-tenths of a mile to the encounter location.

The Commission found that no suspect description was broadcast over Dallas police radio before 12:45 p.m. on November 22, and Oswald was not named before his arrest. The initial description broadcast was similar to Oswald but lacked specific details like hair and eye color, most likely originating from witness Howard Brennan.

Time tests conducted by investigative agencies and the Commission staff established that all of Oswald's attributed movements between leaving the Depository and encountering Tippit could have been accomplished within the available time.

The Commission found no witness who saw Oswald leave the building. The speculation likely arose from his encounter with Patrolman Baker in the lunchroom, where Truly identified him as an employee, allowing him to proceed. Police did not seal the building until several minutes after Oswald could have left.

Cabdriver William Whaley's log showed 12:30 p.m. for Oswald's entry, but Whaley testified he was not accurate with time entries, typically logging at 15-minute intervals and sometimes several trips later. A bus transfer in Oswald's possession was issued after 12:36 p.m. The Commission determined Oswald likely entered the cab around 12:47 or 12:48 p.m.

The Commission found the distance from the Greyhound terminal to where Oswald exited in the 700 block of North Beckley was less than 2.5 miles. Whaley testified the trip took 6 minutes, and Commission staff test runs under similar traffic conditions took approximately 5 minutes and 30 seconds. Walking from Beckley and Neely to 1026 North Beckley took staff 5 minutes and 45 seconds.

The Commission found no evidence that Oswald and Jack Ruby knew each other, had any relationship through third parties, or that Oswald knew where Ruby lived. There was no reason to believe Oswald was on his way to Ruby's apartment when stopped by Tippit.

The Commission found that Tippit was unquestionably patrolling in the area directed by police headquarters. There was no evidence that Tippit and Oswald knew each other or had ever met. A description attributed to one eyewitness that didn't fit Oswald was denied by her and unsupported by other witnesses.

The Commission found that Dallas police policy required approximately 80 percent of day-shift patrolmen (7 a.m. to 3 p.m.) to work alone. Tippit was assigned to work alone that day, consistent with department policy rather than in violation of standing orders.

The Commission found that Tippit's department file and radio log showed he was directed following the President's shooting to move into and remain in the central Oak Cliff area for emergencies, not assigned to downtown Dallas at the time of the encounter.

The Commission found that other police cars were operating in the Oak Cliff area at the same time as Tippit. These officers participated in the search and apprehension of Tippit's slayer, contradicting the claim that police had been withdrawn from the area.

The Commission found that the Dallas Police Department had no requirement or regulation requiring officers to notify headquarters when stopping to question a suspect. Therefore, Tippit did not violate any radio procedure in failing to notify the dispatcher when stopping Oswald.

The Commission found no certain way to know whether Tippit recognized Oswald from the radio description. The radio log showed the dispatcher noted a similarity between descriptions of the President's assassin and Tippit's slayer at 1:29 p.m. The Commission considered it conceivable and probable that Tippit stopped Oswald based on the broadcast description.

The Commission found no evidence that Oswald and Tippit were acquainted, had ever seen each other, or had mutual acquaintances. Witnesses to the shooting observed no signs of recognition between the two men.

The Commission established the shooting of Tippit at approximately 1:15 or 1:16 p.m. based on Domingo Benavides's call to police headquarters on Tippit's car radio. Mrs. Helen Markham's estimate of just after 1:06 p.m. was found to be uncertain and inconsistent across her various statements and testimony.

The Commission identified multiple witnesses to Tippit's killing beyond Mrs. Markham, including Domingo Benavides (who called police at 1:16 p.m.), cabdriver William Scoggins parked nearby, and Barbara Jeanette Davis and Virginia Davis, who saw a man with a pistol crossing their lawn. All witnesses except Benavides subsequently identified Oswald in a lineup as the slayer.

Mrs. Markham described the Tippit killer as about 30, short, with bushy hair, and wearing a white coat—a description that does not fit Oswald. The Commission reviewed allegations that she described the killer as short, stocky, and bushy-haired, but noted that during the lineup, Oswald was not wearing the jacket he wore at the time of the shooting, and Mrs. Markham testified that her identification was based "mostly from his face." She has denied ever describing the killer with those specific characteristics, and in a transcribed telephone conversation, she reaffirmed her positive identification of Oswald while denying the alleged description.

Speculation suggested that an unidentified woman interviewed by the FBI witnessed the Tippit shooting and claimed to have seen two men involved who ran off in opposite directions. The Commission found that the only female witness known to them was Helen Markham, and the FBI never interviewed any other woman claiming to have seen the shooting. Two other women, Barbara Jeanette Davis and Virginia Davis, saw the killer immediately after the shooting as he crossed a lawn but did not witness the shooting itself, and both were interviewed by the FBI and appeared before the Commission.

Speculation claimed that no witness saw Oswald between the time he was supposed to have reloaded his gun near the Tippit shooting scene and his appearance at the shoe store on Jefferson Boulevard. The Commission identified six witnesses who saw Oswald in flight after the Tippit murder: Ted Callaway and Sam Guinyard saw him, gun in hand, in the block of Patton Avenue between 10th Street and Jefferson Boulevard, and later identified him in a police lineup; Warren Reynolds and Pat Patterson saw a man with a pistol running south on Patton Avenue and subsequently identified Oswald's picture; Harold Russell also saw a man with a gun running south on Patton Avenue and identified him as Oswald; and Mrs. Mary Brock saw a man she later identified as Oswald walk quickly into a parking lot behind a service station where Oswald's jacket was found.

Speculation suggested that Oswald left his roominghouse at about 1 p.m. on November 22 wearing a zipper-type tan plaid jacket. The Commission found that the jacket Oswald wore during the Tippit slaying was light gray, and according to Marina Oswald, her husband owned only two jackets—one blue and the other light gray. The housekeeper at 1026 North Beckley Avenue, Mrs. Earlene Roberts, was not certain about the color of the jacket Oswald wore when he left the house.

Speculation claimed Oswald wore an olive-brown plain jacket visible in all pictures of him after his arrest. The Commission found that Oswald was not wearing a jacket at the time of his arrest, and the jacket subsequently recovered in a parking lot and identified as his was light gray. No witnesses stated that Oswald wore an olive-brown jacket immediately before or after his arrest, and the Commission saw no pictures of Oswald after arrest showing such a jacket, with pictures showing him in the shirt Mrs. Bledsoe described him wearing on the bus at approximately 1:40 p.m.

Speculation suggested that Oswald's landlady, Mrs. A. C. Johnson, said Oswald never had a gun in his room. The Commission found that Mrs. Johnson testified he "never brought that rifle in my house," but acknowledged he could have had a pistol because they found the scabbard. As detailed in chapter IV, Oswald kept his rifle in the Paine garage in Irving while living in Dallas during October and November, and the pistol was small and easily concealed.

Speculation claimed there was absolutely no place to hide a gun in Oswald's room at 1026 North Beckley Avenue. The Commission found that police discovered a pistol holster during a search of Oswald's room after his apprehension, and Mrs. Johnson stated she had not seen the holster before. There is no reason to believe Oswald could not have hidden both a pistol and the holster in the room, as Oswald's pistol was small with the barrel cut down to 2¼ inches and could have been concealed in a clothing pocket.

Speculation suggested Oswald did not pick up the revolver from his room at 1 p.m. The Commission found reason to believe Oswald did pick up the revolver from his room, probably concealing it beneath his jacket. This likelihood is reinforced by the discovery of the pistol holster in the room after the assassination, indicating that Oswald did not store the pistol at the Paine home where he spent the night before the assassination.

Speculation claimed that no one saw Oswald enter the Texas Theatre. The Commission found that nearby shoe store manager Johnny C. Brewer and theatre cashier Julia Postal saw Oswald enter the lobby of the theatre, from where he proceeded into the theatre proper.

Speculation claimed that none of the people in the Texas Theatre at the time of Oswald's arrest came forward as eyewitnesses. The Commission found that Johnny C. Brewer, the shoe store manager, and two theatre patrons—John Gibson and George Jefferson Applin, Jr.—were present in the theatre and testified before the Commission about the circumstances of Oswald's arrest. Only 6 or 7 people were seated on the main floor of the theatre at the time.

Speculation suggested there was no independent witness aside from the police who testified that Oswald was carrying a gun when arrested. The Commission found that Johnny Brewer testified before the Commission that he saw Oswald pull a gun and saw it taken away from him by a policeman.

The Commission found that assertions that Dallas police treated Oswald brutally and denied him constitutional rights to legal counsel had no foundation in fact, and insinuations that police officials and District Attorney Henry M. Wade fabricated or altered evidence were baseless. While officials made errors in providing evidential information to the press, these were the result of misapprehensions or ignorance rather than intent. The Commission also addressed the alleged "Darryl Click" taxicab driver claim, finding that no such person existed; the attribution came from an error in transcription of a press conference where a reference to the "Oak Cliff" area was rendered as a person's name. Regarding the brutality allegation specifically, the Commission found that Oswald resisted arrest in the Texas Theatre and drew a gun, receiving a slight cut over his right eye and a bruise under his left eye during his struggles, but was neither ill-treated nor abused while in police custody.

Speculation suggested Oswald was never formally charged with the assassination of the President and was charged only with the shooting of Patrolman Tippit. The Commission found that Oswald was arraigned for the murder of President Kennedy before Justice of the Peace David Johnston on the fourth floor of the Police Department building at 1:35 a.m. on November 23, and had previously been arraigned before Johnston for the murder of Tippit at 7:10 p.m. on November 22.

Speculation suggested the police questioned Oswald extensively about the Tippit murder on the first day of his detention but not about the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission found that Dallas police officials stated they questioned Oswald repeatedly on November 22 about the assassination and his relationship to it, with Captain Fritz asking Oswald to account for himself at the time the President was shot during the first interrogation. FBI agents present also confirmed that he was questioned about the President's assassination.

Speculation suggested Oswald's attempts to obtain legal counsel were deliberately thwarted by the police and he was cut off from outside calls. The Commission found that on November 23, Oswald was visited by Dallas Bar Association president H. Louis Nichols, who offered help in getting a lawyer, which Oswald refused. Oswald was told he could use the telephone when he wished and did make telephone calls, attempting to reach attorney John Abt in New York unsuccessfully, with Mrs. Paine also trying without success to reach Abt at Oswald's request. Oswald was also visited by his wife, mother, and brother, any of whom could have helped him obtain counsel.

Oswald's residence in the Soviet Union for more than 2½ years aroused speculation after his arrest that he was a Soviet agent, supported by assertions that he received exceptionally favored treatment from the Soviet Government in entering and leaving the country, particularly because his Russian wife and child were permitted to leave with him. The Commission's careful analysis led to the conclusion that there is no credible evidence that Oswald was a Soviet agent and that he did not receive unusually favorable treatment in entering or leaving the Soviet Union or in returning to the United States.

Speculation suggested that a young private in the Marine Corps in the 1950s could not study Marxism, learn Russian, and read Soviet newspapers without adverse repercussions in his unit. The Commission found that while Oswald's interest in the Soviet Union was well known, his interest in Marxism was apparently known to only a few fellow Marines, and while stationed in California, he studied Russian, taking an official proficiency test in February 1959 that rated him "Poor." The reactions of fellow Marines aware of his Marxist and Soviet interests were apparently not antagonistic and did not deter him from pursuing them.

Speculation suggested Oswald learned Russian during his Marine Corps service as part of his military training. The Commission found that Oswald never received any Russian language training from the Marine Corps, and his Russian studies were entirely on his own time and at his own initiative.

Speculation suggested Oswald could not have saved $1,600 from his Marine pay for his 1959 trip to Russia. The Commission found that in November 1959, Oswald told American reporter Aline Mosby in Moscow that he had saved $1,500 (not $1,600) while in the Marines, and it is consistent with Oswald's known frugality that he could have saved the money from the $3,452.20 in pay he received. Additionally, despite his statement, he may not have actually saved $1,500, as the trip could have been made for considerably less.

Speculation suggested that Oswald likely had prior contacts with Soviet agents before entering Russia in 1959 because his visa application was processed and approved immediately upon receipt. The Commission found no evidence that Oswald was in touch with Soviet agents before his visit, and the time taken to receive his visa in Helsinki for entry to the Soviet Union, while shorter than average, was not beyond the normal range. Had Oswald been recruited as a Russian agent while in the Marines, it would be most improbable that he would have been encouraged to defect, as he would have been of greater value to Russian intelligence as a Marine radar operator.

Speculation suggested that Soviet suspicion of Oswald was indicated by his being sent to work in a radio plant in Minsk as an unskilled hand at the lowest pay rate, despite qualifying as a trained radar and electronics technician. The Commission found that the Soviet Government probably was suspicious of Oswald, as it would be of any American appearing in Moscow wanting to live in the Soviet Union, and it was expected that he would be placed in a non-national security position. Additionally, Oswald had been a radar operator, not a technician, in the Marines, and his total income in Russia was higher than normal because his pay was supplemented for about a year by Soviet "Red Cross" payments—an official agency that Oswald believed really came from the MVD—as part of a Soviet policy to subsidize Western defectors to maintain their previous standard of living.

Speculation suggested Oswald was trained by the Russians in a special assassin school at Minsk. The Commission found no evidence to support this claim or the existence of such a school in Minsk during Oswald's time there, and while Oswald belonged to a hunting club near Minsk, there is no evidence this was other than an ordinary hunting club.

Speculation suggested that Marina Oswald's father was an important part of the Soviet intelligence apparatus. The Commission found that Marina's father died while she was still an infant, and the reference is presumably to her uncle, Ilya Prusakov, who was an executive in the lumber industry, a position carrying the rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Since 1953, the MVD has not been concerned with internal security or other police functions.

Speculation suggested it was most exceptional that Oswald was able to bring his wife and child out of the Soviet Union with him. The Commission found no reason to believe the Oswalds received unusually favorable treatment in being permitted or assisted to leave the Soviet Union together, noting that other American citizens have brought their Russian wives out of the Soviet Union, both before and after Oswald.

Speculation suggested Oswald would never have been permitted to return to the United States if Soviet intelligence had not planned to use him against the United States. The Commission found no evidence that Oswald had any working relationship with the Soviet Government or Soviet intelligence, and noted that the Russians have permitted other American defectors to return to the United States.

Speculation suggested that the prompt granting of Marina Oswald's exit visa indicated Soviet authorities wanted her to accompany her husband. The Commission found that Marina's exit visa application was not acted upon with unusual rapidity, taking at least 5½ months from application to notification of permission in December 1961, with many instances of visas being granted more quickly to other Soviet wives of American citizens. Regarding another speculation that Soviet authorities gave Oswald a month and a half advance notice of his visa grant—an unprecedented act—the Commission found that the Oswalds were notified on December 25, 1961 that their visa requests had been granted, with Marina picking up her visa on January 11, 1962 (17 days after notice) and Oswald not picking up his until May 22. The Soviets did not give advance notice, and the visas could have been picked up immediately had they desired; Oswald delayed picking up his visa due to its 45-day expiration period, waiting until he could arrange a departure date after receiving State Department permission to return in May.

This section examines seven major speculations concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City in late September and early October 1963. The Commission found no credible evidence that Oswald traveled to Mexico pursuant to an assassination plot, received related instructions, or obtained large sums of money. Specific findings rebut claims that Oswald received his June 1963 passport through special intervention (24 other passports were authorized simultaneously), that the Walter-McCarran Act required an affidavit he did not file (the Act contains no such requirement), and that he lacked funds for the trip (a 7-day journey costing less than $85). The Commission also refuted allegations that Oswald traveled with companions, made a clandestine flight to Havana, or returned with $5,000. A claim that Fidel Castro's November 27, 1963 speech contained a revealing slip about Oswald's visits to Cuba was disproven by USIA monitoring of the actual tape, which showed Castro merely misspoke about the "Cuban Embassy" before correcting to "Cuban consulate."

This section addresses suspicions that Oswald was an agent, informant, or operative of the FBI or CIA, as well as claims about government surveillance and knowledge prior to the assassination. The Directors of both agencies testified that Oswald was never employed or used by their organizations, and the Commission's own investigation of federal files confirmed he was not an agent of any U.S. government agency aside from his Marine service. Specific findings rebut Marguerite Oswald's claims that her son was an agent, Pauline Bates's alleged "secret agent" statement (Bates denied the report and explained her assumption about the State Department), and speculation that the FBI tried to recruit Oswald (Agent Hosty's name and number were provided to Oswald through Ruth Paine for contact purposes). The Commission also found that Dallas police did not know Oswald's address before the assassination, that the FBI had no policy of informing employers about suspected Communist employees, that the FBI did not regard Oswald as a potential killer, that the rifle was successfully traced within 24 hours with no prior information, and that the last FBI interview with Oswald before the assassination occurred in New Orleans in August 1963.

This section examines rumors of conspiratorial relationships involving Oswald, Jack Ruby, Patrolman J.D. Tippit, General Edwin A. Walker, and Bernard Weissman. The Commission conducted intensive inquiries into backgrounds and relationships but found no credible evidence linking these individuals in any plot. Specific findings establish that the three men's residences were miles apart, that there was no evidence Ruby lent Oswald money (an IRS analysis showed Oswald could repay his State Department loan from earnings), and that television and film evidence showed no recognition between Oswald and Ruby before the shooting. A German newspaper allegation that the FBI intervened to prevent Dallas police from arresting Oswald and Ruby for the Walker attack was traced to a fabricated statement by a newspaper editor. Claims of Oswald being seen at the Carousel Club with Ruby, of prearranged meetings between Tippit, Weissman, and Ruby, and of Eva Grant's statement that Ruby and Tippit were "like brothers" (denied by Grant) were all investigated and found baseless. The Commission also found no evidence Ruby was active in organized crime, and no connection between Warren Reynolds's shooting and the assassination.

This section addresses miscellaneous rumors that did not fit into the preceding categories. The Commission found no evidence linking Oswald to the January 1958 death of Marine Pvt. Martin D. Schrand at Cubi Point, Philippines, despite Oswald's presence at that station; the official Marine investigation had ruled the death an accidental discharge. A claim that the Texas School Book Depository was municipally owned (making Oswald a city employee requiring official sponsorship) was disproven, as the Depository was a private corporation and Oswald obtained his position through Ruth Paine's arrangement of an interview with Superintendent Roy Truly. Finally, the Commission found that neither the Dallas police nor the Secret Service had searched other buildings along the motorcade route or elsewhere in Dallas prior to the President's visit, contrary to speculation, and that such building searches were not Secret Service practice.

Sheriff E. J. Decker of Dallas County transmitted a radio dispatch on November 22 ordering officers to respond to trouble at the Texas School Book Depository. The Dallas Times-Herald reported that Decker came on the air at 12:25 p.m., but the official radio log shows his message was issued 40 seconds after 12:30 p.m., with no messages logged between 12:20 p.m. and that time.

A claim that Dallas police on November 22 had placed supporters of school integration under surveillance was investigated. The Dallas Police Department reported that the only person under surveillance in connection with the President's visit was at the Trade Mart, and the Commission found no evidence that integration supporters were surveilled.

A rumor that Oswald was seen practicing with a rifle at Dallas-area shooting ranges was examined. Marina Oswald stated her husband mentioned practicing in March or April 1963, and witnesses reported seeing him at ranges in October and November 1963, but investigation could not confirm the man seen was Oswald.

Despite speculation that Oswald could drive and was seen in cars, the Commission found that Oswald did not have a driver's license. Both Marina Oswald and Ruth Paine testified he could not drive, and there is no confirmed evidence of his driving; however, Mrs. Paine did give him some short driving lessons.

A claim that Oswald collected money via Western Union telegraph before the assassination was investigated. Employee C. A. Hamblen initially claimed to have seen Oswald collecting wire transfers but could not confirm the identification. Western Union records showed no money orders payable to Oswald or his known aliases, and an official concluded the allegation was unfounded.

A rumor that Oswald stopped in Alice, Texas, on his return from Mexico City in October 1963 to apply for a radio station job was investigated. The Commission found that Oswald traveled by bus, arriving in Dallas on October 3, and the bus did not pass through Alice. On October 4, he applied for jobs in Dallas and stayed at the Paine residence. Since Oswald did not own a car and likely could not drive, he could not have been in Alice on October 4.

Claims that Oswald or accomplices had arranged an airplane getaway were found to be entirely unsubstantiated. The Commission found no evidence of any prearranged escape plan following the assassination.

A rumor that $150 was found in the dresser of Oswald's room at 1026 North Beckley Avenue was investigated. The Commission found no money was discovered there; Oswald had left $170 at the Paine residence in Irving, and only $13.87 was on his person at arrest.

A claim that Dallas police found seven metal file boxes containing names of Castro sympathizers in Oswald's room was examined. Police inventories of property from the Beckley Avenue room do not include file boxes, and the small file boxes from the Paine residence contained letters, pictures, books, and literature—most belonging to Ruth Paine—with no lists of Castro sympathizers.

Speculation that Oswald's letters varied too greatly in quality for one person to have written them was investigated. The Commission found no evidence of outside help in the United States. His wife and mother testified he wrote multiple drafts of important letters, and even his better letters contained distinctive spelling, grammar, and punctuation errors common to his poorer efforts. His diary noted that his October 16, 1959, letter to the Supreme Soviet received help from Intourist Guide Rima Shirokova.

A rumor that a Black janitor witness who could identify Oswald was held in protective custody by Dallas police was investigated and found to have no factual basis. No such witness was kept in custody, and the story originated from a newspaper account based on hearsay.

A claim that the Secret Service incarcerated Marina Oswald after the assassination was examined. The Commission found that she was given protection by the Secret Service but retained freedom to communicate, move about, and terminate the protection at any time.

A rumor that FBI agent Bardwell D. Odum showed Marguerite Oswald a photograph of Jack Ruby the night before Ruby killed her son was investigated. Odum did show her a picture of a man on November 23, 1963, to see if she recognized him, but the Commission examined a copy of the photograph and determined it was not a picture of Jack Ruby.

A claim that the son of the Tippit slaying witness was arrested and died after falling from a jail window was investigated. William Edward Markham had no personal knowledge of the shooting. On June 30, 1964, another of Mrs. Helen Markham's sons, James Alfred Markham, was arrested for burglary; while attempting to escape, he fell from a bathroom window to a concrete driveway, was treated at Parkland Memorial Hospital, and remained in Dallas County Jail awaiting trial with a parole violation warrant outstanding.

A claim that the U.S. Army headquarters detachment began rehearsing for President Kennedy's funeral more than a week before the assassination was traced to an interview with Army Captain Richard C. Cloy. Cloy clarified that the rehearsal was conducted because of grave concern for former President Hoover's health, not in anticipation of Kennedy's death.

A rumor that the ship carrying Oswald to Europe in 1959 stopped in Havana was examined. The SS Marion Lykes sailed from New Orleans on September 20, 1959, and docked in Le Havre, France, on October 8, with only one previous stop at the French port of La Pallice—not Havana.

Appendix XIII presents a comprehensive biography of Lee Harvey Oswald, drawing on witness testimony, family records, and contemporary accounts to trace his life from his mother's early years through his upbringing, family circumstances, and formative experiences in New Orleans.

Marguerite Claverie, Lee Harvey Oswald's mother, was born in 1907 in New Orleans into a family of French and German extraction. After her mother died when Marguerite was young, she and her siblings were raised by their father, a streetcar conductor. Though the family was poor, Marguerite recalled a happy childhood. She completed one year of high school and, shortly before turning 17, began working as a receptionist for a New Orleans law firm.

In August 1929, Marguerite married Edward John Pic, Jr., a stevedoring company clerk. The marriage failed, and by summer 1931 they were separated; Marguerite was pregnant and said Pic refused to support her. Their son John Edward Pic was born on January 17, 1932. Marguerite then began seeing Robert Edward Lee Oswald, a married insurance premium collector. After both obtained divorces in 1933, they married on July 20 in a Lutheran church. Their son Robert, Jr., was born on April 7, 1934. In 1938, the Oswalds purchased a house on Alvar Street across from the William Frantz School. Robert Oswald died suddenly of a heart attack on August 19, 1939, and Lee Harvey Oswald was born on October 18, 1939.

Following Robert Oswald's death, Marguerite placed her two older sons, John and Robert, in the Evangelical Lutheran Bethlehem Orphan Asylum (Bethlehem Children's Home) in January 1942, contributing $20 monthly plus clothing. Lee was later admitted on December 26, 1942, after Marguerite could no longer leave him with her sister. The children had generally pleasant memories of the home, which had a Christian atmosphere, allowed considerable freedom, and was visited regularly by their mother.

In July 1943, Marguerite Oswald was hired to manage a small hosiery shop on Canal Street in New Orleans, where she quickly hired additional staff; however, she struggled with figures and was eventually discharged. Around the same time, she met Edwin A. Ekdahl, an electrical engineer originally from Boston, and they began a relationship. Ekdahl met the Oswald boys, and the family spent at least one weekend together at a resort area in Covington, Louisiana.

By January 1944, Mrs. Oswald and Ekdahl had decided to marry, prompting her to withdraw Lee from the Children's Home and move to Dallas. The marriage was postponed until the end of the school year so the older boys could finish at the home, while she cared for Ekdahl during his recovery from a serious illness, probably a heart attack. Upon arriving in Dallas, Mrs. Oswald decided not to marry Ekdahl and used proceeds from the Alvar Street house to purchase a home at 4801 Victor Street, renting out part of it. John and Robert joined her in June, enrolling the following September at Davy Crockett Elementary School.

After some hesitation, Mrs. Oswald resolved to marry Ekdahl in May 1945, influenced by his income and possibly his sister's earlier visit, which favored the marriage due to his ill health. An attempt to return the older boys to the home failed. Ekdahl got along well with the boys, lavishing them with attention, and John recalled that Lee seemed to find in Ekdahl the father he never had, becoming elated when his mother and Ekdahl reconciled after a separation. Because Ekdahl's business required frequent travel, John and Robert were placed in September at Chamberlain-Hunt Military Academy in Port Gibson, Mississippi, with Mrs. Oswald paying tuition from the Alvar Street proceeds; Lee accompanied his parents on their travels. Mrs. Evans testified that Marguerite was "too close" to Lee and spoiled him, which damaged her marriage to Ekdahl.

After John and Robert entered boarding school, the Ekdahls moved to Benbrook, a Fort Worth suburb, living on Granbury Road in a stone or brick house on a large plot. Lee was admitted to the first grade at Benbrook Common School on October 31, with his birth date incorrectly given as July 9, 1939, to meet the age requirement. On February 8, 1946, he was admitted to Harris Hospital in Fort Worth with acute mastoiditis; a mastoidectomy was performed without complications, and he was discharged in four days. Lee later reported an abnormal left eardrum, though a Marine physical a year later found no defects.

The Ekdahls' marriage quickly broke down, with Marguerite suspecting infidelity before the first year was out, finding Ekdahl stingy, and arguing about his refusal to share money. In summer 1946, she left him, picked up John and Robert from Chamberlain-Hunt, and moved to Covington, Louisiana, at 311 Vermont Street, where they were described as a happy family though Lee kept to himself. After the boys returned to boarding school, Lee enrolled in September at Covington Elementary School, having not completed the first grade at Benbrook despite satisfactory attendance and A's and B's.

Lee received no grades at Covington, from which he was withdrawn on January 23, 1947, after his parents reconciled and moved to Fort Worth at 1505 Eighth Avenue. Four days later, he enrolled at Clayton Public School, completing first grade with B's except A's in physical education and health. He entered second grade there in the fall but was withdrawn before grades were recorded as relations deteriorated. Continued arguments and Marguerite's discovery of Ekdahl with another woman culminated in her ordering him out in January 1948. Ekdahl filed for divorce in March, alleging cruel treatment; the jury found for Ekdahl, and on June 24, the court granted the divorce, returning Marguerite to her former name.

While the divorce was pending, Marguerite moved to a house at 3300 Willing Street, next to railroad tracks, signifying to John a return to lower-class circumstances. Lee was withdrawn from Clayton on March 18, 1948, and entered Clark Elementary School the next day, completing second grade with mostly B's and A's. A classmate, Philip Vinson, described Lee as a quiet, stocky, well-built boy who was a gang leader but not a bully. After the divorce, Mrs. Oswald purchased a small Benbrook house on San Saba Street with one bedroom, where Lee slept with his mother. She worked at a department store, a neighbor reported Lee resented discipline, and another witnessed Lee chase John with a knife, which their mother dismissed. The property was appraised at $2,750 and sold to neighbor Carlton at that price.

After the Benbrook house was sold, the family returned to Fort Worth due to employment, purchasing a two-bedroom frame house at 7408 Ewing, from which Robert and Lee could walk to school. John, then 16, took a job as a shoe stockboy, giving his mother $15 of his $25 weekly salary. Lee entered third grade at Arlington Heights Elementary, completing the year with A's in social studies, citizenship, science, art, and music, and a D in spelling. He transferred in September 1949 to Ridglea West Elementary, where he remained for three years, receiving mostly B's and some C's, with D's in spelling and arithmetic, and C's in Spanish, which contributed to his later familiarity with the language. His fourth-grade IQ was 103, and he did best in reading and worst in spelling on achievement tests. Teachers and neighbors characterized him as a lonely, quiet, shy, and rather solitary boy who returned home alone, read a lot, had a stamp collection, and played chess and Monopoly, though Richard Garrett found him easy to get along with and Hiram Conway considered him intelligent but quick to anger.

