The City of God, Volume I

To address this, Augustine turns to the threefold division of rational souls proposed by these philosophers: a division into gods, men, and demons. According to this view, the gods occupy the highest region of heaven, men the lowest region of earth, and demons the middle region of the air. The dignity of their natures corresponds to the dignity of their regions; thus, the gods are better than men and demons, while demons, holding the middle place, are inferior to the gods but superior to men. This superiority is attributed to the demons sharing the immortality of body with the gods, while sharing the passions of the mind with men. Augustine observes that this classification is used to explain why demons are delighted with the obscenities of the theatre and the fictions of poets—because they are subject to human passions from which the gods are far removed. Consequently, Augustine argues that it was not the good gods whom Plato deprived of theatrical pleasure by expelling the poets, but rather the demons, who are the ones actually delighted by such things.

Augustine cites Apuleius, the Platonist of Madaura, who wrote a work entitled Concerning the God of Socrates. Apuleius asserts that the familiar spirit attending Socrates was not a god but a demon, and he diligently discusses the middle estate of demons compared to the lofty estate of gods and the lowly estate of men. Augustine presses the implications of this: if Socrates’ familiar was a demon, and Plato banned the poets from the state, then Plato’s intention was to admonish the human soul to despise the shameful commands of the demons and detest their impurity rather than to deprive good gods of their legitimate pleasures. If Plato was virtuous in prohibiting these things, then the demons were shameful in commanding them. Augustine suggests that either Apuleius is wrong about the nature of Socrates’ familiar, or Plato held contradictory opinions, or Socrates is not to be congratulated on such a friendship. He notes that Apuleius himself seemed aware of the horror attached to the name of demons, as he titled his book On the God of Socrates rather than On the Demon of Socrates, likely to avoid the stigma that would repel readers. Ultimately, Augustine concludes that the only things Apuleius could find to praise in demons were subtlety, strength of body, and a higher place of habitation, while their manners were described as entirely bad.

Moving to refute the notion of the superiority of demons based on their physical attributes, Augustine argues that a truly religious mind should not suppose demons are better than men simply because they possess better bodies. If bodily excellence were the standard of worth, many beasts would be placed before men, as they surpass humans in the acuteness of senses, swiftness, strength, and longevity. Humans excel beasts through reason and understanding, and therefore ought to excel demons through the living of good and virtuous lives. Augustine suggests that divine providence gave demons better bodies so that humans might learn to despise bodily excellence in comparison with goodness of life, knowing that they too shall receive immortality of body—not a tortured immortality, but one consequent on purity of soul.

Similarly, Augustine dismisses the idea that the loftiness of place makes demons superior. It is ridiculous to think that inhabiting the air, rather than the earth, entitles demons to religious submission, for birds also inhabit the air and are yet subjected to man. Even if demons do not return to earth to rest or feed as birds do, this does not make them superior to men. Augustine invokes Plato’s own ordering of the elements to suggest that the gradation of elements does not correspond to the gradation of merit in animated creatures. Apuleius himself admits that man, though a terrestrial animal, is to be put far before aquatic animals, despite Plato placing water above earth. This indicates that a soul of a higher order may inhabit a body of a lower element, and thus the aerial habitation of demons does not signify their superiority over terrestrial men who possess piety of mind.

Augustine then scrutinizes Apuleius’s description of the manners and actions of demons. Apuleius states that demons are agitated by the same perturbations of mind as men; they are provoked by injuries, propitiated by gifts, rejoice in honours, and are delighted with sacred rites. He defines demons as “animal in nature, passive in soul, rational in mind, aerial in body, eternal in time.” Augustine analyzes this definition, noting that being animal is common to beasts; being rational is common to men; being eternal is common to gods but is no advantage if the being is not blessed, for temporal happiness is better than eternal misery. Being passive in soul—subject to perturbations—is common to men and signifies misery. Being aerial in body is unique to them, but since any soul is superior to any body, this physical trait does not justify religious worship. Augustine argues that if Apuleius had attributed virtue, wisdom, and happiness to demons, they might have been worthy of some esteem, though still not worship, as these would be gifts received from God. However, as they are merely rational animals capable of misery, passive in soul, and eternal in their misery, they are utterly unworthy of divine honour.

Focusing on the “passive” nature of the demonic soul, Augustine asks why demons are agitated by the whirlwinds of passions when beasts are not. In beasts, such movements are not contrary to reason, as beasts lack reason; in demons, however, these passions are contrary to reason and thus constitute perturbation. In men, these perturbations arise from misery and the lack of perfect wisdom. The gods are free from them because they are blessed. Therefore, demons, like men, are subject to perturbations because they are miserable animals. Augustine argues that it is madness to submit oneself religiously to demons when the true religion aims to deliver men from the very depravity that makes them like demons. He contrasts the commands of true religion—which forbid anger, partiality for gifts, and hatred of enemies—with the behavior of demons as described by Apuleius. It is the height of folly to worship beings one desires to be unlike in life, for the highest duty of religion is to imitate the one worshipped.

Augustine next critiques the concept of demonic mediation. Apuletius and his school claim demons are placed in the air to carry prayers from men to gods and return answers from gods to men, based on the premise that no god has intercourse with man. Augustine finds this absurd: why would good gods only communicate with men through wicked demons who love the crimes of magic and the obscenities of the stage? A chaste and innocent man, seeking the favor of the gods, would supposedly require the mediation of beings who love the very things he hates. Augustine argues that human modesty should not lead men to think shameful things are pleasing to the divinity, and he again cites Plato’s prohibition of poets as evidence against the demons’ love of theatrical fictions.