Secret Service Intelligence Requests to Federal Agencies
The Secret Service’s requests to other federal agencies for intelligence information were as broad and unspecific as its internal instructions to its own agents and the White House mailroom. The head of PRS testified that the Service asked other agencies to provide “any and all information that they may come in contact with that would indicate danger to the President.” These requests were not made in writing; instead, the Service relied on personal liaison maintained by PRS with the headquarters of federal intelligence agencies—particularly the FBI—and at the working level with personnel of various field offices. The Secret Service also participated in training programs of other law enforcement agencies, with agents from those agencies attending regular Secret Service training schools, where presidential protection was a major topic.
FBI Presidential Threat Reporting Protocol
In the absence of more specific instructions from the Secret Service, other federal agencies interpreted the informal requests as relating principally to overt threats or specific manifestations of hostility toward the President. The FBI Handbook in effect at the time of the assassination, carried by every special agent, specified that investigation of threats against the President, immediate family, President-Elect, and Vice-President fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Secret Service. The Handbook required agents to refer any such information immediately by the most expeditious means of communication to the nearest Secret Service office, to advise the Bureau by teletype, and to refrain from evaluating the information. Written threats required a copy to be given to local Secret Service with the original forwarded to the Bureau for Secret Service headquarters.
Federal Agency Threat Reporting to the Secret Service
The State Department advised the Secret Service of all crank and threat letter mail, crank visitors, and reports concerning any assassination or attempted assassination of a foreign ruler or major official. Several military intelligence agencies reported crank mail and similar threats involving the President. According to Special Agent in Charge Bouck, the Secret Service had no standard procedure for the systematic review of its requests for, and receipt of, information from other federal agencies.
Inadequacy of Secret Service Protective Research Procedures
The Commission concluded that the facilities and procedures of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service prior to November 22, 1963, were inadequate. PRS’s efforts were too largely directed at the “crank” threat. Although the Service recognized that advance preventive measures must encompass more than obvious dangers, it made little effort to identify factors in the activities of an individual or organized group—other than specific threats—suggesting a source of danger against which timely precautions could be taken. Except for its special “trip index” file of 400 names, no cases in the PRS general files were available for systematic review on a geographic basis when the President planned a particular trip.
PRS Failure to Address Dallas Pre-Visit Hostility
When the special file was reviewed on November 8, it contained no names of persons from the entire Dallas-Fort Worth area, despite Ambassador Stevenson having been abused by pickets in Dallas less than a month before. Bouck explained the failure to investigate the Stevenson incident on the ground that PRS required a more direct indication of a threat to the President, which did not exist until the President’s scheduled Dallas visit became known. The Commission found that this approach seriously undermined the precautionary nature of PRS work, since the presence of the Stevenson pickets might have created a danger for the President on any Dallas visit, and PRS should have investigated and been prepared to guard against it.
Limitations of Vague Secret Service Intelligence Requests
Other agencies occasionally provided information to the Secret Service about potentially dangerous political groups—e.g., the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico—but only after members had resorted to political violence. The vague requests made by the Secret Service to federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies were not well designed to elicit information about persons other than obvious threats. The requests shifted responsibility for evaluating difficult cases from the Service—the agency most responsible for performing that task—to other agencies, with no specific guidance provided. Although the CIA had on file Treasury Department requests for information on counterfeiting and certain smuggling matters, it had no written specification of what foreign intelligence information the Secret Service desired in advance of Presidential trips outside the United States.
The original text of this work is in the public domain. This page focuses on a guided summary article, reading notes, selected quotes, and visual learning materials for educational purposes.