Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Activity Prior To and Following Assassination Attempt

Activity Prior To and Following Assassination Attempt Oswald explained his unusual Thursday night (November 21) visit to his wife by saying he had learned she and Mrs. Payne were hosting a party for neighborhood children and he preferred not to be present. The next morning he brought a sack to work containing his lunch, which he said he placed in his lap or beside him on the front seat to avoid crushing it; he denied placing any package in the back seat, suggesting the driver was mistaken or recalling a different occasion. He described being invited to lunch by a Negro employee who went down and sent the elevator back; before he could descend, the commotion of the assassination began. After a brief questioning by a policeman—during which his boss vouched for him as an employee—he walked out the front door of the building.

A.J. Hidell Identification Card

A. J. Hidell Identification Card When Captain Fritz asked if Oswald knew anyone named A. J. Hidell, he denied it and denied ever using the name as an alias, claiming he had never heard it before. Upon being presented with the actual I. D. card found in his pocket bearing the name, Oswald flared up and declared, “I’ve told you all I’m going to about that card. You took notes, just read them for yourself, if you want to refresh your memory,” adding that Holmes and Fritz already knew as much about it as he did.

Appendix XII: Speculations and Rumors

Appendix XII: Speculations and Rumors Appendix XII addresses the myths and rumors that have surrounded the assassination. Noting that misconceptions often arise from mystery and sensational speculation, the Commission acknowledged that, lacking Oswald’s testimony, it painstakingly reconstructed the facts and concluded that Oswald acted alone, without foreign or domestic conspiracy, and had no connection to Jack Ruby except as his victim. The Commission recognized that public judgment was shaped by various hypotheses and that the intense glare of worldwide publicity, combined with early press inaccuracies, local authorities’ premature disclosures, typographical errors, and faulty tape transcriptions, contributed to a substantial body of misinformation. Witness accounts varied and were often influenced by the physical and emotional strain of the events. While many speculators acted in good faith and simply lacked complete information at the time, some informants recanted earlier claims of firsthand knowledge when speaking to official investigators. The Commission undertook critical examination of these theories, rumors, claimed sightings of Oswald or Ruby, and alleged overheard remarks, as detailed throughout its report.

KAPITEL II. With the assistance of Agent in Charge Sorrels of the

Chapter II addresses widespread factual misunderstandings surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy and related events. The Commission notes that U.S. investigative agencies expended considerable effort investigating rumors and speculations reaching across the United States and to most continents. The Commission’s work was hampered by witnesses and persons who sold pictures, documents, and recollections to publishers—sometimes altering evidence—generating misleading impressions, new speculations, and rumors. This appendix presents the most widespread speculations alongside the Commission’s findings, citing relevant portions of the report and supporting evidence. The speculations are organized under ten headings covering the source of the shots, the identity of the assassin, Oswald’s movements, the murder of Patrolman Tippit, Oswald after his arrest, Oswald in the Soviet Union, Oswald’s trip to Mexico City, Oswald and U.S. Government agencies, conspiratorial relationships, and miscellaneous charges.

The Source of the Shots

The Commission examined and rejected speculations that some or all shots aimed at President Kennedy and Governor Connally came from the railroad overpass or from somewhere other than the Texas School Book Depository Building, including theories that shots came from both locations. Specific findings include: shots came from behind and above, with no evidence of shots fired from elsewhere than the Depository; the overpass was guarded by two Dallas policemen on November 22; no witnesses saw shots fired from the overpass—15 witnesses (2 policemen and 13 railroad employees) affirmed no shots came from there; no cartridge was recovered from the overpass; Mrs. Jean L. Hill’s recollection of seeing a man running west was uncorroborated; no witness supports the claim of a motorcycle officer pursuing a couple from the overpass; the weight of evidence indicates three shots were fired; metal remains indicate at least two shots; no bullet was found on President Kennedy’s stretcher (though an almost whole bullet was found on Governor Connally’s); Deputy Sheriff Walthers denied finding a bullet; the Presidential car did not stop after the first shot; the windshield was not penetrated by any bullet; the throat wound was an exit wound, not an entry wound from the front; Parkland doctors did not turn the President over and were unaware of the neck wound until later; and motion pictures demonstrate all shots striking the President came from the rear after the car turned onto Elm Street.