Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

第八章

CHAPTER VIII consolidates the Commission’s findings on the protection of the President, the Secret Service’s protective operations and procedures, the FBI’s pre-assassination knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald, the advance planning for President Kennedy’s November 1963 trip to Dallas, the events of the trip itself, the postassassination investigation by the Secret Service, and the relevant federal statutes governing presidential protection. The chapter also incorporates two appendices: Appendix VII, which surveys prior assassination attempts on U.S. Presidents and the historical development of presidential protection, and Appendix X, which documents the firearms identification evidence in the case.

第八章

The body of Chapter VIII is organized around several major topics. The opening portion frames the legal and historical context, drawing on the writings of Clinton Rossiter (“The American Presidency”), George Washington’s correspondence, and Margaret Smith’s “A President Is Many Men” to establish the symbolic importance of the office and to note that prior assassination attempts are discussed more fully in Appendix VII. The chapter then turns to the FBI’s handling of Lee Harvey Oswald, citing testimony and documentary exhibits from FBI agents John W. Fain, John L. Quigley, James P. Hosty Jr., J. Edgar Hoover, Alan H. Belmont, and from CIA officials John A. McCone and Richard M. Helms. Citations trace the FBI’s investigative file on Oswald (CE 833, 834, 826), Oswald’s contacts with the FBI Dallas field office, his “ FPCC“ activities, his letter to Hosty (4 H 441-442), his travels to Mexico City and interactions with the Soviet and Cuban embassies (CE 833, 834; 11 H 192-193, 203-204), and the destruction of Hosty’s note after the assassination. The narrative addresses Oswald’s Marine Corps discharge, passport issuance, and the FBI’s dissemination of information about him. A substantial portion covers the advance work for the Dallas trip, based on testimony and reports of Secret Service agents Winston G. Lawson, James J. Rowley, and Forrest V. Sorrels, and the Secret Service documentary record (CE 767, 768, 1021). The chapter discusses the risk assessment process, the coordination with the Dallas Police Department, the lack of coverage of the Dallas Trade Mart as the motorcade destination, and specific security decisions (and lapses) at Love Field, the motorcade route, and the Texas School Book Depository building. The advance section includes references to the “abnormal” mental case referred to as the “Kilduff” letter and the handling of threatening communications. The chapter documents incidents surrounding the trip, including the incident at the Cellar Coffee House involving agent Richard J. Mackie (CE 1020, tabs B, D, E, F, G), the arrest of Thomas Arthur Vallee, and the “Adkinson” incident. The chapter cites a Secret Service memorandum of November 25, 1963, and CE 1354, 1355, 1356, 1358 in connection with subsequent intelligence matters. The postassassination Secret Service investigation is documented through CE 1018, 1019, 1020, and the testimony of Chief Rowley, and the Commission’s recommendations appear in connection with the planning document CE 1053A, 1053B, 1053C, 1053D. A statutory and legislative section reviews the federal criminal provisions relating to threats against the President (18 U.S.C. §§ 871, 2385, 1114), the Secret Service’s protective authority (18 U.S.C. §§ 3052, 3053, 3056), and the unsuccessful legislative history of a federal assassination statute (S. 3653, H.R. 10386, H.R. 3896; 36 Cong. Rec. 2961-2964, 2407 (1902); 35 Cong. Rec. 2431 (1902); S. 2330, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (1963)). The chapter closes with an analysis of the Secret Service budget, planning, and staffing deficiencies, drawing on testimony of Rowley, Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon, FBI Assistant Director Belmont, and Director Hoover, and on the planning documents CE 1027, 1030, and 2765, as well as on House Appropriations hearings. Recommendations regarding the use of the presidential limousine, the elimination of risks through apprehension of potential attackers, the Protective Research Section, and the coordination of intelligence are grounded in the cited testimony and exhibits.