John returned to high school in January 1949 while working part time, and entered the Coast Guard early in 1950. Robert left school soon after, worked full time, and contributed most of his earnings to the family; he returned to school in 1951-52, and after completing his junior year, joined the Marines in July 1952. In August, Mrs. Oswald and Lee moved to New York, where John was living with his wife and baby in an apartment at 325 East 92d Street belonging to John's mother-in-law. Mrs. Oswald explained she did not want Lee alone while she worked, and moved to New York because she had family there.

The New York visit began well, with John taking leave to show Lee the city, including the Museum of Natural History and a Staten Island ferry ride. The atmosphere soured as Mrs. Oswald quarreled frequently with John's wife, contributed nothing toward her and Lee's support, and was seen by John's wife as setting Lee against her. The visit ended when Lee threatened Mrs. Pic with a pocket knife during a quarrel, and Lee also hit his mother, permanently destroying his good relationship with John. Mrs. Oswald and Lee moved to a one-room basement apartment at 1455 Sheridan Avenue in the Bronx; he had been enrolled at Trinity Evangelical Lutheran School but was withdrawn on September 26 after irregular attendance and enrolled at Public School 117 four days later. After moves to 825 East 179th Street and various jobs including Martin's Department Store and a hosiery chain, Lee was registered at Public School 117 until January 16, 1953, having been present only 15 full and 2 half days out of 64, receiving failing grades in most courses.

Lee's truancy increased after the move to the Public School 44 district, where he refused to attend; an attendance officer found him at the Bronx Zoo, clean and well-dressed but surly. Several truancy hearings in January led to a decision to begin judicial proceedings if truancy continued. Mrs. Oswald called the Community Service Society on January 16 seeking help, citing adjustment difficulties, but failed to keep a January 30 appointment, and the case was closed. On March 12, an attendance officer filed a petition alleging excessive absence, refusal to register at Public School 44, and being beyond his mother's control regarding school attendance; Mrs. Oswald appeared alone in court, reporting Lee refused to appear. Lee registered at Public School 44 on March 23, but on April 16, Justice Delany declared him a truant and remanded him to Youth House until May 7 for psychiatric study.

Lee was assessed at Youth House through a series of tests and interviews conducted by a staff social worker, probation officer, and Dr. Renatus Hartogs, the chief staff psychiatrist. The findings indicated Lee was withdrawn and socially maladjusted, with a mother who showed insufficient interest in his welfare. Mrs. Oswald, who visited and formed a highly unfavorable impression of the facility, opposed institutionalization. Dr. Hartogs recommended probation with referral to a child guidance clinic and urged Mrs. Oswald to contact a family agency, recommending that institutional placement occur only if probation-based treatment failed.

The probation officer's same-day referral to the Community Service Society was rejected due to the agency's full caseload and the intensive treatment Lee would require; the society confirmed this and closed the case on May 31. A parallel application to the Salvation Army was also declined because it could not provide the needed services.

Lee attended school regularly during the remaining weeks of the term and completed the seventh grade with low but passing marks in all academic subjects, though he failed a home economics course. His conduct was generally satisfactory, and he was rated outstanding in "Social-Participation." He belonged to a model airplane club and had a special interest in horseback riding. That summer, his brother Robert visited New York while on leave from the Marines; Robert did not perceive Lee as unhappy or behaving abnormally, and did not observe strain between Lee and his mother. Mrs. Oswald mentioned Lee's court appearance only in passing.

Lee entered the eighth grade at Public School 44, with his parole set to expire ten days later. Mrs. Oswald telephoned the probation officer on September 24, claiming Lee was well adjusted and that her court appearance was unnecessary; the parole was extended to October 29 pending a school progress report. The report was highly unfavorable: although Lee attended regularly, his conduct was unsatisfactory, he refused to salute the flag, did little work, and spent time sailing paper planes around the room. Justice Sicher extended parole to November 19 and directed referral to the Berkshire Industrial Farm or Children's Village.

After Mrs. Oswald's visit to the school, Lee's behavior improved and he received passing grades in most subjects, though teachers noted he was "quick-tempered," "constantly losing control," and "getting into battles with others." At the November 19 hearing, despite Mrs. Oswald's request that Lee be discharged, Justice Sicher continued parole until January 28, 1954, and directed the probation officer to contact the Big Brothers counseling service.

The Big Brothers caseworker visited the Oswald home on January 4, where he was cordially received but told by Mrs. Oswald that continued counseling was unnecessary; she pointed out that Lee attended the West Side YMCA every Saturday. The caseworker observed that Lee was plainly "displeased with the idea of being forced to join various 'Y' organizations." Mrs. Oswald announced her intention to return to New Orleans and was advised to obtain Lee's release from the court's jurisdiction. Multiple warnings were given to Mrs. Oswald not to remove Lee from the jurisdiction without court consent, prompted by her fear he would be retained in custody. Without further communication to the court, Mrs. Oswald and Lee returned to New Orleans before January 10.

The New York court dismissed Lee's case on March 11, 1954.

Lee and his mother initially stayed with the Murrets at 757 French Street in New Orleans. Lee enrolled in the eighth grade at Beauregard Junior High School on January 13 and completed the year without apparent difficulty. He entered the ninth grade in September with mediocre but acceptable marks. On October 1954 achievement tests, he did well in reading and vocabulary but poorly in mathematics. On his June 2, 1955 "personal history," he listed favorite subjects as civics, science, and mathematics; least favorite as English and art. His vocational preferences were biology and mechanical drawing, with post-high-school plans of "military service" and "undecided." He listed reading and outdoor sports (especially football) as recreations and answered "no" to whether he had any close friends in school.

Those who knew Lee in New Orleans remembered him as a quiet, solitary boy who made few friends. He was briefly a member of the Civil Air Patrol, considered joining an astronomy student organization, and occasionally played pool or darts with his friend Edward Voebel. He read extensively, including Communist literature from the public library, and walked or rode a bicycle, sometimes visiting a museum. He was not unusually argumentative or belligerent except with his mother, but did not avoid fights, which came frequently perhaps due to his aloofness and traces of a northern accent. His only close friendship, with Voebel, arose when Voebel helped tend his wounds after a fight. Friends of Mrs. Oswald thought Lee was demanding and insolent toward her and that she had no control over him.

While Lee was in the eighth and ninth grades, Mrs. Oswald worked first at Burt's Shoestore and then at the Dolly Shoe Co., where she was a cashier and salesclerk, remembered as pleasant and a good worker. At her request, the company hired Lee part time; he worked there, mostly on Saturdays, for about 10 weeks in 1955. On his school "personal history" he listed himself as a "retail shoesalesman," though his employer recalled they had tried unsuccessfully to train him as a salesman and that he had in fact been a stockboy.

After a short stay with the Murrets, Mrs. Oswald and Lee moved to an apartment owned by Myrtle Evans at 1454 Saint Mary Street, then to a less expensive apartment at 1452 Saint Mary Street, and in spring 1955 to 126 Exchange Place in the French Quarter. The school authorities were not advised of the moves earlier because Mrs. Oswald did not want Lee transferred from Beauregard. During summer 1955, Robert left the Marine Corps and spent a week with his mother and Lee in New Orleans before moving to Fort Worth, finding Lee unchanged.

Lee entered the tenth grade at Warren Easton High School that fall. After about a month, he presented a forged note in his mother's name dated October 7, 1955, claiming the family was moving to San Diego. He dropped out shortly before his sixteenth birthday. After turning 16, he tried to enlist in the Marines using a false affidavit from his mother claiming he was 17; the attempt failed. He then spent the next year reading and memorizing the "Marine Manual" obtained from Robert, waiting until he was old enough to join.

Lee worked for the rest of the school year. Between November 10 and January 14, he worked as a messenger boy for Gerald F. Tujague, Inc., a shipping company, earning $130 per month; his employer remembered him as quiet and withdrawn. In January he briefly worked as an office boy for J. R. Michels, Inc., and for several months thereafter was a messenger for the Pfisterer Dental Laboratory. His military record later described his prior civilian jobs as performing clerical duties such as distributing mail, delivering messages, answering the telephone, filing records, and operating ditto and letter-opening/sealing machines.

Anticipating Lee would join the Marines at 17, Mrs. Oswald moved to Fort Worth in July 1956, taking an apartment at 4936 Collinswood for herself, Lee, and Robert. In September, Lee enrolled in the tenth grade at Arlington Heights High School but attended only a few weeks, dropping out on September 28. A few days later, he wrote a letter dated October 3, 1956, to the Socialist Party of America, stating he was sixteen, a Marxist who had been studying socialist principles for over fifteen months, and requesting information about the Y.P.S.L. youth league. He turned 17 on October 18 and enlisted in the Marines on October 24.

On October 26, 1956, Oswald reported for duty at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego, assigned to the Second Recruit Training Battalion. He was 68 inches tall, weighed 135 pounds, and had no physical defects. On October 30, aptitude tests showed him significantly above the Marine Corps average in reading and vocabulary and significantly below average in arithmetic and pattern analysis, with a composite general classification score of 105 (2 points below average). He scored near the bottom in a radio code test. His duty preference was recorded as Aircraft Maintenance and Repair. He trained with the M-1 rifle; his practice scores were not very good, but he scored 212 on the December 21 record fire, qualifying as a "sharpshooter." He also practiced with a riot gun and .45-caliber pistol, with no scores recorded. He received 4.4 ratings in both "conduct" and "proficiency."

On January 18, 1957, Oswald reported to Camp Pendleton for further training, assigned to "A" Company, First Battalion, Second Infantry Training Regiment. After a little more than 5 weeks, he was rated 4.2 in conduct and 4.0 in proficiency. Fellow recruit Allen R. Felde stated that Oswald was generally unpopular and that his company was avoided by other men. On weekend leaves, Oswald accompanied the group on the bus to and from camp but did not stay with them in the city, instead leaving to be alone; this practice was repeated on other trips. On February 27, he went on a 2-week leave, possibly visiting his mother in Fort Worth.

On March 18, Oswald reported to the Naval Air Technical Training Center at the Naval Air Station in Jacksonville, Florida, where he attended the Aviation Fundamental School for 6 weeks, receiving basic instruction including radar theory, map reading, and air traffic control procedures. Both this course and his next assignment at Keesler required handling confidential material. He was granted final clearance to the "confidential" level on May 3 after local records disclosed no derogatory data. He completed the course the same day, ranking 46th in a class of 54, and was promoted to private first class effective May 1. He received ratings of 4.7 in conduct and 4.5 in proficiency, the highest ratings he ever attained.

Oswald left for Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi, Mississippi, the day his course was completed, traveling with a group of six marines led by Pfc. Daniel P. Powers. At Keesler he attended the Aircraft Control and Warning Operator Course, covering aircraft surveillance and radar use. Powers remembered Oswald as "a somewhat younger individual, less matured than the other boys" who was normally outside the group, noting his nickname was "Ozzie Rabbit." Oswald generally stayed to himself, often reading, did not play cards or work out with others, and spent weekends alone, possibly returning to New Orleans. He finished the course seventh in a class of 30 marines on June 17 and was assigned MOS Aviation Electronics Operator on June 25. He went on leave June 20, possibly visiting his mother, and received ratings of 4.2 in conduct and 4.5 in proficiency, which Powers thought was "pretty good."

On July 9, Oswald reported at the Marine Corps Air Station at El Toro, California, classified as a replacement trainee in the Fourth Replacement Battalion. On August 22, he departed San Diego for Yokosuka, Japan, aboard the U.S.S. Bexar. During the voyage, he taught Powers to play chess and they played frequently, sometimes more than four hours a day. Oswald read extensively; Powers recalled he read "a good type of literature," particularly Whitman's "Leaves of Grass." The Bexar docked at Yokosuka on September 12, and Oswald was assigned to Marine Air Control Squadron No. 1 (MACS-1), Marine Air Group 11, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, based at Atsugi about 20 miles west of Tokyo. As a radar operator in the less-than-100-man squadron, his function was to direct aircraft to their targets by radar via radio communication with pilots, and to scout for incoming foreign aircraft such as straying Russian or Chinese planes for interception.

On October 27, while opening his locker to remove gear, Oswald dropped a derringer .22 caliber pistol, which discharged and struck him in the left elbow. Fellow marine Paul Edward Murphy, in the next cubicle, heard the shot and found Oswald sitting on the locker calmly stating, "I believe I shot myself." Oswald remained in the naval hospital at Yokosuka until November 15.

The Judge Advocate General concluded that Oswald had displayed "a certain degree of carelessness or negligence" by storing a loaded revolver in his locker, but that his injury was incurred "in the line of duty" and not due to his own misconduct. He was charged with possession of an unregistered privately owned weapon in violation of general orders. Following a court-martial on April 11, 1958, Oswald was sentenced to confinement at hard labor for 20 days, forfeiture of $25 per month for two months, and reduction to the grade of private. The confinement was suspended for six months, after which it was to be remitted.

Five days after Oswald left the hospital, MACS-1 embarked aboard the Terrell County (LST 1157) for maneuvers in the Philippine Islands area. According to Powers, the squadron was expected to return to Atsugi, but an international crisis prompted it to debark at Cubi Point, Subic Bay, and set up a temporary installation. While in the Philippines, Oswald passed the eligibility test for corporal but received his lowest ratings yet: 4.0 in conduct and 3.9 in proficiency. The unit participated in exercises at Corregidor, then sailed for Atsugi on March 7, 1958, aboard the U.S.S. Wexford County (LST 1168), arriving 11 days later.

Oswald was court-martialed a second time on June 27 for using "provoking words" to a noncommissioned officer (a sergeant) on June 20 at the Bluebird Cafe in Yamato and for assaulting the officer by pouring a drink on him. The court found that Oswald had spilled the drink accidentally but, when shoved away, had invited the sergeant outside in insulting language. Oswald admitted being drunk and inviting the sergeant outside but did not recall insulting him. He was sentenced to confinement at hard labor for 28 days and forfeiture of $55; the previously suspended sentence was also withdrawn. He remained in confinement until August 13. A previously granted extension of overseas duty was canceled, and he received ratings of 1.9 in conduct and 3.4 in proficiency.

On September 14, Oswald sailed with his unit for the South China Sea area; the unit was at Ping Tung, North Taiwan on September 30 and returned to Atsugi on October 5. On October 6, he was transferred out of MACS-1 to general duty in anticipation of his return to the United States, spending several days thereafter in the Atsugi Station Hospital. On October 31, he received his final overseas ratings of 4.0 in both conduct and proficiency. Overseas, Oswald was generally regarded as intelligent, performing his work well and following orders, but he complained frequently, did not socialize much with other marines, and read extensively. Paul Murphy testified that Oswald could speak "a little Russian," and Powers believed Oswald had become more assertive and may have had a Japanese girlfriend. He departed Yokosuka aboard the USNS Barrett on November 2, arrived in San Francisco 13 days later, and took 30 days' leave beginning November 19.

On December 22, Oswald was assigned to Marine Air Control Squadron No. 9 (MACS-9) at the Marine Corps Air Station at El Toro, where he had been briefly before deployment. He was one of approximately seven enlisted men and three officers on a "radar crew" engaged primarily in aircraft surveillance. This work likely gave him access to certain classified material, some of which, such as aircraft call signs and radio frequencies, was changed after his defection. For part of his time at El Toro, Oswald may have been assigned to clerical or janitorial tasks. Some associates believed rumors, incorrect according to official records, that he had lost his clearance to work on radar crews, with one recalling he had once had clearance above "confidential" and lost it for allegedly pouring beer over a staff NCO's head in an enlisted club in Japan.

Peers at El Toro described Oswald as performing his duties adequately but deficient in discipline and barracks inspection. After a series of bad inspections, his quonset hut mates complained and secured his transfer to another hut. He was considered intelligent, somewhat better educated and more intellectually oriented than other men, with a pronounced interest in world affairs in which he was often better informed than officers. By the time he returned to the United States, he had lost all spirit for the Marines and was increasingly preoccupied with Russia. He requested a foreign language qualification test on February 25, 1959, receiving a "poor" rating. He subscribed to a Russian-language newspaper, was nicknamed "Oswaldskovich" to his apparent pleasure, had his name written in Russian on a jacket, played Russian music loudly, and frequently used Russian expressions like "da," "nyet," and "Comrade." Lt. John E. Donovan, his commanding officer and a Georgetown School of Foreign Service graduate, found him competent and noted his calm handling of emergencies, his interest in Latin America and Cuba, his sympathy for Castro, and his subscription to what Donovan considered a Communist newspaper. Donovan never heard Oswald claim to be a Communist. Private Kerry Thornley, a close acquaintance, corroborated Donovan's testimony but believed Oswald thought Marxist morality "the most rational morality" and communism "the best system in the world," though he characterized this as theoretical and not an active commitment. Nelson Delgado, another marine, recalled that Oswald, who enjoyed speaking Spanish with him, was "a complete believer that our way of government was not quite right" but did not think he was a Communist. They discussed Cuba, both favored Castro, and fantasized about joining the Cuban Army; Oswald claimed to be in contact with Cuban diplomatic officials. Oswald read "Das Kapital," Orwell's "Animal Farm" and "1984," played chess (always choosing the red pieces, citing a preference for the "Red Army"), and listened to classical music. He briefly played on the squadron football team but lacked team spirit and was a mediocre player. He spent most weekends alone on the base, though he once traveled to Tijuana with Delgado. Henry J. Roussel Jr. arranged a date between Oswald and his aunt, Rosaleen Quinn, an airline stewardess studying Russian, who found the evening uninteresting and described Oswald to Donovan as "kind of an oddball."

At the end of January 1959 and at the end of July, Oswald received semiannual ratings of 4.0 in conduct both times, with proficiency scores of 4.0 and 4.2. The July ratings were repeated in September when he was transferred from MACS-9. On March 9, he was promoted to private first class (for the second time), effective March 1. He took GED tests on March 23, receiving an overall "satisfactory" rating, with best scores in English composition and physical sciences (76th and 79th percentiles) and his worst in English literature (34th percentile). In the spring, Oswald applied to Albert Schweitzer College in Churwalden, Switzerland, for the spring 1960 term, with the application dated March 19. He claimed Russian proficiency equal to one year of schooling, completion of high school by correspondence with an average of 85 percent, and listed interests in philosophy, psychology, ideology, football, baseball, tennis, stamp-collecting, and writing short stories on contemporary American life. He cited Jack London, Charles Darwin, and Norman Vincent Peale as favorite authors, and claimed membership in the YMCA and the "A.Y.H. Association." In his statement of reasons for attending, he wrote of acquiring a fuller understanding of philosophy, meeting Europeans, receiving formal education, and broadening his knowledge of German. The college approved his application, and he enclosed a $25 registration fee in a June 19 letter. Few other marines knew of the application, though he told Delgado he planned to attend a Swiss school to study psychology.

Oswald was obligated to serve on active duty until December 7, 1959 (adjusted to compensate for his confinement). On August 17, he submitted a request for a dependency discharge, asserting that his mother needed his support. The request included affidavits from his mother, an attorney, a doctor, and two friends, attesting that she had been injured at work in December 1958 and could not support herself. Oswald had previously made a voluntary allotment of part of his salary to his mother ($40 in August) and submitted a "Q" allotment application for $91.30, with one payment made in September. On August 28, the Wing Hardship or Dependency Discharge Board recommended approval, and on September 4, he was transferred from MACS-9 to the H. & H. Squadron. On September 11, he was released from active duty and transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve, in which he was expected to serve until December 8, 1962, with assignment to the Marine Air Reserve Training Command at the Naval Air Station in Glenview, Illinois.

Oswald was released from active duty on September 11 and transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve, in which he was expected to serve until December 8, 1962. He was assigned to the Marine Air Reserve Training Command at the Naval Air Station in Glenview, Illinois.

Almost exactly one year later, on September 13, 1960, Oswald was given an "undesirable discharge" from the Marine Corps Reserve, based on reliable information that he had renounced his U.S. citizenship with the intention of becoming a permanent citizen of the Soviet Union, and that he had brought discredit to the Marine Corps through adverse newspaper publicity generated by this action, proving himself unfit for retention in the naval service.

On September 4, the same day he was transferred out of MACS-9 in preparation for his discharge, Oswald applied for a passport at the Superior Court of Santa Ana, California. His application stated that he planned to leave the United States on September 21 to attend the Albert Schweitzer College and the University of Turku in Finland, and to travel in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, England, France, Germany, and Russia. The passport was routinely issued six days later.

After his discharge from the Marines, Oswald went directly to Fort Worth, arriving by September 14, 1959. He told his mother he intended to work on a ship or in the "export-import business," explaining that a ship would pay "big money" compared to the roughly $30 per week he could earn locally. During his brief stay, Oswald registered his dependency discharge and entry into the Marine Reserve at the Fort Worth Selective Service Board, visited his brother Robert and his family, and gave his mother $100. Three days after arriving, he left for New Orleans.

On September 17, 1959, Oswald visited Travel Consultants, Inc. in New Orleans, where he completed a "Passenger Immigration Questionnaire" listing his occupation as "shipping export agent" and stating he would be abroad for two months on a pleasure trip. He booked passage on the freighter SS Marion Lykes, scheduled to sail September 18 from New Orleans to Le Havre, France, for $220.75. That evening, he registered at the Liberty Hotel.

The Marion Lykes did not depart until the early morning of September 20. Before sailing, Oswald wrote his mother a letter informing her of his European trip, asking her to remember that his "values are very different" from those of his family, and stating that she "could hardly be expected to understand" his plans. The ship carried only four passengers. Oswald shared a cabin with Billy Joe Lord, a young high school graduate headed to France for further education; Lord recalled amicable religious arguments in which Oswald defended atheism, and noted that Oswald was "standoffish" but discussed his background, mentioning his mother's low wages and his interest in possibly studying in Sweden or Switzerland. The two other passengers, Lt. Col. and Mrs. George B. Church, Jr., also found Oswald unfriendly and observed some bitterness about his mother's difficulties. No one aboard suspected that he intended to defect to Russia.

Oswald disembarked at Le Havre on October 8, traveled to England the same day, and arrived on October 9. He told English customs officials in Southampton that he had $700 and planned to stay in the United Kingdom for one week before going to school in Switzerland. On the same day, however, he flew to Helsinki, Finland, where he registered at the Torni Hotel before moving to the Klaus Kurki Hotel. Oswald likely applied for a Soviet visa at the Russian consulate on October 12, his first business day in Helsinki. The visa was issued October 14, valid until October 20, and permitted one trip of no more than six days to the Soviet Union. He also purchased ten Soviet "tourist vouchers" at $30 each, then departed Helsinki by train on October 15, crossed the Finnish-Soviet border at Vainikkala, and arrived in Moscow on October 16.

Oswald was met at the Moscow railroad station by an Intourist representative and taken to the Hotel Berlin, where he registered as a student. The same day, he met Rima Shirokova, the Intourist guide assigned to him, with whom he went sightseeing the next day. Almost immediately, Oswald told Rima that he wanted to leave the United States and become a Soviet citizen. She reported his statement to Intourist headquarters, which notified the "Passport and Visa Office" (likely the Visa and Registration Department of the MVD). Rima was instructed to help Oswald prepare a letter to the Supreme Soviet requesting citizenship, which he mailed that same day. Although Rima was reportedly "flabbergasted" by the defection announcement, she agreed to help, and gave Oswald a copy of Dostoevsky's "The Idiot" for his 20th birthday with an inscription wishing his dreams to come true.

On October 19, Oswald was probably interviewed in his hotel room by a man named Lev Setyayev, who identified himself as a Radio Moscow reporter but was likely also acting for the KGB. Two years later, Oswald told American Embassy officials that he had made only routine, apolitical comments to Setyayev, but the interview may have been an attempt by the KGB to assess him or elicit compromising statements; the interview was apparently never broadcast. On October 20, Rima informed Oswald that the "Pass. and Visa Dept." wished to see him, and the following morning he was interviewed by an official regarding his citizenship application. The official offered little information and no encouragement, saying only that he would check whether the visa could be extended. Oswald returned to the Hotel Berlin, but that afternoon was notified that his visa had expired and that he had to leave Moscow within two hours.

In response to the unfavorable decision, Oswald cut himself above his left wrist in an apparent suicide attempt. Rima Shirokova found him unconscious in his hotel room and had him taken to Botkinskaya Hospital, where she stayed by his side as interpreter into the night. Oswald was confined to the psychiatric ward for three days. A psychiatrist concluded that he was not dangerous and could be transferred to the "somatic" department. Hospital records noted that Oswald had come to Russia to apply for citizenship and had inflicted the injury "in order to postpone his departure"; they also recorded that he claimed to have graduated from a technical high school in radio technology and radio electronics, and that he "regrets his action" and "intends to return to his homeland" after recovering. While hospitalized, Oswald was visited frequently by Rima and by Roza Agafonova of the hotel tourist office, and his diary entries during this period reflect a gentler, friendlier attitude than his earlier cold focus on his status in Russia.

Oswald was released from the hospital on October 28 and, accompanied by Rima Shirokova, was driven by Intourist car to the Hotel Berlin. After saying goodbye to Lyudmila Dmitrieva, head of the Berlin's Intourist office, and to Roza Agafonova, he checked out of the Berlin and registered at the Metropole, a larger hotel under the same administration—a move the Soviet Government had undoubtedly directed. His visa had expired during his hospitalization, making his presence in Russia technically illegal. That day, Rima informed him that the "Pass and Registration Office" wished to discuss his future. When Oswald appeared, he was asked whether he still wanted Soviet citizenship (he confirmed that he did), provided his Marine Corps discharge papers for identification, and was told he could not expect a decision soon. He was also apparently questioned about his earlier interview with the supposed Radio Moscow reporter, leading him to conclude there had been no communication between the two sets of officials. That evening he vented his frustration to Rima.

The following day, Oswald stayed near the telephone, fully dressed and ready to leave if summoned, waiting three days that seemed "like three years." On October 31, he met Rima at noon, expressed impatience without revealing his plans, and she cautioned him to stay in his room and eat well. Shortly after she left, he took a taxi to the American Embassy and asked to see the consul. When the receptionist asked him to sign the tourist register, he laid his passport on the desk and said he had come to "dissolve his American citizenship." Richard E. Snyder, the Second Secretary and senior consular official, was summoned and invited Oswald into his office, where Snyder's assistant John A. McVickar was also present. Oswald declared his desire to renounce his citizenship, denounced the United States, and praised the Soviet Government. Snyder sought to learn more about Oswald's motives and to forestall immediate action, and the interview ended when Snyder said Oswald could renounce his citizenship two days later on the following Monday. During the interview, Oswald handed Snyder a note suggesting he had studied and sought to comply with section 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Snyder testified that he believed Oswald would have formally renounced his citizenship immediately had he been permitted to do so.

Returning to his hotel angry about the delay but "elated" by the "showdown," Oswald was approached by A. I. Goldberg, an Associated Press reporter whom the Embassy had told about his actions; Oswald refused to speak to him. He answered a few questions for two other reporters, R. J. Korengold and Aline Mosby, but again refused to be interviewed. News services made repeated unsuccessful attempts to interview him thereafter, which he interpreted as an indirect form of pressure from the Embassy. The day after his meeting with Snyder, his family read about his Embassy appearance in newspapers and tried to contact him; his mother was shocked at his decision but initially respected his motives, though she later suspected he had been forcibly removed to Russia. She placed a phone call that Oswald either refused or cut short, and on November 2 he rejected the Embassy's efforts to deliver or read over the telephone a telegram from his brother Robert. A call from Robert was either canceled or refused, and Robert's telegram was eventually sent to Oswald from the Embassy by registered mail.

A few days later, the Embassy received a letter from Oswald dated November 3 requesting that his citizenship be revoked, stating he had appeared at the Embassy "for the purpose of signing the formal papers" and protesting the "conduct of the official" who had refused him this "legal right." He noted his pending Soviet citizenship application and said he would ask the Soviet Government to lodge a formal protest on his behalf. The Embassy replied on November 9 that Oswald could renounce his citizenship by appearing in person and executing the necessary papers. Oswald's diary describes the period from November 2 to November 15, during which he continued to isolate himself, as "days of utter loneliness." On November 8, he wrote to his brother Robert insisting he had waited over a year to take this action, claiming to speak a fair amount of Russian, and declaring he would never return to the United States, which he said he hated. Oswald refused to speak to anyone from the United States by telephone, suspecting calls might be taped. Although he claimed to have been told he could remain in Russia, his diary indicates he was not actually told this until later, and only in January was he told he could remain indefinitely. The Embassy's attempt to deliver a telegram from his brother John on November 9 was also refused, with the message eventually sent by registered mail.

On or about November 13, Aline Mosby of United Press International became the first non-Soviet citizen to interview Oswald since his October 31 meeting with Snyder at the U.S. Embassy. Oswald told her she might "understand and be friendly" because she was a woman. He appeared confident and talked almost nonstop, with a small "smirk." He claimed Soviet authorities had indicated he could remain in the USSR, with job possibilities being explored and education likely to continue. He admitted his Russian was poor but expected rapid improvement. Oswald grounded his rejection of the United States in observed racial prejudice, the contrast between Park Avenue wealth and East Side workers, and his mother's poverty, declaring that in America he would inevitably "lose" whether as capitalist or worker, which led him to embrace Marxist ideology. He said he had been interested in Communist theory since age 15, when "an old lady" in New York gave him a pamphlet about the Rosenbergs, but he denied ever having met a Communist or been a Party member. He described witnessing American imperialism while in the Marines and said he had saved $1,500 in preparation for defecting. His only expressed regrets concerned his mother, whom he had not informed, and his brother, who might lose his job from the publicity. The two-hour interview ended with Mosby reportedly promising to show Oswald the story before publication; she did not, and Oswald later complained of distortions, specifically that his family had not been "poverty-stricken" and his defection was a matter of ideology, not personal hardship.

