The Commission also found Secret Service liaison with the FBI inadequate. Both agencies insisted liaison was “close and fully sufficient,” but the Handbook’s reference to “the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President” was construed narrowly to require evidence of a plan or conspiracy.
The Commission recommended that Congress make assassination a federal crime irrespective of the victim’s performance of official duties, and extend coverage to the Vice President, President-elect, and Vice-President-elect. It proposed a Cabinet-level committee, potentially a National Security Council subcommittee including the Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General, to oversee protective activities of all federal agencies. Within Treasury, it recommended the Secretary appoint a special assistant with stature and experience in law enforcement or intelligence to supervise the Secret Service daily.
Some limited information was made available to the Secret Service, but there was no fully adequate liaison between the two agencies. The Commission believed liaison among all federal agencies with presidential protection responsibilities should be improved.
Agent Lawson performed advance work for Dallas largely alone from November 13 to November 18, when Agent David B. Grant joined him after completing advance work for Tampa. The motorcade route, though not the safest freeway alternative, was selected for White House preferences for visibility and public contact. Secret Service arrangements at Love Field and the Trade Mart were coordinated with Dallas police and judged sound. The most significant deficiency was the absence of written instructions or a checklist: Lawson received only oral guidance. The Commission urged that standard procedures be supplemented by trip-specific evaluation drawing on the entire White House detail’s experience.
The Secret Service relied on twenty-eight agents in Dallas, supported by nearly six hundred local law enforcement personnel from Dallas Police, Fire Department, County Sheriff’s Department, and Texas Department of Public Safety. Yet the Service had no written procedures governing relationships with local authorities, no checklist for metropolitan visits, and no written description of local police roles. Discussions with Dallas Police were “entirely informal.” Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor testified that a formal statement of responsibilities would have helped.
No prior inspection was made of buildings along the motorcade route. The Secret Service Chief explained surveys of hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows were “not practical.” The Commission found this unpersuasive. Even if a complete survey was impossible, sniper danger had been on planners’ minds—President Kennedy had raised it that morning, and Agent Forrest Sorrels had mentioned it when designing the route with Lawson. An attempt to cover the most obvious ambush points could and should have included the Texas School Book Depository.
In Fort Worth on the morning of November 22, nine off-duty Secret Service agents violated regulations by visiting the Fort Worth Press Club, where some consumed beer or a single mixed drink, and the nearby Cellar Coffee House, which served only coffee and fruit juice. Agents from the midnight shift also briefly stopped at the Cellar. Chief James Rowley testified none was inebriated or incapable of duty, but acknowledged the alcohol prohibition had been breached. The Commission did not find their conduct contributed to the tragedy, but noted the regulation existed because “nothing can interfere with their bringing to their task the finest qualities and maximum resources of mind and body.”
The Presidential limousine was a convertible without a bulletproof top; the last armored Presidential vehicle had left the fleet in 1953. The car’s design prevented an agent in the driver’s compartment from moving into the passenger area, blocked by a metal bar fifteen inches above the back of the front seat and by jump-seat passengers. Analysis of the Zapruder film showed Agent Clinton J. Hill reached the Presidential car at frame 343, about 1.6 seconds after the fatal head shot, with both feet on the car approximately 3.7 seconds after the wound. Had the vehicle permitted immediate access, the Commission observed, an agent “could have reached the President in time to protect him from the second and fatal shot.” The Vice-Presidential vehicle, with no passenger between Agent Rufus Youngblood and Vice President Johnson, allowed Youngblood to take a protective position before the third shot.
The Secret Service approach to motorcade emergencies rested on two principles: agents were to shield the President by placing themselves between him and danger, and to remove him from danger as quickly as possible. Detailed contingency plans were eschewed because variations precluded effective planning. The Commission found this approach sound and praised the “instantaneous and heroic response” of the agents.
The Commission concluded that presidential protection must be a government-wide concern drawing on the Secret Service, FBI, CIA, State Department, and military intelligence. Pending longer-range reorganization, it urged better coordination, clearer definitions of responsibility, and a Treasury Department special assistant to provide daily, qualified supervision of the Secret Service’s protective mission.
The original text of this work is in the public domain. This page focuses on a guided summary article, reading notes, selected quotes, and visual learning materials for educational purposes.