Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

II. With the assistance of Agent in Charge Sorrels of the

The Commission recognized at the outset that the Secret Service White House detail duty makes exacting demands upon the agents assigned to it, requiring unswerving discipline and dedication from those who accompany the President.

Following the assassination, the Commission catalogued structural weaknesses in the Secret Service and approved the Service’s ongoing overhaul. Formal descriptions of the advance agent’s responsibilities were being prepared, along with formal understandings with collaborating agencies. The Commission urged continuation of this effort, observing that no large organization achieves efficiency without careful demarcation of responsibility, and recommended inculcating the highest standards of excellence and esprit, since the work demanded tight discipline. The Commission found no causal link between the assassination and the breach of regulations at Fort Worth on November 21, but noted the breach, in which so many agents participated, was inconsistent with Secret Service standards, including the strict regulation that forbids drinking by agents accompanying the President.

Turning to preventive intelligence, the Commission found the Secret Service had been a largely passive recipient of threats and reports, lacking investigative staff and data-processing capacity. After the assassination it launched a complete overhaul. The Protective Research Section was augmented, placed under an inspector, and supplemented by outside expertise including the Office of Science and Technology, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Rand Corporation, IBM, a panel of psychiatric and psychological experts, CIA data processing specialists, and a Walter Reed psychiatric prognostication specialist. A Bureau of the Budget planning document of August 31, 1964 made significant recommendations. The FBI, on December 26, 1963, broadened referral criteria to include subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists showing emotional instability, threats to officials, violent anti-U.S. sentiments, or tendencies toward violence; Assistant Director Alan H. Belmont testified the FBI initiated this on its own. Referrals rose sharply: over 5,000 names in the first four months of 1964 and, according to the testimony of Secret Service Chief James J. Rowley, some 9,000 reports on Communist Party members by mid-June. The FBI began transmitting information on all defectors, a category that would have included Oswald. Director Hoover and Belmont warned that mishandled criteria could threaten personal liberty.

The Secret Service issued experimental guidelines in June 1964 to federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Beyond those threatening the President, these covered individuals or groups expressing “a complaint coupled with an expressed or implied determination to use a means, other than legal or peaceful, to satisfy any grievance.” Chief Rowley testified that, because of Oswald’s demonstrated hostility toward the Secretary of the Navy in his letter of January 1962, the case would have been referred under these criteria. The Commission considered the criteria unduly restrictive and questioned whether Oswald’s letter would have been captured, calling for further experimentation and noting prior assassins Charles Guiteau, Leon Czolgosz, John Schrank, and Giuseppe Zangara were all solitary actors without serious prior records of violence.

The Commission found liaison with other agencies too casual and recommended formalization. Once new collection standards were set, the Service should enter written agreements with federal, state, and local agencies specifying the information sought, manner of provision, and respective responsibilities. The FBI and CIA bore major responsibility for organized-group threats, requiring detailed formal agreements. The Service should not duplicate other agencies’ intelligence capabilities but use their data for protective duties. In his testimony Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon informed the Commission that an interagency committee had been established to develop more effective criteria, including representatives of the Office of Science and Technology, the Department of Defense, the CIA, the FBI, and the Secret Service. Treasury requested five additional Protective Research Section agents as liaison officers; on the basis of the Department’s review during the past several months, Secretary Dillon testified that the use of such liaison officers was the only effective way to insure that adequate liaison is maintained. On August 26, 1964, the Service directed field representatives to send intelligence request forms to local, county, and state law enforcement agencies.

The Protective Research Section’s manual filing system was obsolete and unused automatic data processing. Treasury’s planning document requested authority to hire five persons to develop an automated file and retrieval system, with $100,000 for a feasibility study. The Commission recommended prompt favorable consideration and suggested the President might order inquiry into greater interagency data-processing coordination. The Service began requiring a Protective Research Section member to accompany each advance survey team.

For local law enforcement liaison, the Commission recommended formal explanations of anticipated cooperation during presidential visits, tailored for each level of local authority, while addressing concerns that written instructions might leak to the press.

The Service had been experimenting with new techniques for inspecting motorcade-route buildings, designating some as higher risk. According to Secretary Dillon, the studies indicated there was some utility in attempting to designate certain buildings as involving a higher risk than others. The Commission strongly encouraged these efforts and urged using other federal law enforcement personnel for adequate manpower.

On personnel and facilities, the Commission found the Service was undermanned and inadequately equipped. Although Chief Rowley does not complain about the pay scale for Secret Service agents, salaries are below those of the FBI and leading municipal police forces; Chief Rowley testified that the present workload of each Secret Service agent averages 110.1 cases, versus 20 to 25 for FBI agents. The 1964-65 budget sought 25 new positions, mainly in field offices, but the Service had proposed broader plans to the Bureau of the Budget that, as Chief Rowley explained, would not provide enough additional manpower to take all the measures which he considered required. The plan would take approximately 20 months and require roughly $3 million. The plan provides for 205 additional agents, including 17 for the Protective Research Section, 145 for field offices, 18 for a rotating training pool, and 25 for full Vice Presidential protection. The Commission urged a supplemental appropriation.

Regarding manpower from other agencies, since the assassination the Service had used other Treasury law enforcement agents in surveys, and in four months the FBI supplied 139 agents on 16 occasions, a departure from prior practice. From February 11 through June 30, 1964, the Service received 9,500 hours of work from other enforcement agencies. The Commission endorsed these efforts and recommended formal agreements, possibly codified by Executive order, observing that presidential protection could not be the Secret Service’s exclusive responsibility.

The Commission concluded that no procedures could guarantee security, given the varied demands on the President and traditions of the office, but believed its recommendations would materially improve upon pre-assassination procedures and urged active interagency cooperation.