Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR THE DALLAS TRIP

Advance preparations for President Kennedy’s Dallas visit were the primary responsibility of two Secret Service agents: Special Agent Winston G. Lawson, the White House detail’s advance agent, and Forrest V. Sorrels, special agent in charge of the Dallas office. Both were advised of the trip on November 4. Lawson received a tentative Texas schedule on November 8 from Assistant Special Agent in Charge Roy H. Kellerman, who oversaw the entire Texas journey. Lawson’s responsibilities as advance agent included arranging the Dallas timetable and coordinating with White House staff, relevant organizations, and local law enforcement. His most important duties were taking preventive action against potential threats, selecting the luncheon site and motorcade route, and planning security measures for both.

Preventive Intelligence Activities

The Secret Service’s Protective Research Section (PRS) maintains records on individuals who have threatened the President or behaved as potential dangers. On November 8, 1963, after assuming advance preparation duties, Agent Lawson checked PRS geographic indexes in Washington and found no listings for potential dangers in the Dallas-Fort Worth territory. The Secret Service supplements PRS files with local police and federal agency reports. After arriving in Dallas on November 12, Lawson conferred with local police and the FBI about potential dangers. He inquired about the October 24, 1963 demonstration against Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and obtained photographs of some participants, which were distributed on November 22 at the Trade Mart entrance and luncheon area, with several look-alikes placed under surveillance. The FBI provided the name of one possibly dangerous individual who was investigated, and informed the Secret Service of a November 21 handbill critical of President Kennedy (discussed in chapter VI). Neither the Dallas police nor the FBI had yet identified the handbill’s source. No one else was identified as potentially dangerous through local inquiry, and PRS developed no additional information between November 12 and November 22. The adequacy of the Secret Service’s intelligence system, including detailed information on Lee Harvey Oswald and reasons his name was not furnished to the Secret Service, is addressed in chapter VIII.