Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

chapter II. With the assistance of Agent in Charge Sorrels of the

Chapter II examines the Commission’s assessment of presidential protection arrangements following the assassination of President Kennedy. The chapter addresses the overlapping responsibilities of the FBI and Secret Service in preventive investigation, evaluates proposals to restructure or relocate protective functions, and outlines the Commission’s recommendations for improving interagency coordination, Secret Service supervision, personnel standards, and preventive intelligence capabilities. The overarching conclusion is that both agencies had too narrowly construed their responsibilities, and that better coordination, formalized procedures, and broader threat identification criteria are necessary to enhance the President’s security.

FBI’s Role in Presidential Protection

The FBI, established within the Department of Justice in 1908, has played an increasingly important role in presidential protection. Since 1910, an annual appropriation item for the “protection of the person of the President of the United States” has recurred under the FBI’s budget. Although the FBI is not responsible for the physical protection of the President, it shares an assignment with other government agencies in the field of preventive investigation regarding presidential security. The Bureau has attempted to fulfill this role by codifying in its Handbook the procedures agents must follow when receiving information indicating a possible attempt against the President or other protected persons.

Overlap in Preventive Investigation Authority

With two federal agencies operating in the same general field of preventive investigation, questions inevitably arise about the scope of each agency’s authority. J. Edgar Hoover and other Bureau officials testified that the FBI did not believe its directive required notification to the Secret Service of substantial information about Lee Harvey Oswald before the President reached Dallas. The Secret Service had no knowledge of Oswald, his background, or his employment at the Book Depository. Robert I. Bouck of the Secret Service’s Protective Research Section believed the FBI’s accumulation of facts should have constituted sufficient basis to warn the Secret Service of the risk.

Commission Assessment of Agency Responsibility Construal

The Commission concluded that both the FBI and the Secret Service have too narrowly construed their respective responsibilities. Too much emphasis has been placed by both agencies on investigating specific threats by individuals, and not enough on dangers from other sources. The Secret Service particularly tends to be the passive recipient of threat information, and its Protective Research Section is not adequately staffed or equipped to conduct the wider investigative work required for presidential security today.

Proposals to Improve Presidential Protection Arrangements

During the period of its deliberations, the Commission received several proposals to improve presidential protection arrangements. These included suggestions to locate exclusive responsibility in one government agency, clarify the division of authority between agencies, or retain the existing system while expanding the scope and operations of the Secret Service and FBI.

Debate Over Transfer of Preventive Investigative Functions

A debate emerged over whether to transfer preventive investigative functions to the FBI, leaving the Secret Service with only physical protection responsibilities. Proponents argued the FBI is properly manned and equipped for extensive information gathering, and that building equivalent Secret Service capabilities would take substantial time. Opponents urged that all protective functions be committed to an elite, independent corps whose agents are intimately associated with the Presidential family. They contended that an organization limited to receiving information gathered by others could not maintain the esprit de corps or alertness required for such unique responsibilities.

Commission Stance on Long-Range Protection Organization Recommendations

The Commission determined that it was not within its responsibility to make specific recommendations on the long-range organization of presidential protection, except as conclusions flow directly from its examination of the assassination. Unlike the Hoover Commission in 1949, this Commission was not asked to determine the optimum organization for presidential protection. Because protection is in a real sense a Government-wide responsibility shared by the State Department, FBI, CIA, military intelligence, and Secret Service, and because any change in the Secret Service’s intimate association with the President and his family raises imponderable questions, the Commission concluded that determination of responsibility relocation should be left to the Executive and Congress, perhaps upon recommendations from the Cabinet-level committee or the National Security Council.