The Motorcade in Dallas
Rigorous security precautions were arranged at Love Field with local law enforcement authorities by Agents Sorrels and Lawson, including reserving a ceremonial area for the Presidential party, stationing police on the rooftops of buildings overlooking the reception area, and detailing police in civilian clothes throughout the sizable crowd. When President and Mrs. Kennedy shook hands with members of the public along the fences, they were closely guarded by Secret Service agents who responded to the unplanned event with dispatch. During the motorcade, the President directed that his car stop on two occasions so that he could greet members of the public; agents from the Presidential follow-up car stood between the President and the public, and on one occasion Agent Kellerman left the front seat to take a similar position. The Commission regards such impromptu stops as presenting an unnecessary danger but finds that Secret Service agents did all that could have been done to take protective measures.
The Presidential Limousine
The limousine used by President Kennedy in Dallas was a convertible with a detachable, rigid plastic “bubble” top that was neither bulletproof nor bullet resistant. The last Presidential vehicle with any protection against small-arms fire had left the White House in 1953, and it was not replaced because the state of the art did not permit development of a bulletproof top of sufficiently light weight to permit removal when the President wished to ride in an open car. The Secret Service believed it doubtful that any President would ride regularly in a vehicle with a fixed top, even though transparent. Since the assassination, the Secret Service, with the assistance of other Federal agencies and private industry, has developed a vehicle for the better protection of the President.
Access to Passenger Compartment of Presidential Car
On occasion the Secret Service has been permitted to have an agent riding in the passenger compartment with the President, but Presidents have made it clear they did not favor any arrangement that interferes with their privacy; the Secret Service has therefore suggested this practice only on extraordinary occasions. The Presidential vehicle in use in Dallas had no special design or equipment permitting the Secret Service agent in the driver’s compartment to move into the passenger section without hindrance or delay; a metal bar some 15 inches above the back of the front seat and passengers in the jump seats interfered with such access. In contrast, the Vice Presidential vehicle, although not specially designed for that purpose, had no passenger in a jump seat between Agent Youngblood and Vice President Johnson to interfere with Youngblood’s ability to take a protective position before the third shot was fired. The assassination suggests it would have been of prime importance for the Presidential car to permit immediate access to the President by a Secret Service agent at the first sign of danger. Analysis of the Zapruder film reveals that Agent Clinton J. Hill first placed his hand on the Presidential car at frame 343, approximately 1.6 seconds after the President was shot in the head, and had both feet on the car about 3.7 seconds after the fatal wound.
Planning for Motorcade Contingencies
The Secret Service informed the Commission that it consistently follows two general principles in emergencies involving the President: agents in the motorcade must attempt to cover the President as closely as possible and shield him, and agents must remove the President as quickly as possible from known or impending danger. Agents are instructed not to investigate or evaluate present danger but to consider any untoward circumstances as serious and afford maximum protection at all times; their primary responsibility is to stay with and protect the President, not to identify or arrest an attacker. Beyond these principles, the Secret Service believes detailed contingency planning is not feasible due to the variations possible, though various steps are taken to permit appropriate responses, including manning the lead car with agents familiar with the area and local law enforcement, maintaining an elaborate radio net, and including a doctor in the motorcade. The Commission finds this basic approach sound, as detailed contingency plans might inhibit quick and imaginative responses. It also finds that the Secret Service agents immediately responsible for the President’s safety reacted promptly at the time the shots were fired, demonstrating the courage and devotion to duty the Nation can expect from agents of the Secret Service.
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