Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

第八章

This chapter examines pre-assassination interagency dynamics between the FBI and Secret Service, covering gaps in threat information sharing, misinterpretation of threat reporting requirements, ineffective liaison coordination, formal FBI liaison manual mandates, and official discussions of responsibilities for presidential visit security.

Inadequate Pre-Assassination FBI-Secret Service Information Sharing

At the time of the assassination, formal FBI instructions to agents outlining information to refer to the Secret Service were excessively narrow. While the Secret Service bears primary responsibility for this failure, the FBI guidelines did not fully reflect the Secret Service’s need for intelligence on a wide range of potential threats, only referencing “the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the President.” Post-assassination FBI efforts have demonstrated clear awareness of the necessity of sharing a far broader scope of intelligence information with the Secret Service.

FBI Misinterpretation of Secret Service Threat Information Needs

The narrow FBI guidance was misinterpreted by at least some personnel, including Special Agent Hosty, who construed the handbook language as requiring evidence of a formal plan or conspiracy to harm the President, rather than the broader threat intelligence the Secret Service required. This misinterpretation further restricted the flow of relevant threat information to the Secret Service prior to the assassination.

Ineffective Pre-Assassination FBI-Secret Service Liaison

Despite both agencies having testified to the Commission that their pre-assassination liaison was close and fully sufficient, the Commission found that the liaison between the FBI and Secret Service was not as effective as it should have been in the period leading up to the assassination.