Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Secret Service Advance Agent Procedure Shortcomings

The Commission believes the Secret Service has inadequately defined the responsibilities of its advance agents, who have been given broad discretion to determine what matters require attention and what action to take. Agent Lawson was not given written instructions concerning the Dallas trip or advice about any peculiar problems it might involve; all instructions from higher authority were communicated orally. He did not have a checklist of tasks he was expected to accomplish, and the only systematic supervision was a requirement that he file interim and final reports. Agent Lawson’s interim report was received by Agent Kellerman on November 20, the day before departure. The Secret Service advised the Commission that no unusual precautions were taken for the Dallas trip, and Special Agent in Charge Sorrels testified that the advance preparations were “pretty much the same” as those followed in 1936 during a trip by President Roosevelt. The Commission concludes that standard procedures in use for many years may not be sufficient given the constant change in the nature of threats to the President, and recommends constant reevaluation of procedures with attention to special problems and the development of trip-specific instructions.

Liaison with Local Law Enforcement Authorities

Liaison with local law enforcement was indispensable to the Secret Service in carrying out its duties. The Service had 28 agents participating in the Dallas visit, and Lawson’s advance planning called for the deployment of almost 600 members of the Dallas Police Department, Fire Department, County Sheriff’s Department, and the Texas Department of Public Safety. Despite this dependence on local authorities, the Secret Service did not at the time of the assassination have any established procedure governing its relationships with them, no prepared checklist of matters to be covered, and no written description of the role the local police were expected to perform. Discussions and requests were entirely informal. The Commission believes a more formal statement of assigned responsibilities, supplemented to reflect the peculiar conditions of each trip, is essential. The absence of formal guidance led to varying interpretations, as illustrated by the undefined term “unauthorized personnel” used in instructing police to guard overpasses, with railroad and yard terminal workmen permitted to remain at the overpass overlooking the assassination scene. Assistant Chief Batchelor of the Dallas police and Agent Lawson both agreed that a formal statement of assigned responsibilities would be desirable.