Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

The Unanswered Questions

This section addresses unanswerable questions about Oswald’s mindset in the week before the assassination. It notes that after his November 15 argument with Marina over his alias, he skipped his usual weekend visit to Irving, only returning on November 21. He asked coworker Frazier for a ride to Irving that morning, falsely claiming he needed to pick up curtain rods for a new apartment. The Commission states he had likely planned the attack by November 21 at the latest, and that public reporting of the presidential motorcade route (which would pass the Texas School Book Depository) starting November 15 made the target accessible to him. It also explores Oswald’s long-standing personal struggles: his sense of isolation, failed attempts to find belonging in the U.S. Marine Corps, the Soviet Union, and Cuba, his strained marriage, and his feeling of being unwelcome at the Paine home, all of which may have shaped his state of mind. The Commission clarifies that marital conflict alone did not cause the assassination, as Oswald’s underlying hostility and desire for historical recognition predated his marriage.

Oswald’s Post-Assassination Behavior and Arrest

Oswald’s actions following the assassination provide limited insight into his motives. He took only $13.87 with him when he left Irving on November 22, suggesting he did not expect to escape far, similar to a note he sent his wife before his earlier attempt to kill General Walker. After the assassination, he returned to his roominghouse to retrieve his revolver, killed Patrolman J.D. Tippit when Tippit attempted to question him, and was arrested at the Texas Theatre after resisting arrest. Officers testified that at the time of his arrest, he stated “it’s all over now.” During interrogation, he was overbearing and arrogant, consistently denying involvement in the assassination or Tippit’s murder, and handling questioning with composure while lying about other matters, with his denials holding no probative value given the overwhelming evidence against him.

Conclusion

The Commission concludes that no single motive can explain Oswald’s assassination of President Kennedy, but identifies multiple contributing factors: his overriding hostility to his environment, inability to form meaningful relationships, perpetual discontent with American society, long-held hatred for the U.S., commitment to Marxism and communism, desire to be recognized as a “great man” ahead of his time, and willingness to act decisively without regard for consequences when pursuing his goals. These combined traits produced a man capable of carrying out the assassination.

KAPITEL VIII.

This chapter presents the Commission’s review of U.S. presidential protective arrangements in place at the time of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination, prompted by the high rate of presidential assassinations and attempts since 1865. The Commission did not conduct a comprehensive review of all facets of presidential protection, but focused on broader issues highlighted by the Dallas events, drawing on full access to a major post-assassination Secret Service study prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury. Sensitive underlying staff and consultant reports were withheld from publication to avoid compromising current protective methods, while all information related to protective operations during the Dallas trip was included in the Commission’s published record. Chapter VIII examines the intelligence-gathering and threat-assessment practices of the U.S. Secret Service and other federal agencies prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, with particular focus on the Protective Research Section (PRS), the FBI’s monitoring of Lee Harvey Oswald, and the systemic failures that allowed a dangerous individual to remain inadequately scrutinized before the Dallas visit. This chapter covers the FBI’s pre-assassination investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas and the agency’s decision not to refer Oswald to the Secret Service ahead of President Kennedy’s 1963 Dallas visit. This chapter examines pre-assassination interagency dynamics between the FBI and Secret Service, covering gaps in threat information sharing, misinterpretation of threat reporting requirements, ineffective liaison coordination, formal FBI liaison manual mandates, and official discussions of responsibilities for presidential visit security.

KAPITEL VIII.

This chapter presents the Commission’s review of U.S. presidential protective arrangements in place at the time of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination, prompted by the high rate of presidential assassinations and attempts since 1865. The Commission did not conduct a comprehensive review of all facets of presidential protection, but focused on broader issues highlighted by the Dallas events, drawing on full access to a major post-assassination Secret Service study prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury. Sensitive underlying staff and consultant reports were withheld from publication to avoid compromising current protective methods, while all information related to protective operations during the Dallas trip was included in the Commission’s published record.