Around November 16, Oswald granted a second interview to Priscilla Johnson of the North American Newspaper Alliance, who met him at the Metropole Hotel and conducted the conversation in her room from approximately 9 p.m. to 2 a.m. Throughout the five-hour session, Oswald repeatedly expressed pleasure that he would be allowed to remain in Russia but also showed disappointment at obstacles to obtaining Soviet citizenship. He largely repeated the information he had given Mosby, again denying Communist Party membership or contact with Communists in the United States. When asked to name socialist writers he had read in the past five years, he could identify only Marx and Engels, recalling the single title "Das Kapital"; Johnson found his grasp of Communist economic theory to be his "language" but very superficial. He characterized the Russian handling of his defection as a "legal formality," neither encouraged nor discouraged, and refused to return to the Embassy to renounce citizenship, fearing a "run-around." Johnson concluded that Oswald was consciously or unconsciously avoiding effective renunciation to preserve his right to reenter the United States.

For the remainder of the year following his interviews, Oswald rarely left his room at the Metropole, where he had arranged to take his meals, with occasional excursions to museums. His diary records that he spent roughly eight hours a day studying Russian. The only interruptions to this routine were a visit to the passport office, occasional meetings with Rima Shirokova, Russian lessons from Shirokova and other Intourist guides, and a New Year's visit from Roza Agafonova, who brought him a small "Boratin" clown as a gift.

Oswald replied to a letter from his brother Robert with a communication containing his most bitter statements against the United States (quoted in full in chapter VII). A second letter from Oswald, received by Robert on December 17, announced that Lee would not write again and did not want Robert to write to him, stating: "I am starting a new life and I do not wish to have anything to do with the old life. I hope you and your family will always be in good health. Lee." On December 18, his mother mailed him a personal check for $20, which was returned on January 5 with a note that he could not use the check; he asked her to send $20 in cash and indicated he had little money and needed "the rest," apparently referring to the $100 he had previously given her. Mrs. Oswald subsequently sent a money order for approximately $25.

On January 4, Oswald was summoned to the Soviet Passport Office and issued Identity Document for Stateless Persons No. 311479. He was informed that he was being sent to Minsk, an industrial city of roughly 510,000 located about 450 miles southwest of Moscow. While disappointed at not receiving Soviet citizenship, he was relieved that the uncertainty over his status was ended, and he told Rima Shirokova that he was happy. The following day he went to the government agency known as the "Red Cross," which gave him 5,000 rubles (about 500 new rubles or $500 at the official rate); of this sum, 2,200 rubles went to pay his hotel bill and 150 rubles purchased a railroad ticket to Minsk.

The text describes Oswald's transfer from Moscow to Minsk as a direct outcome of his receipt of the stateless identity document and the Soviet decision to send him to an industrial city roughly 450 miles southwest of the capital, with a population in 1959 of about 510,000. While he was disappointed not to have been granted Soviet citizenship, the ending of uncertainty brought relief, and he expressed happiness to Rima Shirokova. He received 5,000 rubles from the "Red Cross" agency, of which he used 2,200 to settle his hotel account and 150 to buy a rail ticket to Minsk, with the remainder presumably available for his new life there.

Oswald arrived in Minsk on January 7 and was met at the station by two "Red Cross" workers who took him to the Hotel Minsk, where two English-speaking Intourist employees were waiting. One of them, a young woman named Roza Kuznetsova, became a close friend and attended Oswald's 21st birthday party in October 1960 (Commission Exhibit No. 2609, p. 271). On the following day, Oswald met the "Mayor," who welcomed him to Minsk, promised him a rent-free apartment, and warned him against "uncultured persons" who sometimes insulted foreigners.

On January 13, Oswald reported for work at the Belorussian Radio and Television Factory, a major producer of electronic parts and systems employing about 5,000 persons. Two days earlier he had visited the factory and met Alexander Ziger, a Polish Jew who had emigrated to Argentina in 1938 and then to Russia in 1955; Ziger, a department head, spoke English and he and his family became good friends of Oswald, corresponding with him after his return to the United States. Oswald's union card described him as a "metal worker," and Marina testified that he fashioned parts on a lathe. In Oswald's later account, the "experimental shop" in which he worked employed 58 workers and 5 foremen, was housed in a two-story red-brick building in the middle of the factory area, began the workday at 8 o'clock sharp, and assigned work by numbered "pay levels" from one to five with a top "master" level, with workers permitted to request testing for promotion at any time.

Oswald had hoped to continue his education in Russia and was disappointed at being assigned to a factory. His salary ranged from 700 to perhaps 900 rubles per month ($70–$90), a figure normal for his type of work, though high compared to certain professional groups in Russia. It was supplemented by 700 rubles per month from the "Red Cross," giving Oswald a total income he said was about equal to that of the factory director. In August he applied for union membership and became a dues-paying member in September. More notably, in March 1959 he was given an attractive small flat with a balcony overlooking the river, for which he paid only 60 rubles a month; in his diary he called it "a Russian dream." Had he been a Russian worker, he would likely have waited several years for a comparable apartment and would have received one only if he had a family. The "Red Cross" subsidy and the apartment exemplified the favorable treatment the Soviet Union typically extended to defectors.

Oswald's diary records that he enjoyed his first months in Minsk: his work at the factory was easy, his coworkers were friendly and curious about life in the United States, and he declined an invitation to speak at a mass meeting. He took Roza Kuznetsova, his interpreter and language teacher, to the theater, a movie, or an opera almost every night, until he moved into his apartment and temporarily lost contact with her, writing in his diary, "I'm living big and am very satisfied." In March or April he met Pavel Golovachev, a coworker at the factory whom he described as intelligent, friendly, and an excellent radio technician (Commission Exhibit No. 2609, p. 271). Oswald helped Golovachev with English, and they became friends who corresponded after Oswald's return to the United States until at least September 1963. The spring and summer passed easily and uneventfully with picnics and drives in the country, which Oswald described as "green beauty." On June 18 he obtained a hunting license and soon purchased a 16-gage single-barrel shotgun; his license identified him as "Aleksy Harvey Oswald," and he was called "Alec" by his Russian friends. He joined a local chapter of the Belorussian Society of Hunters and Fishermen, sponsored by his factory, and hunted small game in the farm regions around Minsk about half a dozen times during the summer and fall, spending nights in small villages and often leaving game with the villagers; Oswald described the peasant life he observed as crude and poor.

In June, Oswald met Ella German, a worker at the factory, of whom he later said he "perhaps fell in love with her the first minute" he saw her (Commission Exhibit No. 2609, p. 271). He spent New Year's Day at the German family home, eating and drinking in a friendly atmosphere and returning home "drunk and happy," and on the walk back he decided to ask Ella to marry him. The following night, after bringing her home from the movies, he proposed on her doorstep; she rejected him, saying she did not love him and feared marrying an American, citing the Polish intervention of the 1920s that had led to the arrest of all Soviet citizens of Polish origin. In one diary entry Oswald attributed her failure to love him to "a state of fear which was always in the Soviet Union." His affection appeared to continue for some time; he had his last formal date with her in February and remained on friendly terms with her throughout his stay in Russia.

Even as Oswald enjoyed his early months in Minsk, the first signs of disillusionment with Russian life appeared. After a friend at a party took him aside and advised him to return to the United States, Oswald noted in his diary that he felt "uneasy inside." In a later entry he compared life in Minsk to military life, writing that he had become habituated to a small cafe where he dined in the evening, that the food was generally poor and always exactly the same throughout the city, cheap but of low quality, and that he did not really care about quality after three years in the U.S. Marines. In an August–September entry he wrote that he was becoming "increasingly concious of just what sort of a sociaty" he lived in.

After returning to the United States, Oswald frequently commented on Russian life. He discussed the Soviet systems of public education and medical care, observed to one acquaintance that everyone in Russia was trained to do something, and discussed with another the system of regular wage and salary increases. His most frequent criticisms concerned the contrast between the lives of ordinary workers and the lives of Communist Party members: he told an acquaintance in Dallas that the working class in the Soviet Union made just about enough to buy clothing and food and that only Party members could afford luxuries; on another occasion he remarked that if he had had as much money as some of the "managers," he could have visited the Black Sea resorts. He complained about the lack of freedom in Russia, the lack of opportunity to travel, inadequate housing, and the chronic scarcity of food products. To one acquaintance he observed that Party members were all "opportunists," who "shouted the loudest and made the most noise," but who were interested only in their own welfare.

Oswald expressed similar views in a manuscript he worked on in Russia and probably intended to publish; soon after returning to the United States he hired a stenographer to prepare a typed draft from his notes. He described the manuscript, which amounted to 50 typed pages, as "a look into the lives of work-a-day average Russians." The manuscript described the factory where he worked and suggested that political considerations of which he disapproved dominated its operation. He attributed the lack of unemployment to a shortage of labor-saving machinery and to a heavy bureaucratic load that kept "tons of paper work" flowing in and out of the factory and required a high foreman-worker ratio, and noted the presence of "a small army of examiners, committees, and supply checkers and the quality-control board." He portrayed life in Russia, including life at the factory, as centered around the "Kollective," headed in his shop by Comrade Lebizen, who enforced shop discipline, attendance at party meetings, and the posting of new propaganda, with walls hung with signs and slogans. Meetings of the Kollective were "so numerous as to be staggering"—in a single month, one professional union meeting, four political information meetings, two Young Communist meetings, one production-committee meeting, two Communist Party meetings, four "School of Communist Labor" meetings, and one sports meeting. All but one were compulsory for Party members and all but three compulsory for everyone (Marina Oswald testified that her husband did not attend the Marxism-Leninism courses given at the factory for Party members and aspirants). Meetings were scheduled not to interfere with work and lasted from ten minutes to two hours; Oswald said no one liked them, that they were accepted "philosophically," and that at political meetings, especially, everyone paid strict attention, with Party members posted in the audience to watch for the slightest lapse. He also described the well-organized "spontaneous" demonstrations on Soviet holidays or for distinguished visitors, noted that elections were supervised to ensure that everyone voted for Communist Party candidates, and touched on the housing shortage and the corruption it evoked, the "rest-homes" where workers had their vacations, television and the omnipresent radio, and Russian reading habits. He acknowledged that the writing might include only what he thought might be acceptable.

On January 4, 1961, one year after he had been issued his "stateless" residence permit, Oswald was summoned to the passport office in Minsk and asked if he still wanted to become a Soviet citizen. He replied that he did not, but asked that his residence permit be extended for another year. The diary entry for January 4–31 reads: "I am stating to reconsider my disire about staying. The work is drab. The money I get has nowhere to be spent. No nightclubs or bowling allys, no places of recreation acept the trade union dances. I have had enough."

After a long silence following his November 1959 letter, Oswald wrote to the American Embassy in Moscow on or about February 6, 1961, from Minsk. The undated letter, received on February 13, requested the return of his passport and stated his desire to return to the United States provided he could reach "some agreement [with the American Government] concerning the dropping of any legal proceedings" against him. Oswald emphasized he had not become a Soviet citizen and was living in Russia with "nonpermanent type papers for a foreigner," noting he could not personally appear at the Embassy because he could not leave Minsk without permission. He referenced a previous letter he claimed had gone unanswered, though there is evidence no such letter was ever sent. A second letter, posted March 5 and received March 20, reiterated his inability to travel to Moscow and asked that preliminary inquiries be put in the form of a questionnaire. Oswald's diary records his "state of expectation about going back to the U.S." and notes that a friend had approved his plans but warned him not to discuss them with others. Soviet authorities had almost certainly intercepted and read the correspondence, and soon after it began, Oswald's monthly "Red Cross" payments were cut off.

Second Secretary Richard Snyder responded to Oswald on February 28, stating that Oswald would have to appear at the Embassy in person to discuss his return to the United States. After Washington was informed, the Embassy wrote again on March 24 reiterating this requirement. The Department of State eventually decided that Oswald's passport could be returned only if he appeared at the Embassy and if the Embassy was satisfied, after exploring the matter with him, that he had not renounced his citizenship. Meanwhile, Oswald's mother, who had inquired about her son's whereabouts at the State Department in January, was notified of his letter.

During the second week of March 1961, Katherine Mallory of the University of Michigan symphonic band, on tour in Minsk, was surrounded by curious Russian citizens. A young man who identified himself as a Texan and former marine stepped from the crowd and offered to interpret for her, doing so for the next 15 to 20 minutes. He later told her he despised the United States and hoped to remain in Minsk for the rest of his life. Although Miss Mallory could not swear her interpreter was Oswald, she was personally convinced that it was he.

Probably on March 17, 1961, Oswald attended a trade union dance at the Palace of Culture for Professional Workers in Minsk with his friend Erik Titovyets. The dance followed a lecture by a Russian woman recently returned from the United States. Marina Nikolayevna Prusakova arrived too late to hear the lecture but attended the dance, where Oswald noticed her and asked Yuriy Merezhinskiy, the lecturer's son and a mutual friend, to introduce him. After dancing together, Oswald obtained her telephone number before she left (though Marina testified she did not give it to him). According to Oswald's diary, they liked each other immediately, and Oswald was smitten.

Marina Nikolayevna Prusakova was 19 years old when she met Oswald. She was born on July 17, 1941, at Severodvinsk (formerly Molotovsk) in Arkhangel Oblast', Russia. A few years after her birth, her mother Klavdiya Vasilievna Prusakova married Aleksandr Ivanovich Medvedev, who became the only father Marina knew. As a young girl, Marina went to live with her maternal grandparents, Tatyana Yakovlevna Prusakova and Vasiliy Prusakov, in Arkhangel'sk, where her grandfather died when she was about four. By the time she was seven, she moved to Zguritva in the Moldavian SSR (formerly Bessarabia) to live with her mother and stepfather, an electrical worker. In 1952, the family moved to Leningrad when her stepfather obtained a job at a power station. Marina testified that neither her mother nor stepfather was a member of the Communist Party.

In Leningrad, Marina attended the Three Hundred and Seventy-Fourth Women's School, completing the seventh grade in 1955 before entering the Pharmacy Teknikum at her own request, citing her mother's poor health. While at the Teknikum she joined the Trade Union for Medical Workers and, in her final year, worked part-time at the Central Pharmacy in Leningrad, graduating in June 1959 with a diploma in pharmacy. After her mother died in 1957 during her second year, Marina continued living with her stepfather but had little contact with him; she testified she was not easily disciplined and was a source of concern. After graduation, she left an assigned pharmaceutical warehouse job after one day and, two months later, went to live in Minsk with her childless aunt and uncle, the Prusakovs, who held one of the best apartments in an MVD building. She started work in the drug section of the Third Clinical Hospital in October 1960, earning about 450 rubles per month, and joined the local Komsomol at about the same time. Her social life centered on cafe meetings with student friends for coffee, newspapers, gossip, and discussions, and she had not attached herself to any particular boyfriend by the time she met Oswald in March 1961.

When Marina first met Oswald, she thought he was from one of the Russian-speaking Baltic countries because of his accent; she learned that same evening he was an American. They met again at another dance a week later, danced together most of the evening, and he walked her home. They arranged to meet the following week, but Oswald called to say he was in the hospital and asked her to visit. Medical records show Oswald was admitted to the Clinical Hospital Ear, Nose, and Throat Division on Thursday, March 30, 1961. Marina visited him often, using her uniform to gain entry outside the regular Sunday visiting hours, and brought him an Easter egg on Easter Sunday. On a later visit, he asked her to be his fiancée, and she agreed to consider it. He left the hospital on April 11. During these visits, Marina discussed Oswald's reasons for coming to Russia and his current status; he told her he had surrendered his American documents and told officials he did not intend to return, saying he could not return to the United States. Oswald continued visiting Marina at her aunt and uncle's apartment, who were undisturbed that he was an American, and she accepted his marriage proposal on April 20 (according to her recollection) or April 15 (according to his diary).

After filing notice of intent to marry at the registrar, obtaining the special consent required for an alien to marry a Soviet citizen, and waiting the usual ten days, Oswald and Marina were married on April 30, 1961. Oswald's diary entry for the wedding day describes two of Marina's girlfriends acting as bridesmaids, a dinner reception at her aunt's home for about 20 friends, an evening of eating and drinking, and the couple walking the 15 minutes to their nearby home at midnight. Both took three days off from their jobs, which they spent in Minsk.

In late June 1961 (according to the diary) or between May and July (according to Marina's recollection), Oswald told his wife he was anxious to return to the United States; she was "slightly startled" but encouraged him to do as he wished. Embassy records show Oswald notified the Embassy in a letter received May 25 that he was married and that his wife would seek to accompany him to the United States. The Oswalds began making inquiries in Soviet offices about exit visas. During this period they enjoyed their new life together, taking most meals at cafes or restaurants where they worked, and going boating, to the opera, concerts, the circus, and films, occasionally gathering with friends for cooperative meals. Oswald's Russian improved but he retained an accent and never learned to write or speak grammatically; he read the English-language Daily Worker and books on Marxism and Leninism, along with some Russian newspapers.

Before marrying Marina, and presumably before February 1961, Oswald had applied for admission to the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow. On May 3, 1961, the university sent a letter apologizing for the delay and rejecting his application on the ground that the institution had been established exclusively for students from the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Oswald expressed his disappointment to Marina.

On May 5, Oswald reopened his correspondence with his family by writing a friendly letter to his brother Robert, mentioning his marriage, his job as a "metal-smith," and that he was living well, while asking for their mother's address and encouraging Robert to visit Minsk. Robert answered quickly, and on May 31 Oswald wrote again expressing pleasure at hearing from his brother, declining an offer of aid while suggesting Marina might like a small wedding present. In the letter he stated he did not know whether he would ever return to the United States, citing the need for Soviet exit permission and assurances against U.S. prosecution, and mentioned he was in touch with the Embassy in Moscow. Around this time Oswald also wrote to his mother.

Having heard nothing from the Embassy since March about his passport, Oswald appeared without warning at the Embassy on Saturday, July 8, 1961, when the offices were closed, and reached Snyder by house telephone. Snyder came to the office, spoke briefly with him, and suggested he return Monday. Oswald called Marina, who arrived Sunday, July 9, and they took a room at the Hotel Berlin. On Monday, Marina waited outside while Oswald was interviewed by Snyder, who examined his Soviet papers and questioned him closely about his life in Russia and possible expatriating acts. Oswald stated he was not a Soviet citizen, had never formally applied for citizenship, taken an oath of allegiance, or joined the factory trade union, and had never given Soviet officials confidential Marine information—though some of these statements were almost certainly false, as he had applied for Soviet citizenship, been disappointed when it was denied, and possessed a union membership card. Oswald expressed anxiety about possible prosecution; Snyder informed him informally that he knew of no grounds for prosecution but could give no assurances, noting Oswald seemed to have matured and had "learned a hard lesson the hard way." Because his passport would expire September 10, 1961, Oswald filled out a renewal application and questionnaire reiterating his American nationality. On the basis of Oswald's statements, Snyder concluded he had not expatriated himself and returned the passport, stamped valid only for direct travel to the United States. The following day, accompanied by Marina, Oswald returned to the Embassy to initiate procedures for her immigration to the United States, undergoing a routine interview with McVickar, Snyder's assistant, before returning to Minsk three days later. On the same day, Oswald wrote to Robert reporting he had his passport back and that he and Marina were doing everything possible to leave the Soviet Union, the letter's tone of firm purpose reflecting his attitude thereafter.

Upon returning to Minsk, the Oswalds immediately began working with local authorities to obtain permission to leave the Soviet Union. Oswald's diary entry for July 16 through August 20 records that they identified approximately 20 required documents—including birth certificates, an affidavit, and photographs—and submitted them on August 20, with officials indicating a 3½-month waiting period for a decision. The entry also noted that Marina was pregnant and that multiple meetings were being held at her workplace by her bosses at the direction of "someone" by phone, ostensibly to dissuade her from emigrating. Oswald reported these efforts to the Embassy in a July 15 letter, stating he would keep the Embassy informed and noting that the intimidation "tactics" were "quite useless" since Marina had "stood up well."

Marina testified that after news of her July visit to the American Embassy reached Minsk, she was expelled from Komsomol (the Communist Youth Organization) and that "meetings were arranged" at which "members of the various organizations" attempted to dissuade her from leaving the Soviet Union. Her aunt and uncle did not speak to her for "a long time." Paul Gregory, to whom Marina later taught Russian in the United States, testified that she once described this period in Minsk as "a very horrible time."

Oswald's diary entry for August 21 through September 1 records that he made "repeated trips to the passport & visa office, also to Ministry of For. Affairs in Minsk, also Min. of Internal Affairs, all of which have a say in the granting of a visa," and that he "extracted promises of quick attention." However, a subsequent entry covering September through October 18 noted simply: "No word from Min. ('They'll call us.')." On October 4, Oswald wrote to the Embassy requesting official U.S. intervention, citing "systematic and concerted attempts to intimidate" Marina—including a 5-day hospitalization on September 22 for "nervous exhaustion" (a claim Marina later denied and which he omitted from his diary and family letters). The Embassy replied on October 12 that it had no means of influencing Soviet conduct in such matters and that action on visa applications was "seldom taken rapidly."

In October 1961, Marina took her annual vacation and spent approximately three weeks with an aunt in Khar'kov, a "change of scenery" agreed upon by both. Evidence suggests they were not getting along well during this period: a post-return diary entry noted quarrels and Marina's wavering on emigration, which Oswald attributed to anxiety about visas and her pregnancy, while he dreaded the "hard Russian winter." During her absence, Oswald felt lonely but socialized with his friend "Erich" (presumably Erik Titovyets) at dances and other amusements, and on his 22nd birthday went alone to see his favorite opera, "The Queen of Spades." Marina returned on November 11, "radiant, with several jars of preserves."

After Marina's return, Oswald applied for an interview with Col. Nicolay Aksenov, a local MVD official, to expedite their visa application but was told by subordinates they could handle it. Oswald then insisted that Marina seek the interview, which she agreed to reluctantly. Marina suspected the interview may have been granted because her uncle was a high-ranking Minsk MVD official, though she did not believe he would have used his position. Colonel Aksenov questioned her about her reasons for wanting to go to the United States and, noting her pregnancy, suggested she delay departure so the child could be born in Russia, but did not otherwise discourage her. He ultimately informed her they would have to wait their turn.

Throughout this period, Oswald continued corresponding with his mother, brother, and the U.S. Embassy. In a November 1 letter to the Embassy, he stated that if his residence permit were renewed in January, it would be over his protest; the Embassy replied on November 13 that retention of his Soviet passport (issued to persons considered stateless) would not prejudice his citizenship claim. Late in December, Oswald wrote to Senator John G. Tower of Texas, stating he was an American citizen being held against his will and asking the Senator to raise the matter. The letter was referred to the State Department with no further action taken.

On January 2, 1962, Oswald wrote to his mother asking her to contact the Red Cross and request aid from the International Rescue Committee or a similar group, stating he would need about $800 and instructing her to insist on a gift rather than a loan. Despite his instructions, she requested a loan. On January 13, Oswald wrote directly to the International Rescue Committee requesting $800 for two tickets from Moscow to Texas, and on January 26 he wrote again, this time asking for $1,000. Crossed letters of January 5 between Oswald and the Embassy included the Embassy's suggestion that he consider returning alone, which he rejected on January 16. The Embassy also noted that Marina had not yet obtained a U.S. visa and that no evidence had been submitted showing she would not become a public charge, suggesting Oswald's mother or another relative file an affidavit of support. Oswald drafted his own affidavit, mailed it, and on January 23 wrote to his mother asking her to file one as well. The Embassy acknowledged receipt on January 24 but again suggested obtaining an affidavit from another person.

On December 25, Marina was called to the Soviet Passport Office and informed that exit visas would be granted to her and her husband—news that surprised her, as she had doubted she would ever be permitted to leave. Oswald wrote to the Embassy on December 27 confirming the visas and asking that his passport be extended without another trip to Moscow, offering to come if it would expedite processing. In his diary he wrote, "It's great (I think?)." Before year-end, Marina began maternity leave, and the Oswalds spent New Year's Eve at a dinner party given by the Zigers.

Oswald took Marina to the hospital on the morning of February 15, 1962, where a baby girl was born at approximately 10 a.m.; he had gone on to the factory, where news of the birth awaited him. Per hospital practice, he did not see the baby until Marina's discharge. The child was named "June Lee" under the Russian custom requiring a child's second name to derive from the father's first name—Oswald had wanted "June Marina" and protested the application of this law, noting wryly in his diary, "Po-Russki." His coworkers gave the Oswalds gifts including a summer blanket, diapers, chemises, suits, and toys. Marina came home on February 23. With the child born, there was less urgency about departure; Oswald wrote to his mother and brother that he would probably not arrive for several months, and in an April 12 letter to Robert wrote that only "the American side" was holding up departure, though he added he didn't "really * * * want to leave until the beginning of fall, since the spring and summer * * * [in Russia] are so nice."

Late in January, Oswald received a letter from his mother stating he had been given a dishonorable discharge from the Marines (it was actually "undesirable," a less derogatory characterization), reviving his fear of prosecution. On January 30, he wrote to his brother for more information and to John B. Connally, Jr., then Governor of Texas, whom he mistakenly believed was still Secretary of the Navy, asking him to look into the discharge as a "gross mistake or injustice" to a "boni-fied U.S. citizen and ex-service man." Connally referred the letter to the Department of the Navy, which replied that no change in the undesirable discharge was contemplated. On March 22, Oswald wrote insisting on a full review; the Department replied that it had no authority to hear such petitions and referred him to the Navy Discharge Review Board. Oswald completed the enclosed application in Minsk but did not mail it until after returning to the United States.

On May 10, the Embassy wrote that everything was in order and suggested Oswald bring his family to sign final papers. He was discharged from the factory around May 18. He picked up his Soviet exit visa on May 22 and had an interview with an MVD official for final departure clearance. By May 24, the Oswalds had arrived in Moscow and completed documents at the American Embassy, with Marina receiving her U.S. visa. On June 1, Oswald signed a promissory note for a repatriation loan of $435.71. The family boarded a train for Holland, passing through Minsk that night, and crossed the Soviet frontier at Brest on June 2. Two days later, they departed Holland on the SS *Maasdam*.

Probably while aboard the *Maasdam*, Oswald wrote notes on ship stationery summarizing what he believed he had learned from living under both capitalist and Communist systems, reflecting his "unhappy and deepening feeling of disillusionment" with both. He observed that reform groups always claim to serve their people and country, and asked what would happen "if somebody was to stand up and say he was utterly opposed not only to the governments, but to the people, too the entire land and complete foundations" of his society. He proposed a "third choice" between communism and capitalism, writing: "I have lived under both systems, I have sought the answers and although it would be very easy to dupe myself into believing one system is better than the other, I know they are not." He also acknowledged that his "Red Cross" subsidy had actually been paid by the Soviet Government and declared, "I shall never sell myself intentionlly, or unintentionlly to anyone again." Likely also aboard ship, Oswald drafted two sets of anticipated answers to questions about his decision to go to Russia and return—one apologetic in tone, the other asserting he had gone to study the Soviet system while remaining a loyal American who owed no apologies.

The *Maasdam* docked at Hoboken, New Jersey, on June 13, where Spas T. Raikin of the Traveler's Aid Society—contacted by the Department of State—met the Oswalds. Raikin believed Oswald was trying to avoid meeting anyone. Oswald reported he had only $63 and no plans for the night or onward travel to Fort Worth, but he accepted the society's help "with confidence and appreciation." The couple passed through immigration without incident, and Raikin assisted them through customs. The society then referred them to the New York City Department of Welfare, which secured them a room at the Times Square Hotel. To the welfare representatives and Raikin, Oswald claimed he had been a marine stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow, had married a Russian woman, renounced his citizenship, worked in Minsk, discovered Soviet propaganda to be inaccurate, and waited more than two years for an exit visa for his wife and child, which he said he had paid for himself.

The New York welfare department called Robert Oswald's home in Fort Worth; his wife answered and said they would help, and Robert sent $200 immediately. Oswald initially refused the money and insisted the department itself should pay the fare to Texas, threatening that they would travel as far as their $63 would allow and rely on local authorities for the rest. He ultimately accepted the money, and on the afternoon of June 14 the Oswalds left New York by plane for Fort Worth.

Oswald had originally indicated that he and his family would stay with his mother in Vernon, Texas, but his decision to stay with Robert in Fort Worth was prompted by his brother's earlier letter. On an "Intake Interview" form for the welfare department he listed only his brother as a relative. Robert, his wife, and their children met Lee, Marina, and baby June Lee at Love Field in Dallas. Robert testified that Lee was noticeably balder and somewhat thinner than in 1959, had acquired "something of an accent," but was otherwise "the same boy." Lee seemed disappointed that no newspaper reporters appeared, though he later sought to avoid publicity. Robert drove the family to his home at 7313 Davenport Street. For a few days Lee seemed tense, but the brothers got along well, observing a tacit agreement not to discuss politics. Lee told Robert he hoped to have his undesirable Marine discharge corrected. Robert and his wife "took to Marina and June," and Marina helped in the household while resting and caring for the baby. Apart from a trip to the library, Marina testified that Lee spent about a week "merely talking."

