The City of God, Volume I

Augustine begins this book by addressing the composition of the two cities—the City of God and the city of man—demonstrating that these societies are not divided by species, such as angels versus men, but by the disposition of the will. He asserts that it is entirely congruous to speak of a single society composed of both holy angels and holy men, just as there is a single society of the wicked composed of both fallen angels and sinful men. The distinction between the good and the bad angels arises not from a difference in their nature or origin, for God, the supreme Creator, fashioned the essence of both, but solely from a difference in will and desire. The good angels steadfastly adhered to the common good of all, which is God Himself, finding their joy in His eternity, truth, and love. Conversely, the wicked angels, enamored of their own power and desiring to be a good to themselves, lapsed from that supreme beatitude. They traded the dignity of eternity for the inflation of pride, the assurance of truth for the vanity of deception, and unifying love for factious division. Thus, the cause of the blessedness of the good angels is their adherence to God, while the cause of the misery of the wicked is their forsaking of Him.

From this, Augustine deduces that there is no other good for a rational or intellectual creature save God alone. Creatures made out of nothing cannot be blessed of themselves but only by Him who created them. A creature is blessed by the possession of that whose loss makes it miserable; therefore, He who is blessed in Himself, needing nothing else, cannot be miserable. Augustine affirms that there is no unchangeable good but the one true God. Things created by Him are good because they come from Him, yet they are mutable because they are made from nothing. While they are not the supreme good, those mutable natures that can adhere to the immutable good are very good, for without Him they are inevitably wretched. Augustine argues that the rational nature, even when wretched, is more excellent than irrational or lifeless natures that cannot experience misery. Since the rational nature was created excellent enough to secure blessedness by adhering to God, and since it cannot be satisfied without perfect blessedness, not to adhere to God is manifestly a fault. Every fault injures the nature and is contrary to it. Therefore, the creature that cleaves to God differs from the wicked not by nature, but by fault. This very fault proves the nobility of the nature, for one only justly blames a fault because it mars a praiseworthy nature. Just as blindness proves that sight belongs to the nature of the eyes, the fault of the angelic creature proves that it pertained to its nature to cleave to God.

Augustine proceeds to refute the notion that there could be an entity contrary to the divine. Citing God’s declaration, “I am that I am,” he explains that since God is the supreme existence and is unchangeable, the only contrary to Him is non-existence. To some natures He communicated a more ample existence, to others a more limited one, arranging beings in ranks. Consequently, no nature is contrary to the Supreme Being save that which does not exist. Therefore, the enemies of God are enemies not by nature, but by vice. They have no power to hurt Him, only themselves. Vice is contrary to God as evil is to good, and it is contrary to the nature it vitiates because it is hurtful. Vice cannot exist in the highest good, nor can it exist except in some good, for it injures the nature it corrupts. Even natures vitiated by an evil will are good in so far as they are natures, and when they are punished, they possess the good of justice.

Augustine briefly addresses irrational and lifeless creatures, stating that it is ridiculous to condemn their faults, as they received an existence fitting to them, often passing away to make room for others. This transitory order contributes to the beauty of the universe, even if mortals, involved in a fragment of it, cannot perceive the whole harmony. These creatures, in their proper places and according to their nature, glorify their Artificer. Even the nature of fire, though penal to the condemned, is beautiful and useful in its proper application. Thus, in all natures, God is glorified.

Returning to the angels, Augustine reiterates that the cause of the blessedness of the good is their cleaving to Him who supremely is, while the misery of the wicked stems from turning to themselves, who have a lesser existence. This vice is pride, the beginning of sin. By preferring themselves to God, they diminished their own being. Augustine then investigates the efficient cause of the evil will. He argues that there is none, for if a thing caused the evil will, that thing must either have a will or not. If it has a good will, it cannot cause evil; if it has a bad will, one must ask what caused that will, leading to an infinite regress. If one posits that the evil will always existed, it must have existed in some nature, which it would have injured; but it could not injure an evil nature, only a good one. If one suggests that a thing without a will caused the evil will, that thing is a good nature, and good cannot be the efficient cause of evil. Augustine illustrates this with the example of two men viewing the same beautiful object; one consents to an illicit desire, the other does not. The object is not the cause, nor is the flesh or temperament, for these are identical. The cause is the will itself. Therefore, the will is not made evil by something else but becomes evil by its own defection.

Augustine concludes that one should not look for an efficient cause of the evil will, for it is a deficient cause, not an efficient one. Defection from the supreme being to a lesser being is the beginning of an evil will. Seeking the cause of such defection is like trying to see darkness or hear silence; these are known not by their presence but by their absence. The will becomes evil by turning away from the immutable good to mutable goods. The fault lies not in the object loved—for gold, beauty, or power are not evil—but in the inordinate love of the creature that neglects the higher good for a lower one. He who inordinately loves a lower good becomes evil in the midst of that good and wretched because he is deprived of the greater good.