CHAPTER V
Lee Harvey Oswald spent almost all of his last forty-eight hours in the Police and Courts Building, housing Dallas Police headquarters and the city jail. Following his November 22 arrest, he remained there until Sunday morning, November 24, when he was scheduled for transfer to the county jail. At 11:21 a.m., in full view of millions of television viewers, Oswald was fatally wounded by Jack Ruby, who emerged from the crowd and fired a single shot into Oswald’s abdomen. The events raised important issues about law enforcement conduct, press responsibilities, the rights of the accused, and criminal justice administration.
Activity centered on the third floor. Public elevators opened into a lobby midway along a 140-foot corridor, with Chief Curry’s offices at one end and a small pressroom at the other; between them lay Captain Fritz’s homicide and robbery bureau offices. Oswald arrived on the third floor at about 2 p.m. Friday, was arraigned for the Tippit murder at 7:10 p.m. and for the Kennedy murder shortly after 1:30 a.m. Saturday. He was held in a maximum security cell on the fifth floor, in a center cell with empty cells on either side.
Interrogations, conducted primarily by Fritz in his 14-by-9½-foot office, drew as many as seven or eight people at a time, with more than twenty-five different persons participating. Fritz warned Oswald before the first questioning that he was not compelled to speak. Justice of the Peace David L. Johnston advised him of his rights to counsel and silence at each arraignment. Oswald was never represented by counsel; he tried repeatedly to reach New York lawyer John Abt by telephone without success. On Saturday afternoon, H. Louis Nichols, president of the Dallas Bar Association, offered to obtain a lawyer, but Oswald declined, preferring Abt and secondarily an ACLU attorney.
Within an hour of Oswald’s arrival, newsmen learned he was a suspect in both killings and flooded the building. Felix McKnight of the Dallas Times-Herald estimated that within twenty-four hours more than 300 news media representatives were in Dallas, with upwards of 100 in the third-floor corridor alone. Television cameras and floodlights filled the lobby. An FBI agent compared the conditions to Grand Central Station at rush hour. Police efforts to control the crowd largely failed.
Oswald traversed the twenty feet between the homicide office and the jail elevator in full view and within arm’s length of the assembled newsmen, making that trip at least fifteen times. His most prolonged exposure came at the midnight Friday press conference in the basement assembly room, where seventy to one hundred people crowded in, including Jack Ruby and other unauthorized persons. No identification was required. Curry had instructed reporters not to question Oswald, but they immediately began shouting questions and shoving microphones. After a few minutes Curry had Oswald removed because the newsmen “tried to overrun him.”
The decision to transfer Oswald to the county jail Sunday morning was reached by Chief Curry the preceding evening after consulting Fritz, who preferred not to move him at night for visibility reasons. Curry told reporters that if they returned by 10 a.m. they would not “miss anything.” During the night, the FBI and sheriff’s office received anonymous calls warning that a committee had decided “to kill the man that killed the President.”
Planning involved multiple officials. Curry discussed the matter with Sheriff J. E. Decker, who left the decision to police. Concerned about the threats, Curry proposed an armored truck, agreed to by Assistant Chief Batchelor and Deputy Chief Stevenson. Captain C. E. Talbert secured the basement, placing officers at the tops of the Main and Commerce Street auto ramps, at the five doorways into the garage, and at the double doors leading to the public hallway near the jail office. Sergeant Patrick Dean led fourteen men in a search of the garage. Two weak points remained: the stairway door near the public elevators may not have been fully secured, and the hallway near the jail office was accessible from inside the Police and Courts Building without showing identification.
On Sunday morning, additional measures were implemented. At about 11 a.m., Deputy Chief Stevenson brought available detectives from the third floor to the basement to form two lines flanking the transfer passageway. By the time Oswald reached the basement, forty to fifty newsmen and seventy to seventy-five police officers were assembled.
The plan changed at the last minute. When the armored truck arrived at the Commerce Street exit at about 11:07 a.m., Fritz objected to using it in favor of an unmarked police car for speed and maneuverability. Curry agreed; the armored truck would serve as decoy. The change meant the transfer car had not been fully backed into position when Oswald and his escort emerged from the jail office.
As Lieutenant Pierce’s lead car started up the Main Street ramp at about 11:20 a.m., Oswald, accompanied by Fritz and four detectives, arrived at the jail office. His right hand was handcuffed to the left hand of Detective J. R. Leavelle. Someone shouted, “Here he comes!” Additional spotlights were turned on, the din increased. About ten feet from the door, Jack Ruby passed between a newsman and a detective at the crowd’s edge on the Main Street ramp, extended his right hand holding a .38 revolver, stepped forward, and fired a single fatal bullet into Oswald’s abdomen.
The killing, in the midst of more than seventy police officers, sparked speculation that one or more officers had helped Ruby enter the basement. The Commission found no evidence of such assistance, concluding Ruby entered unaided, probably via the Main Street ramp, no more than three minutes before the shooting. Video tapes established that Pierce’s car cleared the foot of the ramp fifty-five seconds before the shooting and that Ruby was already at the foot of the ramp. Ruby had sent a money order at the Western Union office on Main Street at 11:17 a.m., then was observed departing on foot toward the police building. James Turner testified he saw a man he was confident was Ruby moving slowly down the ramp about thirty seconds before the shooting. There was no evidence Ruby used a press badge, concealed himself in a police car, or was admitted by any officer.
The Commission concluded that the shooting resulted from the failure of Dallas Police Department security precautions. General Order No. 81 directed officers to render every assistance to accredited news media. Under this policy, news representatives had access to the building, and shortly after Oswald’s arrival, Captain King granted permission to bring television cameras to the third floor. By the time the crowd’s size became apparent, the press was entrenched, and no one suggested reversing the policy.
The Commission also found significant deficiencies in planning and coordination. No single Dallas Police member assumed full responsibility. Curry and Fritz each believed the other was directing the transfer; the decision to move Oswald at an announced time was never carefully thought through. No thought was given to the blinding effect of television and camera lights on the escort party.
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