Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Nonreferral of Oswald to the Secret Service

The Commission evaluated whether the FBI should have alerted the Secret Service to Oswald’s presence in Dallas ahead of President Kennedy’s visit, as the two agencies disagreed on whether Oswald met the criteria for referral as a potential threat to the President. Secret Service Protective Research Section (PRS) head Robert I. Bouck testified that cumulative information about Oswald (his continued association with the Russian Embassy after returning from the Soviet Union, ties to Castro groups, past Marine court-martial for illegal handgun possession, hunting experience in Russia, and unreliable character) would have raised concern for the Secret Service if all the information was known, especially paired with the fact that Oswald was employed in a building overlooking the motorcade route. He noted no single factor met formal PRS referral criteria on its own, but the combination would have signaled meaningful risk. Agent Hosty testified he was aware of the pending Presidential Dallas visit, and that Dallas FBI head J. Gordon Shanklin had instructed staff twice (including a November 22 biweekly conference) to immediately notify the Secret Service in writing of any indication of planned violence or demonstrations against the President or Vice President. Hosty confirmed he transmitted two pieces of information related to the visit to the Secret Service. He stated he did not know until the evening of November 21 that a motorcade was planned, did not review detailed motorcade route reports, and never realized the route passed the Texas School Book Depository. He testified that even if he had recalled Oswald’s employment was on the route, he would not have referred Oswald, as his understanding of the instructions required evidence a person planned to take action against the President or Vice President. He judged no information in FBI files (Oswald’s defection, Fair Play for Cuba activities in New Orleans, lies to Agent Quigley, recent Mexico City trip) indicated he was capable of violence, and his initial reaction to Oswald being named a suspect in the assassination was complete shock, as he had no reason to believe Oswald could be a Presidential assassin. After Oswald’s arrest, Hosty’s superior sent him to observe Oswald’s interrogation. At Dallas police headquarters, Hosty told Dallas Police Lt. Jack Revill the FBI knew of Oswald’s Dallas presence and employment at the Depository. Revill testified Hosty also stated the FBI had information Oswald was capable of committing the assassination, and that he would share this with homicide bureau Lt. Wells; Revill made a written memo of the conversation that afternoon, which was seen by Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry and District Attorney Henry M. Wade. Hosty unequivocally denied making these statements, testifying he never indicated Oswald was capable of violence or had information suggesting this. The only other witness to the conversation, Detective V.J. Brian, did not hear Hosty make such a statement, as he was out of earshot for parts of the discussion due to commotion at headquarters. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and assistant Alan H. Belmont defended Hosty’s interpretation of referral criteria, concluding no pre-assassination FBI information indicated Oswald was a danger to the President. Hoover noted the first indication of Oswald’s capacity for violence was the shooting of General Walker, which the FBI only learned of after the assassination. Belmont emphasized the State Department had permitted Oswald’s return to the U.S., that his post-return behavior indicated he had settled down, and no pre-assassination information suggested a potential for violence, so there was no basis for a Secret Service referral. The Commission concluded the FBI took an unduly restrictive view of its preventive intelligence responsibilities: while there were no formal Secret Service criteria requiring referral of Oswald’s case, the cumulative information the FBI held (his defection, hostility to the U.S., pro-Castro activity, lies to agents, Mexico City contact with Soviet officials, employment at the Depository on the motorcade route) should have prompted an alert agency to list him as a potential Presidential threat. The Commission concluded that a more careful review of Oswald’s case by the FBI could have led to a Secret Service referral, and might have prompted additional investigation between November 5 and November 22, including more vigorous efforts to locate his Dallas roominghouse address and interview him about unresolved matters related to his Mexico City visit and false biographic information.