Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Check of Buildings Along Motorcade Route

Agent Lawson did not arrange for a prior inspection of buildings along the motorcade route, since it was not the usual practice of the Secret Service to do so. The Chief of the Service explained that, except for inaugurations and certain Washington parades, the Service has not made surveys or checks of buildings along a Presidential motorcade route because such surveys of hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows is not practical with available men and time. In Dallas, the route necessarily involved passing through the principal downtown section between tall buildings, and arrangements for building and roof security were made only at Love Field and the Trade Mart. The Commission found this justification not persuasive, noting that President Kennedy himself had mentioned the danger from a concealed sniper that morning, as had Agent Sorrels. Levels of risk can be determined, as confirmed by building surveys made since the assassination, and an attempt to cover only the most obvious points of possible ambush might well have included the Texas School Book Depository Building. The Commission further found that substitute measures, such as depending on local law enforcement personnel and on agents in the motorcade scanning buildings, were of limited value: television films showed foot patrolmen facing the passing motorcade rather than adjacent crowds and buildings, and the three officers assigned to the intersection of Elm and Houston were focused on traffic and crowd control. Captain Lawrence did not instruct his men to watch buildings. Agents Sorrels, Lawson, and Kellerman, riding in or near the lead car, had limited opportunities to scan nearby buildings, and the Commission concluded that agents in the followup car, who must concentrate on crowd threats, do not provide a significant safeguard against dangers in nearby buildings.

Conduct of Secret Service Agents in Fort Worth on November 22

In the early morning hours of November 22, 1963, in Fort Worth, a breach of discipline occurred among Secret Service agents officially traveling with the President. After the President retired at his hotel, nine off-duty agents went to the nearby Fort Worth Press Club at midnight or slightly thereafter seeking food. Finding no food, all stayed for a drink of beer or, in several cases, a mixed drink; according to affidavits, no one consumed more than three glasses of beer or 1½ mixed drinks, and no agent was inebriated or acted improperly. They remained from 30 minutes to an hour and a half, and the last left by 2 a.m. Two agents returned to their rooms, while the other seven went to the Cellar Coffee House, where no intoxicating drinks were consumed. During the night, three members of the midnight-to-8 a.m. White House detail shift also visited the Cellar during their half-hour relief breaks, but none had any beverage there. The agents involved had duty assignments beginning no later than 8 a.m., and several had key responsibilities in Dallas, including assignments at Love Field, the Trade Mart, and the followup car. Chief Rowley testified he was satisfied that each agent reported for duty on time, with full possession of his mental and physical capabilities, and that their conduct did not impede their actions or prevent them from taking any action that might have averted the tragedy. However, Chief Rowley did not condone the action, since it violated a Secret Service regulation prohibiting the use of intoxicating liquor of any kind, including beer and wine, by members of the White House Detail and special agents cooperating with them on Presidential protective assignments while in travel status.

KAPITEL II. With the assistance of Agent in Charge Sorrels of the

This chapter addresses Secret Service conduct regulations and the protective arrangements surrounding President Kennedy’s trip to Dallas. It opens by discussing the regulation absolutely forbidding drinking by any agent accompanying the President on a trip and notes that violation provides cause for removal from the Service. Chief Rowley declined to take disciplinary action against agents who had been drinking in violation of the regulation because he believed it would unfairly imply that the violation had contributed to the tragedy of November 22. The Commission acknowledges the arduous responsibilities of the White House detail, the long hours and strain they endure, and the need for high standards of personal conduct. While it is conceivable that agents with little sleep and limited alcohol might have been more alert on the Dallas motorcade had they retired promptly in Fort Worth, the Commission finds no evidence that any agent failed to take action within his power that would have averted the tragedy. The chapter then turns to a detailed examination of the security arrangements at Love Field, the motorcade route, the Presidential limousine, access to the passenger compartment, planning for motorcade contingencies, and broader issues of Federal jurisdiction, interagency cooperation, and the historical basis of the Secret Service’s protective mandate.