The City of God, Volume I

The Platonists perceived that no material body can be God, and so they transcended all bodies in their search. They perceived that whatever is changeable cannot be the most high God, and so they transcended every soul and all mutable spirits. They understood that in every changeable thing, the form that makes it what it is can exist only through Him who truly is, since He alone is unchangeable. Whether we consider the whole fabric of the world with its orderly motion, or all bodies contained within it, or every kind of life—from the nutritive life of plants to the sensitive life of beasts to the rational life of humans to the angelic life that needs no sustenance—all exist only through Him who absolutely is. In Him, to be, to live, to understand, and to be blessed are one and the same. From this unchangeableness and simplicity, the Platonists gathered that all things were made by Him and that He Himself was made by none.

In rational philosophy the Platonists likewise excel. Augustine refuses to compare them with those who assigned to bodily senses the power of discriminating truth—the Epicureans and Stoics who derived their notions from sense perception. The Platonists distinguished what the mind conceives from what the senses perceive, and they affirmed that the light by which we understand all things is God Himself, by whom all things were made.

In moral philosophy they hold the first rank as well. The question concerns the chief good—that final end beyond which nothing further need be sought. Let all yield to those who taught that the human being is blessed not through enjoyment of body or mind, but through enjoyment of God. Plato defined the final good as life according to virtue, and taught that only those who know and imitate God can attain virtue. He therefore held that to philosophize is to love God, whose nature is incorporeal. The philosopher becomes blessed when he begins to enjoy God, for though loving what ought not to be loved brings misery, no one is blessed who does not enjoy what he loves.

Whatever philosophers have thought concerning the supreme God—that He is the maker of all things, the light by which truth is known, and the good toward which all action should be directed—Augustine prefers these to all others and acknowledges their nearness to Christian faith. A Christian, even if unacquainted with philosophical writings, knows that the apostle Paul taught how certain philosophers had the invisible things of God manifested to them through creation, yet failed to worship Him rightly, giving divine honors to created things instead. Christians agree with the Platonists concerning the one God, the author of the universe, who is above every body as incorporeal and above every soul as incorruptible—our principle, our light, our good.

Some Christians have wondered at the agreement between Plato’s conceptions of God and the truths of faith. Some have conjectured that Plato heard the prophet Jeremiah during his travels in Egypt or read the Hebrew scriptures. Yet chronological calculation shows that Plato was born about a century after Jeremiah prophesied, and the Septuagint translation was completed after Plato’s death. It remains possible that he learned something of those writings through an interpreter, just as he studied Egyptian thought. What most suggests such influence is the divine name revealed to Moses: “I am who I am.” This identification of God with pure being, unchangeable and eternal, Plato held with special vehemence. Whether he derived this from Hebrew sources or from natural reason, Augustine has chosen the Platonists as the proper partners for disputing the question of natural theology.

Yet here lies the critical difficulty. The most renowned Platonists—Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyry, Apuleius—and Plato himself, all held that sacred rites should be performed in honor of many gods. This is the point Augustine now takes up. He asks: To what sort of gods do they think rites should be performed—to the good or to the bad, or to both? Plato himself affirmed that all the gods are good and that none is evil. It follows that rites are performed to the good, for if they are not good, they are not gods. This demolishes the common notion that evil gods must be propitiated to avert harm while good gods are invoked for assistance. If there are no evil gods, then all rites are directed to the good.

What then are we to make of those gods who delight in theatrical spectacles, demanding that such displays be instituted in their honor? Their power proves they exist, but their taste for such things proves they are not good. Plato himself held that poets who composed songs unworthy of divine majesty should be banished from the city. What then of gods who contend with Plato about those very spectacles? He refuses to let the gods be slandered with false crimes; they command those same crimes to be celebrated in their honor. When they demanded the inauguration of scenic games, they not only required base things but inflicted cruel punishments—taking the son of Titus Latinius and afflicting him with disease because he delayed obedience, removing the affliction only when he complied. Plato, by contrast, refused to fear such powers, holding firm to his conviction that a well-ordered state must purge the sacrilegious follies of poets. These gods delight in impurity, which proves they are impure themselves. Here stands the contradiction at the heart of Platonic theology: if the gods are good as Plato defined them, they cannot take pleasure in what wise and virtuous men condemn; yet the gods who demand theatrical honors plainly delight in obscenity and cruelty. Either Plato’s definition fails, or the beings who require such worship are not gods at all.

Augustine begins his examination of the nature and worship of demons by addressing the inconsistencies found within the Platonic tradition, particularly regarding the theatrical pleasures attributed to spiritual beings. He notes that Labeo, a certain interpreter of religious rites, claimed that good deities are to be propitiated with plays and things associated with joyfulness, while bad deities require bloody victims and fasts. Augustine immediately points out the contradiction this poses with the philosophy of Plato, who persistently dared to take away these pleasures from the gods—not because he deemed the gods bad, but because he deemed the plays base. If the Platonists hold that all gods are good, friendly to the virtues of the wise, and that it is unlawful to think otherwise, they must explain why Plato would deprive these good gods of the pleasure they supposedly enjoy. Furthermore, the gods themselves refute Labeo’s opinion, as they demonstrated in the case of Latinius by appearing not merely sportive but cruel and terrible. Augustine demands that the Platonists explain these discrepancies, as they claim to follow the opinion of their master.