On June 18, four days after arriving in Fort Worth, Oswald visited the office of Mrs. Pauline Virginia Bates, a public stenographer whose name he had found in the telephone directory, and asked her to type his manuscript of Soviet impressions from his "scraps of paper." Intrigued, she agreed to a reduced rate of $1 per page or $2 an hour. Over three days she spent eight hours typing while Oswald remained in her office, helping with the notes and translating the Russian portions. He collected his materials after each session and on June 20 paid her $10 for ten completed pages, refusing her offer to postpone payment. On June 19, Oswald called Peter Gregory, a Siberian-born petroleum engineer who taught Russian at the Fort Worth Public Library, requesting a letter attesting to his Russian ability for interpreter or translator work. Gregory had Oswald read from a randomly opened Russian book in his office; Oswald read well, and Gregory provided the letter. They had lunch and discussed Oswald's life in the Soviet Union, but, according to Gregory, nothing was said about publishing the manuscript. About a week later, Gregory and his college-student son Paul visited the Oswalds at Robert's home, and Paul arranged to take conversational Russian lessons from Marina during the summer.

On June 26, Oswald was interviewed by FBI agents in Fort Worth. One agent described him as tense, "drawn up," arrogant, and "a little insolent." Oswald declined to say why he had gone to Russia, stating he refused to "relive the past." He denied attempting to obtain Soviet citizenship, being approached by Soviet officials about his Marine experience, or offering them such information. Noting that Marina's Soviet passport required her to register her address with the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Oswald said he planned to contact the embassy within a few days and promised to notify the FBI if approached by Soviet agents. He told Robert the interview had been "just fine."

On August 16 the FBI again interviewed Oswald, this time in the back seat of a car in front of his home. The session covered substantially the same material as the first. Oswald again denied making any deal with Soviet representatives, protested his undesirable Marine discharge, and confirmed that his wife was registered at the Soviet Embassy. He continued to refuse to discuss why he had gone to the Soviet Union but was less hostile than in the earlier interview. According to Marina, however, he was very upset by the FBI's interest in him.

The Oswalds remained with Robert for about a month. During that time Oswald's mother moved from Crowell, Texas, to Fort Worth, and sometime in July the family moved into her apartment at 1501 West Seventh Street. Mrs. Oswald testified that she and Marina and Lee got along well during what she described as "a very happy month," and that she helped Marina with the house and baby and aided Lee in seeking employment. Marina testified, however, that Lee did not get along well with his mother and decided after several weeks to move to their own apartment. Oswald did not file a change-of-address card when they moved to West Seventh Street, suggesting he may have planned a short stay there. Around mid-August, the Oswalds moved to a one-bedroom furnished apartment at 2703 Mercedes Street, paying $59.50 in advance for one month. In the third week of July, Oswald obtained a job as a sheet metal worker at the Louv-R-Pak Division of the Leslie Welding Company, a manufacturer of louvers and ventilators, referred by the Texas Employment Commission. On his application he falsely claimed prior experience as a sheet metal worker and machinist in the Marines and an honorable discharge. He worked eight or nine hours a day at $1.25 an hour, was regarded as a good but uncommunicative employee, and remained with the company until October, when he quit. The Mercedes Street apartment was later described as "decrepit" and poorly furnished, without telephone service, and the family was observed to have little food, poor clothing, and at first no bed for the baby.

Through Peter Gregory the Oswalds became acquainted with a growing circle of Russian-speaking residents of the Dallas–Fort Worth area, a group tied together by common origin, language, and religion, primarily from Eastern European countries. Marina gave conversational Russian lessons to Paul Gregory two days a week during August and early September for $35, usually at the Mercedes Street apartment with Oswald present, and Paul occasionally took the Oswalds shopping and had politically oriented discussions with Oswald. Around August 25, Peter Gregory hosted a dinner for the Oswalds and several community members, including George Bouhe, a Dallas accountant and community leader interested in Marina because she had lived in Leningrad, his birthplace, and Anna Meller, a Russian-born wife of a Dallas department store employee. Near the end of August the Oswalds met consulting geologist Declan Ford and his Russian-born wife at the Mellers' home, and were introduced to Elena Hall, a Tehran-born dental laboratory worker of Russian parentage, through Bouhe who brought Marina to her for dental aid. In early September they met Alexander Kleinlerer, then courting Mrs. Hall, and were introduced to Mrs. Max Clark by Bouhe and Meller. Around the same time, Russian-born petroleum engineer George De Mohrenschildt visited them after hearing about them from within the group, and they later met his wife Jeanne, daughter Alexandra, and son-in-law Gary Taylor. The community was interested both in helping the Oswalds and in hearing fresh news from Russia; some members were initially apprehensive about the apparent ease of their departure from the Soviet Union, but Bouhe, Meller, and Elena Hall were the primary contributors of money, groceries, clothing, and furniture, with others providing transportation and groceries. The Oswalds visited some of these acquaintances in Dallas, and they in turn visited the Oswalds.

It was evident that Oswald did not appreciate the community's help. At least once he flew into a rage and shouted that he did not need what people were giving him. Some felt he resented the gifts because he could not provide his wife what others supplied, and he was also critical of the group for what he saw as an overemphasis on economic advancement. He became increasingly unpopular, partly because of his resentment, his political philosophy, his criticism of the United States, his apparent self-absorption, and his treatment of Marina; some in the group believed he was mentally disturbed. They continued to help, however, out of sympathy for Marina and the child. Marital problems were also apparent: several visitors noted that Marina had a blackened eye at the Mercedes Street apartment, which she attributed to her husband having struck her—though she told Anna Meller she had walked into a door—and friction between the couple was observed on various occasions. Marina wrote that the period was difficult, that her husband was "very irritable" and prone to rage over trivial things, and she testified that "immediately after coming to the United States Lee changed," becoming more reclusive and irritable, though she denied that their later separation was the result of quarrels.

On a weekend afternoon in early October, the Oswalds were visited by Mrs. Oswald and several members of the Russian community, including Bouhe, Meller, the Halls, the De Mohrenschildts, and the Taylors. Oswald discussed his lack of job prospects and overdue rent and was advised to look for work in the Dallas area. Elena Hall invited Marina to stay at her Fort Worth home until Oswald found a job in Dallas; Marina accepted, and Hall moved her, baby June, and the Oswalds' few household goods in a pickup truck from the dental laboratory. Oswald worked at the Leslie Welding Company on Monday, October 8, but failed to appear the next day because he was already in Dallas. He falsely told Marina he had been discharged and told Bouhe the job had been temporary; the company later received an undated letter stating he had "moved permanently to Dallas" and asking that his wages be forwarded to box 2915 in Dallas. He did not tell his mother he was leaving. Marina spent her first weeks in Dallas at Gary Taylor's house during dental appointments and otherwise remained at the Halls' in Fort Worth, with Mrs. De Mohrenschildt bringing her to the Baylor Dental Clinic on October 8, 10, and 15, paid for by funds Bouhe had given Mrs. De Mohrenschildt. After the assassination, Oswald did not see or communicate with his mother until she came to see him.

Even before Oswald moved to Dallas, his acquaintances were helping him look for work there. George De Mohrenschildt directed him to Dallas financial consultant Samuel B. Ballen, but no employment resulted. George Bouhe recommended that he go to the Texas Employment Commission in Dallas, and Anna Meller had her husband ask Mrs. Helen Cunningham, a counselor in the clerical and sales division of the Dallas office, to help. Oswald first came to the commission's office on October 9; he was reluctant to accept industrial employment and was placed in the clerical category and assigned to Mrs. Cunningham. He expressed an interest in writing, and aptitude test results forwarded from the Fort Worth office suggested clerical and writing potential. His application noted "outstanding verbal-clerical potential," and he demonstrated ability in many skilled and semi-skilled jobs, with some indication he could do college work. Cunningham gave him three special tests—for general clerical work, insurance claims examining, and drafting—on which he scored high. The application noted he had no driver's license and described him as "well-groomed and spoken, business suit, alert replies—expresses self extremely well." Oswald told Cunningham he hoped to qualify for responsible junior executive employment through a college work-study program but that this would have to wait because of his immediate financial responsibilities.

Mrs. Cunningham of the Texas Employment Commission classified Oswald for clerical work but sought any available position due to his financial need. After an unsuccessful referral to an architect, she sent him to Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall Co., a graphic arts firm, on October 11 in response to a call from John Graef, head of the photographic department, who needed a photoprint trainee. Oswald impressed Graef and was selected over other applicants, beginning work the following day on a 40-hour week at approximately $1.35 per hour, with take-home pay ranging from $49 to $74 weekly. Marina reported that he enjoyed his work.

Oswald moved into the Dallas YMCA on October 15, paying $2.25 per night, and used the Taylors' address and telephone as a contact point. He also rented post office box 2915 under his own name and filed a change-of-address form. On October 16, Mrs. Hall brought Marina and baby June to Dallas to have June baptized. Marina did this secretly because Oswald opposed baptism, though he showed little disturbance upon learning of it.

Two days after the baptism, Mrs. Hall was hospitalized following an automobile accident and remained there until October 26, with Marina staying at the Hall house during her absence. Mrs. Max Clark and Alexander Kleinlerer checked on Marina. After leaving the YMCA on October 19, Oswald moved to an unknown room or apartment in Dallas, though he likely spent several weekends with Marina at the Hall house.

Four days after Mrs. Hall returned from the hospital, she departed for New York. By her return, Marina had moved to a three-room apartment at 604 Elsbeth Street that Oswald had rented on November 3 for $68 monthly plus utilities, with a $5 deposit. The Taylors helped the Oswalds move their belongings with a rented trailer, and Kleinlerer assisted.

Soon after reuniting, marital difficulties resumed. Kleinlerer witnessed Oswald slap Marina over an unzipped dress during the move. The couple argued about his prohibition of her smoking and about his misrepresentation of her nationality to the landlady as Czechoslovakian. Oswald discouraged others from teaching Marina English, and he continued to beat her. When George De Mohrenschildt criticized his conduct, Oswald replied, "It is my business." Marina's husband became increasingly nervous and irritable, and she admitted some fault for provoking him.

Several acquaintances felt Marina would be better off alone. George Bouhe offered help if she promised to leave Oswald permanently. In early November, with De Mohrenschildt assistance, Marina moved into Anna Meller's house intending not to return. Oswald was upset and temporarily did not know her location. After meeting at De Mohrenschildt's house, Oswald asked her to return, but she insisted he change; he said he could not. Marina then moved to Katherine Ford's house (November 11-17), then briefly to Mrs. Frank Ray's home. When Oswald professed his love and cried, begging her return, she agreed to come back. Russian community members felt their efforts had been in vain, with Bouhe so irritated that he never helped the Oswalds again. Contacts with the community diminished, and Lydia Dymitruk testified she saw them only once. Mrs. Ford testified Marina had contemplated suicide during this period.

In an effort to renew family ties, Robert Oswald wrote to Lee and John Pic on November 17, inviting them to Thanksgiving dinner. Lee accepted, and he and Marina traveled to Fort Worth by bus on Thanksgiving Day, where Pic and Robert met them. Pic, who had not seen his half-brother in ten years, observed Lee's good parenting. After dinner, Paul Gregory hosted them for sandwiches before their return. Robert maintained limited contact afterward but did not see Lee again until after the assassination.

Despite his disillusionment with Soviet life, Oswald maintained interest in Russia, writing to the Soviet Embassy to subscribe to Russian periodicals. In December 1962, the Oswalds sent New Year's greetings to Embassy staff. He also corresponded with the Communist Party, U.S.A. and the Socialist Workers Party, subscribing to the Worker in August 1962 and offering his photographic skills to these organizations and the Hall-Davis Defense Committee, though his offers were not accepted. The Socialist Workers Party had no Texas branch.

Oswald read extensively on diverse subjects. Bouhe testified his fare consisted of Marx, Lenin, and similar works. Marina reported he read H. G. Wells' "Outline of History" and biographies of Hitler, Kennedy, and Khrushchev. Despite the break with the Russian community, the De Mohrenschildts brought the Oswalds to a Russian Christmas party at the Fords' home, where Oswald spoke at length with Yaeko Okui. The Oswalds were not invited to three other Russian Christmas gatherings. Marina visited the De Mohrenschildts after Christmas, and in February 1963, the De Mohrenschildts hosted a dinner attended by Oswald. On February 22, Everett Glover held a gathering to introduce the Oswalds to his friends studying Russian.

At Glover's February gathering, Marina met Ruth Paine, who had recently separated from her husband Michael Paine, a Bell Helicopter research engineer, and was studying Russian. Mrs. Paine obtained Marina's address and wrote to arrange a visit, which Marina accepted. Marina and Mrs. Paine began exchanging visits in March, with Mrs. Paine inviting the Oswalds for dinner and taking them on a picnic on April 20. When Oswald was absent, the women discussed marital problems, and Marina disclosed her pregnancy. Marina wrote warmly of these visits, the companionship for June, and Lee's enjoyment of fishing.

The Oswalds moved from Elsbeth Street to an upstairs apartment at 214 West Neely Street on March 3, 1963, after Oswald responded to a "For Rent" sign. The rent was $60 monthly plus utilities. They moved themselves, carrying belongings and using a baby stroller. Marina preferred the new apartment for its porch and suitability for June. On George Bouhe's earlier advice, Oswald enrolled in a typing course at Crozier Technical High School night school on January 14, beginning attendance on January 28, though he attended irregularly and stopped around March 28.

Using the alias A. J. Hidell, Oswald ordered a Smith & Wesson .38 revolver from Los Angeles (dated January 27) and a rifle from Klein's Sporting Goods in Chicago on March 12. He used the name "Alek James Hidell" on identification cards likely produced at Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall. Both weapons shipped on March 20. Oswald stored the rifle in a Neely Street storeroom he forbade Marina to enter, telling her it was for hunting. Marina photographed him with the rifle, the Worker and Militant, and the revolver strapped to his belt. Over the weekend of March 9-10, Oswald photographed the alley behind General Edwin Walker's home. He prepared a notebook outlining a plan to shoot Walker and studied bus schedules. On the evening of April 6 or 7, he hid the rifle nearby, then retrieved it on April 10, firing at Walker but narrowly missing his head. When Marina learned of the attempt, she made him promise never to repeat it, and she kept his written instructions. Oswald compared the act to assassinating Hitler. The De Mohrenschildts later visited and saw the rifle; De Mohrenschildt jokingly intimated Oswald was the shooter, visibly unsettling him.

On April 6, Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall terminated Oswald because, in his supervisor's opinion, he could not do the work despite trying, and he did not get along with fellow employees; his bringing a Russian newspaper to work may have contributed. Marina testified he was very upset by the loss. On April 8, Oswald informed the Texas Employment Commission he was seeking work and had been laid off due to lack of work. He filed for unemployment benefits on April 12, but the Commission disapproved the claim four days later due to insufficient wage credits.

After moving to Neely Street, the Oswalds initially got along well but soon resumed quarreling. Oswald continued preventing Marina from learning English and beating her. Since February, he had been urging her to return to Russia. Marina wrote several letters to the Russian Embassy requesting a visa, but she testified that Oswald forced her to write them and that she never wanted to return.

Oswald Moves to New Orleans and Stays with Aunt Lillian Murret On April 24, Ruth Paine visited the Oswalds at their Neely Street apartment in Irving, Texas, and was surprised to find Oswald already packed and ready to depart for New Orleans by bus. He explained that he had been unable to find employment in the Dallas area and that Marina had suggested he go to New Orleans, his birthplace. Marina later testified that her real motivation was to get Oswald out of Dallas because of the Walker incident. Mrs. Paine offered to drive Marina to New Orleans later and to have Marina and June stay at her home in the meantime. Upon arriving in New Orleans, Oswald telephoned his aunt, Lillian Murret, at 757 French Street. She had not known he had returned from Russia or that he was married with a child, but she agreed to let him stay. Once in New Orleans, Oswald visited his father's gravesite and telephoned every "Oswald" listed in the phone book, locating his father's brother's widow, Hazel Oswald of Metairie, Louisiana, who provided him with a photograph of his father.

Job Search and Unemployment Benefits in New Orleans On April 26, Oswald registered with the Louisiana Department of Labor employment office, identifying himself as a qualified commercial photographer, shipping clerk, or "darkroom man." His interviewer noted that he would travel on a limited basis, would relocate, and would accept a minimum wage of $1.25 per hour, describing him as "Neat. Suit. Tie. Polite." Although the commission made some referrals, Oswald relied chiefly on newspaper advertisements. On April 29, he filed a request for reconsideration of the employment commission's prior disapproval of his unemployment compensation claim; his complaint that he had not been credited for his work at Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall in Dallas was ruled valid on May 8, granting him maximum benefits of $369 at $33 per week. He filed interstate claims on May 7 and 15, receiving $33 from the latter, but listed fictitious employers on his claim forms. In letters to Marina, Oswald described staying with Aunt Lillian and said that Uncle "Dyuz" (Charles Murret) had offered him a $200 loan if needed.

Employment at Reily Co. and Marina's Move to New Orleans On May 9, responding to a newspaper ad, Oswald applied for work at William B. Reily Co., Inc., a coffee roasting, grinding, canning, and bagging enterprise at 640 Magazine Street. On his application he listed as references John Murret plus "Sgt. Robert Hidell" and "Lieut. J. Evans," both apparently fictitious names. He was approved and began work on May 10 at $1.50 per hour, lubricating machinery. He did not enjoy the job and falsely told his wife and Mrs. Paine he was doing commercial photography. Also on May 9, with the help of Myrtle Evans (who had known him as a child), Oswald rented an apartment at 4905 Magazine Street for $65 a month. After phoning Marina and inviting her to join him, Ruth Paine drove Marina and June from Dallas; they left May 10, overnighted in Shreveport, and arrived on May 11. Mrs. Paine stayed three days with the Oswalds and toured the French Quarter with them before returning home on May 14.

Social Visits from the Murrets and Ruth Kloepfer The Murrets and the Oswalds exchanged visits occasionally; Marina testified that the Murrets were "very good" to them, and Mrs. Murret's daughter Marilyn took the Oswalds on an outing. According to Marina, aside from Ruth Paine and Ruth Kloepfer and her daughters, the Murrets were the only social visitors the Oswalds had in New Orleans. Ruth Kloepfer was a clerk of the Quaker Meeting in New Orleans whom Ruth Paine had contacted in hopes that she might direct Russian-speaking visitors to Marina. Kloepfer visited the Oswalds but made no effort to bring Russian-speaking acquaintances to them.

Dismissal from Reily and Subsequent Unemployment Claims On July 19, Oswald was dismissed by Reily Co. for inefficiency and inattention. He had spent many of his working hours at the adjacent Crescent City Garage, where he read gun magazines and discussed firearms with co-owner Adrian Alba. On Monday, July 22, he returned to the Louisiana employment office to seek new work and file another unemployment compensation claim, again listing fictitious job applications on his forms. He collected unemployment benefits weekly thereafter, ostensibly made some effort to find another job, but soon gave up his search and began spending his days at home reading. On July 25, he received another setback: the Marine Corps affirmed his 1962 undesirable discharge.

Plans to Travel to the Soviet Union or Cuba During this period, Oswald began expressing thoughts of returning to the Soviet Union or going to Cuba. On June 24 he applied for a new passport, receiving it the following day. At Oswald's request, Marina wrote to the Russian Embassy expressing a desire to return to Russia with her husband, citing family problems and her impending second pregnancy. Accompanying her letter was a July 1 letter from Oswald asking the Embassy to rush an entrance visa for his wife while his own visa was considered separately. Marina testified, however, that Oswald's basic desire was to get to Cuba by any means, and that the rest of the correspondence was "window dressing" for that purpose; she believed he planned only to go to Cuba.

The Oswalds' Marital Life in New Orleans During the early New Orleans period, the Oswalds' marriage was more harmonious than it had been previously. Marina wrote that Lee took great satisfaction in showing her his birthplace; they visited the beach, the zoo, and the park, and Lee enjoyed hunting crabs. He was dissatisfied with his job, money was tight, and a new baby was on the way, but as before, Lee read a great deal. Marina testified, however, that after some time Oswald became depressed and she once found him alone in the dark crying. She wrote Ruth Paine that his "love" had ceased soon after Mrs. Paine left New Orleans (though Mrs. Paine noted friction even earlier). On July 11, 12, and 14, Mrs. Paine wrote Marina offering her a place to stay at the Irving home if Oswald did not wish to live with her, emphasizing that Marina could help with housework and that her presence would provide a tax advantage. Marina replied that she had previously raised the subject of separation but that Oswald had been good to her lately; she attributed the improved treatment to his anticipation of their second child and declined the invitation, while leaving open the possibility of taking advantage of it later.

Fair Play for Cuba Committee Activities in New Orleans In late May and early June, Oswald began formulating plans for a New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Using the alias "Lee Osborne," he ordered printed circulars demanding "Hands off Cuba" along with application forms and membership cards. On August 5, he visited a store managed by Carlos Bringuier, a Cuban refugee and anti-Castro New Orleans delegate of the Cuban student directorate; Oswald claimed to have been a Marine trained in guerrilla warfare and offered to train Cubans to fight Castro and to join the fight himself. The next day he left his "Guidebook for Marines" at the store. On August 9, Bringuier saw Oswald distributing Fair Play for Cuba leaflets and a dispute with three Cuban exiles followed, resulting in arrests for disturbing the peace. Oswald claimed his New Orleans branch had 35 members and that he had been in touch with the Committee's president, "A. J. Hidell" (another fictitious name); he was in fact the only member, and the chapter had never been chartered by the national Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Arrest for Distributing Fair Play for Cuba Literature Oswald spent the night of August 9 in jail and was interviewed the next day by a New Orleans Police Department lieutenant and, at Oswald's request, an FBI agent. He maintained he was a member of the New Orleans FPCC branch with 35 members and that he had been in touch with "A. J. Hidell," the president. Later that day Oswald was released on bail; two days later he pleaded guilty to the charges and paid a $10 fine, while the charges against the Cuban exiles were dismissed. Marina testified that the arrest upset Lee and that afterward he "became less active, he cooled off a little."

Media Appearances for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee On August 16, Oswald, assisted by at least one hired helper, again distributed Fair Play for Cuba literature, this time in front of the International Trade Mart; that night's television newscasts featured pictures of his activities, which later hindered his attempts to obtain employment. Bringuier sent a friend to Oswald's home posing as a Castro sympathizer to extract information, but Oswald saw through the ruse. William Stuckey, a radio broadcaster whose program "Latin Listening Post" had long sought an FPCC member, learned about Oswald from Bringuier and visited him on August 17, recording a roughly five-minute interview that aired that evening. On August 21, Stuckey arranged a debate between Oswald and Bringuier on the 25-minute public affairs program "Conversation Carte Blanche." Oswald defended the Castro regime and discussed Marxism but was put on the defensive when his defection to Russia came up. Stuckey testified that the program had effectively ended the FPCC in New Orleans but that Oswald had seemed clean-cut and intelligent and had conducted himself well.

Correspondence with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and Communist Party Oswald wrote several times during the summer to V. T. Lee, then national director of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, sometimes in exaggerated terms about his activities. He also wrote to the Communist Party asking whether, given his prior defection, he should "continue to fight, handicapped as it were, by * * * [his] past record," competing with anti-progressive forces above ground, or "always remain in the background, i.e., underground." The Party replied that "often it is advisable for some people to remain in the background, not underground." Although Oswald wrote four letters to V. T. Lee during the summer, there is no evidence that he heard from Lee after May 29.

Ruth Paine's Visit and Marina's Return to Texas Ruth Paine arrived in New Orleans on September 20 and spent three nights with the Oswalds. Although relations between Lee and Marina had improved, it was decided that Marina would return to Irving with Mrs. Paine for the birth of the baby. The two women toured Bourbon Street while Oswald stayed home packing. On Sunday, September 22, Oswald and Mrs. Paine finished loading the station wagon with the Oswalds' household belongings, and on the morning of September 23, Marina and June departed with Ruth Paine for Irving. Before she left, Oswald told Marina not to tell anyone about his impending trip to Mexico; Marina kept this secret until after the assassination.

Preparations for Travel to Mexico City Marina testified that sometime in August, Oswald first told her of his plan to travel to Mexico and from there to Cuba, where he intended to stay; he had abandoned an earlier plan to hijack an airplane directly to Cuba, which Marina had consistently opposed. On September 17, Oswald obtained from the Mexican consulate general in New Orleans a "Tourist Card" (FM-8 No. 24085) good for one journey of up to 15 days, typed in the name "Lee, Harvey Oswald," occupation "Fotogrofo," with destination Mexico City. On the application he stated he was employed at "640 Rampart," though he was in fact unemployed. On September 24, a neighbor saw Oswald, carrying two pieces of luggage, hurriedly leave the Magazine Street apartment and board a bus; a city busdriver recalled picking up a similarly described passenger who asked directions to the Greyhound station. The landlord found the apartment vacant on September 25. Among the items Oswald took with him were a Spanish-English dictionary, his address book, his 1963 passport and old passport, his correspondence with the Communist Party and the Soviet Embassy, proof of his marriage, newspaper clippings about his Fair Play for Cuba arrest, evidence that he was "Director" of the New Orleans FPCC chapter, various identification cards from Russia, and several sheets of notepaper containing a summary of important events in his life—including his Marine service, Soviet stay, Russian language ability, organization of the New Orleans FPCC, and experience in "street agitation," as a "radio speaker and lecturer," and as a photographer—which he apparently intended to present to Cuban and Soviet officials in Mexico City. The two bags were a small blue cloth zipper bag and a large olive-colored cloth bag; he carried the smaller one throughout the trip and checked the larger one through from Nuevo Laredo to Mexico City.

Oswald remained in New Orleans until September 25, 1963. The night before his departure, his whereabouts are uncertain, though limited finances suggest he likely returned to his apartment, checked his luggage at a bus station, or stayed at an inexpensive hotel. After 5 a.m. on September 25, he collected a $33 Texas unemployment compensation check from his New Orleans post office box, which he cashed between 8 a.m. and noon at a store on Magazine Street. This gave him approximately $200 for his trip to Mexico. He departed New Orleans by bus, likely Continental Trailways Bus No. 5121, which left at 12:20 p.m. and was scheduled to arrive in Houston at 10:50 p.m.

During the evening bus trip to Houston, Oswald telephoned the home of Horace Elroy Twiford, a Socialist Labor Party member. Mrs. Twiford, who answered, believed the call was made locally before 10 p.m., though it may have originated from Beaumont or another stop. Given the bus schedule, it was probably made from Houston later than she remembered. Oswald identified himself as a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and expressed interest in meeting her husband before flying to Mexico. Mrs. Twiford explained that her husband, a merchant seaman, was at sea, and Oswald indicated he could not wait because he was flying to Mexico. The Twifords reported no further contact with Oswald.

A U.S. Selective Service System employee in Austin, Texas, stated that a man identifying himself as "Harvey Oswald" appeared at her office immediately after lunch on September 25 to discuss rectifying his undesirable Marine Corps discharge. However, all information she provided could have been derived from news media by the time she spoke with the FBI, and other Austin residents who should have observed him failed to corroborate her testimony. The Commission determined that the phone call to the Twifords—intended to arrange a Houston meeting that evening—indicates Oswald was in Houston or en route. He could not have traveled from New Orleans to Austin and back to Houston on September 25 unless by air, yet airline records show no such flights, and his limited finances and established frugality made such travel extremely unlikely.

On September 26, Oswald boarded Continental Trailways Bus No. 5133 in Houston, departing at 2:35 a.m. for Laredo via Corpus Christi and Alice. British tourists Dr. and Mrs. John B. McFarland boarded the same bus and noticed Oswald when they awoke around 6 a.m. He told them he was going to Cuba via Mexico City, that he had left New Orleans the previous afternoon, and that he was secretary of the New Orleans Fair Play for Cuba Committee, hoping to see Fidel Castro. The bus was scheduled to arrive in Laredo at approximately 1:20 p.m.

Oswald crossed the border from Laredo to Nuevo Laredo between 1:30 and 2 p.m. on September 26. He boarded Flecha Roja Bus No. 516 at 2:15 p.m., scheduled to arrive in Mexico City at 9:45 a.m. the following day, holding baggage claim check No. 320435. The McFarlands and two Australian girls who boarded at Monterrey saw him on the bus. He sat next to an elderly Englishman, probably Albert Osborne, an itinerant British preacher, whose denial of sitting beside Oswald the Commission found not credible. During the 20-hour trip, Oswald conversed with the Australian girls, mentioning his visit to Russia, recommending the Hotel Cuba, and apparently falsely claiming prior stays there. He did not speak Spanish, got off at every stop to eat large meals alone, and the bus arrived 15 minutes late at 10 a.m. on September 27.

Oswald registered at the Hotel del Comercio within an hour of arrival, staying there throughout his visit. The hotel, located four blocks from the bus station, had perhaps the best appearance of nearby intercity bus-terminal hotels, and its owner understood some English. Oswald registered as "Lee, Harvey Oswald," gave his occupation as "photo," and was assigned room 18 at $1.28 per day.

