Automatic Data Processing
The Commission identifies the Secret Service’s obsolete manual filing system for protective intelligence data as a critical gap, noting it cannot effectively handle growing volumes of interagency information and lacks use of modern automatic data processing capabilities widely adopted in other government and private sector operations. The Department of the Treasury has requested approval to hire five staff to plan and develop an automated file and retrieval system for the PRS, plus $100,000 for a feasibility study to fund consultants, equipment leasing, or pilot system testing. The Commission recommends prompt favorable consideration of this request, and advises the Secret Service to coordinate its data processing planning closely with federal agencies it receives data from to build compatible systems. It also recommends the President order an interagency inquiry to explore opportunities for broader coordinated, mutually compatible data processing across federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, without interfering with individual agency core missions.
Protective Research Participation in Advance Arrangements
Post-assassination Secret Service procedures now require a PRS agent to accompany every advance survey team to liaise with local intelligence gathering agencies, evaluate incoming protective intelligence, and establish informal local liaison committees to coordinate all protective intelligence activities. The Secret Service has requested additional PRS personnel to make this arrangement permanent without disrupting field office operations, a change the Commission regards as a highly useful innovation and urges be continued.
Liaison With Local Law Enforcement Agencies
The Commission notes that Secret Service guidance to local police for Presidential visit protection has historically been delivered informally, and recommends the Service develop formal, standardized instructions for all levels of local authorities, including master protective plans for specific city visits and instruction booklets for patrol officers outlining expected cooperation. While the Service has raised concerns that written instructions could leak to local newspapers and compromise protective precautions, the Commission argues instructions will be shared with local police regardless of format, and lack of clear, prepared guidance creates risk of protective lapses, such as the confusion over public access to overpasses during the 1963 Dallas motorcade. The Commission notes such standardized instructions should be adapted as needed and not override professional judgment in unique circumstances.
Inspection of Buildings
Since President Kennedy’s assassination, the Secret Service has tested new techniques for inspecting buildings along Presidential motorcade routes, including identifying structures that pose elevated risk. The Commission strongly encourages these efforts to improve motorcade route protection, and recommends the Service continue to leverage personnel from other federal law enforcement agencies stationed in relevant localities to ensure adequate manpower for building inspections, noting that resource constraints are not an acceptable justification for failing to implement improved advance protective precautions in this critical area.
Secret Service Personnel and Facilities
Testimony and evidence before the Commission indicates the Secret Service is overstretched due to understaffing and inadequate modern equipment. Secret Service field agents average a caseload of 110.1, far higher than the FBI’s average of 20-25 cases per agent, and Secret Service agent salaries are lower than those of the FBI and leading municipal police forces. While Congress approved a 1964 appropriation for 25 new field office positions, the Secret Service has proposed a 20-month, $3 million plan to add 205 total agents: 17 for the PRS, 145 for field offices to handle increased security investigations and support Presidential and Vice Presidential travel protection, 18 for a rotating training pool to supplement the White House detail for unexpected needs, and 25 to provide full-time protection for the Vice President. The Commission urges the Bureau of the Budget to review this proposal with the Secret Service and support a supplemental appropriation request as soon as the plan can be fully justified.
Manpower and Technical Assistance From Other Agencies
Prior to the assassination, the Secret Service rarely requested assistance from other federal law enforcement agencies for protective duties, but post-assassination it has piloted and expanded short-term use of personnel from other agencies. In the four months after the assassination, the FBI provided 139 agents across 16 separate occasions to assist with Presidential visit protection, and other agencies contributed 9,500 hours of support between February 11 and June 30, 1964. The FBI has agreed to continue this assistance, and the Commission endorses formalizing these arrangements through formal agreements between the Secret Service and relevant federal agencies, with potential eventual codification via executive order, to allow the Secret Service to better plan long-term personnel requirements. The Commission also notes that shared protective responsibility across agencies improves security outcomes, and recommends formalizing existing permanent arrangements with the Office of Science and Technology and other federal agencies that provide scientific and technological support to the Secret Service, potentially via executive order or memoranda of understanding.
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