Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

CHAPITRE II.

Chapter II of the report, titled “The Assassination,” describes President Kennedy’s trip to Dallas in November 1963, from its origin through planning, Secret Service preparations, the motorcade, the assassination itself, activities at Parkland Memorial Hospital, and the return of the Presidential party to Washington. The narrative is based largely on participants’ recollections, supplemented by documentary evidence. An evaluation of protective procedures and recommendations appears in chapter VIII.

The Assassination

This introductory section frames the chapter’s scope: it recounts the advance plans and Secret Service preparations for the Texas trip, the motorcade through downtown Dallas, the assassination, the response at Parkland Memorial Hospital, and the return to Washington. The Commission’s account draws primarily on participants’ recollections, with documentary or other evidence used where available. Evaluation of security procedures and recommendations for improvement are deferred to chapter VIII.

PLANNING THE TEXAS TRIP

President Kennedy’s November 1963 trip to Texas was under consideration for nearly a year before it occurred. The President wished to resolve factional controversy within the Texas Democratic Party before the 1964 election, and party leaders saw a fundraising opportunity via a political dinner eventually planned for Austin. The President also valued firsthand contact with citizens and public appearances. The basic decision to travel to Texas in late November 1963 was made at a June 5, 1963 meeting in El Paso between President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson, and Governor Connally. The trip was originally planned for one day covering Dallas, Fort Worth, San Antonio, and Houston, but was later extended from November 21 through the evening of November 22. Governor Connally was left to largely plan the Texas events, with White House Special Assistant Kenneth O’Donnell coordinating the trip. All parties agreed that a motorcade through downtown Dallas was desirable once the schedule was extended, and O’Donnell described motorcades in large cities as automatic for maximizing public exposure.

ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR THE DALLAS TRIP

Advance preparations for President Kennedy’s Dallas visit were the primary responsibility of two Secret Service agents: Special Agent Winston G. Lawson, the White House detail’s advance agent, and Forrest V. Sorrels, special agent in charge of the Dallas office. Both were advised of the trip on November 4. Lawson received a tentative Texas schedule on November 8 from Assistant Special Agent in Charge Roy H. Kellerman, who oversaw the entire Texas journey. Lawson’s responsibilities as advance agent included arranging the Dallas timetable and coordinating with White House staff, relevant organizations, and local law enforcement. His most important duties were taking preventive action against potential threats, selecting the luncheon site and motorcade route, and planning security measures for both.

Preventive Intelligence Activities

The Secret Service’s Protective Research Section (PRS) maintains records on individuals who have threatened the President or behaved as potential dangers. On November 8, 1963, after assuming advance preparation duties, Agent Lawson checked PRS geographic indexes in Washington and found no listings for potential dangers in the Dallas-Fort Worth territory. The Secret Service supplements PRS files with local police and federal agency reports. After arriving in Dallas on November 12, Lawson conferred with local police and the FBI about potential dangers. He inquired about the October 24, 1963 demonstration against Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and obtained photographs of some participants, which were distributed on November 22 at the Trade Mart entrance and luncheon area, with several look-alikes placed under surveillance. The FBI provided the name of one possibly dangerous individual who was investigated, and informed the Secret Service of a November 21 handbill critical of President Kennedy (discussed in chapter VI). Neither the Dallas police nor the FBI had yet identified the handbill’s source. No one else was identified as potentially dangerous through local inquiry, and PRS developed no additional information between November 12 and November 22. The adequacy of the Secret Service’s intelligence system, including detailed information on Lee Harvey Oswald and reasons his name was not furnished to the Secret Service, is addressed in chapter VIII.

The Luncheon Site

An important purpose of the Dallas visit was a luncheon speech before business and civic leaders. The White House staff specified arrival and departure at Love Field, a motorcade through downtown to the luncheon site, and a direct return route to the airport. On November 4, White House detail agent Gerald A. Behn asked Sorrels to examine three potential sites: Market Hall (unavailable for November 22), the Women’s Building at the State Fair Grounds (secure but lacking food facilities and aesthetically unsuitable), and the Trade Mart (well-equipped but with security challenges including numerous entrances, multi-tier balconies, and catwalks). On November 4, Sorrels advised Behn that Trade Mart security difficulties could be overcome with special precautions. Lawson evaluated the site on November 13. O’Donnell made the final decision, and Behn notified Lawson on November 14. Sorrels and Lawson then developed detailed security arrangements, including access control, perimeter policing, roof security, and deployment of more than 200 law enforcement officers (mainly Dallas police, plus 8 Secret Service agents) in and around the building.