The City of God, Volume I cover
Angelology and the Angelic Fall

The City of God, Volume I

When Rome burned, Augustine answered pagan accusations with a sweeping theology of two cities—divine and earthly—that reframed the meaning of history itself, locating the true City of God not in empire but in the fellowship of souls oriented toward eternal beatitude.

Augustine, of Hippo, Saint · 2014 · 192 min

Alternative Interpretations of Waters

Augustine concludes the chapter by addressing a specific, erroneous interpretation of the creation narrative that has arisen among some thinkers. Some have supposed that the angelic hosts are referred to under the name of “waters,” and that this is what is meant by the command, “Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters.” In this view, the waters above the firmament are understood to be the holy angels, while the waters below are interpreted as either the visible physical waters, the multitude of bad angels, or the nations of men. Augustine critiques this suggestion, noting that if this were the case, the text would not indicate when the angels were created, but only when they were separated.

More gravely, Augustine refutes the foolish and wicked opinion of certain heretics, specifically the Audians and Sampsæans, who have dared to deny that the waters were created by God. Their argument rests on the observation that nowhere in the Genesis narrative is it written, “God said, Let there be waters.” With equal folly, they might argue that the earth was not created by God, for nowhere do we read, “God said, Let the earth be.” However, Augustine counters, the opening declaration of Scripture—“In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth”—necessarily encompasses the waters. The sea is included in the work of God, as the Psalmist testifies: “The sea is His, and He made it; and His hands formed the dry land.”

Furthermore, Augustine addresses the physical objections raised by those who would spiritualize the waters. Those who understand the angels by the waters above the skies often struggle with the specific gravity of the elements, fearing that waters, due to their fluidity and weight, could not naturally reside in the upper regions of the cosmos. Augustine exposes the inconsistency of this “world-weighing” logic by pointing to the human body. If these critics were to construct a man according to their own principles of physics, they would not place any moist humors—what the Greeks call “phlegm”—in the head, as water is heavy and belongs low. Yet, in God’s actual handiwork, the head is the seat of the phlegm, and most fittingly so. If these critics were unaware of this anatomical fact and were informed by Scripture that God placed a moist, cold, and therefore heavy element in the uppermost part of the human body, they would refuse to believe it. If confronted with anatomical reality, they would insist the text must mean something else. Augustine uses this analogy to affirm that God, as the Creator of all nature, has the authority to order the elements—whether in the cosmos or in the human body—according to His wisdom, not according to human presumptions about weight and place.

Thus, Augustine reaffirms the literal creation of the material elements. The waters are part of the physical creation, ordered by God’s command. While the spiritual meaning of the separation of good and evil angels remains the deeper truth conveyed by the narrative of light and darkness, the waters themselves are to be understood as created matter. Having clarified this point and defended the goodness and origin of all created things, Augustine brings the book to a close, having established the foundation of the two cities in the angelic division and prepared the way for the history of the earthly and heavenly cities in human affairs.

Augustine begins this book by addressing the composition of the two cities—the City of God and the city of man—demonstrating that these societies are not divided by species, such as angels versus men, but by the disposition of the will. He asserts that it is entirely congruous to speak of a single society composed of both holy angels and holy men, just as there is a single society of the wicked composed of both fallen angels and sinful men. The distinction between the good and the bad angels arises not from a difference in their nature or origin, for God, the supreme Creator, fashioned the essence of both, but solely from a difference in will and desire. The good angels steadfastly adhered to the common good of all, which is God Himself, finding their joy in His eternity, truth, and love. Conversely, the wicked angels, enamored of their own power and desiring to be a good to themselves, lapsed from that supreme beatitude. They traded the dignity of eternity for the inflation of pride, the assurance of truth for the vanity of deception, and unifying love for factious division. Thus, the cause of the blessedness of the good angels is their adherence to God, while the cause of the misery of the wicked is their forsaking of Him.

From this, Augustine deduces that there is no other good for a rational or intellectual creature save God alone. Creatures made out of nothing cannot be blessed of themselves but only by Him who created them. A creature is blessed by the possession of that whose loss makes it miserable; therefore, He who is blessed in Himself, needing nothing else, cannot be miserable. Augustine affirms that there is no unchangeable good but the one true God. Things created by Him are good because they come from Him, yet they are mutable because they are made from nothing. While they are not the supreme good, those mutable natures that can adhere to the immutable good are very good, for without Him they are inevitably wretched. Augustine argues that the rational nature, even when wretched, is more excellent than irrational or lifeless natures that cannot experience misery. Since the rational nature was created excellent enough to secure blessedness by adhering to God, and since it cannot be satisfied without perfect blessedness, not to adhere to God is manifestly a fault. Every fault injures the nature and is contrary to it. Therefore, the creature that cleaves to God differs from the wicked not by nature, but by fault. This very fault proves the nobility of the nature, for one only justly blames a fault because it mars a praiseworthy nature. Just as blindness proves that sight belongs to the nature of the eyes, the fault of the angelic creature proves that it pertained to its nature to cleave to God.

The original text of this work is in the public domain. This page focuses on a guided summary article, reading notes, selected quotes, and visual learning materials for educational purposes.

Project Gutenberg