Mexican officials would not permit a U.S. citizen without a Cuban visa to board a plane to Cuba, even with a valid American passport, but would allow passage with a visa even if the passport proscribed Cuban travel. Oswald's 1963 American passport was stamped invalid for travel to Cuba, and he possessed neither a regular Cuban visa nor an intransit visa. On September 27, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy and spoke with Senora Silvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican employee. He applied for a visa to Cuba intransit to Russia, presenting his passport showing his three years in the Soviet Union, his Russian-language work permit, and letters, as well as proof of his marriage to a Russian woman and his role as New Orleans director of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. He claimed Communist Party membership and stated he intended to travel to Cuba on September 30, stay two weeks, and proceed to Russia.

Either before or during his initial Cuban Embassy visit, Oswald went to the Soviet Embassy and spoke with either Pavel Yatskov or Valeriy Kostikov, both consular officials who were also KGB agents. Oswald later said he had dealt with "Kostin," referring to Kostikov. He was unable to obtain a Soviet visa at that time. Marina Oswald later testified that Soviet officials "refused to have anything to do with him."

Oswald returned to the Cuban Embassy that afternoon with passport photographs, possibly obtained in the United States. Senora Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy and learned Oswald's Russian visa would be delayed approximately four months. Oswald became "highly agitated and angry," particularly upon learning he could not obtain an intransit Cuban visa before acquiring a Russian visa. Duran called Cuban Consul Eusibio Azque, and the ensuing discussion became a heated argument that ended with Azque telling Oswald that people like him were harming the Cuban Revolution and that he would not be given a visa. Duran provided Oswald with her name and the Embassy's phone number, which he recorded in his address book. The visa application was forwarded to Havana, but on October 15, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that the visa could be issued only after Oswald obtained a Russian visa. Oswald contacted both embassies again during his stay with no greater success. In a later letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, he blamed a "gross breach of regulations" at the Cuban Embassy for his failure.

The hotel maid reported Oswald was generally gone by 9 a.m., and the night watchman said he usually returned around midnight. He ate inexpensive lunches (40 to 48 cents) at an adjacent restaurant, arriving shortly after 2 p.m. and ordering by pointing at the menu; he ate soup, rice, and meat or eggs, refusing dessert and coffee. He was seen with no other person at the hotel or restaurant. Though the Soviet and Cuban Embassies were some distance from his hotel, Oswald traversed substantial portions of the city. Marina testified that he told her he had seen a bullfight, visited museums, done sightseeing, and watched motion pictures. Notations in his Spanish-English dictionary and guide map suggest he intended to attend a jai alai game, which he almost certainly did not. He purchased bullfight and tourist postcards, and brought Marina a silver bracelet inscribed with her name—likely of Japanese origin and commonly sold in Dallas five-and-ten-cent stores rather than in Mexico. He did not purchase the Mexican phonograph records Marina had requested.

On September 30, Oswald appeared at the Agencia de Viages, Transportes Chihuahuenses and purchased international exchange orders costing $20.30 for travel on a Transportes del Norte bus from Mexico City to Laredo and by Greyhound directly from Laredo to Dallas. A reservation was made for him on Transportes del Norte Bus No. 332, departing Mexico City at 8:30 a.m. on October 2, with seat No. 12 reserved in the name "H. O. Lee"—likely copied from Oswald's tourist card reading "Lee, Harvey Oswald." The manifest for Transportes Frontera Bus No. 340, leaving October 2 for Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo, later contained the name "Oswld," apparently added after the trip; Oswald did not take that bus. On October 1, Oswald paid his hotel bill through that night.

The night watchman helped Oswald obtain a taxicab at approximately 6:30 or 7 a.m. on October 2. Transportes del Norte Bus No. 332 departed on schedule at 8:30 a.m., and at Monterrey passengers were shifted to relief bus No. 373, scheduled to depart for Laredo at 10 p.m. Fellow passengers recalled that Oswald was pulled off the bus by Mexican officials at the border due to alleged irregularities in his tourist papers, and was overheard muttering complaints upon his return. They also remembered him hurriedly gulping a banana after the bus reached customs, possibly believing he could not take fruit into the United States. One passenger was annoyed by Oswald keeping his overhead light on to read after 10 p.m. At approximately 1:35 a.m. on October 3, Oswald crossed the International Bridge from Nuevo Laredo into Texas. He then traveled from Laredo to Dallas via San Antonio on Greyhound Bus No. 1265, substantially following Interstate Route 35, leaving Laredo at 3 a.m. and arriving in Dallas at about 2:20 p.m. the same day.

Upon returning to Dallas, Oswald did not immediately contact his wife. He went to the employment commission to file an unemployment compensation claim and announced he was again looking for work. He spent the night at the YMCA, registering as a serviceman to avoid the membership fee. The following day, he applied for a typesetter trainee position at Padgett Printing Co., making a favorable impression on the department foreman, but the plant superintendent contacted Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall and decided not to hire him based on unfavorable responses. Oswald telephoned Marina, who refused to have Mrs. Paine pick him up, so he hitchhiked to the Paine home, where he spent part or all of the weekend. Marina testified that although he "changed for the better" after the Mexican trip and treated her better, she did not want to live with him because she was pregnant and felt it better to be with a woman who spoke English and Russian. On Monday, October 7, Mrs. Paine drove Oswald to the bus station, and he returned to Dallas to look for work and a place to live.

After deeming the local YMCA too expensive, Oswald first inquired about a room at his later residence 1026 North Beckley on October 7 but found no vacancies. He then responded to a "For Rent" listing at a 621 Marsalis Street rooming house, paid $7 in advance weekly rent, and moved in the same day. He immediately resumed job hunting via employment commission referrals, spent most of his non-working time in his room, and called his wife twice daily. On a Friday in mid-October, he told his landlady Mrs. Mary Bledsoe he would visit Irving for the weekend, and she refused to rent him the room for the following week due to personal dislike.

Oswald spent the October 12-13 weekend at Ruth Paine's residence, where he received a driving lesson. He told Mrs. Paine his final unemployment check had arrived but was smaller than prior payments, and was noted to be extremely discouraged by his wife Marina's pregnancy, lack of job prospects, and loss of income. On the following Monday, Mrs. Paine drove Oswald to Dallas to retrieve his belongings from the Marsalis Street rooming house. He then rented a room at 1026 North Beckley Avenue from Mrs. A. C. Johnson for $8 weekly, registering under the alias O. H. Lee and moving in immediately. He found the new room more comfortable due to included television and refrigerator access, spent most evenings there, borrowed library books, and held subscriptions to periodicals including *Time*, the *Worker*, the *Militant*, and Russian-language publications.

On the Monday Oswald moved to North Beckley, Mrs. Paine mentioned the Oswalds' financial and employment struggles to neighbor Linnie Mae Randle, who noted her brother Buell Wesley Frazier worked at the Texas School Book Depository and referenced a job opening. When Marina learned of the opening, she asked Mrs. Paine to inquire about the position. Mrs. Paine called Depository superintendent Roy S. Truly, who stated he would interview Oswald if he applied in person. Oswald called the Paine home that evening, was informed of the opportunity, interviewed with Truly the next day, and was hired for a temporary role. He began work Wednesday, October 16, filling book orders from 8 a.m. to 4:45 p.m. for $1.25 per hour. Both Oswalds were pleased with the position, though Oswald still hoped to find better employment, kept to himself among coworkers, and performed his duties satisfactorily.

During his first week at the Depository, Oswald became acquainted with Frazier, and arranged to ride with him to Irving on weekends. On Friday, October 18, Frazier drove Oswald to the Paine home for his birthday, where Marina and Ruth Paine held a small celebration. On Sunday, Oswald stayed with his daughter June and the Paine children while Mrs. Paine drove Marina to Parkland Hospital, where she gave birth to the couple's second daughter Rachel. Oswald visited Marina in the hospital that evening, stayed overnight in Irving, and returned to Dallas the next morning.

On the evening of October 23, Oswald wrote to Communist Party USA official Arnold Johnson stating he had attended an "ultra right" meeting led by Gen. Edwin A. Walker. Two nights later, he accompanied Michael Paine to an American Civil Liberties Union meeting at Southern Methodist University, where he pushed back against a claim that John Birch Society members were not anti-Semitic, stating he had heard anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic remarks at Walker's meeting. Later in the evening, he discussed Marxist views with multiple attendees including Bell Helicopter employee Frank Krystinik, identifying as a Marxist but not a Communist, praising President Kennedy's civil liberties work, and acknowledging U.S. civil liberties superiority over the Soviet Union. Krystinik testified Oswald did not appear to fully understand the views he was espousing. Oswald spent the following weekend at the Paine home after Marina and Rachel returned from the hospital, and obtained post office box No. 6225 at the Terminal Annex Post Office Station on November 1, registering it for mail for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and ACLU. He spent that weekend in Irving as well.

The FBI had tracked the Oswalds' activities, with Dallas office records noting Oswald's subscription to the *Worker*, Fair Play for Cuba Committee involvement, and prior travel to Mexico. FBI agents visited the Paine home on November 1 and November 5, speaking briefly with Mrs. Paine when Oswald was not present. Mrs. Paine recorded the lead agent's name and phone number, and Marina recorded his license plate number, both of which they reported to Oswald. Oswald was troubled by the FBI's attention, stating they were trying to inhibit his activities, and wrote to the Soviet Embassy in Washington claiming an agent had warned him that FPCC activity in Texas would draw further FBI scrutiny, and that the agent had suggested Marina could defect to the U.S. under FBI protection. He requested updates on the family's Soviet entrance visa status. Marina testified the statements Oswald attributed to the FBI were never made.

On Friday, November 8, Oswald rode with Frazier to the Paine home as usual. On Saturday, Mrs. Paine drove him to the Texas Drivers' License Examining Station, which was closed for election day. He stayed at the Paine home through Monday, November 11 (Veterans Day), and received a second driving lesson from Mrs. Paine over the weekend. Oswald did not visit Irving the following weekend, as Marina had asked him not to come because Michael Paine (with whom he had a poor relationship) would be there for his daughter's birthday, and she felt a 3-day prior visit had already strained Mrs. Paine's hospitality. Oswald called Marina Saturday afternoon to say he had returned to the licensing station that morning but left due to a long line.

On Sunday, November 17, at Marina's request, Ruth Paine called Oswald at the Beckley Avenue number he had provided, and was told no one by that name lived at the address. The next day, Oswald called Marina; when she expressed distress over the missing name at the address, he became angry, stated he was using a fictitious name, and said she should not have called the Beckley number. He did not call the following day, an unusual break in contact. On the morning of Thursday, November 21, Oswald asked Frazier to drive him to Irving that evening, saying he needed to pick up curtain rods. His unannounced arrival surprised the household, as he usually requested permission to visit in advance; the women assumed he came to make amends for the prior argument over his fictitious name. He told Marina he was lonely after missing the prior weekend and wanted to make peace, played with his daughter on the lawn before dinner, and asked Marina to move to Dallas with him, which she refused. After supper, he watched television while the women cleaned and prepared their children for bed, and went to bed early at around 9 p.m.

This appendix details a complete analysis of Lee Harvey Oswald's receipts and expenditures from June 13, 1962 through November 22, 1963, including all known income sources, spending on rent, subscriptions, loan repayments, Fair Play for Cuba Committee costs, and estimated monthly expenses for food, clothing, and incidentals set at $100 per month. The Bureau of Labor Statistics noted this estimate was slightly above average for a family in Oswald's income class in the southern U.S. The analysis shows a grand total of $3,665.89 in receipts, $3,501.79 in expenditures, and $164.10 in cash on hand as of November 22, 1963, plus $170 in Oswald's wallet and $13.87 cash taken at the time of his arrest.

This appendix reviews all transactions between Lee Harvey and Marina Oswald and the U.S. Department of State and Immigration and Naturalization Service (Department of Justice) from September 4, 1959 (Oswald's first passport application) to shortly before the assassination, including processing for Marina's entry to the U.S. The Commission found no indication the Oswalds received illegal or disparate treatment compared to similarly situated individuals, based on the facts, statutes, regulations, and practices in effect at the time.

On September 4, 1959, while on active duty with the U.S. Marine Corps, Oswald applied for a passport at a Santa Ana, California superior court clerk’s office. He stated he intended to leave the U.S. for approximately 4 months starting around September 21, 1959, via ship from New Orleans, with travel plans to attend Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland and the University of Turku in Finland, plus tourist visits to Cuba, the Dominican Republic, England, France, Switzerland, Germany, Finland, and Russia. He submitted a signed statement from a Marine officer confirming his upcoming September 10, 1959 discharge from the Corps. Passport No. 1733242 was routinely issued to him on September 10, 1959, and the U.S. had no travel proscriptions for any of the countries Oswald listed at the time of issuance.

U.S. officials in Moscow had no knowledge of Oswald’s presence in the Soviet Union until October 31, 1959, more than two weeks after his arrival, as he failed to complete standard registration at the U.S. Embassy for American travelers in the country. On that Saturday, Oswald visited the American Embassy in Moscow, placed his passport on the receptionist’s desk, and stated he had come to dissolve his U.S. citizenship. Consul Richard E. Snyder and his assistant John A. McVickar met with Oswald, who was neatly dressed but came across as arrogant and in command of the conversation from the outset. Oswald declared his allegiance was to the Soviet Union, confirmed he had already applied for Soviet citizenship, and stated he was familiar with U.S. loss of citizenship laws, refusing a review of them. He retrieved his passport from the receptionist and placed it on Snyder’s desk, having inked out the portion showing his U.S. address, and provided a pre-written formal note requesting revocation of his U.S. citizenship, citing his pending Soviet citizenship application and political motivations for the request. He stated his primary reason for renouncing citizenship was his identification as a Marxist, his admiration for the Soviet system and policies, and his long-held intent to defect to the Soviet Union, formed before his Marine Corps discharge; he also claimed he had volunteered to share all information about his Marine Corps radar operation specialty with Soviet officials. Snyder refused to process the renunciation immediately, citing State Department policy to discourage impulsive expatriation (a permanent, high-stakes act) and a recent precedent in which a mentally ill U.S. citizen had been allowed to renounce citizenship without proper review. He told Oswald he could return on a regular business day to complete the process, and persuaded Oswald to provide his home address and mother’s name by stating the information was required to proceed. The Embassy sent a telegram to the State Department the same day detailing the visit, with copies provided to the FBI and CIA, followed by a November 2, 1959, memorandum proposing to delay action on the renunciation request pending further developments and State Department guidance. The State Department replied on November 2 that the Embassy could not block Oswald’s right to renounce citizenship if he insisted, per Section 1999 of the Revised Statutes. Oswald never returned to the Embassy to complete the renunciation. On November 3, 1959, he sent a handwritten letter from his Moscow Metropole Hotel formally protesting the refusal to process his renunciation on October 31, restating his request to revoke his citizenship, and noting he would ask the U.S. government to protest the incident if his Soviet citizenship application was approved. The Embassy responded on November 6, advising Oswald he could visit on any normal business day to complete expatriation paperwork, and made multiple attempts through November 30, 1959, to deliver messages from his U.S. family urging him to reconsider; he refused to communicate with Embassy staff, so the messages were sent via registered mail. American journalist Priscilla Johnson interviewed Oswald at the Metropole Hotel on November 16, 1959, and informed the Embassy the next day that Oswald claimed he planned to leave Moscow soon, and may have intentionally not completed the renunciation to leave an option open. The Embassy later reported to the State Department that Oswald had left the Metropole Hotel, though other records indicate he did not actually depart Moscow for Minsk until approximately January 4, 1960. Johnson’s interview was the last U.S. government contact with Oswald until February 13, 1961. In March 1960, Oswald’s mother asked Texas Representative James C. Wright Jr. to help locate her son; the inquiry was forwarded to the State Department and then the Moscow Embassy, which responded on March 28, 1960, that it had had no contact with Oswald since November 9, 1959, and found no evidence he had expatriated other than his stated intent. The Embassy suggested Oswald’s mother send a letter to her son that could be forwarded to the Soviet government, and the State Department replied on May 10, 1960, that no action should be taken unless a family member submitted a voluntary request. A follow-up inquiry sent June 22 was answered by the Embassy on July 6, 1960, stating no further contact had been made, and no further action would be taken per the May 10 guidance. Mrs. Oswald did not follow up on the inquiry.

In 1960, State Department Passport Office procedures required the creation of a "refusal sheet" whenever circumstances indicated a prospective passport applicant might not be entitled to a U.S. passport; the records section would then prepare a "lookout card" to file in the Passport Office’s central lookout file. When any passport application was received from any location globally, the applicant’s name and date of birth were checked against the lookout file, and a match would trigger appropriate action including possible passport refusal. Lookout cards were removed from applicant files when facts warranted an unquestioned passport grant. On March 25, 1960, a refusal sheet was created for Lee Harvey Oswald, with a notation that he "may have been naturalized in the Soviet Union or otherwise expatriated himself." An Operations Memorandum dated March 28, 1960, documented the reason for the card’s preparation, advised the Moscow Embassy to take no further action on the Oswald case unless evidence of loss of nationality was obtained, and confirmed an appropriate notice had been placed in the lookout card section to flag any future Oswald passport application submitted outside the Soviet Union. Despite these records, the State Department informed the Commission on May 18, 1964, that no investigation had found evidence a lookout card for Oswald was ever prepared, modified, or removed, and no such card was ever located, with some file entries indicating it was never created. The State Department noted that as of October 1959, it possessed information that could reasonably have prompted preparation of a lookout card for Oswald. The Passport Office employee who created the refusal sheet suggested a possible explanation for the missing card: Oswald’s file was temporarily removed from its storage location between the refusal sheet creation and the normal timeline for lookout card preparation due to additional correspondence from the Embassy, and when the file was returned, staff may have incorrectly assumed the card had already been prepared. The Department noted that if a lookout card had been created on grounds of possible expatriation, it would have been removed and destroyed after the 1961 determination that Oswald had not expatriated, prior to his June 1963 application for a second passport, so the failure to prepare the card had no impact on later administrative actions. Additional regulations for lookout file handling were issued on February 20, 1964, a category for returned defectors (which automatically generates lookout cards) was established on March 14, 1964, and the Office of Security issued a procedural study of the lookout-card system with recommendations on July 27, 1964.

This section covers the administrative context and initial steps related to Lee Harvey Oswald’s request to recover his originally issued 1959 U.S. passport after his relocation to the Soviet Union, including U.S. government responses to family inquiries about his status and his formal request for passport return to facilitate his departure from the Soviet Union and return to the United States.

The formal negotiations between Oswald and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow over his passport return request began after Oswald’s mother visited the State Department on January 25, 1961, to ask for help locating her son. On February 1, 1961, the State Department requested the Moscow Embassy inform the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Mrs. Oswald was concerned for her son’s safety and wished to hear from him; the request arrived in Moscow via diplomatic pouch on February 10 or 11, 1961. Before the Embassy could act on the request, it received an undated letter from Oswald postmarked Minsk on February 5, 1961, in which he formally requested the return of his U.S. passport, stating he wished to return to the United States if an agreement could be reached to drop any legal proceedings against him, as he believed a valid U.S. passport would help him secure a Soviet exit visa. He noted he had not been required to take Soviet citizenship, was living in Minsk with non-permanent foreigner documentation, and could not leave the city without official permission. The Embassy replied on February 28, 1961, informing Oswald he would need to travel to Moscow in person to discuss passport and expatriation matters. Oswald responded with a letter dated March 12, 1961, received by the Embassy on March 20, objecting to the requirement to travel to Moscow, citing the lengthy and difficult process of obtaining permission to leave Minsk, and requesting that any preliminary questions be sent to him in questionnaire form instead. The provided source text cuts off at the end of this correspondence.

After receiving Oswald’s first letter postmarked February 5, 1961, the Moscow Embassy forwarded a dispatch to the State Department on February 28 relaying Oswald’s correspondence and the Embassy’s initial response. The Embassy asked whether Oswald would face prosecution if he returned to the U.S., whether he should be notified of potential prosecution, and if there was any objection to mailing his 1959 passport to him to facilitate his application for a Soviet exit visa. After receiving Oswald’s March 20 letter, the Embassy consulted Washington again, proposed to inform Oswald he must travel to Moscow in person to discuss reentry to the U.S. and that the Soviet government did not object to visits by American citizens, and sent this letter to Oswald on March 24.

The State Department reviewed the Embassy’s February 28, 1961 dispatch, and on April 13 issued instructions that for security reasons, Oswald’s passport could only be released to him if he appeared in person at the Embassy. Even then, the passport could only be provided after a full investigation confirmed he had not renounced his U.S. citizenship, he had to present proof he had arranged to depart the Soviet Union for the U.S., and the passport would be stamped valid only for direct return to the U.S. The Department also informed the Embassy it could not advise Oswald whether he would face prosecution for any offenses if he returned to the U.S.

On May 26, 1961, the Embassy sent a dispatch to the State Department reporting it had received Oswald’s May 16 letter, in which he demanded full guarantees he would not be prosecuted under any circumstances if he returned to the U.S., threatened to seek assistance from U.S. relatives if guarantees were not provided, noted his Russian wife would accompany him, and repeated his refusal to travel to Moscow. The Embassy proposed to reply that citizenship questions required an in-person interview, advise on his wife’s immigration procedures, and observed that Oswald’s Soviet internal passport listed him as “without citizenship,” suggesting he had not yet expatriated under Section 349(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Embassy asked whether Oswald was entitled to U.S. government protection while abroad without evidence of an expatriating act.

The State Department responded to the Embassy’s May dispatch on July 11, 1961, noting it was unclear if Oswald’s “without citizenship” designation meant he lacked Soviet citizenship or any citizenship. It stated that in the absence of evidence he had definitively lost U.S. citizenship, he retained that technical status. The Department said the Embassy could use its discretion to provide protection in an emergency, but non-emergency matters should be submitted to the Department, and the Embassy should seek prior State Department advice before granting Oswald U.S. citizen documentation for any application.

On July 8, 1961, Oswald appeared unannounced at the Moscow Embassy, met with consul Richard E. Snyder who asked him to return on July 10. Oswald contacted his wife to travel to Moscow, and returned alone on July 10 for an official interview. Snyder’s post-interview memorandum noted Oswald appeared more mature than during his 1959 Embassy visit, stated he had only applied for Soviet residence (not citizenship), never took an oath of allegiance to the Soviet Union, worked as a metal worker in Minsk earning 90 rubles monthly, had saved 200 rubles for travel to the U.S., and denied making derogatory statements about the U.S. or providing information to the Soviets as he had threatened in 1959.

During the July 10 interview, Oswald completed an application to renew his American passport, which was set to expire on September 10, 1961, and he was highly unlikely to obtain the required Soviet exit documents before that date. The application included a list of acts that could disqualify an applicant for a passport due to loss of U.S. citizenship. One carbon copy of the application showed Oswald signed after the “have not” option was struck through, possibly indicating he admitted to committing a disqualifying act (potentially swearing allegiance to a foreign state), though Snyder could not confirm this and noted it may have been a clerical error. Oswald also completed a required supplementary questionnaire for applicants who acknowledged possible expatriating acts, answering that he was recognized as an American national in the USSR, had not sought foreign nationality registration, had not taken an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, and did not consider his factory employment to be foreign government service.

Based on Oswald’s interview statements and questionnaire answers, Snyder concluded Oswald had not lost his U.S. citizenship, so he returned Oswald’s 1959 passport stamped valid only for direct travel to the U.S. On July 11, 1961, the Embassy sent a dispatch to the State Department reporting this conclusion, enclosing Oswald’s renewal application and supplementary questionnaire, and requesting authorization to renew his passport at its discretion, contingent on evidence he needed the passport to return to the U.S.

On August 18, 1961, the State Department Passport Office concluded Oswald had not expatriated himself, and sent a dispatch to the Moscow Embassy concurring with the Embassy’s July 11 determination. The Department authorized renewal of Oswald’s 1959 passport upon his application, provided no adverse information was known, contingent on him presenting evidence he needed the renewal to return to the U.S. It directed the Embassy to issue the passport only in person, stamp it valid only for direct return to the U.S., and submit reports of his travel data and any intervening developments.

The decision that Oswald was entitled to a new passport was made independently by Moscow consul Richard E. Snyder for the Embassy, and by Passport Office employee Bernice L. Waterman for the State Department, with no outside influence. Waterman’s decision was approved by her area chief, the head of the Foreign Operations Division, and the Passport Office Legal Division. The Director of the Passport Office and the State Department Legal Adviser later reviewed the full record and confirmed both Snyder and Waterman acted correctly in determining Oswald had not expatriated his U.S. citizenship.

In an October 12, 1961 dispatch, the Embassy informed the State Department it had received four letters from Oswald (dated July 15, August 8, October 4, and an undated August letter) reporting difficulty obtaining exit visas for himself and Marina, and that they faced increasing harassment in Minsk. The Embassy replied it could not influence Soviet exit visa decisions, told Oswald he could discuss passport renewal in person at the Embassy, and notified him his wife’s immigration status petition had not yet been approved. The State Department approved the Embassy’s response on December 28, 1961. After further correspondence addressing Soviet exit delays, approval of Marina’s U.S. entry, and Oswald’s request for a repatriation loan, the Embassy renewed Oswald’s passport for 30 days on May 24, 1962, stamped it valid only for direct return to the U.S., and handed it to him in person. He used the passport to return to the U.S. one week later.

As a U.S. citizen by birth, Oswald could only lose his citizenship by committing acts specified by federal law. The State Department determined he had not committed any expatriating acts: he never received Soviet naturalization, never formally renounced his U.S. nationality before a U.S. consular officer in the required legal form, never took an oath of allegiance to the Soviet Union, and never worked for the Soviet government in a role requiring such an oath.

Under Section 349(a)(1) of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, a U.S. citizen loses their nationality by obtaining naturalization in a foreign state on their own application. Although Oswald applied for Soviet citizenship, he never received it, so he did not expatriate himself under this provision.

Section 349(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that a U.S. citizen loses their citizenship by making a formal renunciation of nationality before a U.S. diplomatic or consular officer in a foreign state, in the form prescribed by the Secretary of State. Implementing regulations require 4 copies of the renunciation form to be executed, with the original and one copy sent to the State Department for approval. Once approved, the consular official provides a copy of the form to the individual, who must sign it in the presence of the consular official, who also signs the form. Oswald never completed this formal renunciation process, so he did not lose U.S. citizenship under this provision.

Oswald's Failed Citizenship Renunciation Section 349(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act requires compliance with specific forms and procedures prescribed by the Secretary of State for a U.S. citizen to renounce citizenship. Although Oswald stated to American Embassy officials in 1959, both orally and in writing, that he desired to renounce his citizenship, he did not execute the proper forms and did not sign his letters of October 31 or November 3, 1959, in the presence of a consular official. Because the statutory requirements were not satisfied, Oswald did not expatriate himself under section 349(a)(6).

Foreign State Oath Expatriation Section 349(a)(2) provides for loss of nationality by taking an oath or making a formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state. In his October 31, 1959 letter, Oswald wrote "I affirm that his allegiance is to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and both letters stated his Soviet citizenship application was pending. However, since 1940 it has been well established that an oath of allegiance must be given to an official of the foreign state, not to a party unconnected with the foreign state. There is no indication that Oswald actually took any oath or declaration before an official of the Soviet Government, and therefore he did not expatriate himself under section 349(a)(2).

Foreign Government Employment Expatriation Section 349(a)(4) provides for loss of nationality by accepting employment under a foreign government, either when the person acquires the nationality of that state or when an oath is required for the position. While Oswald was employed in a state-owned factory in Minsk, he did not acquire Russian nationality and there is no indication that any oath was required for the employment. Furthermore, prior judicial decisions hold that merely working in a government-owned factory does not result in expatriation, and several cases under an earlier but similar provision held that government employment taken to subsist was considered involuntary and thus did not result in expatriation. Oswald therefore did not expatriate himself under section 349(a)(4).

Commission Finding on Oswald's Expatriation Status Based on the analysis of the three statutory provisions, the Commission concludes that Lee Harvey Oswald had not expatriated himself by any acts performed between October 16, 1959, and May 1962. The Commission concurs in the opinion of the State Department that his passport was properly returned to him in July 1961 and properly reissued in May 1962.

Marina Oswald U.S. Entry Authorization On July 11, 1961, Lee Harvey Oswald and his wife appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow before John A. McVickar, where they executed papers to begin procedures for Marina's admittance to the United States as a nonquota immigrant as the wife of an American citizen. During the routine interview, Marina stated she was a member of the Trade Union of Medical Workers but denied membership in the Komsomol or any other Communist organization. Marina later admitted to the Commission that she had been a member of the Komsomol but claimed she was expelled when it was learned she intended to accompany her husband to the United States. The Embassy forwarded the application papers to the State Department on August 28, 1961.

Embassy Visa Negotiations for Marina Marina Oswald's ability to obtain a nonquota immigrant visa depended on the favorable resolution of three questions: (1) whether she was the wife of an American citizen, which depended on whether Oswald had expatriated himself; (2) whether she was not and had not been affiliated with a Communist organization on other than an involuntary basis; and (3) whether she was not likely to become a public charge after admission. A fourth issue arose under section 243(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which prohibits issuance of immigrant visas by American Consuls in countries that have refused to accept or delayed accepting the return of persons sought to be deported—the Soviet Union having been designated as such a country in 1953. However, sanctions under section 243(g) are often waived, and Marina could alternatively obtain her visa at an American Embassy in another country if otherwise entitled.

Marina's Nonquota Visa Eligibility In a despatch dated August 28, 1961, the Embassy requested a security advisory opinion on Marina Oswald's application, recommending a favorable opinion and waiver of section 243(g) sanctions, noting that her membership in the Soviet Trade Union for Medical Workers since 1957 was routinely considered to be involuntary. The Department initiated checks with the CIA, FBI, the Office of Security, and the Passport Office. The security check revealed no derogatory information, and in early October 1961, the Department cabled Moscow that the available information established Marina's eligibility to enter the country as a nonquota immigrant.

