Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

chapter II. With the assistance of Agent in Charge Sorrels of the

Chapter II examines the Secret Service’s advance preparations for President Kennedy’s visit to Dallas on November 22, 1963, and the conduct of agents in the preceding hours in Fort Worth. Drawing on the work of Agent Lawson (assisted later by Agent Grant) and the testimony of Special Agent in Charge Sorrels, the Commission evaluates the adequacy of advance planning, liaison with local law enforcement, security measures along the motorcade route, and the discipline of agents immediately before the assassination.

Advance Work for Dallas Presidential Trip

Agent Lawson of the Dallas Secret Service field office was responsible for working out a great many arrangements for the President’s trip. The Service normally prefers to have two agents perform advance preparations, but because President Kennedy had scheduled visits to five Texas cities and other parts of the country immediately before, there were not enough men available to assign two agents to all the advance work. Consequently, Agent Lawson did the advance work alone from November 13 to November 18, when he was joined by Agent David B. Grant, who had just completed advance work on the President’s trip to Tampa.

Commission Findings on Dallas Advance Arrangements

The Commission concludes that the most significant advance arrangements for the President’s trip were soundly planned. The motorcade route selected by Agent Lawson, upon the advice of Agent in Charge Sorrels and with the concurrence of the Dallas police, was entirely appropriate in view of the known desires of the President, even though there were far safer freeway routes directly to the Trade Mart. Much of Lawson’s time was spent establishing adequate security along the motorcade route and at the two places where the President would stop, Love Field and the Trade Mart. The arrangements worked out at the Trade Mart with the cooperation of the Dallas police and other local law enforcement agents were carefully executed, and the Commission regards the security arrangements at Love Field as entirely adequate.

Secret Service Advance Agent Procedure Shortcomings

The Commission believes the Secret Service has inadequately defined the responsibilities of its advance agents, who have been given broad discretion to determine what matters require attention and what action to take. Agent Lawson was not given written instructions concerning the Dallas trip or advice about any peculiar problems it might involve; all instructions from higher authority were communicated orally. He did not have a checklist of tasks he was expected to accomplish, and the only systematic supervision was a requirement that he file interim and final reports. Agent Lawson’s interim report was received by Agent Kellerman on November 20, the day before departure. The Secret Service advised the Commission that no unusual precautions were taken for the Dallas trip, and Special Agent in Charge Sorrels testified that the advance preparations were “pretty much the same” as those followed in 1936 during a trip by President Roosevelt. The Commission concludes that standard procedures in use for many years may not be sufficient given the constant change in the nature of threats to the President, and recommends constant reevaluation of procedures with attention to special problems and the development of trip-specific instructions.

Liaison with Local Law Enforcement Authorities

Liaison with local law enforcement was indispensable to the Secret Service in carrying out its duties. The Service had 28 agents participating in the Dallas visit, and Lawson’s advance planning called for the deployment of almost 600 members of the Dallas Police Department, Fire Department, County Sheriff’s Department, and the Texas Department of Public Safety. Despite this dependence on local authorities, the Secret Service did not at the time of the assassination have any established procedure governing its relationships with them, no prepared checklist of matters to be covered, and no written description of the role the local police were expected to perform. Discussions and requests were entirely informal. The Commission believes a more formal statement of assigned responsibilities, supplemented to reflect the peculiar conditions of each trip, is essential. The absence of formal guidance led to varying interpretations, as illustrated by the undefined term “unauthorized personnel” used in instructing police to guard overpasses, with railroad and yard terminal workmen permitted to remain at the overpass overlooking the assassination scene. Assistant Chief Batchelor of the Dallas police and Agent Lawson both agreed that a formal statement of assigned responsibilities would be desirable.