Recommendations for Improved Interagency Coordination
Pending any determination on long-range reorganization, the Commission is convinced of the necessity for better coordination and direction of all government agencies furnishing information and services related to presidential security. The Commission believes the Secret Service, FBI, State Department, and CIA—when the President travels abroad—could improve their existing capacities and procedures to lessen the chances of assassination. Without reaching final conclusions on long-range organization, the Commission identifies specific measures flowing from the assassination facts that can and should be recommended.
General Supervision of the Secret Service
The intimacy of the Secret Service’s relationship to the White House and the dissimilarity of its protective functions to most Treasury Department activities have made close and continuing supervision difficult. The Commission believes the recommended Cabinet-level committee will help correct major deficiencies of supervision, but other measures are also needed to improve overall operation.
Recommendation for Dedicated Secret Service Supervisory Role
Daily supervision of Secret Service operations within Treasury should be improved. The Chief of the Service currently reports to the Secretary through an Assistant Secretary whose duties also include direct supervision of the Bureau of the Mint and the Department’s Employment Policy Program, and who has no technical qualifications in presidential protection. The Commission recommends that the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a special assistant responsible for supervising the Service. This assistant should have sufficient stature and experience in law enforcement, intelligence, or allied fields to provide effective continuing supervision and keep the Secretary fully informed on all significant developments relating to presidential protection.
Recommendations for Secret Service Procedural Overhaul
Actions by the Secret Service since the assassination indicate awareness of the need for substantial administrative improvement. A formal description of the advance agent’s responsibilities is in preparation, and work is progressing toward formal understandings of the respective roles of the Secret Service and collaborating agencies. The Commission urges the Service to continue overhauling and defining its procedures, noting that while manuals are no guarantee of effective operations, no sizable organization can achieve efficiency without careful analysis and demarcation of responsibility reflected in definite and comprehensive operating procedures.
Standards for Secret Service Personnel
The Commission recommends that the Secret Service consciously maintain the highest standard of excellence and esprit for all personnel. This requires tight and unswerving discipline and promotion of outstanding dedication and loyalty to duty. While the Commission finds no causal connection between the assassination and the breach of regulations on the night of November 21 at Fort Worth, such widespread participation is inconsistent with the standards the Secret Service is required to meet.
Preventive Intelligence
In attempting to identify individuals who might pose a danger to the President, the Secret Service has largely been the passive recipient of threatening communications and reports from other agencies that independently evaluate their information for potential dangers. This resulted from the Service’s lack of an adequate investigative staff, inability to process large amounts of data, and failure to provide specific descriptions of the kind of information it sought.
Issues with Secret Service’s Passive Intelligence Role
The Secret Service’s passive intelligence role was the consequence of inadequate investigative staffing, inability to process large data volumes, and failure to articulate clear information requirements. Both the Secret Service and FBI have recognized that PRS files can no longer be limited largely to persons communicating actual threats to the President. New FBI instructions issued on December 26, 1963 require agents to report immediately information concerning subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists meeting specified criteria regarding emotional instability, threats, anti-U.S. sentiments, or violent tendencies. The volume of referrals increased substantially after these instructions took effect, with more than 5,000 names referred in the first four months of 1964 and approximately 9,000 Communist Party member reports received by mid-June 1964. The FBI now transmits information on all defectors—a category that would have included Oswald. However, both Hoover and Belmont expressed concern that improper handling of referrals could result in interference with personal liberty.
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