Security Review of Marina's Application The State Department conducted a thorough security check on Marina Oswald through multiple agencies including the CIA, FBI, the Department's own Office of Security, and the Passport Office. The security review turned up no derogatory information about Marina, and on this basis the Department concluded in early October 1961 that the available information established her eligibility to enter the United States as a nonquota immigrant. The Department's decision assumed that prior to obtaining her visa, Marina would need to provide reasonable assurance that she was not likely to become a public charge.

Public Charge Requirement for Marina's Visa The State Department encountered difficulty in determining that Marina had met the requirement that she not become a public charge. She knew no one in the United States other than members of Oswald's family, who lacked the means to furnish substantial financial guarantees. After considerable correspondence with Oswald and the Department, the Embassy decided on March 16, 1962 to accept Oswald's own affidavit as sufficient assurance, noting his training in a trade that should make him readily employable, his legal obligation to support his wife, and that the family could live with his mother in Texas. The necessity of relying solely upon Oswald's affidavit was later eliminated when the Department received an affidavit of support from Oswald's mother's employer in Vernon, Texas.

INS Investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald By law, the Attorney General must pass upon an applicant's eligibility, with this responsibility delegated to District Directors of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. On October 6, 1961, the Visa Office sent a letter to the District Director in Dallas, Texas, transmitting Marina's marriage certificate, a $10 check from Oswald, and a signed petition to classify Marina for an immigrant visa as the spouse of a U.S. citizen. The INS Dallas office instituted a field investigation on Oswald, conducting routine checks with federal security agencies and local law enforcement, finding no new derogatory information and no evidence that Oswald was ever a Communist Party member. A record check in New Orleans confirmed Oswald's birth certificate proving his American citizenship. On October 17, 1961, an investigator interviewed Oswald's brother Robert, who characterized Lee as a "mixed up kid" who had emigrated due to bitterness, possibly from his Marine Corps experience.

Initial Section 243(g) Waiver Denial On January 25, 1962, the Dallas field investigation results were consolidated into a report and sent to the District Director in San Antonio with a covering memorandum the next day. Although the immigrant inspector had endorsed the case "approved," the memorandum author overruled that decision on the grounds that the sanctions under section 243(g) should not be waived, finding that Oswald was not a "reputable relative" within the meaning of Operations Instructions 205.3. On January 30, 1962, the San Antonio District Director affirmed this denial, concluding that Oswald's recent statements about learning from his Russian experiences were insufficient to relieve doubts raised by his arrogant, anti-American statements upon entering Russia in 1959. The Washington office of the INS also concurred that section 243(g) provisions should not be waived, but indicated the correct disposition was to grant the petition with a notation that the waiver was not authorized. On February 28, 1962, the Dallas office notified the State Department and Moscow Embassy of this disposition, and Oswald later told the Embassy he received the notice on March 15.

State Department Effort to Reverse Waiver Denial The plan to obtain Marina's visa in Belgium became unnecessary when the Immigration and Naturalization Service began reconsidering the section 243(g) waiver. On March 16, 1962, the Soviet desk at the State Department took initial action to seek a change by sending a memorandum to the Visa Office urging that INS be asked to reconsider. The memorandum argued that it was in U.S. interest to get Oswald and his family out of the Soviet Union quickly because Oswald was an unstable character whose actions were unpredictable, and that refusing to issue a visa would allow the Soviet Government to argue the United States imposed a forced family separation, weakening the Embassy's position in other cases. The State Department subsequently notified the Moscow Embassy that the decision was under review and instructed it to withhold action pending reconsideration.

Section 243(g) Waiver Request The Visa Office first contacted the Washington INS office informally and was advised that any letter requesting review should come from the Director or Acting Administrator level, since the case had been carefully considered at the Assistant or Deputy Associate Commissioner level. On March 27, 1962, an acting administrator in the State Department wrote to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization requesting that the section 243(g) sanction be waived in Marina's case. The letter acknowledged the difficulty of the case given Oswald's background but argued that refusing a visa would effectively punish Marina and the Oswalds' newborn child for Mr. Oswald's earlier indiscretions, noted the $500 repatriation loan the Government had advanced to Oswald, and emphasized the importance of not allowing the Soviet Government to claim it had done its part while the U.S. refused to issue a visa, which would weaken the Embassy's position in encouraging positive Soviet action in other cases.

Brussels Embassy Visa Processing Option As an alternative to obtaining the visa at the Moscow Embassy where section 243(g) sanctions applied, the Moscow Embassy on March 16, 1962 inquired of the Brussels Embassy whether Marina could obtain her visa there. The Brussels Embassy replied affirmatively, indicating a visa could be issued to Marina within two or three days of her arrival. The Marina Oswald file was accordingly sent to the Brussels Embassy to preserve this option pending the outcome of the State Department's effort to have INS reverse its denial of the section 243(g) waiver.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service reversed its initial position and granted the section 243(g) waiver for Marina Oswald on May 9, 1962. A letter from the INS stated that the matter had been "carefully reviewed in this office" and that, in view of the strong representations made in the March 27 letter, the sanctions imposed pursuant to section 243(g) were waived in behalf of Mrs. Oswald. The State Department's Office of Soviet Affairs had informally learned on May 8 that the letter would be signed the following day, and the State Department quickly telegraphed the Moscow Embassy reporting that the waiver had been granted. Marina Oswald completed her processing when she, her husband, and daughter came to Moscow in May 1962 on their way from Minsk to the United States.

The legal justification for the decisions affecting Marina Oswald rested on four main grounds: her status as the wife of a U.S. citizen under section 205 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952; the assurance, supported by Lee Harvey Oswald's affidavit, that she would not become a public charge under section 212(a)(15); her membership in a Communist organization under section 212(a)(28), which was held not to bar her admission; and the waiver of the section 243(g) sanctions that had been imposed against the Soviet Union. Each of these justifications is analyzed in turn in the following sections.

Marina Oswald's status as the wife of a U.S. citizen was established under section 205 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which provides for the admission into the United States of persons married to American citizens. Lee Harvey Oswald's American citizenship was established once it was determined that he was born in the United States and had not expatriated himself. Marina Oswald submitted a marriage certificate to show that she was his wife, thereby satisfying the statutory requirement.

Section 212(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that aliens will not be admitted to the United States if, in the opinion of the responsible Government official, they are likely at any time to become public charges. The pertinent Department of State regulations require that such a determination be predicated upon circumstances indicating that the alien will probably become a charge upon the public after entry. In 1962, Lee Harvey Oswald was 22 years old and in good health, had lived in the United States for 17 years before joining the Marine Corps, and had gained two and a half years of job experience in a factory producing electronic equipment. Under these circumstances, the Department concluded that Oswald's affidavit that he would support his wife was sufficient assurance that she was not likely to become a public charge. A second affidavit from Marguerite Oswald's employer provided a possible alternative basis, but the Embassy had no reason to consider its sufficiency because a favorable ruling had already been made on the basis of Oswald's affidavit.

Under section 212(a)(28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, an alien is not admissible to the United States if a member of, or affiliated with, a Communist organization, unless the alien establishes that such membership was involuntary, occurred solely when under sixteen years of age, or was for the purpose of obtaining employment, food rations, or other essentials of living. At the time she applied for a visa, Marina Oswald was a member of the Soviet Trade Union for Medical Workers. The State and Justice Departments had a long-standing interpretation that membership in a professional organization or trade union behind the Iron Curtain is considered involuntary unless accompanied by some indication of voluntariness, such as active participation or holding office. Because there was no evidence of such voluntariness, her union membership was properly held not to bar her admission. Although Marina Oswald declared she was not a member of the Komsomol or any other Communist organization, she was in fact a member of the Komsomol. Had this fact been known, she would not necessarily have been denied a visa but a careful investigation would have been required. If the membership had become known after her denial, she could have been excluded for willful misrepresentation of a material fact. The text notes that judicial decisions disagree on what constitutes a material fact for this purpose, and that the Visa Office applies a "rule of probability" under which a misstatement is material only if it concealed facts which probably would have resulted in a denial of a visa.

Section 243(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 prevented issuance of a visa to Marina Oswald by the Moscow Embassy. The section requires consular officers in a country, upon notification by the Attorney General that the country has refused or unduly delayed accepting a deportable alien who is a subject or resident of that country, not to issue visas to citizens of that country. The section had been invoked against Russia on May 26, 1953. Although section 243(g) contains no express provision for waiver, the Justice Department has concluded that the Attorney General possesses such waiver powers, and pursuant to this decision the Department has granted waivers in over 600 cases from the Soviet Union since 1953. The 1962 waiver procedures were prescribed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which required that before adjudicating a petition for an eligible beneficiary residing in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary, the district director obtain a report of investigation. If no substantial derogatory security information is developed, the district director may waive the sanctions in an individual meritorious case. If adverse security information is developed, the visa petition is processed on its merits and certified to the regional commissioner for determination. The State Department's visa instructions provide that "the sanctions will be waived only in individual meritorious cases in behalf of a beneficiary of a petition filed by a reputable relative." Because Lee Harvey Oswald signed the petition on Marina's behalf, his character was relevant. The State Department file on Oswald contained facts relating to his attempted expatriation, but the INS regulations did not require automatic denial of the waiver. The State Department successfully urged reversal of the original INS decision because reversal would be in the best interests of future U.S. dealings with the Soviet Union on behalf of American citizens, and because it seemed unfair to punish Oswald's wife and baby for his earlier errors. Prevention of the separation of families is among the most common reasons underlying waivers of section 243(g).

Sometime shortly before January 26, 1962, an undated letter from Lee Harvey Oswald was received in the office of U.S. Senator from Texas, John G. Tower. In the letter, Oswald identified himself as 22 years old, formerly of Fort Worth, said he had come to the Soviet Union in October 1959 for a residential stay, and stated that he had unsuccessfully applied since July 20, 1960, for a Soviet Exit Visa for himself and his Soviet wife, who had applied at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on July 8, 1960 for immigration status. Oswald, identifying himself as a U.S. citizen with passport No. 1733242, asked Senator Tower to raise the question of the Soviet Union's holding of a U.S. citizen against his will. The letter was read in Senator Tower's office by a caseworker and forwarded on January 26 to the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, with a machine-signed cover letter from the Senator stating that he did not know Oswald or the facts of his case, that Oswald's inquiry should have gone to the executive branch, and that he was forwarding it for whatever action the Department considered appropriate. On February 1, an officer at the State Department telephoned the Senator's office and spoke briefly with the caseworker, who noted that the Senator should not become involved in such case and that State would report on the course they followed. About a week later, the State Department forwarded to Senator Tower copies of correspondence with Oswald and informed the Senator that he could contact the Department if he wished to be kept informed. Neither the Senator nor any member of his staff contacted the Department again or took any other action in the matter.

In a letter dated January 5, 1962, Oswald asked about arranging a loan from the Embassy or a private organization for part of the airplane fares. The Embassy replied on February 6, 1962, that he would have to supply certain personal and financial data, and noted that after repatriation he would not be furnished a passport for travel abroad until the money was repaid. Between February 6 and May 1, 1962, Oswald attempted to secure a loan from the Red Cross and the International Rescue Committee in the United States. The State Department wrote to Oswald's mother on February 1 asking whether she could advance the money, but Oswald later advised both his mother and the Department that his mother should not be bothered about the loan. After an exchange of communications, the Department approved a loan to Oswald for passage to New York only, directing the Embassy to "Keep cost minimum." On June 1, Oswald signed a promissory note for $435.71. Statutory authority for such a loan was conferred by title 5, section 170(a) of the U.S. Code, which authorizes the Secretary of State to make expenditures for unforeseen emergencies arising in the diplomatic and consular service. Since 1947, the State Department's annual appropriation act has included a sum for such emergencies, used in recent years for relief and repatriation loans to U.S. citizens abroad. The Secretary has annually allotted approximately $100,000 to meet the expenses of indigent U.S. nationals, including those in the Soviet Union. From 1959 to 1963, 2,343 such loans were granted. Section 423.2-1 of the Department's regulations provides that repatriation loans may be granted only to destitute U.S. nationals who are in complete and unquestioned possession of their citizenship rights, are entitled to receive U.S. passports, and whose loyalty to the United States Government is beyond question, or to whom section 423.1-2(b) applies. Oswald satisfied the first two requirements because he was determined to be a U.S. citizen and had been issued a passport to return. The Commission noted a serious question whether he could have qualified under the loyalty clause, given his expressed hostility and disloyalty and manifested desire to renounce his citizenship. The Department instead exercised its judgment under section 423.1-2(b), which authorizes loans when the U.S. national is in, or the cause of, a situation damaging to the prestige of the United States Government or constituting a compelling reason for extending assistance to effect his return. The Department decided this provision applied to Oswald because his "unstable character and prior criticism of the United States" would make his continued presence in the Soviet Union damaging to U.S. prestige. The Department acted within its competence and the law, and as required by the regulations sought funds from private sources—Oswald's mother and the International Rescue Committee—before using Government funds. Regulations further provide that repatriation loans may be authorized for the alien wife and children of a U.S. national to avoid the division of families, but loans are limited to the minimum amount required to cover transportation and subsistence en route to the nearest continental U.S. port, with transportation limited to third-class passage by ship. Oswald's loan covered no more than the least expensive transportation from Moscow to New York, and his passport was stamped valid only for return to the United States. According to its own procedures, the Department should have prepared a lookout card for Oswald in June 1962 when he received the loan proceeds, and his promissory note contained a provision that he would not be furnished a passport for travel abroad until the obligation was repaid. However, a lookout card was never prepared. The State Department informed the Commission that the Revenues and Receipts Branch of the Office of Finance should have notified the Clearance Section in the Passport Office of Oswald's name, date, and place of birth; if only the name was received, the Passport Office would not have prepared a lookout card under its procedures. The Finance Office may not have notified the Clearance Section, possibly because of lack of information concerning Oswald's date and place of birth, or the Finance Office may have notified the Clearance Section of the name only. Since Oswald began repaying the loan immediately after his return, the Office of Finance may have decided not to pursue the matter further. In any event, Oswald's loan was repaid in full on January 29, 1963, five months prior to his application for a new passport.

On June 1, 1962, the same day Oswald received his State Department loan, he and his family departed Moscow by train for Rotterdam and boarded the SS *Maasdam* on June 4, arriving in Hoboken, New Jersey, on June 13, 1962. The American Embassy in Moscow notified the State Department of their departure on May 31, and the Department in turn informed the FBI consistent with its prior practice. Upon arrival, INS Officer Frederick J. Wiedersheim interviewed the Oswalds, asking questions about Oswald's alleged expatriation and Marina's possible Communist affiliations; their satisfactory answers allowed them admission. After reentry, Oswald voluntarily repaid his loan according to a schedule of small payments from August 1962 through January 29, 1963, totaling $435.71, after first reimbursing his brother Robert for the approximately $200 used for travel from New York to Fort Worth.

On June 24, 1963, Oswald applied for a U.S. passport at the New Orleans Passport Office, listing planned visits to England, France, Holland, the U.S.S.R., Finland, Italy, and Poland, and stating an intended ship departure from New Orleans in November or December. A teletype listing 25 applicants, including Oswald, was sent to Washington, with the routine red-penciled notation "NO" (indicating New Orleans) appearing beside his name. Because there was no lookout card on Oswald, his passport was processed routinely and issued on June 25, 1963, within the usual 24-hour timeframe, with no prior review of his existing file. The Commission finds no information in State Department files that would have justified denial under Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act (applicable only to members of organizations required to register) or under Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which permits denial only when the applicant's intended foreign activity would violate U.S. law, harm foreign relations, or prejudice U.S. interests. While Oswald's prior defection had caused adverse publicity and could theoretically have supported denial under the discretionary regulation, the Supreme Court's decisions in *Kent v. Dulles* and *Dayton v. Dulles* narrowed the Secretary's authority largely to questions of citizenship and illegal conduct, and State Department practice in 1963 generally granted passports even to those expected to criticize the United States abroad. The Commission therefore concludes that the State Department was justified in granting Oswald a passport.

In October 1963, the State Department Passport Office received a CIA report that Oswald had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City (the report did not mention his also visiting the Cuban Embassy). Upon review by an attorney and a supervising attorney, no basis was found to revoke Oswald's passport or to notify the FBI and CIA that he had received a new passport in June 1963, since travel to the Soviet Union was not proscribed and was among the countries he had listed on his application. Later, on November 14, 1963, the FBI sent the Department a report on Oswald's August 1963 arrest in New Orleans for a fistfight while distributing "Hands Off Cuba" pamphlets, but no action was taken on this either. The Commission agrees that neither incident warranted revocation of Oswald's passport.

The Commission's investigation of Oswald's complete dealings with the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service found no irregularity, illegal action, or impropriety by government officials. The Commission recommends, however, that the Department exercise greater care in repatriating defectors who have shown disloyalty, hostility, or desire to renounce citizenship, and should improve dissemination of relevant information to intelligence agencies; it acknowledges that the "lookout card" system was deficient but finds these deficiencies beyond the scope of its inquiry because they did not affect Oswald. Although Oswald was often insulting to U.S. personnel abroad and was characterized as "unstable," officials acted properly within their discretion in admitting him, and only hindsight reveals the tragic irony of their determination.

Appendix XVI provides a biography of Jack Ruby. The Commission has decided to include this detailed account despite pending Texas criminal proceedings because the biography will aid evaluation of the conspiracy question, will serve the public interest given numerous rumors about Ruby, and will help convey his character and background; however, the appendix does not address legal issues from Ruby's trial or his possible motive for shooting Oswald.

The biography of Jack Ruby (born Jacob Rubenstein) is presented by the Commission to allow better evaluation of evidence regarding whether Ruby was involved in any conspiracy, to serve the public interest amid many rumors about him, and to provide sufficient material to convey his character and background, while necessarily limiting its scope so as not to interfere with pending Texas proceedings relating to Ruby's trial or possible motive for shooting Oswald.

Jack Ruby, born Jacob Rubenstein, was the fifth of his parents' eight living children, with conflicting records placing his 1911 birth on various dates; March 25, 1911, appears most frequently on his adult records and driver's license. He had one older brother (Hyman) and three older sisters (Ann, Marion, and Eva), as well as two younger brothers (Sam and Earl) and a younger sister (Eileen), with at least one and possibly two other children dying in infancy. His father, Joseph Rubenstein, was born in 1871 in Sokolov near Warsaw (then Czarist Russia), entered the Russian artillery in 1893 where he learned carpentry and developed a drinking problem, married Fannie Turek Rutkowski in an arranged match, served in China, Korea, and Siberia before deserting around 1898, and emigrated via England and Canada to the United States in 1903. Joseph settled in Chicago, joined the carpenters union in 1904, worked fairly steadily until 1928, and was unemployed for the remaining 30 years of his life until his death in 1958; he also belonged to a purely social, nonpolitical group of fellow Sokolov immigrants.

Jack Ruby's mother, Fannie Rubenstein, was likely born in 1875 near Warsaw, Poland. She immigrated to the United States in 1904 or 1905 with her children Hyman and Ann, joining her husband. An illiterate woman, she attended night school around 1920 to learn to sign her name, but an alien registration form filed after roughly 35 years in the U.S. was signed with an "X." Although she acquired some English, Yiddish remained her primary language. Despite her own limited education, Fannie strongly believed her children needed schooling to advance and frequently clashed with her husband, who felt grammar school was sufficient.

Jack Ruby was born in 1911, with his family initially living near 14th and Newberry Streets in Chicago, the first in a succession of Jewish neighborhoods. By 1916, the Rubensteins resided at 1232 Morgan Street, where they remained until 1921—the fourth home in his first five years. The neighborhood was described as a "ghetto" with pushcarts on the streets, "below the middle class but not the poorest," near Italian sections with frequent ethnic fights. The home was marked by constant strife, with parents occasionally striking each other. Joseph Rubenstein was repeatedly arrested between 1915 and 1921 for disorderly conduct and assault, some charges filed by his wife. The parents separated in spring 1921, largely due to Joseph's drinking and Fannie's temper—she resented her pregnancies, suspected infidelity, and nagged him about earnings.

In June 1922, 11-year-old Jack was referred to the Institute for Juvenile Research for "truancy and incorrigible at home." By July 1922, the institute recommended placement in a new environment, and in March 1923 advised placement in a home with "intelligent supervision and discipline." The 1922 examination found Jack "quick tempered" and "disobedient," frequently defying his mother. Jack said he ran away because she lied and beat him. Self-administered questionnaires revealed he felt classmates picked on him and he could not keep friends, though he claimed to be a good ballplayer with no club or team memberships. His interviewer noted he reacted quickly but carelessly, with wandering attention. A letter described him as egocentric, shaped by early sex experiences and street gangs, with a mother lacking insight. Dr. Raymond E. Robertson later confirmed that Jack's unstable, disorganized home could not provide necessary controls.

A dependency hearing on July 10, 1923, involving Jack, his younger brothers Sam and Earl, and sister Eileen, was held in Chicago's juvenile court. The children had been in their mother's custody on Roosevelt Road. The court found dependency, appointed the Jewish Home Finding Society guardian with foster placement authority, and ordered Joseph to pay $4 weekly per child. On November 24, 1924, this order was vacated, signifying the guardianship's end and the children's return to their mother; on April 8, 1925, the case was continued "generally." Despite records indicating the children were wards of the Jewish Home Finding Society only briefly in 1922-23, Jack and Eileen recalled spending about 4-5 years in foster homes. Earl testified that he and Sam first went to a private foster home, then a farm for over a year, while Jack was on a different farm "some distance away," before the three brothers lived together in another foster home.

After returning to his family, the unit remained disordered. His father stayed apart from the children at least until 1936 and possibly later. Family members described Fannie as never a housekeeper, careless with money, selfish, and indifferent to the children. Dr. Hyman I. Rubenstein recalled she ran an "irregular household" and appeared "a rather disturbed person of poor personal appearance." Around 1913, Fannie developed a delusion that a fishbone was lodged in her throat; for years Hyman took her to a clinic monthly where doctors found no organic cause. She resumed clinic visits in 1927, had a thyroidectomy in 1930, but claimed no relief. She was committed to Elgin State Hospital on July 16, 1937, paroled October 17, 1937, then readmitted January 14, 1938, after the family reported her uncooperative, discordant, noisy, and obscene behavior. She was paroled again May 27, 1938, and discharged "improved" August 25, 1938. She then lived with daughter Marion, whose separation from the family ended most difficulties. Her husband eventually rejoined her; alien registration forms from late 1940 showed both at Marion's address. Fannie died at Michael Reese Hospital on April 11, 1944, from heart trouble complicated by pneumonia. Joseph died in Chicago on December 24, 1958, at age 87.

Chicago Board of Education records show Jack attended Smyth Grammar School from October 24, 1916, through 1920-21, completing kindergarten through 4B and repeating the third grade. He finished fourth grade at Clarke School in 1921-22 and completed sixth grade at Schley School in 1924-25. Gaps in 1922-23 and 1923-24 likely relate to his time with the Institute for Juvenile Research and Jewish Home Finding Society. He probably completed eighth grade in 1927 at age 16. Although Ruby claimed at least one year of high school, the Chicago Board of Education found no records of his attendance, and the Commission deemed it unlikely his education extended beyond eighth grade given the absence of records and his apathetic attitude. As of June 1922, Ruby had no religious education outside public school. His parents observed Orthodox Jewish dietary and festival laws and sent the boys to Hebrew school until the 1921 breakup, though instability and economic pressures undermined these efforts.

From age 10, with his family disintegrating and limited education, Ruby found himself on Chicago streets supporting himself and family. An avid sports fan, he "scalped" tickets to sporting events with friends and sold novelty items, especially athletic-related ones. He refused steady work for others. His only youthful legal difficulty involved an altercation with a policeman over ticket scalping; charges were dropped through brother Hyman's political connections. During the Depression, Ruby served a short jail sentence for unauthorized sale of copyrighted sheet music. Brother Hyman had been declared incorrigible by juvenile court on May 1, 1916, but no further difficulties were known. Some childhood friends became criminals, but family and acquaintances reported Ruby had no involvement with Chicago's criminal element. Ruby showed no interest in politics; Hyman was the family's only political participant, serving as sidewalk inspector and warehouse investigator for 8 years. Hyman once obtained a pushcart permit for Jack during the pre-Christmas rush, but complaints led to its revocation.

Childhood acquaintances offered sharply divergent views of Ruby's temperament. Many described him as mild mannered, quiet, and even tempered. Welterweight champion Barney Ross said Ruby was "well behaved," never a troublemaker, and never involved with law enforcement. A west coast businessman-friend said Ruby never started fights despite his fists. Others recalled a hot temper and quick resort to violence or words. One friend explained self-defense was vital in their "tough" neighborhood and Ruby was fully capable. Another described him as quick tempered but unlikely to start fights, yet willing to accept any challenge regardless of odds. Ruby often intervened in fights to aid those being severely beaten. He had a reputation as a good street brawler; one school friend recalled him using sticks or weapons during sports arguments, though he returned to his likable self once anger passed. From early childhood, Jack was called "Sparky." Sister Eva Grant explained it derived from the way he wobbled when walking, resembling the comic strip horse "Sparky" or "Sparkplug." Jack hated the nickname and would strike anyone calling him that from about age 8. The nickname may also relate to his quick reaction to taunts. Hyman Rubenstein attributed it to Jack's speed, aggressiveness, and quick thinking—a theory supported by the many accounts of his volatile temper.

Ruby reported going to Los Angeles around 1933 with several Chicago friends, then shortly to San Francisco. Although evidence suggests he may have stayed until 1938, 1939, or 1940, Ruby stated he returned to Chicago around 1937, which appears accurate. Sister Eva, who had married Hyman Magid in Chicago in 1930 and divorced in early 1934, joined Jack in San Francisco around June 1934, sharing an apartment with him and her son Ronald. In 1936, Eva married Frank Granovsky (Frank Grant) in San Francisco, and Ruby briefly shared a four-room apartment with them and Ronald.

Jack Ruby moved to the West Coast seeking employment, as Eva Grant testified. After initially staying in Los Angeles, the group relocated to San Francisco. Eva joined him there in mid-1934 following her divorce, and the family arrangement continued until Eva's 1936 remarriage to Frank Grant, after which the living situation shifted.

Upon arriving in Los Angeles, Ruby and his friends sold handicapper's tip sheets at the newly opened Santa Anita racetrack. Eva Grant testified he also worked as a singing waiter in Los Angeles with little pay. In San Francisco, Ruby continued selling "tip" sheets at Bay Meadows racetrack, then became a door-to-door salesman of newspaper subscriptions. Some evidence suggested he became chief of his crew with workers under him, though other reports disputed this. Eva Grant, who also sold newspaper subscriptions, said she relied on her brother's advice and support, as he was more proficient.

Ruby, known as "Sparky" to his San Francisco acquaintances, was generally regarded as well-mannered, soft-spoken, and meticulously dressed. Friends and a former crew manager described him as honest, likable, and forthright, with a fondness for sports and law enforcement but no reputation for violence or a vicious temper. He associated with Jewish friends and showed little religious interest, meeting Virginia Belasco—granddaughter of playwright David Belasco—at a Jewish community center dance in 1936. He also told a longtime girlfriend that Virginia Fitzgerald was the only other woman he had considered marrying.

After returning to Chicago, Ruby experienced a period of unemployment but claimed to work as a "traveling salesman." He supported himself through ticket scalping and reselling watches and small items, described by a close friend as "shady" but "legitimate." He was able to maintain a normal life without financial help from family or friends during this period.

Ruby became involved with Local 20467 of the Scrap Iron and Junk Handlers Union around 1937, working as a union organizer until early 1940. His close friend and attorney Leon Cooke served as the local's financial secretary until Cooke was shot by union president John Martin in December 1939; Martin was acquitted on self-defense grounds. Devastated by Cooke's death, Ruby left the union and adopted the middle name "Leon" in his memory. An AFL-CIO investigation in 1956 found no evidence linking Ruby's union activities to Chicago's criminal element, and employers and longtime members attested to the union's good reputation during his tenure.

In 1941, Ruby and Harry Epstein organized the Spartan Novelty Co., which sold cedar chests containing candy and punchboards in northeastern states. Returning to Chicago, Ruby continued his mail-order punchboard business and attempted to sell "Remember Pearl Harbor" commemorative plaques, though perfectionism delayed production until the market was saturated. He also sold busts of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and worked for Globe Auto Glass Co. and Universal Sales Co. in 1942-43. Despite his patriotic-themed ventures, friends reported Ruby had no genuine political interest, though he greatly admired Roosevelt.

Ruby maintained an active social life, entertaining Virginia Belasco on weekends during a New York trip and cultivating a "ladies' man" reputation. He joined friends in disrupting German-American Bund rallies for ethnic rather than political reasons, sometimes physically fighting Bund members. While temperamental, his violence was generally limited to intervening against perceived unfairness, such as fighting students who insulted a Black piano player or a man abusing an older woman. He maintained friendships with boxer Barney Ross, frequented Marigold Gardens and the Lawndale Poolroom, and worked out at athletic clubs. Despite his participation in various questionable activities, the evidence did not demonstrate significant organized crime affiliations, as nearly all his Chicago friends denied such connections.

