Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Implausibility of Soviet-Led Assassination

It would have been an act of rashness and madness for Soviet leaders to undertake an assassination of the President as an active policy, because everything would have been put in jeopardy or at stake by such an act. Madness has not characterized the actions of the Soviet leadership in recent years. The Commission accepted Rusk’s estimate as reasonable and objective, though recognizing that a precise assessment of Soviet intentions or interests is most difficult, and therefore examined all known facts regarding Oswald’s defection, residence in the Soviet Union, and return to the United States to determine whether Soviet authorities may have directly or indirectly influenced Oswald’s actions.

Commission Examination of Soviet-Oswald Ties

The Commission examined all known facts regarding Oswald’s defection, residence in the Soviet Union, and return to the United States, seeking to determine at each step whether there was any evidence supporting a conclusion that Soviet authorities may have directly or indirectly influenced Oswald’s actions in assassinating the President. The Commission’s findings on Soviet involvement were supported by evidence other than material provided by the Soviet Union or Oswald’s writings, with the CIA also contributing data on normal Soviet practices for handling American defectors.

Oswald’s Entry into the Soviet Union

Although evidence is inconclusive as to what motivated Oswald to go to the Soviet Union, there is no indication he was prompted by agents of that country. He may have begun studying Russian while stationed in Japan (August 1957 to November 1958) and told several persons in Moscow in October 1959 that he had been planning defection for two years. Statements to American newspaper reporters and others about his motivations were somewhat at variance, and which version was more accurate remains unknown. No evidence shows he received outside financing; he likely saved from his Marine Corps salary (earning $3,452.20 over his service) and his known frugal habits suggest he could finance the trip. He studied Russian in Japan and California, scored “Poor” on an Army aptitude test in February 1959, and could barely speak the language upon arrival; after extensive study and lessons from a Soviet-assigned interpreter, he eventually spoke well, though with grammatical errors and poor writing. The Commission investigated his visa acquisition in Helsinki in October 1959 and found nothing indicating he was a Soviet agent; the relatively prompt visa may have reflected normal procedures after the summer rush ended. His defection and disloyal public statements eliminated any possibility of his gaining access to confidential U.S. information—itself persuasive evidence he was not recruited as an agent prior to defection.