Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Primary Police Responsibility for Press Control Failures

The Commission assigns primary responsibility for failing to control press access and prevent the release of unvetted, unprocessed evidence to the public to the Dallas Police Department, noting it was the only agency positioned to establish orderly, appropriate operating procedures to manage the large influx of news personnel gathered in the police building following the assassination.

Shared News Media Responsibility for Post-Assassination Circumstances

The Commission determines the news media bears partial responsibility for the negative circumstances following the President’s death, as the crowd of reporters generally failed to comply with police demands, frequently used third-floor police offices without permission, tied up critical facilities, disrupted normal police operations, and resisted efforts to clear corridor passageways.

News Media Misconduct and Disregard of Police Directives

Reporters repeatedly disregarded explicit police directives: they completely ignored Chief Curry’s order against asking Lee Harvey Oswald questions and crowding him during the November 22 press conference, and the following morning multiple reporters shouted questions at Oswald as he appeared in the basement despite instructions to direct no questions at him.

Press Pressure Compromising Law Enforcement Operations

Constant, aggressive pressure from news representatives on public officials to disclose investigation details impacted police decision-making, as the department sought to maintain satisfactory relations with reporters and cultivate a positive public image of their handling of the assassination response.

Veiled Press Threats Over Oswald Custody Allegations

One or two press representatives made veiled, unjustified threats to the police, implying the department had brutalized Oswald in custody, and stated these unsubstantiated claims would be shared with the public if reporters were not granted access to view him.

Shared Responsibility for Oswald Death and Law Enforcement Failures

The Commission finds both the Dallas Police Department (for failing to impose appropriate, orderly conditions for press interaction) and the news media (for its lack of self-discipline and disregard for the requirements of a fair justice process) share responsibility for the law enforcement failures that resulted in Lee Harvey Oswald’s death.

News Editors’ Misgivings Regarding Press Conduct in Dallas

At their April 1964 annual meeting, members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors expressed strong misgivings about the press’s conduct in Dallas in the immediate aftermath of the assassination, and voiced a commitment to demonstrating greater self-discipline and adhering to higher professional standards in future reporting.

Call for Formal News Media Code of Professional Conduct

The Commission calls for the promulgation of a formal, binding code of professional conduct governing all news media representatives, stating such a code would serve as evidence the press had learned from the mistakes of its conduct in Dallas following the assassination.

Balancing Public Information Access and Fair Trial Rights

The Commission notes that state and local governments, the legal bar, and the general public all share responsibility for pushing to establish ethical conduct standards for the news media, to strike an appropriate balance between the public’s right to be informed and an individual’s right to a fair, impartial trial.

CHAPITRE VI.

This chapter presents the Warren Commission’s findings on whether Lee Harvey Oswald had accomplices in the planning or execution of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination. It responds to widespread post-assassination conspiracy rumors, notes the significant investigative challenges stemming from Oswald’s death and limitations on accessing foreign evidence, and outlines the chapter’s coverage of conspiracy investigation, assassination circumstances, motorcade route selection, Oswald’s presence in the Texas School Book Depository, his transport of the rifle into the building, and the question of accomplices at the assassination scene. CHAPTER VI examines the possibility of accomplices in the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission analyzes fingerprints on sixth-floor cartons, the presence of Depository employees and outside witnesses near the sixth floor, the testimony of Arnold Rowland and Roger Craig regarding a possible second person at the window, the Commission’s investigation of all building employees, Oswald’s escape route, and his background including his 1959–1962 residence in the Soviet Union. Finding no credible evidence of accomplices either at the scene or in Oswald’s flight, the Commission concludes that Oswald acted alone and turns to a detailed examination of his life for traces of conspiracy. Chapter VI examines whether the Soviet Union had any involvement in President Kennedy’s assassination, beginning with Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s testimony that he saw no evidence of Soviet desire to harm Kennedy, and proceeding through the Commission’s detailed investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald’s activities in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1962, including his entry, defection, residence in Minsk, and return to the United States. Chapter VI examines Lee Harvey Oswald’s activities during his residence in the Soviet Union from October 1959 through mid-1962. The chapter covers his citizenship renunciation attempts at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, speculation about Soviet coaching of his behavior, the timeline of his residency approval, assessments by the CIA and State Department on the reasonableness of that timeline, his life in Minsk, verification of his presence there, his income and benefits, analysis of whether those benefits suggest undercover activity, and his employment and job performance at the Minsk Radio Factory. Chapter VI examines Oswald’s activities and circumstances during his time in the Soviet Union and his eventual departure. The chapter addresses his hunting club membership, his marriage to Marina Prusakova, his request to return to the United States, and the process by which the Oswalds obtained Soviet exit permission. Throughout, the Commission assesses whether these circumstances suggest covert Soviet direction or special treatment, concluding that the available evidence does not support such inferences. Chapter VI examines the Soviet Union’s treatment of Marina Oswald’s emigration, the Commission’s conclusion regarding the Oswalds’ departure from the USSR, and the Oswalds’ associations within the Dallas-Fort Worth community upon their return to the United States, including their relationships with the local Russian-speaking community, the De Mohrenschildts, and the Paine family.