Jack Ruby, originally classified 1-A in September 1941 and reclassified as 1-H or 3-A due to age or financial hardship, was reclassified 1-A again in early 1943 and inducted into the U.S. Army Air Forces on May 21, 1943, becoming the last of the Rubenstein brothers to enter military service. After completing basic and advanced aircraft mechanic training at various southern airbases (with a brief five-week stint at Farmingdale, New York), he earned a sharpshooter's rating with the M1 carbine in February 1944, received consistently excellent character and efficiency ratings, attained the rank of private first class, and was honorably discharged on February 21, 1946. Ruby was reportedly quick to respond to anti-Semitic insults, at one point beating a sergeant who called him a "Jew bastard," and while his military work ethic drew conflicting assessments, the record contained no indication of anti-American sentiment. He openly admired President Roosevelt, reportedly weeping upon learning of the president's death in April 1945, and continued small-scale entrepreneurial ventures while in the service, peddling punchboards and chocolates sent from Chicago and enjoying card and dice games near the barracks.

After his discharge, Ruby joined his brothers in Earl Products Co., which manufactured cedar chests, punchboards, and small aluminum goods, with Jack handling sales. Insufficient profits led to frequent arguments, and Hyman left the company early. Jack sold costume jewelry alongside Earl Products merchandise and refused to travel outside Chicago, leading Earl and Sam to buy out his interest for over $14,000. Despite some reports, it was unlikely he was in the nightclub business—he may have been confused with Harry Rubenstein, who operated such establishments and was convicted of manslaughter. His personality remained largely unchanged: fashionably dressed, soft-spoken but hot-tempered, quick to fight anti-Semitic or anti-military insults, and active at athletic clubs with a reputation as a "Romeo."

Ruby established permanent residence in Dallas in late 1947, having initially visited to help his sister Eva Grant manage the Singapore Supper Club. He reported returning to Dallas at Eva's request, though he later stated his Chicago "merchandising deals" had failed. His sister had visited Dallas during World War II and arranged financing from her brothers for the nightclub. The move was likely motivated by the failure of his Chicago business and his separation from Earl Products. Ruby became the operator of the Singapore Supper Club, which during Paul Roland Jones' appeal was frequented by Jones and other criminals.

Before opening the Singapore, Eva Grant sold metal products and met Paul Roland Jones, who had been convicted of attempting to bribe the Dallas sheriff. After Jones' narcotics arrest in October 1947, Jack and Hyman Rubenstein were interrogated by the Bureau of Narcotics; they admitted knowing Jones but denied awareness of his narcotics activities. Intensive investigation concluded Ruby was probably not involved in narcotics violations, as Bureau files showed no prosecution of the brothers, and Jones' coconspirators did not implicate them. Former sheriff Steve Guthrie alleged that Chicago criminals mentioned Ruby would operate a "fabulous" restaurant as a gambling front, but the Commission found this difficult to accept: Lieutenant George Butler, who witnessed the Jones-Guthrie conversations, said Ruby was not involved, and 22 recordings of the conversations never mentioned Ruby, indicating Jones' only planned confederate was not to be Jewish.

The Change of Name Sometime in 1947, Jack Ruby's brothers Earl and Sam, pursuant to a joint understanding, legally changed their surname from Rubenstein to Ruby. Earl testified that he made the change because everyone already called him Ruby and because a former employer advised that a "Jewish name" was disadvantageous for mail orders in Earl Products. On December 30, 1947, Jack secured a decree from the 68th Judicial District Court of Dallas changing his name to Jack L. Ruby, asserting that Rubenstein was misunderstood, was too long, and that he was "well known" as Jack L. Ruby. A Bureau of Narcotics report indicates Jack was already known as Ruby by October 29, 1947, although several Dallas associates still knew him as Rubenstein.

Nightclub Operations Except for a brief period around 1953, when he managed the Ervay Theater, Ruby's primary occupation and interest was running nightclubs and dance halls. Arriving in Dallas in 1947, he and Eva Grant jointly managed the Singapore Supper Club; he later renamed it the Silver Spur Club. In 1952, borrowing $3,700 from Ralph Paul, he acquired a half interest in the Bob Wills Ranch House with Martin Gimpel, a former Spartan Novelty Co. associate. Financial reverses in 1952 led him to abandon the Ranch House and transfer the Silver Spur to Gimpel and Willie Epstein. After a period of depression and a six-week stay in Chicago, Ruby reacquired the Silver Spur. In 1953, he obtained an interest in the Vegas Club, which he operated with Joe Bonds, and which Ruby still owned at the time of his arrest; Eva Grant assumed management of the Vegas in 1959. In late 1959, Ruby partnered with Joe Slatin to establish the Sovereign Club, a private club selling liquor to members, but Slatin withdrew in early 1960. Ruby obtained additional capital from Ralph Paul and, after a disagreement over the club's operating model, renamed the Sovereign the Carousel Club, featuring striptease shows. The Carousel became one of three downtown Dallas burlesque clubs, serving champagne, beer, setups, and pizza, with net receipts averaging about $5,000 per month.

Employee Relationships Ruby's employees reacted in widely varying ways to his management style. Long-term employees who became accustomed to his violent temper and constant threats of discharge generally described him sympathetically and reported genuine interest in their welfare, but considerable evidence also showed that he dominated his employees, sometimes resorted to violence, publicly embarrassed them, attempted to cheat them of pay, and delayed salaries. Numerous violent incidents are documented: in 1950, Ruby struck an employee with a blackjack; in 1951, a scuffle with guitarist Willis Dickerson led to the amputation of the top half of Ruby's left index finger; in approximately 1955, he beat a musician with brass knuckles; in 1960, he struck Joe Peterson and knocked out a tooth; in September 1962, he severely beat handyman Frank Ferraro; and in March 1963, he threatened to throw a cigarette girl down the Carousel's stairs. Ruby also had a long-running dispute with the American Guild of Variety Artists (AGVA) over its "amateur" stripper policy, which he believed his competitors were exploiting. He enlisted acquaintances, including known criminals, to pressure AGVA on his behalf. In June 1963, he obtained the stripper "Jada" in New Orleans, but contract disputes, absenteeism, and concerns about her deliberately provocative performances culminated in her firing at the end of October 1963.

Financial Data and Tax Problems Jack Ruby's pockets and the trunk of his car effectively served as his bank; he and his clubs rarely used bank accounts, paying most expenses directly from club receipts. In the latter half of 1963, the Carousel, the Vegas, and Ruby each maintained small checking accounts at the Merchants State Bank in Dallas. An examination of more than 50 banking institutions revealed only three other dormant accounts, and two safety deposit boxes were found empty. Ruby's financial records were chaotic; one accountant abandoned efforts to prepare his returns because of the disarray. The Texas charter of the corporation controlling the Sovereign and Carousel clubs was canceled in 1961 for failure to pay Texas franchise taxes. Ruby's most serious tax problem involved federal excise taxes: relying on an attorney's advice that the Vegas Club, a dance hall serving food, was not a "cabaret," Ruby collected excise-free charges from patrons until federal courts ruled that dance halls providing "incidental" food were cabarets, leaving him liable for more than six years of taxes totaling almost exactly $40,000. He also fell behind on personal income taxes, owing more than $4,400 for 1959 and 1960 at the time of his arrest. The Government filed tax liens of more than $20,000 in 1960 and rejected Ruby's subsequent compromise offers of $8,000 in November 1962 and $3,000 in June 1963, the latter remaining unresolved as of November 24, 1963.

Other Business Ventures Because his clubs occupied few of his daytime hours, Ruby engaged in numerous other commercial ventures, most of which were unsuccessful. While running the Silver Spur, he sold costume jewelry at discount prices and, in about 1951, sold sewing machine attachments at the Texas State Fair. Around 1952, he managed a young Black performer known as "Little Daddy" Nelson, eventually traveling to Chicago in 1953 or 1954 to seek a television appearance before abandoning the venture. In 1954, he sold pizza crusts to Dallas restaurants. He was also reported to have sold an arthritic preparation, manufactured and sold a liquid vitamin formula called "Miniron," attempted in 1958 or 1959 to build and sell log cabins at a Texas lake resort, and investigated in early 1959 the possibility of selling jeeps to Cuba. Additional side activities included furnishing entertainment for a Dallas hotel, promoting records for musicians, and selling English stainless steel razor blades. In October 1963, Ruby assisted producers of the "How Hollywood Makes Movies" carnival show at the Texas State Fair and explored opening a new club in Dallas, even offering his brother Hyman a managerial post at the Carousel—an offer Hyman declined. He also unsuccessfully attempted to sell "twistboards," an exercise device, despite his brother Earl's contrary advice, having one of his strippers demonstrate the product at the Texas Products Show in early November 1963.

Between 1949 and November 24, 1963, Jack Ruby was arrested eight times by the Dallas Police Department on charges including disturbing the peace, allegedly carrying a concealed weapon, violating State liquor laws, permitting dancing after hours, simple assault, and ignoring traffic summonses; outcomes ranged from fines and dismissals to an acquittal for simple assault in February 1963. He also accumulated roughly 20 motor vehicle violations and was placed on six months' probation as a traffic violator in 1956 and again in 1959. Separately, the Texas Liquor Control Board suspended Ruby on multiple occasions—most notably for moral turpitude, obscene striptease performances, allowing a drunkard on his premises, dishonored checks, and permitting on-premises solicitation of alcoholic beverages—with suspensions ranging from three to ten days.

The evidence indicates that Ruby was keenly interested in the work of the Dallas Police Department, and that his police friendships were considerably more widespread than those of the average Dallas citizen, even though Chief Jesse Curry estimated that no more than 25 to 50 of Dallas's roughly 1,200 officers were personally acquainted with him. There is no credible evidence that Ruby sought special favors or attempted to bribe officers, though he routinely extended them reduced rates, free cover charges, and complimentary coffee and soft drinks—hospitality characterized as unremarkable for a Dallas nightclub operator. Ruby's personal attachment to the police is further evidenced by his attendance at the funeral of a policeman killed in action, his staging of a benefit performance for another officer's widow, his treatment of several officers as personal friends, his employment of others, and the marriage of at least one officer to a Carousel stripper.

From his arrival in Dallas in 1947, Ruby associated with numerous underworld figures, including Paul Roland Jones (convicted of attempting to bribe the Dallas sheriff and of narcotics sales) and Joe Bonds, his partner in the Vegas Club, who had a criminal record. Ruby was friendly with several professional gamblers, enjoyed card playing and horse racing, and in 1959 accepted an invitation to visit Cuba at the expense of gambler Lewis McWillie; his gambling acquaintances also included Sidney Seidband and others whose names appeared on gamblers' contact lists. Although two persons of questionable reliability claimed that Ruby's consent was necessary before gambling or narcotics operations could be launched in Dallas, the Commission concluded that the evidence does not establish a significant link between Ruby and organized crime, a view corroborated by State and Federal officials and by numerous other persons interviewed.

Most of Ruby's time after 1947 was spent in Dallas, but documented or reported trips included Havana (1959), Las Vegas (denied after 1937 but rumored in late 1962 and early November 1963), New York (August 1963, tied to American Guild of Variety Artists difficulties and talent scouting), Chicago (1952, 1958 for his father's death, and August 1963 to meet family at O'Hare), New Orleans (June 1963, discussed in connection with "Little Daddy" Nelson), Wichita, Kansas (early 1963, related to stripper Gail Raven), and an Oklahoma motel registration on May 25, 1963; some evidence also suggests a possible Honolulu trip in summer 1961 to recruit dancing talent. The 1959 Havana trip, undertaken at McWillie's expense, was corroborated in part by McWillie and by three Chicagoans who reported seeing Ruby there during the Labor Day weekend, as well as by Meyer Panitz, who met Ruby in Miami during the summer of 1959 upon Ruby's return from Cuba; the Commission found no reliable evidence that Ruby traveled to Havana after September 1959 and discussed any conspiratorial implications of the trip in chapter VI.

The Commission examined Ruby's family, social, religious, recreational, and psychological profile to establish a baseline understanding of his personality. The subsections that follow address his relationships with siblings (especially his sister Eva Grant) and other family members, his dating history and the question of alleged homosexuality, his affection for dogs, his Jewish religious observance and sensitivity to anti-Jewish remarks, his physical regimen and recurring violent behavior as an unofficial bouncer at his clubs, and his pattern of generous financial and personal support to friends alongside a pronounced need for recognition and attention.

Eva Grant, the only sibling living in Dallas when Ruby returned in late 1947, was the family member to whom he felt closest despite recurring arguments that sometimes became physical; a notable summer 1963 altercation occurred when Ruby, angered over Eva's complaints that he had given a friend about $800 rather than pay Vegas Club bills, shoved her and caused her to fall roughly eight feet, injuring her arm and shoulder. In early November 1963 Eva consented to an operation Ruby had long urged; she was hospitalized for about a week, leaving around November 13, and Ruby visited her two or three times daily and remained in constant contact over the November 22 weekend. Sam Ruby moved from Chicago to Dallas in July 1955 at Eva's suggestion to work as a builder; he and Jack were never particularly close, partly because of an unpaid $5,500 loan, but Sam did enter into a partnership with Jack's friend Ralph Paul in an unsuccessful ice cream business. Jack had sporadic contacts with his brother Earl (who moved from Chicago to Detroit around 1960), the most successful of the brothers, who often supplied business advice and capital; Earl estimated that Jack owed him about $15,000 at the time of his arrest. Jack also borrowed at least $1,000, and probably more, from his sister Marion in Chicago.

Allegations that Ruby was a homosexual are not supported by the available evidence: he did not frequent known gathering places for homosexuals, many of the reports were inherently suspect or rested on inaccurate premises, and Ruby, his associates, and his employees denied the charge. The claims relied on hearsay, Ruby's lisp, a "feeling" that he was a "sissy" or "weird," his occasionally high-pitched voice when angry, or the erroneous assumption that he did not date women. For roughly eleven years Ruby dated Alice Reaves Nichols, a blonde divorcee and insurance company secretary who saw him twice weekly from 1948 to 1956 and once weekly thereafter until about 1959; although Ruby discussed marriage with her, both dated other people during that period, and the record overall indicates that Ruby sought and enjoyed feminine company.

Ruby was extremely fond of dogs, was frequently accompanied by several of the dogs he owned, and—according to testimony at his March 1964 trial—referred to his dogs as his "children." He became extremely incensed when he witnessed the maltreatment of any of his animals.

Reared in the Jewish faith, Ruby was not especially devout but maintained ties to Rabbi Hillel Silverman's conservative temple, attending services twice daily for the prescribed eleven months following his father's death in 1958 to recite the traditional memorial prayer; he otherwise attended services only on the Jewish high holy days and was unfamiliar with Hebrew. Ruby was sensitive to his identity as a Jew, forbidding his comedians from telling jokes directed at Jews or Jewish practices and physically fighting persons who made derogatory remarks about his ethnic origins; he was also reportedly deeply upset that an advertisement insulting President Kennedy appeared above a Jewish-sounding name.

In Dallas, Ruby maintained an exercise regimen at the YMCA, the Carousel, and his apartment (where he kept a set of weights), and was acutely concerned about his weight, health, baldness, and general appearance. Because he served as his own unofficial club bouncer, he physically attacked patrons on about fifteen occasions since 1950 using his fists, a blackjack, or pistol-whipping, and on many other occasions ejected troublesome customers by force, often throwing them down the Carousel stairs. Beyond his clubs, Ruby repeatedly beat non-patrons with his fists, including a man who called him a "kike Jew" (knocking out a tooth), a man kicked in the face from behind, and a 1958 assailant at the Vegas whom he disarmed, beat almost to death, and threw down the stairs; in another 1958 Vegas incident he knocked down and humiliated a man six feet three inches tall and weighing 230 pounds, and he also severely beat a heavyweight boxer who had threatened him. Violent episodes in 1962 and early 1963—including the February 1963 beating of Don Tabon, for which Ruby was acquitted—were documented by patrons and a doctor who visited the Carousel repeatedly between August and November 1963. Ruby rarely used firearms in disputes (exceptions being a reported pistol chase of Joe Bonds shortly before Bonds's 1954 conviction and Larry Crafard's account of an incident about a week before the assassination involving AGVA official Earl Norman), although his gun was frequently accessible when he carried large sums of money; friend and fellow bouncer Buddy Turman observed that Ruby "picked his shots," often targeting drunks, women, or otherwise defenseless victims.

Although Ruby often flared up aggressively, he calmed quickly, and the record shows he was extremely generous to friends, loaning them money without much concern for repayment, offering jobs to the needy, helping acquaintances find work elsewhere, and regularly opening his apartment to friends and newcomers who had nowhere to stay. This unusual generosity appears to stem from his emotional reaction to people in distress—possibly informed by his own early familiarity with poverty—and from a strong craving to be recognized and relied upon; many acquaintances described him as a "publicity hound," "glad hander," and "name dropper," always seeking the center of attention, and the "egocentrism" of his youth never left him, though he frequently sought reassurance from those he admired.

Appendix XVII documents Jack Ruby's persistent efforts, beginning as early as December 1963, to be tested by a polygraph, truth serum, or other scientific device that would establish his veracity, especially regarding any conspiratorial connection between himself and Lee Harvey Oswald. It records the procedural steps taken by his defense counsel in the Texas criminal proceedings—motions filed in court and a request that the FBI administer the examination—Ruby's reiteration of the request during a May 11, 1964 psychiatric examination, and the numerous letters written to the President's Commission on his behalf requesting a polygraph examination.

The polygraph examination of Jack Ruby was undertaken at his own repeated insistence and at the request of his defense counsel, who sought an objective scientific test of any conspiratorial link between Ruby and Oswald. The appendix traces Ruby's persistent requests from December 1963 onward and the formal defense motions and FBI requests filed in support of such a test, culminating in his restated wish during a May 11, 1964 psychiatric examination and the flood of letters to the President's Commission urging that the examination be conducted.

As early as December 1963, Jack Ruby expressed a desire to be examined by a polygraph, truth serum, or any other scientific device that would test his veracity, and his attorneys in the Texas criminal proceedings agreed that such an examination should be conducted to assess any conspiratorial connection between Ruby and Oswald. To that end, Ruby's defense counsel filed motions in court and requested that the FBI administer the test; during a psychiatric examination on May 11, 1964, Ruby stated, "I want to tell the truth. I want a polygraph * * *," and numerous letters were written to the President's Commission on his behalf requesting a polygraph examination.

When Jack Ruby testified before the Warren Commission at the Dallas County Jail on June 7, 1964, his opening words were a request for a lie detector test. Expressing concern that the pressure of events might "brainwash" him, Ruby asked Chief Justice Warren whether the Commission had confidence in lie detector tests and truth serum. Warren replied that while he could not vouch for the test's reliability, he would arrange any kind of test Ruby and his counsel desired. Defense counsel Joe Tonahill agreed to the request. Throughout his testimony, Ruby repeatedly renewed his plea for a polygraph examination, and in the final portion of the hearings he stated that the polygraph was "the only way you can know" whether he was telling the truth, to which Warren agreed.

Following Ruby's persistence, the Commission arranged for the FBI to conduct the polygraph examination, scheduling it for July 16, 1964, and preparing a detailed set of questions. A few days before the test, the Commission learned that Ruby's sister Eva Grant and his attorney Joe Tonahill opposed the polygraph on the ground that psychiatric examinations indicated Ruby's mental state would render the test meaningless. Detroit attorney Sol Dann, representing the Ruby family, informed the Dallas FBI office on July 15, 1964, that the examination would harm Ruby's health and was of questionable value according to Detroit psychiatrist Dr. Emanuel Tanay. On the same date, Assistant Counsel Arlen Specter discussed the matter with Tonahill, who personally favored administering the test. Dallas District Attorney Henry Wade requested by letter that the polygraph cover both premeditation and the defensive theories in the case.

Because of opposition to the polygraph and Ruby's frequent changes in attorneys, a Commission representative traveled to Dallas to determine whether Ruby still wished to take the test. On July 18, Assistant Counsel Arlen Specter informed Chief Defense Counsel Clayton Fowler, co-Counsel Tonahill, and Assistant District Attorney William F. Alexander at the Dallas jail that the Commission was not insisting on or even requesting the test, but was merely fulfilling its commitment to make it available. After conferring with Ruby in his cell, Fowler reported that Ruby insisted on taking the examination. Fowler requested that Dr. Tanay be present, that the results not be disclosed outside the Commission, that the questions not be shared with the District Attorney's office, and that the results be made available to defense counsel. Sheriff William Decker announced that his chief criminal deputy and polygraph operator Allan L. Sweatt would be present to maintain custody of Ruby. Assistant District Attorney Alexander requested the questions, a recording of the test, and the interpreter's report. The procedure adopted provided that questions would be discussed in a preliminary session with defense counsel, the assistant district attorney, and Chief Jailer E. L. Holman; the assistant district attorney would not be present when Ruby answered, but Holman would remain to maintain custody. The Commission made no commitment regarding disclosure of the results. Because Dr. Tanay was not in Dallas, Dr. William R. Beavers, a psychiatrist who had previously examined Ruby, was arranged to be present.

After extensive preliminary proceedings, Ruby entered the jury conference room at 2:23 p.m. and was informed the Commission was prepared to offer the polygraph examination but was not requesting it. Assistant Counsel Specter warned Ruby that anything he said could be used against him, and Chief Defense Counsel Fowler advised Ruby of his objections. Ruby stated he wanted the examination and that the results should be released to the public promptly. FBI Special Agent Bell P. Herndon obtained a written "consent to interview with polygraph" signed by Ruby, then administered the test by breaking the questions into series of approximately nine questions each, consisting of relevant interrogatories and control questions. Ruby answered relevant questions denying any prior knowledge of Oswald, any assistance in the assassination, any Communist affiliation, any conspiracy or involvement with others, and any advance intent to shoot Oswald until Sunday morning. He confirmed he was on the sidewalk when Lieutenant Pierce's car stopped on the ramp exit, that he walked past the guard at that time, and that he shot Oswald in order to save Mrs. Kennedy the ordeal of a trial. He gave no response when asked whether members of his family were in danger or whether Mr. Fowler was in danger because of his defense.

A polygraph examination is designed to detect physiological responses to stimuli in a controlled interrogation that may indicate deception. The instrument's name derives from Greek roots meaning "many writings." The polygraph chart records three physiological reactions: breathing patterns captured by a pneumograph (a tube around the chest), galvanic skin response measured through electrodes on the fingers, and a cardiograph tracing obtained via a pneumatic cuff around the left arm that records relative blood pressure and heart rate. Developed beginning around 1920, the polygraph can record responses suggestive of deception but must be carefully interpreted by comparing relevant questions with control questions that establish a known baseline of expected emotional response. Physiological responses may stem from fear, anxiety, nervousness, or other emotions rather than deception, and there are no valid statistics on the polygraph's reliability. FBI Agent Herndon testified that an informed judgment could nevertheless be obtained from a well-qualified examiner on a normal person under appropriate conditions. Ordinarily only the examiner and examinee are present during testing; the FBI typically adds a second agent to take notes. Due to the numerous interested parties, Ruby's examination was attended by Commission and district attorney representatives, two defense counsel, two FBI agents, the chief jailer, a psychiatrist, and a court reporter, although some left during the actual questioning. Ruby faced a wall to minimize distraction, and Herndon expressed the opinion that Ruby was not affected by the others' presence. Ruby showed deceptive reactions on several irrelevant control questions, such as whether he had received disciplinary action in the service, ever overcharged a customer, been known by another name, or ever hit anyone with a weapon. Herndon concluded that the absence of any physiological response on the relevant questions indicated no deception.

An accurate evaluation of Ruby's polygraph examination depends on whether he was psychotic. A psychotic individual, being divorced from reality, might believe a false answer to be true and therefore not register the emotional response characteristic of deception that a normal person would. If a person is so mentally disturbed that he does not understand the nature of the questions or the substance of his answers, no validity can be attached to the polygraph results. Herndon stated that a person in touch with reality could be evaluated by the polygraph like any other examinee. Based on his prior contacts with Ruby and on observing him throughout the polygraph proceeding, Dr. William R. Beavers testified that in the greater proportion of Ruby's answers, he appeared aware of the questions, understood them, and gave answers based on an appreciation of reality.

Dr. Beavers stated that he had previously diagnosed Ruby as a "psychotic depressive," establishing the psychiatric baseline that would shape the subsequent polygraph analysis.

Based on the assumption that Ruby was a "psychotic depressive," Herndon testified that there would be no validity to the polygraph examination and that no significance should be placed upon the polygraph charts.

Considering other phases of Dr. Beavers' testimony, Herndon stated that, based on the hypothesis that Ruby was mentally competent and sound, the charts could be interpreted to indicate that there was no area of deception present with regard to his responses to the relevant questions during the polygraph examination.

While stating his opinion that Ruby was in touch with reality and understood the questions and answers, Dr. Beavers excepted two questions where he concluded that Ruby's underlying delusional state took hold. Those questions related to the safety of Ruby's family and his defense counsel. Ruby had answered these questions in the preliminary session by stating that he felt his family and defense counsel were in danger, but he did not answer either question when the polygraph was activated. Dr. Beavers interpreted Ruby's failure to answer as a reflection of "internal struggle as to just what was reality."

Dr. Beavers testified that the polygraph test was not injurious to Ruby's mental or physical condition.

Because Ruby not only volunteered but insisted upon taking a polygraph examination, the Commission agreed to the examination.

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover commented on the polygraph examination, noting that the polygraph is not in fact a "lie detector" but is designed to record emotional responses in the form of physiological variations which may indicate and accompany deception. The FBI felt that the polygraph technique is not sufficiently precise to permit absolute judgements of deception or truth without qualifications, and noted that one of its limitations relates to the mental fitness and condition of the examinee to be tested.

During the proceedings at Dallas, Texas, on July 18, 1964, Dr. William R. Beavers, a psychiatrist, testified that he would generally describe Jack Ruby as a "psychotic depressive." In view of the serious question raised as to Ruby's mental condition, no significance should be placed on the polygraph examination and it should be considered nonconclusive, as the charts cannot be relied upon.

Having granted Ruby's request for the examination, the Commission is publishing the transcript of the hearing at which the test was conducted and the transcript of the deposition of the FBI polygraph operator who administered the test.

The Commission did not rely on the results of the polygraph examination in reaching the conclusions stated in the report.

The Appendix XVIII footnotes provide the citation conventions used throughout the Commission's work. For references to the testimony of witnesses before the Commission, the form is: number of volume, "H" (for "Hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy"), page number, and the name of the witness in parentheses, e.g., 7 H 441 (O'Donnell). Commission exhibits are referred to by the capital letters "CE" and number; deposition exhibits by the name of the witness, the capital letters "DE," and the number or letter of his exhibit, e.g., CE 705; Sorrels DE 1. References to audiovisual sources for one Dallas broadcasting station (WFAA) are cited as follows: PKT for video tapes, PKF for films, and PKA for audio tapes. The video and audio reels and tapes of other stations are cited by number, e.g., WFAA-TV reel PKT 10; KBLD-TV reel 13.

The Witness, Exhibit and Audiovisual Source Citation Form establishes the standardized referencing system for the Commission's work. Witness testimony is cited by volume number, "H" designation, page number, and witness name in parentheses. Commission exhibits use "CE" plus number, while deposition exhibits use the witness name, "DE," and the exhibit number or letter. Audiovisual materials from WFAA use PKT (video tapes), PKF (films), and PKA (audio tapes), and other stations' reels and tapes are cited by number.

The Foreword provides cross-references to the Executive Order and other foundational documents. Executive Order No. 11130 is set forth as appendix I. The White House press release is set forth as appendix II. Senate Joint Resolution 137 (Public Law 88-202) is set forth as appendix III. The names of all witnesses are set forth in appendix V. The procedures of the Commission are set forth as appendix VI.

This section contains a single cross-reference directing the reader to chapter III. No additional evidence or testimony is introduced in this section.

Forged identification card evidence is established through testimony from Albert Yeargan, J. Philip Lux, and William Waldman, and from Louis Feldsott. The testimony addresses the production and characteristics of a forged identification document associated with Oswald, with supporting references to the commission exhibits and witness depositions on the creation and use of the forged card.

Marina Oswald name spelling testimony concerns the transliteration of Oswald's name from Russian into English. The evidence establishes that when translated from Russian the name was rendered "Alec," while Oswald himself used the spelling "Alek" in his own correspondence, with supporting commission exhibits illustrating the variations in spelling across documents.

Forensic analysis evidence is presented through the expert testimony and exhibits of James Cadigan, Alwyn Cole, William Waldman, Mitchell Scibor, and Harry Holmes, supplemented by commission exhibits 2957, 773, 788, 789, 791, 792, 793, 801, 802, 806–813, and 2004. The evidence includes detailed descriptions of the steps in the creation of the forged card, handwriting and fingerprint analyses, and comparative examinations linking Oswald to the rifle and to the forged identification card.

Paine and Oswald personal belonging testimonies are drawn from Ruth Paine, Marina Oswald, and supporting deposition exhibits. The testimony covers Oswald's clothing and personal items, the brown paper package in which the rifle was carried into the Depository, the curtain material, and the chain of custody of these items between the Paine home, the Depository, and the Dallas Police Department.

Oswald photographic evidence consists of the CE 133 series, including CE 133-A, 133-B, 134, 748, 749, and 750, with supporting testimony from Marina Oswald, Lyndal Shaneyfelt, Richard Stovall, and Guy Rose. The evidence shows Oswald holding a rifle and wearing a holster, the recovered negative of one of the pictures, and Shaneyfelt's expert analysis confirming that the rifle in the photographs is the same Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found in the Depository.

Rifle possession witness testimony establishes Oswald's access to and ownership of the rifle. Testimony is drawn from Heinz Michaelis, Waldman, Marina Oswald, Ruth Paine, Michael Paine, and supporting exhibits including CE 134, 140, 1403, 1406, 2003, and 2046. The witnesses describe the package Oswald carried to the Paine home and then to the Depository, the rifle's storage in the Paine garage, and Oswald's possession and display of the weapon.

TSBD physical evidence concerns the layout and condition of the Texas School Book Depository, the movements of personnel and visitors on November 22, 1963, and the physical objects and prints recovered from the building. Testimony comes from Wesley Frazier, Ruth Paine, Michael Paine, Linnie Mae Randle, Cortlandt Cunningham, J. W. Fritz, and supporting exhibits including CE 139, 144, 429, 430, 434, 446, 449, 1304, 1305, 2003, 2008, and 2009. The evidence covers the freight elevator route, the lunchroom arrangements, the sixth-floor stairway, and the cartons that provided concealment for the shooter.

TSBD rifle discovery witness accounts detail the finding of the rifle on the sixth floor of the Depository. Testimony comes from Roy Truly, J. C. Day, Luke Mooney, Eugene Boone, Sebastian Latona, Arthur Mandella, Ronald Wittmus, Paul Stombaugh, Robert Lee Studebaker, and Lyndal Shaneyfelt, with supporting exhibits CE 142, 2637, 508, 637–639, 654, 673–676, 723, 726, 733, 734, 1077, 1301, 1302, 1306, 1308, 1309, 1312, 1977, 1980, 2011, 3135, and 364. The evidence establishes the precise location of the rifle between boxes, the fingerprints and palmprint recovered, the partial palmprint on the rifle, and the chain of custody from discovery to the Dallas Police Department.

Howard Brennan eyewitness testimony is presented in detail, covering Brennan's observation of a man on the sixth floor of the Depository, the description of the man's clothing and rifle, the subsequent identification of Oswald in police lineups, and Brennan's statements regarding the firing of the shots. Supporting testimony comes from Forrest Sorrels, J. Herbert Sawyer, Harold Norman, James Jarman, W. E. Barnett, and exhibits including CE 477–479, 481, 482, 485, 486, 494, 715, 1301, 1974, 1991, 2005, and 2006. The evidence establishes Brennan's positive identification of Oswald as the person he observed on the sixth floor.

Additional Depository area eyewitness accounts include testimony from Ronald Fischer, Robert Edwards, Amos Euins, James Underwood, James Altgens, Lyndal Shaneyfelt, and Mrs. E. Roberts, with supporting exhibits CE 365, 367, 369, 900, 1407, 1408, 203, and 1413. The testimony covers observations of a man fitting Oswald's description in various locations around the Depository and the subsequent photographic analyses of the Altgens and other photographs.

Depository employee witness testimonies are drawn from Billy Lovelady, William Shelley, T. L. Baker, Roy Truly, Jack Dougherty, Eddie Piper, Bonnie Ray Williams, Harold Norman, James Jarman, Charles Givens, Frankie Kaiser, Nat Pinkston, Victoria Adams, John Howlett, and Mrs. A. C. Johnson, with supporting exhibits CE 485, 486, 490, 492, 494, 498, 506, 1118, 1381, 1966, 3141, and the Depository deposition exhibits. The testimony establishes the movements, locations, and lunchroom arrangements of Depository employees on November 22, 1963, the time required to travel from the sixth floor to the second floor, and the absence of the south elevator during the period in question, corroborating the placement of the assassin on the sixth floor.

The footnotes supporting Chapter IV cite testimony and exhibits drawn primarily from the Hearings volumes of the Commission proceedings (designated by volume and page number, e.g., "6 H 329"), Commission Exhibits (CE numbers), and the depositions of various witnesses (designated "DE"). Witnesses whose testimony is most heavily cited include William Shelley and Ted Lovelady (who found the rifle on the fifth floor of the School Book Depository), Mrs. Reid (a secretary), Marina Oswald, Eugene Kaiser, Seymour Weitzman, Tom D. McWatters (a fellow employee), Mrs. A. C. Johnson, Mrs. Bledsoe, Roger Craig, and William Whaley (all witnesses to portions of Oswald's flight from the Depository), Captain Will Fritz and other Dallas police officers involved in the investigation, Domingo Benavides, Helen Markham, Barbara and Virginia Davis, Ted Callaway, Sam Guinyard, William Smith, William Scoggins, and Warren Reynolds (Tippit murder witnesses), Gerald Hill, Captain Jesse Curry, James Leavelle, L. C. Graves, Forrest Sorrels, and Captain J. W. Fritz, as well as other officers connected with the assassination investigation. The footnotes also reference the testimony of Robert Oswald, Ruth Paine, George and Jeanne De Mohrenschildt, Major Eugene D. Anderson, Sergeant James A. Zahm, Ronald Simmons, and Bobby M. Patterson and L. J. Lewis (regarding the discovery of CE 399), Michaelis (a Babushka lady witness), and various documentary exhibits relating to the rifle, the palm print, the backyard photographs, Oswald's Selective Service card, the revolver, and other physical evidence. Cross-references to earlier portions of the Report and to Chapter III are noted, and citations include Commission Exhibits 1 through 2964 and pages from the CE series of documents.

Citations in this fragment reference Chapter II at page 31 and page 40 (C6-19 through C6-21), drawing on foundational earlier material. The cross-reference at C6-2 ("See pp. 31-40, supra") invokes background facts presented in Chapter II that underpin later analysis in this chapter.

Chapter IV is cross-referenced extensively throughout the fragment, particularly pages 130-164 and accompanying footnotes 215, 217, 223, and 232. The references appear at C6-22 (pp. 131-137), C6-28 (pp. 130-131), C6-29 (pp. 135-136), C6-37 (pp. 137-140), C6-41 (footnotes 217, 223; pp. 140-146), C6-42 (footnote 215, p. 140), C6-44 (footnote 232, p. 141), C6-57 and C6-58 (pp. 143-147), C6-80 and C6-81 (pp. 156-164 and 155-163), C6-84 (pp. 149-156), and C6-87 and C6-88 (pp. 160 and 163). These cross-references incorporate Chapter IV's treatment of Oswald's activities, movements, and witness observations in the period surrounding the assassination.

Chapter VII is referenced in two citations (C6-152 and C6-169). C6-152 directs the reader to that chapter for "discussion of his character," integrating the evidence catalogued here with broader character assessments. C6-169 cross-references pages 384 and 388-390 of Chapter VII.

Appendix XIII is referenced multiple times in this fragment, primarily at pages 673-690 and page 722. The cross-references include C6-27 (p. 740), C6-98 (pp. 681-689, regarding Oswald's Marine service), C6-121 (p. 690), C6-168 (pp. 675, 679, 683, 685-688, 722), C6-169 (pp. 679, 686-687), and C6-306 (pp. 673-675). These citations incorporate the appendix's documentary record of Oswald's Marine Corps service, evaluations, and conduct.

Appendix XIV is cited once in this fragment at C6-4 ("See app. XIV, p. 745"), directing the reader to specific documentary evidence contained in that appendix.

Appendix XV is referenced several times in this fragment. C6-164 cites appendix pages 747-751 for "further details regarding Oswald's attempted expatriation." C6-203 directs the reader to the appendix "generally" for treatment of related subjects. C6-265 cross-references pages 747-751 for "the factual and legal basis" of the relevant decision. These references support evaluation of the legal and factual determinations concerning Oswald's expatriation attempt and citizenship status.

Witness testimony about Oswald's background draws on Marina Oswald's testimony and statements from numerous acquaintances in the Dallas–Fort Worth émigré community, including M. Clark, Peter and Paul Gregory, Bouhe, A. Meller, the De Mohrenschildts, the Fords, the Halls, Glover, V. and N. Ray, the Raigorodskys, the Taylors, Ballen, Mamantov, Gravitis, the Leslies, the Voshinins, and Gibson, supplemented by various Commission exhibits. The testimony covers Oswald's domestic life with Marina, his employment difficulties, his behavior toward his wife, and the circumstances under which the Oswalds came to know various members of the community. Marina's own statements about life with Oswald in the months leading up to the assassination are repeatedly cited alongside corroborating witnesses. Kleinlerer's testimony is also referenced as relevant to these background inquiries. Notes 311–323 provide the specific citation references for this body of witness testimony.

Background records on the De Mohrenschildts are drawn from extensive testimony by G. De Mohrenschildt and J. De Mohrenschildt, supplemented by statements from Bouhe, M. Clark, the Voshinins, G. Taylor, Mamantov, H. Leslie, Glover, and others familiar with the couple. The material documents the De Mohrenschildts' movements, business activities, social associations within the émigré community, and the nature of their relationship with the Oswalds. A Commission footnote (C6-340) notes that additional data relative to the De Mohrenschildts' background is contained in the Commission's files beyond the testimony and exhibits included in the report. The cited excerpts cover their activities in the early 1960s, their prior associations, and the contacts they had with Oswald. Notes 315, 316, and 326–350 provide the supporting references, including exhibits CE 3100, CE 3116, and CE 3117.

Background records on the Paine family rely heavily on the testimony of R. Paine and M. Paine, with corroborating statements from Marina Oswald, Lillian and Charles Murret, and FBI agents Hosty, Fain, and Quigley, as well as numerous documentary exhibits. The material documents the Paines' family history, their connection to the Oswalds through the rental of a room in their Irving, Texas home, Michael Paine's employment background, Ruth Paine's acquaintance with Marina, and the Paine family's pre-assassination interactions with Oswald. It also covers Ruth Paine's knowledge of the Oswalds' living arrangements and Marina's testimony concerning them. A Commission footnote (C6-402) indicates that additional background data on the Paines is contained in the Commission's files. Notes 324–325, 351–401, and 403–404 provide the supporting references, including exhibits CE 3116, 3117, and CE 821–836.

Records of Oswald's political affiliations document his contacts with the Communist Party USA (through A. Johnson and the Tormey–Weinstock network), the Socialist Workers Party (through Farrell Dobbs and related materials), the Socialist Party of America (through V. Gray), and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (through V. T. Lee, Bringuier, Martello, Steele, Stuckey, and others). The material covers Oswald's efforts to distribute "Fair Play for Cuba" literature in New Orleans, his altercation with Carlos Bringuier, the addresses of 544 Camp Street and 4907 Magazine Street, his contacts with anti-Castro Cuban exiles, and his claim of membership in the Communist Party as told to Señora Duran of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. The chapter also notes that Oswald subscribed to Russian-language periodicals and that one purpose of his Fair Play for Cuba activities was to gain entry into Cuba. Notes 405–450 and 451–526 provide the supporting references, including exhibits CE 93, CE 1145, CE 1147, CE 1410–1414, CE 1799, CE 2120, and others.

Documentation of Oswald's Mexico City trip in late September and early October 1963 is drawn primarily from Mexican governmental records (CE 2120, CE 2121, CE 2123) and from the testimony of Marina Oswald, Dr. and Mrs. John B. McFarland, Pamela Mumford, and Silvia Duran of the Mexican Immigration Service. The material establishes Oswald's departure from New Orleans, his arrival in Mexico City, his visits to the Soviet and Cuban consulates, his contacts with Consul Kostikov and Silvia Duran, his claim of Communist Party membership, the "notation" of an address provided by Duran, and his return trip to the United States. The chapter cross-references the appendix (XIII) for time-of-departure data and the documents Oswald carried with him, and notes that the only witness placing Oswald with anyone else during the trip was thoroughly discredited. Notes 527–556 provide the supporting references, including exhibits CE 18, CE 156, CE 161, CE 1969, CE 2445, CE 2450–2451, CE 2564, CE 2566, CE 2569–2575, CE 3095, and CE 3127.

This section provides a consolidated Commission Exhibit and Hearing Reference Index, listing exhibit numbers, hearing transcripts, and deposition exhibits cited across multiple investigative threads. References include CE 2450, Mumford testimony at 11 H 217, CE 2195 (pp. 2-3, 40-46), and CE 2121, establishing foundational exhibits for document authentication and cross-referencing throughout the chapter.

Documentation of Oswald's Mexico entry establishes that he entered Mexico on September 26 with a tourist card valid for fifteen days thereafter, supported by CE 2478 (reproduced in the report at p. 300). Supporting references include CE 2121 (p. 47), CE 2480, and CE 2463, along with Pamela Mumford's testimony at 11 H 217, 220. References to Mrs. E. Twiford (11 H 179-180) and Mary E. Bledsoe (6 H 401) provide corroborating witness context.

Harry Holmes testimony and exhibits are documented through CE 792, CE 817, and Holmes Deposition Exhibits 1, 1-A, 3, and 3-A. Holmes provided testimony at 7 H 292-296 and 7 H 527. Supporting materials include app. XIII (pp. 713-730, 737-740), Arnold Johnson DE 5, V.T. Lee DE 7 through 9, Dobbs DE 6, 9, 10, and R. Watts DE 1, 4, 5, establishing a comprehensive documentary record of Holmes's investigative findings.

Testimony from Earlene Roberts and Mrs. A.C. Johnson appears at 6 H 435-437 and 10 H 292-294 respectively. Supporting exhibits include CE 1160, 1158, 1152, 1178, CE 1799 (p. 1), and Holmes DE 1. These witnesses provide observations relating to Oswald's movements and activities, with their statements cross-referenced through CE 791 and Gibson's testimony at 11 H 136, 149.

Ruth Paine's depositions and related exhibits include testimony at 3 H 13-18, 51-52, with additional references at 2 H 515, 3 H 41, 11 H 153-155, and 2 H 470-472. Supporting exhibits include CE 2764, CE 3126, and materials referenced through Mrs. Donald Gibson's testimony (11 H 140-141) and Gary E. Taylor (9 H 77). The Paine materials establish key timelines and contacts with the Oswalds.

Marina Oswald's Mexico-related testimony appears at 1 H 26-27, 1 H 44, 49, and 1 H 58, with supporting exhibits CE 2124 (p. 383), CE 405, CE 1156 (pp. 443-444), CE 2125 (pp. 475, 477), CE 2479, and CE 2131. Jesse J. Garner's testimony at 10 H 276-277 provides corroborating details. Additional references include CE 2938-2940, CE 3109, CE 2476, and materials relating to McFarland's statements at 11 H 214.

Dial D. Ryder testimony spans 11 H 225-238, with Charles W. Greener testimony at 11 H 241-259. Supporting exhibits include CE 1333, CE 1334, CE 1325, CE 1330, CE 1327, CE 2454, and Greener DE 1. References to F.M. Turner (7 H 224-225), Schmidt and Lehrer testimony, and CE 3030 provide additional investigative context for the Mexico-related inquiries.

Clothing and personal effects evidence is documented through CE 2976, CE 2977, and CE 2975, with comparative analyses referencing CE 2903, CE 2446, app. XIII (pp. 730-736), CE 2944, CE 2448, CE 3049, CE 2454, CE 2447, CE 2904, CE 2547, CE 3110, CE 2925-2928, CE 2933, and CE 2908. Clifton M. Shasteen's testimony at 10 H 309-327, along with CE 2209 and CE 3130, provides witness context for these physical evidence comparisons.

Mrs. Gertrude Hunter testimony appears at 11 H 254-262, 277, 280, 282, 284, 288-289, while Mrs. Edith Whitworth testimony spans 11 H 263-275, 286-288. Supporting references include CE 1337, CE 2974, CE 1327, CE 3089, and Marina Oswald's testimony at 5 H 399-400 and 11 H 280. These witnesses provide observations about household items and activities related to the Paine residence.

Comparative Commission Exhibit analysis involves systematic cross-referencing among multiple exhibits, including CE 2903 versus CE 2446 with app. XIII (pp. 730-736); CE 2944 versus CE 2448, CE 3049, Roy Truly's testimony at 3 H 214, and CE 2454; CE 2447 versus CE 2904 and CE 3049 (see CE 2547); CE 3110 versus CE 2925; and CE 2926-2928 versus CE 3049 (see CE 2933, 2908). Additional references include 10 H 309-327 (Shasteen), CE 2209, and CE 3130.

Malcolm H. Price, Jr. testimony references appear throughout at 10 H 356-395, with specific citations at 10 H 370-376. Supporting exhibits include CE 2909 (p. 238), CE 2910, CE 2916, CE 2919, CE 2915, CE 2917, CE 2930, CE 2923-2924, CE 2898, CE 2922, CE 2906, CE 3077, CE 2934-2935, CE 2941, and CE 2897. References to app. XIII (pp. 730-736) provide supplementary context.

Garland G. Slack testimony references appear at 10 H 380-384, with supporting references at 10 H 381-383. Related exhibits include CE 2913, CE 2909, CE 2915, and references to Floyd G. Davis testimony at 10 H 361. Slack's observations are cross-referenced with CE 2934-2935, CE 2916, and CE 2924, establishing his role in the investigative record regarding Oswald-related observations.

Sterling C. Wood testimony references appear at 10 H 391-397, with Homer Wood testimony at 10 H 385-392. Supporting exhibits include CE 2934-2935, CE 2897, CE 2898 (pp. 116-117), CE 2909, CE 3077, CE 2913, CE 2924, and CE 2915. The Wood testimony materials provide comparative evidence regarding observations and movements relevant to the investigation.

Firearm evidence references include CE 139, Robert A. Frazier's testimony at 3 H 392-396, and CE 3133. Supporting witness testimony includes Howard L. Brennan at 3 H 154, J.C. Day at 4 H 257, and references to CE 541 (pp. 3, 4). Additional comparative testimony comes from Malcolm Price (10 H 370-374), Garland Slack (10 H 382), Sterling Wood (10 H 392), and Homer Wood (10 H 386).

Albert Bogard's polygraph interview notes are documented through 10 H 352-356 and CE 3071, 2969. On February 24, 1964, the FBI interviewed Bogard regarding his allegation using polygraph equipment (CE 3031). No significant emotional responses were recorded when relevant questions were asked, with responses consistent with truth-telling. However, given the uncertain reliability of polygraph results (see app. XVII, pp. 813-816), the Commission placed no reliance on these results.

Frank Pizzo testimony and exhibits span 10 H 342-351, with supporting exhibits CE 3078 (p. 7), CE 3091-3092, CE 3071 (pp. 2, 365), and CE 2970. Additional references include CE 3091, CE 3071 (p. 2), and CE 3091. Pizzo's testimony is cross-referenced with Bogard's statements (10 H 354), CE 2969, and CE 3071, providing witness context for the investigative record.

Marina Oswald's rifle possession testimony appears at 1 H 112-113, 5 H 402, and 11 H 280, with supporting references to Lillian Murret (8 H 142-143, 185), Robert Oswald (2 H 292-293), E. Hall (8 H 399), G. Taylor (9 H 87), Cunningham (10 H 126-127), and J. Pic (11 H 56-57). Cross-references include Ruth Paine testimony at 2 H 502-517 and 11 H 153-154, establishing the chain of evidence regarding the rifle's possession.

Sylvia Odio testimony references span 11 H 368-385, with supporting exhibits CE 2907, CE 2942, and CE 3045. Odio's testimony is cross-referenced with 1 H 26 (Marina Oswald), CE 2124 (p. 383), CE 2131, CE 2939, and references to Mrs. Odio's account at 11 H 372, 374-375. The testimony provides witness observations regarding Oswald's reported visits and statements.

McFarland and Twiford Mexico trip testimony includes McFarland at 11 H 214-215 and Horace E. Twiford at 11 H 179. Supporting exhibits include CE 2191 (pp. 5-7), CE 2193 (pp. 1-2), CE 2123, CE 2566 (pp. 2-3), CE 2534, CE 2138 (pp. 12-14), CE 3075, CE 3086, and CE 3090. Estelle Twiford's testimony at 11 H 179-180 provides additional context, along with CE 2732.

Juan Rodriguez testimony references appear at 11 H 341-346, with supporting exhibits CE 3148, CE 3147, CE 3146, and CE 2390. Rodriguez's statements are compared with Sylvia Odio's testimony at 11 H 370, 382-383 (see 11 H 341-342). The testimony provides witness observations regarding individuals connected to the Odio episode and the broader investigation.

Orest Pena testimony references appear at 11 H 350-356, with supporting exhibit CE 2902 and CE 2477 (p. 10). Pena's testimony is cross-referenced with Juan Rodriguez (11 H 342), establishing comparative observations relevant to the investigation. Additional references include id. at 15, with comparative analysis to 11 H 355-356 (Pena).

Dean Andrews testimony and exhibits span 11 H 325-339, with supporting exhibits CE 3094, CD 2899, CE 2900, CE 2901, and CE 3104. Andrews's testimony is referenced at 11 H 331, providing investigative context regarding representations and contacts. The materials establish the documentary record for Andrews's role in the broader investigation.

Marguerite Oswald testimony references appear at 1 H 142, 191-193, 195-196, 200, 206, 214, with supporting exhibits CE 1138 (p. 3), CE 821, and CE 2580-2581. Comparative testimony is referenced through Marina Oswald (1 H 20, 83), R. Paine (3 H 108), and John W. Fain (4 H 408-409). Footnote 865 is referenced generally for additional context regarding Marguerite Oswald's statements.

Pauline Bates testimony reference appears at 8 H 341, with the citation repeated for emphasis. This brief section provides a single witness reference relevant to investigative observations and contacts documented in the Commission's record.

CIA and FBI internal document references include John A. McCone testimony at 5 H 120-121, Richard M. Helms at 5 H 121-122, CE 3138 (Department of Defense), and CE 870. FBI references include J. Edgar Hoover at 5 H 105-106, Alan H. Belmont at 5 H 14-15, 26-27, John W. Fain at 4 H 429, John L. Quigley at 4 H 440, and James P. Hosty at 4 H 469. Additional exhibits include CE 825 and CE 835.

Marina Oswald's rifle knowledge testimony appears at 1 H 48 and 1 H 62, with supporting references to Ruth Paine at 3 H 18, 99, and 103-104. The testimony materials include CE 18 (address book, p. 76), CE 1148, CE 1149, CE 1155, CE 1169, and CE 1160. Additional references include Mrs. Mahlon Tobias (10 H 237-241), M. Waldo George (11 H 155), and Mrs. Jesse Garner (10 H 265).

Witness accounts of Oswald's behavior include testimony from Katherine Ford (2 H 299, 304), Anna N. Meller (8 H 386-387), Marina Oswald (1 H 11-12, 35), Valentina Ray (8 H 416), Colin Barnhorst (10 H 288-290), Richard L. Hulen (10 H 281-283), Mrs. A.C. Johnson (10 H 307), Mary Bledsoe (6 H 401-402), Lillian Murret (8 H 133-135, 138-139), and Charles Murret (8 H 186-187). Additional references include CE 1160 (p. 3) and CE 1166 (p. 3).

Leonard Hutchison testimony references span 10 H 328-340, with supporting exhibits CE 3121, CE 1165 (pp. 5-6), CE 3129, and CE 2789 (pp. 629-631). Cross-references include Marina Oswald (1 H 58), Ruth Paine (11 H 155, 290-291), Mrs. A.C. Johnson (10 H 296), Mary Bledsoe (6 H 404-405), CE 2454 (pp. 2-4), and B.W. Frazier (2 H 213, 222-225). CE 1132 and Robert Oswald (1 H 348) provide comparative references.

Journalist testimony on Ruby rumors includes L. Wilcox at 10 H 412-425, Robert G. Fenley at 11 H 315-318, C.A. Hamblen at 11 H 311-314, and A. Lewis at 11 H 318-325. Supporting materials include Wilcox DE 3005, 3006, 3007, 3008, and Semingsen DE 3001. The testimony documents the spread and reporting of rumors regarding Jack Ruby's activities and connections to the investigation.

Curtis Crafard testimony and exhibits include 13 H 436, Crafard DE 5226 (pp. 147-148, 150), and exhibits CE 2319, CE 2322, CE 2276, CE 2291, CE 1669, CE 2265, CE 2251, CE 2269, CE 2288, CE 2245, and Newnam DE 2. Supporting witness testimony includes Eva L. Grant (15 H 323) and Eileen Kaminsky (15 H 283). These materials document Crafard's connections and activities relevant to the Ruby investigation.

Citations to testimony of Lawrence V. Meyers (15 H 626, 628; 15 H 629; 15 H 626-635; 15 H 631-634; 15 H 633-635; 15 H 632) along with related Commission Exhibits. References to a Senate testimony (14 H 265) are also noted. The material appears to address Meyers's statements and accounts during the investigation.

Citations to testimony of Ralph Paul (14 H 151, 153; 14 H 151-152; 15 H 667, 671, 672, 675, 678-679, 796-797, 805, 873) and his deposition exhibit (Paul DE 5319, p. 7). Paul's testimony appears particularly relevant to events on the weekend of the Oswald shooting, including interactions with Jack Ruby.

Extensive citations to testimony of Jack Ruby (5 H 183-188, 191, 193-194, 197-199, 203, 206-207; 14 H 529, 532, 542-544, 559, 561-563, 567-568) covering his accounts of activities, statements, and movements during the critical period surrounding the shooting of Oswald.

Citations to deposition exhibits and testimony of C. Ray Hall (C. Ray Hall DE 1, 2, 3, including DE 2 pp. 13-15, DE 3 pp. 3-12), as well as 15 H 69-70. Hall's accounts provide third-party observations relevant to the events under investigation.

Citations to testimony and deposition exhibits of Larry Crafard (Crafard DE 5226, p. 150; 13 H 437-448, 452-453, 455-457, 463-469, 501-504; 14 H 39-40, 42, 83-87, 90), who appears to be a key witness regarding Jack Ruby's activities and associations during the period in question.

Citations to testimony of Officer Roy Armstrong (13 H 319-320, 330-340), a law enforcement witness whose accounts relate to events and observations during the transfer of Oswald and related activities.

Citations to testimony and deposition of John W. Newnam (15 H 535-539, 540-545; 14 H 542-544; Newnam DE 4), covering his observations and accounts of relevant events.

Citations to testimony of Seth Kantor (15 H 75-76, 76-82, 79, 81-82, 82-83, 87-88; Kantor DE 3, pp. 3S, 3T), a journalist witness whose accounts pertain to events at Parkland Hospital and other relevant locations.

Citations to testimony of Wilma May Tice (15 H 388-396), a witness whose accounts are referenced in connection with the Parkland Hospital events and Ruby-related activities.

Citations to testimony of Billy A. Rea (15 H 575), a witness whose accounts relate to relevant events during the investigation.

Citations to testimony of Richard L. Saunders (15 H 579-580, 580-581, 583-584, 579), a witness whose accounts are referenced in connection with relevant activities and observations.

Citations to testimony of Earl Grant (15 H 323-325, 325-331, 327, 330, 332, 336-343; 14 H 433-434), a witness whose accounts appear to address significant aspects of the investigation.

Citations to testimony of Augustus M. Eberhardt (13 H 187, 187-189, 189-190), a witness whose accounts relate to observations of relevant events and activities.

Citations to testimony of Karen B. Carlin and Bruce R. Carlin (13 H 203-205, 208-211; 15 H 647, 652), witnesses whose accounts relate to events at the Carousel Club and other relevant locations.

Citations to testimony of Joseph Weldon Johnson, Jr. (15 H 219-220) and Speedy Johnson (15 H 610-613), witnesses whose accounts address relevant activities.

Citations to testimony of Eileen Kaminsky (15 H 282-283), a witness whose accounts relate to relevant events and observations.

Citations to testimony of Alice R. Nichols (14 H 113-115, 123-125; Nichols DE 5356), a witness whose accounts address activities at relevant locations during the period in question.

Citations to testimony of John Henry Branch and his deposition exhibit (15 H 474; Branch DE 1), a witness whose accounts relate to relevant events.

Citations to testimony of Stanley M. Kaufman (15 H 519-520; 15 H 523), a witness whose accounts relate to relevant events and observations.

Citations to testimony of Nancy M. Powell (15 H 419, 421-423, 423-424), a witness whose accounts address relevant activities and observations.

Citations to testimony of Huey Reeves (13 H 246-247), a witness whose accounts relate to relevant events.

Citations to testimony of Hyman Rubenstein (15 H 31-32), a witness whose accounts address relevant matters under investigation.

Citations to testimony of Harry N. Olsen and Kay Helen Olsen (14 H 631, 632, 635, 647-649), witnesses whose accounts address relevant events and observations.

Citations to testimony of Roy A. Pryor (15 H 555-559, 558-562), a witness whose accounts address relevant events and activities.

Citations to testimony of Arthur W. Watherwax (15 H 566-570), a witness whose accounts relate to relevant activities and observations.

Citations to testimony of Ronald L. Jenkins and Roy G. Standifer (15 H 601-603, 612, 616-617), witnesses whose accounts address relevant events.

Citations to testimony of Victor F. Robertson, Jr. (15 H 351-352), a witness whose accounts relate to relevant events and activities.

Citations to testimony of Clyde F. Goodson (15 H 588-599), a witness whose accounts address relevant events and observations.

Citations to testimony of John G. McCullough (15 H 375-376, 380-381), a witness whose accounts relate to relevant events and activities.

Citations to testimony of Dave L. Miller and Louis D. Miller (15 H 454, 455; 12 H 308, 313-314; L. D. Miller DE 5013, 5014), witnesses whose accounts address relevant observations and events.